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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is based on the assumption that reasoning functions in its context. The 
locus of this context is the subject-in-act. The subject-in-act observes, wonders, 
asks questions, judges and makes justifications. In the functioning of reasoning, 
she uses the basic set of these cognitional operations rather than pure logical form 
or the empirical content alone to reach conclusions. Our contention is that logic 
cannot function on its own without the subject-in-act. Hitherto, efforts have been 
made to show that any knowledge system is based on either purely axiomatic and 
mathematical formulations or deductive tautologies and inductive reasoning or 
empirical convictions based on probability. The thesis attempts to argue that 
reasoning is not possible without the interventions of the set of cognitional 
operations. In the thesis we take as an example the early Wittgenstein's attempt to 
give a foundation for our knowing or the identity of what can be known, using 
atomic or elementary propositions. Wittgenstein' s own later repudiation of this 
introduces the idea that logic, and language are relative to social context. In 
Wittgenstein's second phase, we focus on the analysis of understanding in terms of 
"following a rule." This idea is later taken up by Winch in relation to his point of 
inter-cultural learning but he does not give us the method of how to achieve that 
learning. Lonergan introduces the idea of "self-appropriation" which we interpret 
by the idea of the "subject-in-act." It is this subject-in-act that forms a foundation 
for all possible understanding, explaining and knowing. Barden picks up from 
Winch and addresses precisely the issue of traditions and cultural differences. We 
want to argue that traditions and context are imponant ~in a. sense that they serve as 
'. , . . ~ . 
a starting point in our search for knowledge but in themselves, are not ultimately 
foundational. What is ultimately foundational is not a set of propositions, or rules 
to be followed, or social practice, but the subject-in-act. 
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This thesis presents an argument that formal logic or any other system of knowledge 
is not ultimately foundational for understanding or knowing reality in all aspects. 
Instead, it is the subject-in-act who is ultimately foundational. Our argument is 
conducted in six chapters. The first one is the general introduction in which we give 
the major problem of the thesis that provoked and motivated us to carry out this 
research. In this chapter, we also give the major assumption, which underlies the 
entire thesis. It is this assumption that we set out to investigate and which reflects the 
objective of our investigation This major assumption, we hope, contains the solution 
or the answer to our major problem It is in this chapter still that we shall give the 
scope of our investigations, reflecting the main references consulted during the study. 
This is done, unlike in the bibliography where all the references are given irrespective 
of the chapters concerned, to provide an on-the-spot check for the main references 
used for each specific chapter. In order to provide proper focus to the whole thesis, we 
shall provide a chapter-by-chapter resUlll6. 
1.1 Major Problem 
The problem that this thesis sets out to investigate begins with Wittgenstein's attempt 
to develop a perfect formal system of logic that would reflect reality in all 
departments of knowing. But, as we know, formal logic has the problem of being 
suppositional or hypothetical and excessively structural. Logical structures tend to 
reflect symbolic form but no content. These structures or foI'Im operate on rules and 
laws of logic. Propositions are expressed in symbols, which are variables and 
constants. The whole enterprise is taken as being self-sufficient. This situation 
becomes problematic because forrnallogic tends to disregard the architect - subject-
in-act - who is the agent behind the symbols, the structures, the rules and the laws of 
logic. 
Formal logic fails to show clearly the link between the formal operations of 
logic and epistemology. Because of this shortcoming, the purity oflogic can no longer 
be taken for granted. In the context of thinking systematically, arguing rationally and 
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reasoning correctly, there should be a clear link between logic and epistemology and 
this link should be the agent - subject-in-act - who operates in both logic and 
epistemology. This link should take into account the social contexts and their 
underlying values. This endeavour requires the active involvement of the subject-in-
act that needs first to appreciate her capacity to observe, theorise and judge the 
accuracy of her understanding. We need to point out that formal logical techniques are 
simply a help in this process but not ultimately foundational in themselves. So the 
problem, which we are investigating, is the neglect or total lack of the architect of 
logic or systems or contexts or traditions - the subject-in-act - in the functioning of 
logic and epistemology within the scope of a multi-cultural context. 
Concretely the problem that this thesis is set to investigate is lack of a 
foundation for knowing that is ultimately basic. That is a foundation which can lead 
us to knowledge in all its departments. These departments include logic in all its 
entirety, science in all its entirety, non-science in all its entirety and all traditions 
irrespective of whether they are African, European, Oriental or any other. 
1.2 Major Assumption 
After identifying our problem as being lack of an ultimate foundation to knowing 
reality in all its departments, we proceed to identify a solution in our major 
assumption The assumption, which is serving as our guide to the entire thesis, is that 
we cannot find a foundation that is ultimately basic to knowing in all respects in the 
existing schools of thought, as we shall illustrate in the chapter resume. That is we 
cannot find the solution, for example, in naIve realism per se. The same can be said 
for rationalism and empiricism The main reason being that they are not 
comprehensive enough, as the thesis shall illustrate, to encompass all knowing in its 
entirety. Our guiding assumption, therefore, is that the fOWldation that is ultimately 
basic can be fOWld in the architect of all these schools of thought and that architect is 
the subject-in-act. 
As an example we take formal logic in which form and content have been 
regarded as two separate entities. On top of that formal logic has been regarded as 
ultimately basic or fOWldational for the understanding, explaining and knowing reality 
in all its aspects. Our view is that formal logic on its own is not ultimately basic or 
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foundational. If that were the case, it would presuppose a set of propositions as 
ultimately basic to reasoning. This presupposition, however, would be difficult to 
justify, because cultures might differ as to what would be taken as ultimately basic 
propositions. This difference might inevitably lead to cultural relativism However, 
we notice the prevalence of multi-cultural wisdom where one culture benefits from 
the precepts of another culture and vice versa This fact proves that cultural relativism 
does not always apply. 
For the purposes of this thesis, our stand therefore, is that formal logic - like 
any other mode of reasoning or any other field of learning that would lead to the 
understanding, explaining and knowing reality in all its aspects in any system, or 
tradition - has to be placed in its context, that is the subject-in-act. It is the subject-in-
act who is ultimately basic or foundational for understanding, explaining and knowing 
reality in all senses; but not the set of propositions as it is presupposed in formal logic. 
Neither is it any method or system or tradition but the set of operations performed by 
the subject-in-act, who is wondering, asking questions and critical of suggested 
interpretations. It is the subject-in-act, therefore, engaged in the practical act of 
reasoning, who underlies all logic, all systems and all traditions in their respective set-
ups. 
1.3 Literature Ovemew 
1.3.1 Atomic Propositions and Language-games: W'lItgenstein 
In this chapter we would like to examine - in relation to Wittgenstein - the argument 
that the place of logic - formal logic - in the expression of the basic structures of 
reality should be replaced by the necessary operations of the subject by which we 
uncover the truth of things and facts. We contend that the subject, in the sense which 
we will explain more fully in Chapter Three, should be ultimately basic or 
foundational in leading to the understanding and explanation of reality around us in 
all its forms. However we do not imply that the subject-in-act can decisively acquire 
all knowing or all understanding or can explain "all reality" in one's lifetime. This 
may turn out to be an impossible epistemological mission to pursue. But definitely the 
subject-in-act, and this is the sense in which, at times, we are using the expressions 
"all knowing", "all understanding" and "all explaining", can lead us to all knowing 
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and all understanding. It can also lead us to the explaining of reality in all its 
manifestations. 
In our analysis we shall begin with Wittgenstein's ideas to help us discuss this. 
In doing so we shall examine SOIre of his early thoughts in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1974) and some of his later thoughts in the Philosophical 
Investigations (1997). 
Our choice of these two books does not in any way show that the ideas 
reflected in them are conclusive about Wittgenstein's thinking. We select them 
because they adequately reflect our thinking about Wittgenstein' s mistaken view 
about the subject as a knower. This fact will be explained in our discussions in 
Chapter Two. 
We shall show that the subject-less approach in the picture theory, as it is put 
in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not work and the same is the case in 
following a rule in the language-game approach as it is put in the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
Below is an overview of the main references for the chapters as they appear in 
the thesis. Together with the other references, they are to be elaborated on and their 
relevance justified later, in the respective chapters. 
Stroll and Popkin in their book, Introduction to Philosophy (1979), introduce 
Wittgenstein as one of the thinkers in the contemporary period. They present the 
views of the early Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, and the later Wittgenstein, in the 
Philosophical Investigations. They help us to show that in his early thought 
Wittgenstein attempted to solve the problems of philosophy through an ideal 
language, formal logic. This language would help to picture reality in all c~es, as he 
understood it. When this endeavour failed, he switched to following a rule in the 
language-games. Stroll and Popkin provide the background for us to show that 
Wittgenstein, in his early thought was not right to assign the subject a metaphysical 
position with no functional role to play in the knowable world. They also help us to 
show that even in his later thought in the Philosophical Investigations, the role of the 
subject does not come out clearly. 
While Stroll and Popkin give us the picture of Wittgenstein's thoughts in the 
contemporary period, Hudson in his book, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1968), gives us a 
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general overview of what Wittgenstein meant both in his early and later thoughts. 
Hudson helps us with the clarification and explanation of Wittgenstein's ideas. He 
gives us Wittgenstein's objectives in constructing both the picture theory and the 
language-game theory. By understanding his thoughts, we are put in position to 
appreciate Wittgenstein's thinking and therefore point out the consequences of 
omitting a functional subject in his ideas. 
Fogelin, on the other hand, in his book, Wittgenstein (1976), concentrates on 
criticising Wittgenstein. He does not agree with Wittgenstein's atomic theory. He is of 
the view that reality, in Wittgenstein's sense, could not be pictured through 
elementary propositions. When it comes to the notion of following a rule, Fogelin 
interprets Wittgenstein's idea of following the rule blindly as actual blind following. 
For us we argue that Wittgenstein's early and later thoughts do make specific 
contributions to knowing. The aspect of formal logic and that of following a rule in 
the language-game, each has its place in the process of knowing. Wittgenstein 
deserves credit in that respect. However, our problem with him is the neglecting of the 
subject who would otherwise playa comprehensive role both in formal logic and the 
language-games. 
Van Peursen, in Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969), makes a comprehensive analysis 
of Wittgenstein's early and later thoughts. His analysis of Wittgenstein is thematic. 
For instance he categorises the themes into the "logic of speech", the "metaphysics of 
silence", and "showing and saying". Thereafter, he analysis these themes, showing the 
weaknesses in them We are in consonance with this approach because it helps to 
show that unless the subject is given an active role in the process of knowing, 
knowing cannot be comprehensive. Our view is that the process of knowing cannot 
begin and end in formal logic, or the language-games or any other method. The 
subject-based set of operations should be actively involved in all these approaches. In 
order to bring out this point clearly, we are assisted by Meynell in his article 
''Transcendental Psychology" (1980). He argues that objective reality can be reached 
through particular subjective realities. This is achieved through the set of operations. 
That is our point precisely. Through the set of operations, we can endeavour to reach 
all reality. 
Taylor, in the Philosophical Arguments (1997), introduces another scenario of 
following a rule. He helps us to bring out the disagreement between Wittgenstein's 
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notion of following a rule in social use and the intellectualist notion of knowing 
through explanation. Wittgenstein feels that explanations can be endless. Knowing, 
according to Wittgenstein, is a consequence of following what everyone else is 
following. While we agree that this is possible, in certain instances explanations are 
necessary. We propose the means through which this endeavour can be achieved, and 
that is engaging the active set of operations, or the subject-in-act. It is the subject-in-
act to judge when to use explanations in order to attain knowledge, or to follow the 
rule in common use. 
Wittgenstein, both in the Tractatus and in the Philosophirol Investigations, 
leaves us with the problem of the lack of a foundation that would lead us to knowing 
reality in all its manifestations. We find this foundation in Lonergan' s idea of self-
appropriation. Below is an overview of the references that help us to argue out this 
case. 
1.3.1 The Subject as Foundational to Knowing Reality in all its IIUlnifestations: 
Lonergan 
The justification for Lonergan's views in this thesis is that he is concerned with 
providing a foundation for philosophy. This foundation is to be found in the idea of 
the subject. In his book, Insight (I 957), he introduces us to the idea of self-
appropriation. This idea stipulates that an attempt towards knowing reality in its final 
analysis should begin with conscious self-knowing. 
Cronin, in his book, Foundations of Philosophy: Lonergan's Cognitional 
Theory and Epistemology (1999), helps to focus Lonergan's ideas sharply. He 
emphasises the concern of the lack of a foundation in philosophy. He makes a 
comprehensive exposition of the different attempts made at different times in the 
history of philosophy in order to establish a foundation in philosophy, to the extent 
that none of them turned out to be comprehensive enough to provide a foundation. He 
explains and elaborates on Lonergan's idea of self-appropriation, through his own 
idea of interiority in a manner that helps to put across our views about a foundation. 
We express and argue out this case of a foundation through the idea of the 
basic pattern of operations. Lonergan helps us to put across our argument through his 
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book, Method in theology (1975). In this book we concentrate on Chapter One, in 
which he gives us a complete breakdown of this set of operations. 
We apply also Shutte' s ideas in his article, "Aristotle and the Aristotelian 
Tradition" [nd]. Shutte is of the view that Lonergan goes a long way to fill the gap 
that was left by Aristotle concerning the knowing subject. He exposes the 
complexities involved in the process of knowing and points out that Lonergan's 
approach of self-appropriation takes care of all these complexities. This is a position 
which we entirely agree with. 
We draw from the assistance of Giddy, in his article ''The African University 
and the Social Sciences: the Contribution of Lonergan' s EpisteIIX>logical Theory" 
(1996). He exposes Lonergan's approach as integrative and comprehensive. He is 
against the idea of the dualism of the self He rather argues for the approach of 
heightening the presence to self This position rhymes well with Lonergan' s idea of 
self-appropriation. This is the method which projects the subject in a comprehensive 
manner, who approaches the process of knowing more comprehensively. 
Lonergan helps us to establish a method which is ultimately foundational for 
knowing in all respects. Winch, on the other hand, comes up with the idea of inter-
cultural learning. By discussing Winch' s views we corre to realise that without a 
comprehensive method, the idea of inter-cultural learning is next to impossible. 
Below we present an overview of the main references for Chapter Four. 
1.3.3 Inter-Cultural AppTOtlch: Winch 
In Chapter Four, we shall use Winch' s book Ethics and Society (1972), relying 
heavily on his Chapter Two, "Understanding a Primitive Society." We are using this 
chapter because it suggests a multicultural approach in the understanding of behaviour 
in different societies. It presents two societies, one of the "primitive" Azande and the 
other of the scientific Europeans. These two societies, because of their different 
modes of life, seem to be incompatible. Winch suggests that one group or society can 
understand what is taking place in the other group or society. But Winch does not give 
us a method of how this can be done, something which Barden succeeds in doing in 
Chapter Five, in the idea of the basic pattern of operations. To help us argue our case 
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in this chapter we use some of the ideas in the references below. Justification for 
using these references appears later in Chapter Four. 
We get introduced to Winch' s idea of the multicultural context through 
Barden's book, After Principles (1990). He presents two contexts, namely the Azande 
who attempt to answer questions through witchcraft and the European context which 
attempts to answer questions through science. 
MacIntyre, in his article, "The Idea of a Social Science" (1974), finds 
problems with Winch' s thinking. MacIntyre finds it difficult to learn from the Azande 
outside his own norms of rationality. Macintyre seems to emphasise our point that in 
order for inter-cultural learning to take place there must be a method that 15 
comprehensive enough to cater for the two seemingly different contexts. 
Horton, in his article, ''Professor Winch on Safari" (1994), also finds problems 
with Winch's idea of a member from the European culture learning form the Azande 
using the Azande's means of knowing. He does not see how a member of the 
scientific culture with the backgrOlDld of the scientific approach can learn from 
another culture which uses the witchcraft approach. Someone who helps us to get out 
of this quagmire is Barden. Barden following Lonergan introduces the idea of the 
basic set of operations. It is through this set that inter-cultural learning can be made 
possible. 
1.3.4 Found.ationfoT Knowing: Barden 
In Chapter Five our basic text is Barden' s book After Principles (1990). We must say 
that he mainly focuses on ethics. But as we know, ethics is a context like any other, 
such as formal logic, mathematics, and science, to mention a few. In Chapter Three, 
we do argue that our method, the transcendental method - idea of subject-in-act -
does fit all contexts. In Chapter Five we use Barden' s ideas, because he helps us to 
actualise the transcendental method. Though he is mainly addressing ethical issues, 
for us we are taking ethics as a case in point or as mentioned, a context like any other. 
He presents the case for the operations of the subject in a manner that solves the 
problem of the foundation to knowing, which is our concern in this thesis. 
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1.3.5 Further Application of Barden 
In Chapter Six, which is the general conclusion, we extend the application of Barden 
to inter-cultural learning to other contexts including the African contexts. To help us 
argue out these cases, our main references include Cronin (1999). He helps us to set 
out frameworks for inter-cultural learning. These are the common sense, the theory 
and the interiority frameworks. For the common sense framework we draw heavily on 
Cisternino's book, The Proverbs of Kigezi and Ankole (1987). He presents the 
pedagogical power in the genre of Bantu proverbs. However he lacks a method that 
can draw people from different contexts to learn from this genre. The wisdom in this 
genre remains concealed due to lack of a method to help in exposing it to people from 
different contexts. 
Mbiti, in his book, African Religions and Philosophy (1969), helps us to 
emphasise Cronin's point concerning compactness, lack of differentiation and 
definition, a notion that characterises the common sense framework. This is seen in 
Mbiti's notion of the religious consciousness and the concept of time in the common 
sense framework. 
We draw heavily also from Masolo in his book, African Philosophy in Search 
of Identity (1994). Masolo presents views from different African philosophers. These 
include, Hountondj~ Wiredu, and Odera Oruka, among others. In Chapter Six, views 
from these references will help us to show how the subject-in-act is ultimately 
foundational to all other approaches and how this approach can facilitate inter-cultural 
learning. 
1.4 Foundation for a Multicultural Context: Chapter Resume 
1.4.1 From Formal Logic to Language-Games: W'lttgenstein 
Chapter Two presents a resume of some of Wittgenstein' s thoughts in the Tractatus. 
These thoughts are presented in atomic or elementary propositions. We present a brief 
summary of what we shall find in this resume. Wittgenstein, in his early thought, is 
preoccupied with the idea of finding a pure language. He identifies this language in 
the atomic or elementary propositions. He constructs these propositions in logical 
form and uses logical symbols and connectives to express them In his thinking, that 
forms the language that would lead to all knowing. Atomic propositions picture the 
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world. This world is made of states of affairs that expr-ess facts. These facts in the end 
are captured in pictorial form which is a structure of symbols and propositional signs. 
This forms a logical space into which objects are assimilated. In the logical space the 
picture and what is pictured form a determinate relationship making a correlation 
between the picture and what is pictured in the pictorial or propositional form. That is 
how reality is depicted by the picture whose form it has. Reality is not haphazard. A 
picture agrees or disagrees with reality. It is because of this that truth or falsity, 
correctness or incorrectness is determined. A logical picture is a thought. Here logic, 
picture and thought are combined. A fact or state of affairs becomes thinkable. In a 
valid argument the truth of a conclusion follows from the truth of the premises. Logic 
is capable of looking after itself Therefore in a certain sense we cannot make a 
mistake in logic. However there is no such thing as a subject that thinks or entertains 
ideas. It is only the atomic propositions that reflect all reality about the world. So 
logic is not a doctrine but a mirror image of the world. It transcends the world (2.1.3). 
In this exposition a complete scenario is presented by moving from objects to 
things to states of affairs or facts to pictorial form to thought and finally to deductive 
reasoning. Though the idea of thought is introduced the functional role of the subject 
is not clear. He presents his ideas in a numbered style, hence our quoting from him 
extensively (2.2.1-2.2.2). 
Hudson picks up from here and helps us to clarify Wittgenstein's early 
thoughts. He interprets Wittgenstein as working out the logic of the view that the 
meaning of language is its referent. Or that language is truth functional. In this case 
"referent" means the object to which language refers. An object can be identified 
either verbally by definition or by pointing. Wittgenstein is trying to establish how the 
world or all reality in his sense can be known through pure logical language. So he 
talks of the logical simples that he matches with objects. From this initial stage he 
moves to language and reality. Knowing involves meaning. Meaning must satisfy two 
criteria That is, there must be an object or referent to which meaning refers. Secondly 
meaning must be determinate. A proposition must have only one meaning. From 
meaning, inferences concerning both language and the world can be drawn. Hudson 
clarifies the composition of an atomic proposition It consists of a nexus of names that 
are simple signs. Names do not describe but denote or designate referents. In that case 








these names must be meaningful. In that case it is the atomic proposition which is 
ultimately basic. It, therefore, projects a logical world. That is how logic relates to 
language and that is how an atomic proposition projects the world. 
Another aspect which Hudson helps to clarify is how Wittgenstein interprets 
the world, and how we get to know of it. The world comprises simple objects and in 
knowing them there are no descriptions involved but simple naming. Descriptions are 
indeterminate but names are precise and determinate. Language reduces to names; 
names form atomic propositions; atomic propositions form facts and facts form the 
logical world. This logical world is pictured in the atomic propositions, hence the 
picture theory. Atomic propositions have sense while words have referents and the 
two are linked together by meaning. 
How do variables and constants relate in the logical world? Names and 
referents constitute the variables while logical connectives constitute the constants. 
Names name objects or referents while logical connectives do not (2.2.3). 
In Chapter Two we shall develop an elaborate discussion of how we get to 
know, in Wittgenstein's sense, by moving from simples to atomic propositions giving 
us the logical picture of reality. Hudson's clarification is necessary at this juncture 
because, before we introduce our own approach to knowing, it is necessary to 
understand Wittgenstein's thinking about a pure logical language representing the 
world. That is what Hudson helps to show. 
In what is to follow we shall show how a logical language, on its own, without 
the cognitional operations would not necessarily picture all reality. We shall show that 
the cognitional operations of the subject or the subject-in-act are a necessary factor 
not only in Wittgenstein's logical world but also in all possible worlds. Wittgenstein 
does not teU us the architect of the states of affairs. So we find it a problem to 
understand how the states of affairs can be organised and configured into facts. This 
process is not possible using the rules of logic alone. Or can reality be explained 
through cause and effect, as social and natural science require? But how would they 
be interpreted without the cognitional operations of the subject? We argue that 
Wittgenstein's picture theory only succeeds in starting us on the philosophical 
method. But by failing to give the subject a functional role to play in the logical world 
he does not complete this process (2.2.4). 
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We proceed to examine what went wrong in Wittgenstein's early thoughts. All 
misunderstandings in philosophy could be wiped out if facts were expressed in atomic 
propositions. Atomic propositions would eliminate the problems of ambiguity. This is 
because atomic facts have one and only one possible meaning. While this may be true, 
we argue that there is need for criterion to determine the presence or absence of 
ambiguity. Secondly, there is a problem of circumstances and conditions. An atomic 
proposition could mean one thing under certain conditions and circumstances and 
mean completely a different thing when these circumstances and conditions change. 
Again there is need for criteria to determine truth in these changes. We argue that 
these criteria are the cognitional operations of the subject (2.2.5). 
We point out that Wittgenstein, in his attempt to create a pure universal 
language, takes logical empiricism to its logical conclusion. That is logic having no 
subject matter. He is of the view that objective truth could be reached through logical 
calculus. Logical calculus could describe the world fully. While this may be the case, 
we argue that it would not be correct to try and separate logic from semantics in order 
to create one ideal language, formal logic. We argue that this is not possible because 
pure logic or formal logic tends to lead to generalised knowledge while semantics 
lead us to particularities. In our case knowing involves both general and particular 
truths. These truths are established by the cognitional operations of the subject 
(2.2.5.2). 
Wittgenstein creates a problem when he attempts to isolate the set of 
cognitional operations from their context. At one time he talks of clarity of thought 
and at another time he talks of there being no such thing as a thinking subject. Here 
the operation of thinking is being removed from its context, the SUbject. This is a 
contradiction because it is impossible to have clarity of thought in a vacuum We 
argue that thinking takes place in the subject. Therefore the subject is not only 
metaphysical but also functional in the activity of knowing (2.2.5.3). 
We discuss the relevance of Wittgenstein's ideas on the operations of the 
subject. Wittgenstein's idea of the picture theOlY or the subject-less formal logic 
actually fails. Logical symbolism and language do not necessarily agree. Therefore 
logical symbols separated from content continue to express generality at the expense 
of particularity. This does not necessarily reflect all reality. Logic is not capable of 
looking after itself without the cognitional operations of the subject. Picturing reality 
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alone is not enough, there is need to involve more than one sense in the activity of 
knowing. We do not agree with Wittgenstein that there is no such thing as the subject 
that thinks. Thinking is an operation that is necessary in the activity of knowing. So in 
the early Wittgenstein, we say that it was a serious mistake for Wittgenstein to regard 
the subject as a metaphysical being with no functional role in the knowable world 
(2.2.6). 
Wittgenstein, in his later thought, abandons the idea of forma1logic as a pure 
language that would serve as foundation for knowing and instead places language in a 
social context. In this respect, we discuss the idea of knowing through following a 
rule in the language-game. Even here it is Hudson who helps us to clarify 
Wittgenstein' s thoughts. Wittgenstein begins by exposing the defects in his early 
thoughts. Now, referring a word to a referent is to confound the meaning of a name 
and the bearer of a name. He rejects this position He also rejects his idea of a one-one 
representation between the simples of a language and reality. Analysing a proposition 
into atomic propositions does not make the meaning clearer. He also rejects the idea 
of the picture theory that in order for a proposition to have sense it must have an 
absolute determinate sense. His new stand now is that a proposition finds meaning in 
the use to which it is put (2.3.1). 
We proceed with Hudson's help to the clarification of what "language-game," 
means. Knowing involves learning. In order for one to know, three things must be 
taken into consideration. Namely: what meaning is, the object being named and the 
action that is required in the process of naming. All the three require training. 
Training makes the language-game a game of language and action to which language 
is put. This makes language part of an activity or a form of life (2.3.2). 
How does language relate to reality? Through Hudson, we discuss 
Wittgenstein's view of how language relates with reality. Reality is made up of facts 
things and events. It is one world expressed in three languages. Each of these 
elements has its own language-game. In order to play that game one must follow the 
rules governing it. These rules must be followed without explanations because 
explanations tend to generate more explanations and the task of explaining can turn 
out to be endless. Following a rule is nothing more than a social practice. We should 
try to understand rules as they are applied in their social contexts. In our case we say 
that there should be a difference between accepting the beliefs and practices as laid 
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down by society and understanding. Understanding should involve the conscious set 
of cognitional operations. All understanding in whatever language-game being played 
should be defined by these operations (2.3.3 - 2.3.5). 
What is the relevance of the subject-in-act in the language-games? Although 
Wittgenstein discredits formal logic, still in his later thoughts the role of the subject 
remains unclear. We affmn that language in its social roles requires the cognitional 
operations of the subject. Language is a labyrinth of paths. To get out of these paths 
and find our direction we need these operations. Just as in the context of logic the 
cognitional operations become paramount in formal logic, so do they even in the 
language-games. Rules of language need these operations first of all to formulate 
them, and because they change every now and then due to social demands, still they 
need the subject-in-act to constantly evaluate their relevance in the given conditions 
and circumstances. In this chapter we argue that formal logic without its context 
which is the subject-in-act and following rules in the language-games without the 
conscious cognitional operations - to be explained in Chapter Three - cannot lead us 
to all knowing (2.3.6). 
1.4.2 The Subject as Foundational to Knowing: Lonergan 
In Chapter Three we posit our foundation in the subject. In our discussion we shall 
refer to the subject as "the subject-in-act," "the basic pattern of operations," 
"patterned set of operations," "the basic set of operations," "self-appropriation," "set 
of cognitional operations," the idea of "interiority," "cognitional set of operations," 
and the idea of "transcendental method." Cronin starts us off by setting the problem of 
the lack of a trans-cultural philosophy. This problem is there as a consequence of 
factionalising philosophy. He helps us to show that there is no way in which a 
foundation can be established in this factionalised scenario. In the past, because of 
societies being small and unsophisticated, societies provided foundations. But 
societies and communities have enlarged and tended to be sophisticated to the extent 
that it is difficult to establish a foundation in them Science has solved many empirical 
problems but it has done little in the area of human or moral values. Besides that, it is 
incapable of accounting for its own success. So we cannot -establish a foundation in 
science either. The only locus of a foundation is the subject. Cronin, following 
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Lonergan, invites us to join in the task of self-discovery. Self-discovery will lead us to 
self-understanding and self-knowing. It is after self-knowing that we can proceed to 
know everything else (3.l.1). 
We pursue the problem of lack of a foundation by looking at what Lonergan 
says in Insight. He characterises this problem as a crisis of knowledge. In his view 
this problem can be overcome by having insight into insight or insight into oversight. 
That is, understanding what is to understand or understanding why people run away 
from understanding. In other words, Lonergan in Insight is inviting us to join in, in the 
task of self-appropriation for that is where a foundation can truly be found. Insight is 
not an argument with premises and a conclusion but a programme which presumes 
readers. It invites us to focus on our inner intelligence and reasonableness. That is, 
focussing not only on knowing but knowing what is to know. We are invited not only 
to focus on the aspects of knowledge, such as science, mathematics, the humanities 
and the like but to penetrate our inner dynamism of intelligent enquiry and critical 
reflection. We cannot find a foundation in the aspects of knowledge such as 
mathematics, science and the like but in our own cognitional operations. The practical 
good of Insight is in the fact that it looks at both the existence and nature of 
knowledge. The aspects of knowledge should provide a scheme for the cognitional 
operations. Understanding of this scheme comes as a consequence of the application 
of the cognitional operations. We are looking for a method that will assist in 
integrating the content of knowledge and the knower. This is the foundation which is 
to know both the aspects of knowledge and the knowing subject. Insight offers a 
programme that will assist, through self-appropriation, in the formation of a 
foundation that will help in solving the mentioned crisis of knowledge (3.1.2). 
The reason why we do not have a foundation for knowing is that the subject 
has hitherto been neglected. Self-knowing precedes any kind of knowing. This is not 
what has happened so far. There has been a preoccupation with the search of objective 
truth. This is evident in the fields of rationalism and empiricism Over concentration 
on these areas has led to the overlooking, if not totally neglecting, of the exploration 
of the endowments of the subject. What has not been taken into consideration is the 
fact that in order to reach truth the cognitional operations of the subject are needed. 
Philosophers in their philosophies have tended to overlook this fact. Another problem 
which is responsible for the lack of a foundation is the focusing on the dualism of the 
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body and the soul. Philosophers have tended to focus on the paramount nature of the 
soul above the body. So efforts have been concentrated on the nature and 
characteristics of the soul. This has been done almost to the exclusion of the subject. 
The subject has not had the opportunity to appropriate herself That has led to self-
ignorance and therefore, in some cases to the conclusion that there is no such thing as 
the subject. Through self-appropriation, efforts should be made to establish the nature 
and existence of the cognitional operations of the subject. It is this knowledge that 
will lead to knowledge of all other aspects of knowledge (3.2.1). 
We present the foundational nature of the subject in the knowing activity. 
Human knowing is not a single uniform property but a complexity of different 
operations. The subject is not only immanent or partly hidden The activity of 
knowing involves self-transcendence. That is knowing and being aware that one is 
knowing. Therefore being a subject means being an integrated whole. The subject is 
not just immanent, or the soul, or the body. She is a conscious being present to 
herself both in the data of the senses and the data of consciousness. In our discussion 
we differentiate between the subject of our thesis, who is objective in all cultures, and 
the mistaken fragmented subject or the neglected and truncated subject. We show that 
there is no way a foundation can be established in the latter subject. The subject of our 
thesis is characterised by a movement from the data of the senses to the data of 
intelligence to the judgement and to responsibility. It is a complete process that 
ensures knowing in objective terms (3.2.2). 
We proceed to show the composition and description of the basic pattern of 
operations. These include the operations of the senses and operations of the mind. It is 
this edifice which constitutes the subject-based method We discuss also the 
relationship between the subject and the object. That is the perceiving subject-in-act 
and object being perceived. The subject is the operator who voluntarily operates 
consciously. The perceiving subject is basic to the perceived object because the 
perceiving subject intends the perceived object. Therefore their relationship is 
psychological rather than mechanical. A mechanical operator functions on mechanical 
rules while the subject functions on conscious operations. The subject functions 
consciously and intentionally. We discuss fully the four levels of cognitional 
operations. These are the empirical, the intellectual, the rational, and the responsible. 
These levels work in close collaboration. There is a conscious dynamism running 
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across them All of them are both conscious and intentional. At all these levels the 
subject is conscious of herself The operation is such that from data we move to 
inquiry - inquiry, however, does not seek another datum as will be shown - questions 
emerging from enquiry help to organise data into intelligible wholes. The level of 
inquiry is more challenging than the empirical one. It is this level that helps to sort out 
conflicting alternatives, hence leading to appropriate judgement. 
Before committing ourselves at the level of judgement we must be sure that 
the selected alternative is truly true. So in this sub-section we shall be discussing the 
fact that the cognitional set of operations moves progressively and in an interlinked 
manner from the simpler level which is usually the empirical level to the intellectual 
level where alternative and competing data are sorted out to a closely related but still 
challenging level of positing a judgement that will finally lead to the responsible 
choice (3.3.1). 
In the following subsection we argue that the subject-based set of operations is 
indeed a method and not only that but it is also transcendental. In what sense is it a 
method? It is a method because, as we shall show, it is a normative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations, which yield cumulative and progressive results. In 
what sense is it transcendental? It is transcendental because its results are not limited 
categorically to some particular field or subject. It is a method that yields any results. 
It is because of its applicability to any field or any study that it is elevated above any 
other method to the level of being transcendental. Again it is transcendental because 
the precepts of transcendental method, which are, being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable, and responsible, are present in all of us irrespective of anything else. We 
argue that the transcendental method is foundational to everyone because there is no 
way anyone can act, no matter from what field, without employing the precepts of 
transcendental method of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. 
Because of this potentiality for being applicable to all fields and subjects the 
transcendental method becomes a rock to build on (3.3.2). 
After this, we reiterate the fact that the subject is a rock to build on In what 
sense? Transcendental method presupposes intellectual curiosity, a striving to 
understand, and to know. It presupposes critical reflection, it presupposes truth or 
falsity in the propositions and conclusions drawn, it presupposes responsibility in 
one' s actions. This method is a rock to build on because the patterns that link 
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operations are not arrived at in isolation and there is unity of consciousness at any 
level of cognitional operation. These operations are clearly distinguishable as we 
move from sense to judgement and responsibility. This enables the conscious subject 
to isolate any anomaly at any level of operation. The pattern of the set of operations is 
not hypothetical or susceptible to change. It is only data that changes and not the 
operations. In fact operations participate in the changing of data Any attempt to reject 
the patterned set of operations is tantamount to self-rejection. This is because it will 
be rejecting the very precepts of the transcendental method (3.3.3). 
Finally we discuss the functional usefulness of the foundational method. We 
affirm that the foundational method is functionally useful to all other Irethods because 
each and every method follows the precepts of the transcendental method. All 
methods, no matter from what field, are in the final analysis at one stage or another 
constitutive of the transcendental method. The transcendental method sets a standard 
for all other Irethods. That makes it normative to all of them We also argue that the 
transcendental method executes a critical function. This is because differences at the 
lower levels can be resolved at higher levels. That is, differences at sense level can be 
resolved at the intellect level. Differences at the intellect level can be resolved at the 
reasonable level. Differences at the reasonable level can be resolved at the responsible 
level. That makes the transcendental method all-inclusive because of the functioning 
of these levels. Any problem from any field can be resolved at any of these levels or 
at all the levels. The transcendental method r-etlects systematicity in its approach. That 
is, it constructs the elementary acts of knowing into compound knowing and also 
constructs the elementary objects of knowing into compound objects of knowing, the 
whole process ensuring continuity. This is also desirable for all methods. The 
transcendental method brings into interplay concrete reality and the cognitional 
process of the subject who consciously comprehends the concrete reality. This is the 
case for all methods. 
The transcendental method also executes a heuristic function Here the 
ignorant subject intends the unknown. This leads to inquiry. The discovered data is 
subjected to the intellect and the process progresses according to the stipulated norms 
of the transcendental method. Examples of methods from different fields retlect that 
they are not comprehensive to the extent of the transcendental method. Therefore it 
brings harmony to all the other methods. This is because none of them is exempt from 
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the stipulated precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible 
(3.3.4). 
To help us argue our case we use various ideas from commentators. These 
include Cronin {l999). He points out the shortcomings across the history of 
philosophy of attempting to locate a foundation to knowing in wrong places. The 
problem stretches from ancient philosophy right through modem philosophy to the 
contemporary period. He exposes the fact that time and resources have been 
misallocated in these endeavours because they could not yield a method that is 
comprehensive enough to lead us to all knowing. Following Lonergan, Cronin locates 
this method in interiority. In his exposition, he leads us through all the stages of 
interiority or self-appropriation. He helps us to argue for the subject-in-act as 
foundational for all knowing. Another commentator whose views are relevant to our 
thesis is Shutte [n.d]. He regards Lonergan as an integrating philosopher in the sense 
that his method touches all areas of knowing. He presents the aspect of knowing as 
being dynamic in the sense that it is self-assembling and self-constituting. Knowing 
does not occur with the blindness of natural process. The knower is conscious, 
intelligent and rational. Shutte helps us to bring out the very crux of the matter of our 
thesis in the sense that he projects the subject-in-act as self-assembling who takes into 
account all fields of knowing. The subject-in-act is self-corrective. This is the sort of 
integrative and comprehensive method that our thesis is attempting to establish. We 
are looking for a method which does not only cover all areas but which can also 
ensure truth in its procedure and which can effect a correction where an anomaly 
occurs. He is of the view that there is no other method that is comprehensive enough 
to serve as foundation for all knowing. This includes the scientific method. Science 
puts forward experiments and measurements as the only way of achieving objectivity, 
hence presenting it as a model for all other methods. He is of the view that the 
scientific method can only cover certain aspects of the real but it is not comprehensive 
enough to cover all reality. He supports fully Lonergan's precepts of the 
transcendental method. His views help us to consolidate our position as regards the 
subject-in-act as being ultimately basic to all knowing. Giddy (1996), is another 
commentator whose views are of direct relevance to our thesis. 
He also projects Lonergan as an integrative philosopher. He points out that 
Lonergan's views do entail a heightening of the presence to self That is, they do not 
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presuppose the dualism of the subject and object. He brings this idea in opposition to 
the "standard empiricist" position that knowing is through scientific objectivity which 
is achieved by eliminating subjective elements. He points out that the empiricist and 
rationalist stands are lopsided. He, instead, exalts Lonergan's approach of self-
appropriation. After discussing the precepts of self-appropriation convincingly, he 
introduces another idea of the indeterminism of the subject. He argues that one is 
entirely responsible for one's actions. This is because one is fully capable of 
interrogating one's ideas. Therefore one has the option of restraining or going ahead 
with one's actions. The choice is one' s own. Therefore one should always be in a 
position to account for one's actions. This idea is particularly relevant to our thesis 
because it calls forth the appli cation of the precepts of self-appropriation, particularly 
at the level of intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. 
Giddy goes ahead to say that a human being is understood through various 
sciences. These include chemical, biological psychological and other related sciences. 
From these sciences knowledge of the self can be discerned and therefore self-
determination established. Giddy is contributing to the idea of self-understanding and 
knowing which leads to the knowing of everything else. This is in consonance with 
Lonergan's point of understanding the self through self-appropriation being a 
prerequisite for understanding and knowing everything else. In our discussion we use 
Giddy's ideas to emphasise the fact of self-knowing or self-appropriation as being 
foundational to knowing everything else. We show that before knowing other sciences 
and humanities one has to know oneself as a knower, and to be aware of oneself or 
present to oneself in the activity of knowing. If one knows what one is capable of 
knowing, then one will proceed to know whatever piece of knowledge that confronts 
one and one' s knowing in this respect will be thorough. This is because the 
endowments of knowing allow the knower to check and crosscheck one' s 
understanding and knowing. So the fact that one knows that one is a knower through 
the precepts of self-appropriation, there should be no excuse for determinism in an 
individual. This knowing is obtained through being attentive, intelligent, reasonable 
and responsible (3.4). 
In the following sub-section we look at the role of belief in transcendental 
method. We argue that there is an existing fund of knowledge out there that has been 
contributed by science and humanities. This fund of knowledge is generated by 
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distinguished and respected specialists. The accumulation of this knowledge dates 
back some centuries. Some of this knowledge is technical knowledge in the form of 
specialised, specific, electronic equipment needed for scientific enterprises. There are 
all sorts of knowledge in archives, textbooks, journals, photographs, graphs, maps, 
oral literature, museums and many other sources. Cronin implores us to believe this 
knowledge. It would be next to impossible to try and verify all this stock of 
knowledge before accepting it as true. We have to believe in expertise and 
distinguished scholarship. It would be a futile and expensive endeavour to try and 
verify for ourselves the already available high-tech instruments in order to accept 
them as accurate. We have to believe in their accuracy. We also argue that there is no 
conflict between belief and judgement in the Lonergan sense. Judgement in the 
Lonergan sense is based on the precepts of the transcendental method. Belief on the 
other hand is based on trust of distinguished scholarship and expertise. In this respect 
truth should not be based on judgement alone. There are situations that justify belief 
as source of knowledge. However since there is a possibility of being mistaken both 
in judgement and in belief: where there is doubt we should always resort to the 
precepts of the transcendental method (3.5.1). 
In order to consolidate the position of the transcendental method as ultimately 
basic we look at the scientific method and see how it compares with the 
transcendental method. The scientific method is based on scientific theory, 
hypotheses, and experimentation. It yields new knowledge which is cumulative in 
nature. It functions on a set of rules. It functions on logic and precision This ensures 
accuracy and excellence. The problem here is that a system which functions on a set 
of rules tends to produce routine results. The old but similar is added to the new and 
the process continues. This is the role of logic in science. It consolidates the old, 
which of course keeps on recurring. Science also applies the non-logical procedures 
which ensure advancement. Though this is a positive development, the scientific 
approach does not lead us to all departments of reality. We argue that although it 
seems to cover the stage of sense knowing and the stage of the intellect, when it 
comes to the third and fourth stages of human knowing it falls short of the 
transcendental method. These are the stages of judgement and responsibility in the 
Lonergan sense. Science succeeds in starting us off on the road of the transcendental 
method but it does not complete it. The transcendental method remains more 
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comprehensive and all encompassing. The scientific method suffers from the 
shortcomings of empiricism, as we shall argue later in the thesis (3.5.2-3.5.3). 
1.4.3 Inter-Cultural Learning: Scientific and non-Scientific Cultures 
In Chapter Four we address a specific problem of two cultures that appear to be 
incompatible. One culture which we have called the European, mainly follows the 
scientific approach for purposes of knowing. The other culture, the Azande, mainly 
follows the mystical or oracular approach. In our argument we are mainly addressing 
two problems. The first one is whether there is anything in common between the two 
cultures that would lead to all knowledge, irrespective of cultural differences. The 
second question is whether either of the two cultures can learn something from the 
other. Here we are looking at the issue of cultural relativism How can we go around 
the problem of cultural relativism? We are looking for a method that would facilitate 
the notion of inter-cultural learning. In Chapter Two we posit this method in the form 
of the subject-in-act. In this chapter we are handling similarities and differences 
among cultures and trying to see how we can overcome them In this discussion we 
are assisted by Winch who presents the scientific culture as being followed mainly by 
Europeans and the non-scientific culture as being followed mainly by the Azande of 
Southern Sudan (4.1). 
We discuss the aspect whether rationality is relative to culture. We see Winch 
emphasising the aspect of cultural relativism To help us see his point, he points out 
the belief among the Azande, who do not only believe in oracular revelations but also 
believe that some of their kind are capable of exercising a malignant occult influence 
on the lives of their fellow members. This notion valued as it does among the Azande 
it is likely to be incomprehensible among the European mainly science-based culture 
(4.2.1). 
We look at Winch' s view of the likely attitude of the European social 
anthropologist studying a "primitive" culture like that of the Azande. The first task he 
would face would be to understand them and secondly to make members of his own 
cultures also comprehend them Such an endeavour would inevitably be challenged in 
the face of the scientific norms. Such an anthropologist because of the ties resulting 
from her own cultural norms is likely to suffer from an attitudinal problem (4.2.2). 
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The attitudinal problem notwithstanding, and as a consequence of his study, he 
helps us to see that there is logic in both the European' s and the Azande approaches. 
Evans-Pritchard' s point of departure with Winch is his view that it is the scientific 
approach that is in accord with reality. He also proceeds to point out that it is the 
scientific approach that conform; to objective truth. This position is unacceptable to 
Winch. Can Winch and Evans-Pritchard come to a compromise? Is there a meeting 
point? If so, which one? Yes, we say that the two can come to a round table and strike 
a balance of understanding through the subject-based cognitional operations (4.2.3). 
We look at the notion of independent reality. Winch is of the view that the 
check for the independent reality is not peculiar to science. Accepting such a position 
is a reflection of bias connected to the fascination of science. Reality is contextual. 
For instance, the reality of God can largely be understood in the context of religion or 
the religious tradition. Winch adds also that, in order to distinguish the real from the 
unreal, one has first of all to understand how this distinction operates in language. The 
understanding of a concept depends on examining the use it has in a particular 
language. So there is no way Evans-Pritchard can work out the concept of reality 
without first taking it to its use in language, no matter what discourse is being used, 
scientific or any other (4.2.4). 
The oracular system form; the very foundation of the Azande social life. The 
Azande are entangled in a web of beliefs and practices and these form the very fabric 
of their social life. The oracular approach reveals both the presence and absence of 
witches and on top of that it explains why certain events are harmful to man. That is a 
reality that is intelligible to the Azande. The oracular system is part and parcel of the 
Azande beliefs and practices. To the European trying to enter this system, the practice 
of the oracle is something detached from him He looks at the practice of the oracle as 
an entity and the Azande as an entity and their beliefs also as an entity. In her study 
the European will not look at the Azande and their practices as an integrated whole. 
This means that his intelligibility of the Azande and their systems will not be 
comprehensive. Moreover, the European enters the Azande oracular system as an 
alien Therefore his intelligibility of the Azande system is likely to be tainted by his 
own cultural influence (4.2.5). 
We discuss whether the oracular approach makes sense and to whom Winch 
is of the view that if something contradicts itself then it does not make sense. The 
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oracular experiences tend to show contradiction in their function. To an outsider, like 
the European, the experience that is contradictory cannot make sense. Winch points 
out that over the years the Azande have built a mechanism in their oracular practices 
that explain away the contradiction. And since the function of the oracle is to reveal 
mystical forces, it cannot be placed in the scientific category, where knowledge is 
revealed in terms of confirming hypotheses after carrying out experiments. Though 
knowledge revealed by the oracle may not make sense to the European the Azande 
sees differently (4.2.6). 
In our discussion we show that the scientific system cannot be compared to the 
oracular system We show that the oracular system can lead to the revelation of a 
witch but there is a more direct way of revealing the presence of a witch and that is 
through the post-mortem method. This method can show that certain members of a 
tribe or a clan do posses elements of witchcraft while others do not. In the eyes of the 
European such an experience is a good case of a contradiction. But instead of looking 
at such an experience as a contradiction, it could be looked at in terms of the different 
levels of operation The Azande are operating at a different level and the Europeans 
are also operating at a different level. So what the European is regarding as a 
contradiction at his level, the Azande sees it differently. Once again the scientific 
standards cannot be used to interpret the Azande standards simply because the levels 
of operation are different (4.2.7). 
We look at the point in following a rule through Winch's comparison of 
Wittgenstein's and Evans-Pritchard's approaches. In the exercise of knowing, Winch 
supports the idea of following a rule in a particular context. In comparing Evans-
Pritchard and Wittgenstein he rejects the early Wittgenstein's idea of attempting to 
make formal logic the ideal language to be applied in all respects. Similarly he rejects 
Evans-Pritchard's attitude of regarding the scientific approach to knowing as the 
correct one and the Azande approach as mistaken. To Winch, the Azande are playing 
their own language-game following its rules and the Europeans are also playing their 
own language-game following its rules (4.2.8). 
To help us in our discussion we also use ideas from commentators. What we 
mainly see in the ideas of these commentators are presentations, attacks and counter-
attacks, accusations and counter-accusations, defence, and counter-defence. It is an 
intellectual battle between Winch and the commentators on his works. These 
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commentators include Barden. He brings out the issue of whether there is meaning 
behind accidents, as the Azande purport, or whether accidents, in the strict sense of 
the word, that is, where negligence or carelessness are not involved, are mere 
coincidence, as the Europeans purport. 
He brings out also the issue that what seem; rational to the Azande may seem 
irrational to the Europeans. This comes as a consequence of contextual differences. 
The situation is that the Azande are playing their own language-game and Europeans 
are also playing their own language-game. The rules of these games are different. 
This brings in the problem of cultural relativism The oracular approach to meaning 
and the scientific approach appear to be incompatible. Our interest in Barden here is 
that while Winch suggests the possibility of inter-cultural knowing, he does not give 
us the method with which to carryout this enterprise. Barden does. And it is Barden's 
method which helps us to go around the problem of cultural relativism This method 
is the basic set of operations (4.3.1). 
MacIntyre (1974) wonders whether Winch's VIew of the difficulty of 
expressing the Azande beliefs about witchcraft from the point of view of the scientific 
culture is a genuine one. There is an impasse between MacIntyre and Winch. 
MacIntyre maintains the view that it is difficult to explain the Azande beliefs about 
witchcraft outside the scientific norms of rationality. To Winch, maintaining such a 
position would be generalising. Winch's position is that the Azande are playing their 
own language-game and the Europeans are also playing their own language-game. 
MacIntyre finds it difficult to appreciate the fact that the European can use the norms 
of the Azande, with which she is not familiar, to interpret the beliefs in witchcraft. 
MacIntyre disagrees with Winch's view that one society cannot go beyond another 
society's own self-description without first grasping the criteria embedded in that self-
description. Between Winch and MacIntyre we see the view that each culture plays its 
own language-game following the rules understandable to them and another view that 
it is not easy to try to understand what takes place in another culture outside one's 
norms of rationality. The question of our concern is: can Winch and MacIntyre reach 
some form agreement? If so, by what means? This is what Barden (1990), helps us to 
solve in Chapter Five. The solution is found in the idea of the subject-in-act (4.3.2). 
Horton (1994) comes in defence of Evans-Pritchard and MacIntyre against 
Winch as regards Winch's ideas oftranslational understanding and mystical thinking. 
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Winch in his presentation of the idea of ''translational understanding" stipulates that in 
order to understand utterances made in an alien culture, we first find the point or 
significance that these utterances have for them In order to discover this point, one 
should first place these utterances in the context of social life within which they arise. 
Thereafter, one will be in a position to say which utterances associated with one' s 
conceptual systems are appropriate translational instruments. Horton seems to have a 
problem with this position, as we shall discuss later. 
Another problem that is disturbing to Horton is Winch' s insistence of not 
imposing one's norms of rationality on an alien culture. Winch is of the view that 
what may appear of paramount importance to one culture, the scientific culture of the 
Europeans for example, may be of peripheral importance or no importance at all to 
the Azande culture of the oracle. 
From Winch' s standpoint Horton raises the problems regarding disparities of 
points in utterances as regards different goals being pursued by different cultures. 
Horton's problem is that Winch' s view is restricted. This problem is heightened by his 
stand on what he calls the locus of universal human strivings as being birth, sexual 
relations and death. To Horton this view is also restricted. He is of the view that 
Winch in his locus should include other forms oflife such as the religious, the artistic, 
and the scientific. In defence of his own stand, that of Evans-Pritchard, and that of 
MacIntyre, Horton feels that it is Winch himself who is the target of methodological 
caveats. Another issue that disturbs Horton is Winch' s stand on the aspect of 
witchcraft. Winch is of the view that Evans-Pritchard' s method imposes the approach 
of the scientific culture on to the Azande. Horton interprets mystical thinking as 
involving spiritualistic elements such as gods and witchcraft and oracles. Winch 
presents his approach to the understanding of an alien culture as a model to emulate. 
These different positions reflect the problem of cultural relativism We argue that they 
can be effectively handled by the cognitional operations of the subject-in-act (4.3.3). 
Winch' s stand inevitably introduces the problem of cultural relativism If one 
is to follow a rule, then how does one learn from the other if rules are contextually 
different? Winch attempts to show how this can be achieved through a criticism of 
MacIntyre' s views. He criticises MacIntyre's approach of knowing through a stock of 
descriptions. To Winch the alternative to the use of descriptions is how these 
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descriptions are expressed in the language of the people affected. So we learn from 
others by comprehending their daily use oflanguage (4.4.1). 
MacIntyre presents the view that, in order for one culture to learn from another 
culture, one has to evoke one' s nonm of rationality. In order to declare that one 
culture is rational one has to declare it in terms one' s norms of rationality. However 
there is a possibility of coincidence. A particular case may be common to the two 
cultures affected. If that turns out to be the case, then it can be referred to under the 
same conception of the two cultures in question. Winch however argues that standards 
of rationality do not always coincide. In that case knowing which comes as a result of 
discovery will not necessarily take place because another culture has discovered it. 
Winch's conviction links up with his stand on context and language-games. Each 
culture plays its own language-game and follows its own rule. As far as inter-cultural 
learning and knowing is concerned, Winch creates a problem of cultural relativism 
which we shall address more precisely in Chapter Five (4.4.2). 
In his criticism of MacIntyre, Winch is of the opinion that the European nonm 
of rationality are not a finite set. We learn through training to adhere to particular 
cultural norms. However we are not limited or uniquely determined by these nonns. 
For instance, the way the European learns how to think, speak and act rationally is 
also applicable to alien cultures. Norms of rationality are principles that can be 
employed for purposes oflearning as many variables as possible, both in one' s culture 
and in the alien cultures (4.4.3). 
Using the Azande system of magic, Winch once agam emphasises, the 
problem of taking the scientific approach or norms as a paradigm or standard through 
which to comprehend other systeIm or cultures. He continues to emphasise the fact 
that it is wrong to look at the Azande ways of life in terms of the European ways of 
life. It is difficult for someone coming from a sophisticated society to grasp the ways 
of life of a simple and unsophisticated society like that of the Azande using her own 
norms. Instead, one has to jettison one' s sophistication and bring oneself to the level 
of the simple and the unsophisticated ways of the simple society. That is when the 
comprehension of the beliefs, practices, and ways of life will effectively take place. 
Learning will not be effective when one uses one' s nonm as standard in order to 
comprehend what takes place in an alien culture. Nonns, beliefs and practices either 
in one' s culture or in an alien culture are contingent. There is nothing fIXed about 
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these notions. In that respect none of the two should be taken as ideal or a paradigm to 
comprehend other cultures (4.4.4-4.4.5). 
We present Evans-Pritchard's notion of the exclusivity of the scientific 
conception of objective facts, reality, and truth together with Winch's objection to this 
notion. We note that the science-based methods are mainly empirical, hence based on 
theory, hypothesis, and experiments. Evans-Pritchard happens to fall in this 
background. This inevitably affects his attitude towards the Azande oracular 
approach. In his approach he falls in the same trap as Wittgenstein of attempting to 
reach all reality through the subject-less formal logic. Evans-Pritchard attempts to 
reach objective facts, truth, and reality through scientific means. Winch once again 
does not accept this attitude. According to Winch there is no one-way which can lead 
to objective facts, reality or truth. Any attempt at that would only succeed in reflecting 
bias and prejudice. What is objective, real, and true using the scientific language-
game may not necessarily be the case when the oracular language-game is used. For 
us we argue that the scientific language-game may be a step in the right direction also 
the oracular language-game may be a step in the right direction, but neither of the two 
is, on its own, comprehensive enough to enable us reach objective facts, truth, and 
reality. The case holds even if it were possible to combine the two approaches. Both 
approaches need to be subjected to the cognitional set of operations (4.5.1). 
Evans-Pritchard brings in the notion of objective facts, truth and reality. The 
question still remains: whose facts, truth and reality? Objectivity of the scientist 
operating at the level of scientific theory would be different from objectivity of the 
mystical thinker operating at the level of the oracle. Evans-Pritchard should attempt to 
see sense in the oracular method instead of prescribing the scientific method. The 
Azande do move from the question ''how'' to "why". In this endeavour they are going 
beyond mere coincidence or accident to the meaning behind accidents and 
coincidences. Europeans have reached a level at which objectivity can be explained 
through scientific theory. The Azande are still at common sense level. The difference 
between the two cultures is the level at which they are functioning. That in itself does 
not qualify one level to be superior to the other and the other inferior. It is only a 
matter of time. Members of the two cultures both possess the cognitional set of 
operations. This is what matters. This set of operations can enable either of the two to 
see a point in approaches other than their own (4.5.2). 
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We look at intercultural learning and knowing through MacIntyre's eyes. One 
way of gaining intelligibility in alien culture is to look at the stock of descriptions in 
that culture. It is difficult to achieve this objective outside one' s norms of rationality. 
Winch challenges MacIntyre on this matter. It is better to look at the sense that the 
alien language gives this stock of description MacIntyre is of the view that what is 
explained as rational by the European in an alien society has to be rational in the 
European sense. The case holds for intelligibility. What is intelligible to the European 
in an alien culture has to be intelligible in the European sense. Winch again disagrees 
with MacIntyre on this aspect. Intelligibility is categorial. The scientific laboratory 
based intelligibility of theory and hypothesis is far removed from the intelligibility of 
the oracle. Applying the criteria of the laboratory to that of the oracle is next to 
impossible. What the European will get will not be what is the case on the ground but 
what the European wants to know. In our case we emphasise rationality itself rather 
than the norms of rationality as a means to gain intelligibility in alien culture. This is 
because norms of rationality may by cultural and contextual (4.5.3). 
1.4.4 Foundation/or Knowing, a Cross-Cultural Concept: Barden's Idea o/the Set 
0/ Operations 
Chapter Five ties up the loose ends of our thesis. We move from the problem of a 
foundation in Chapter Two to the solution of a foundation to knowing in Chapter 
Three. In Chapter Four we are introduced to the possibility of inter-cultural learning. 
But the question is, where do we begin? We cannot begin in a vacuum and it would be 
difficult and confusing to begin in all cultures, some of which may be alien to us. We 
would immediately be faced with the problem of acute relativism something that 
would make it difficult to begin at all. Chapter Five helps us put into practice our 
foundation to knowing established in Chapter Three, but also introduces the idea of 
commencing the task to all knowing in our own tradition This is a tradition with 
which we are familiar (5 .1). 
In Chapter Five we discuss two broad ideas, largely with the help of Barden 
(1990), that is the idea of traditions, systems and cultures and how they cohere. We 
also discuss how we arrive at truth in inter-cultural debates. The overall message that 
emerges is that knowing is always knowing against a tradition. This tradition is 
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expandable and hence the idea of inter-cultural learning and knowing. This is 
achievable through the cognitional set of operations or the subject-in-act. Below is the 
compendium of Barden's ideas, as they will help us in our discussion in subsequent 
sections (5.1.1). 
Where one is born is neither by choice nor design However, one's place of 
birth does not become ultimate for one. It serves only as a starting point from which 
to actualise one's endowments that include the cognitional set of operations. One-can 
influence the propositions that serve as norms in a particular tradition. Therefore one 
is born with the potential to shape one's destiny. Propositions are neither ultimately 
basic nor natural but it is what is contained in a proposition that may be natural. 
Contexts also are not ultimately basic. They can serve as a starting point for further 
learning (5.1.1.1). 
Moving from context to context, searching for answers, requires criteria with 
which to judge whether what is being learnt is true or not. The theory of naive 
correspondence helps in our discussion. It helps the subject-in-act to link propositions 
to reality. The theory itself is not ultimately basic (5 .1.1.2). 
We move from purely cognitive to the realm of behaviour, where two judicial 
syste{llS, namely that of the Azande and that of the Europeans, run parallel to each 
other. This discussion shows that the two systems are addressing different contents 
but they both have a judicial structure and a method of approach. They may not 
concur on the outcome of their judicial practices and that is the point of our 
cognitional operations which we proceed to elucidate (5. 1. 1.3). 
We shall analyse ideas concerning traditions and operations. This includes the 
aspect of the subject-in-act as operational in traditions. The subject-in-act begins in a 
tradition, her tradition, which is not only where she is, but also more profoundly what 
she is. The problem, however, is that traditions are not necessarily systematic. 
Wisdom in a tradition is accumulated over a long period of time. This wisdom is 
translated into ordinary propositions, postulates or axioms. These later turn into 
general guidelines in that tradition. In our case, however, whatever form this scenario 
may take, it remains at the level of data for the subject-in-act to systematize. It is the 
subject-in-act who systematises this data and therefore who is ultimately foundational 
to this data (5.2.1). 
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We show that traditions and systems are different in different cultures or 
systems. This means that the propositions, postulates or axioms are also different. 
This difference leads to incompatibility within traditions and systems. This, in tum, 
leads to radical relativism of traditions. Given this scenario, is there a meeting point 
between traditions and systems? If so, how is it possible? We argue that radical 
relativism is only apparent in the practical day-to-day activities in a tradition or a 
system, if radical relativism is looked at in teflll') of principle that will be so by choice 
of the actor or actors. Given the cognitional set of operations, that is a situation that 
can be debated with a possibility of changing it (5.2.2). 
We look at the way out from the confines of the contexts, traditions, horizons 
and logical systems. This comes as a consequence of radical revision. As a case in 
point, we discuss Einstein' s shift to relative mechanics because of the inconsistencies 
between the propositions of electromagnetic forces and those of mechanics. His aim 
was to dispel the conflict between mechanics and the electromagnetic theory of 
Maxwell. There is a possibility of incoherence among the propositions of science that 
may lead to the possibility of lack of understanding of the logical system or the 
tradition or the horizon in which they are functioning. The consequence of this is 
unreliability in knowledge. We argue that propositions, or postulates or axioms, on 
their own, cannot lead us to reliable knowing. They must be directed by the 
cognitional set of operations. We also look at the perspectives of common sense and 
theory. This involves our appreciation of knowing, as stipulated by provable scientific 
hypotheses, and knowing as perceived in common sense. We argue that perception at 
common sense level can be explained using the cognitional set of operations (5.2.3 -
5.2.5). 
From traditions and systems we discuss the principle of non-contradiction. 
Barden expands that it is not a proposition that is the principle of non-contradiction. It 
is not something that one acquires from out there and then puts into practice. The 
principle of non-contradiction is inherent in the subject. It flows from the subject. The 
proposition merely expresses the concept of the principle of contradiction; that is, the 
principle of contradiction is not revealed by a proposition but by an operation. It is 
operations that are ultimately basic and not propositions. Because the principle of 
non-contradiction is an operation and not a proposition it leads to coherence. 
Coherence is vital in the activity of knowing (5.2.6). 
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In the next sub-section we apply our ideas to inter-cultural contexts. We look 
at how we arrive at truth, first by focussing on the proposition and then on the criteria 
for truth. The question which we are addressing is how to get to the truth of a 
proposition We show that propositions can be both true and false, or a proposition 
can be true whether anyone knows of it or not. Or a proposition can be known to be 
true. But still, how do we get to the truth of a proposition? This can be done in three 
ways: through the naIve correspondence theory, that is an attempt to compare the 
proposition with reality, or when the state of affairs it asserts do obtain, or through the 
subject-in-act (5.2.7 - 5.2.7.1). 
We follow up the idea of the subject-in-act in inter-cultural contexts. We 
revisit Winch' s idea of inter-cultural learning. We recall MacIntyre's position that one 
cannot explain social behaviour independently of one's norms of rationality; and 
Evans-Pritchard's position that it is only the scientific approach that can lead to 
objective facts, truth and reality. We recall this without forgetting Wittgenstein's 
position of the language-games. All these positions do lead to confinement in 
relativism Winch' s own position is that before one makes a judgement about the 
correctness or incorrectness of a method within a tradition or a system it is better first 
to understand the definitions, the propositions, the postulates and the axioms which 
define, explain and project the true identity of that tradition or system 
For us this is a very important development by Winch, but the shortcoming 
remains that he does not tell us how. How do we effectively undertake this enterprise 
of inter-cultural learning in the middle of our relativist backgrounds? It is Barden who 
takes us out of this quagmire by suggesting the basic pattern of operations, in our case 
the subject-in-act. He demonstrates that the subject-in-act does not only understand 
her tradition and system but transcends her own cultural tradition and systems and 
extends her own horizon into other horizons in search of answers which may not be 
existing in her own set-up (5.2.7.2). 
We turn to criteria for arriving at the truth. Here we expand the idea of a 
horizon and then proceed to see how the subject-in-act functions in the horizon We 
look at truth within the ambit of the naive version of correspondence theory. The 
reaching of truth through this version is prevalent mainly at common sense level, as in 
the case of the Azande. Truth is simply reached by "taking a good look" at the 
tendency which is linked to empiricism and Wittgenstein's positivism in the picture 
32 
theory of knowledge. In the picture theory the role of the subject is hidden. It is the 
atomic proposition that is known to be true. Then truth becomes contextual, due to 
many language-games following different rules and uses. We remain with the 
question whether there are criteria for truth that apply to all cases and contexts. 
Barden takes us through different examples in order to help us establish criteria for 
truth. In the first example, a criterion for truth is established in the grasper of the 
sufficiency of the evidence and this happens to be the subject-in-act. In the second 
example it is again the subject-in-act that turns out to be the criterion for truth (5.3.1). 
As we search for truth in different horizons, we note that horizons can be 
provisional. We move from one horizon to another in search of answers that are 
absent in our own horizon. We realise that sooner or later further questions do arise in 
our new horizon, necessitating a shift to yet another horizon. This goes on and on. 
Along this journey we encounter a question whether or not there is a limit to this 
move. The answer is ''yes'', because a situation is reached when there are no further 
relevant questions to ask. Then we say that this is a perfect horizon. In our endeavours 
for inter-cultural learning we discover that inter-cultural learning is two-way traffic. 
We do not only seek for answers in a less restricted area but also in a more restricted 
area (5.3.2). 
We proceed with the discussion of the foundation for all knowing. We finally 
come to this foundation by recapturing the Azande and the European contexts. We 
establish this foundation in the fact that both the Azande and the Europeans are 
endowed with a capacity to ask questions. This endowment is neither an exclusive 
possession of the Azande nor of the Europeans. It is an endowment that is common to 
all of us. We discuss the fact that both the questions and the answers that are asked by 
both the Europeans and the Azande are contingent. It is only this capacity that is 
actualised into an operation for asking questions that is a constant to all human 
beings. Because it is constant it is therefore the only ultimate facilitator for inter-
cultural learning. It is the solution to Winch' s problem of inter-cultural learning or 
knowing (5.3.3). 
The idea of inter-cultural learning or knowing involves mutual respectability 
in the contextual methods that lead to inter-cultural knowing. The European context 
has a structure of approach that involves the court system The Azande context has a 
structure of approach that involves the oracle. In both cases a tort is committed. In 
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both cases investigations are carried out. In both cases the guilty party is established. 
In both cases there is redress or compensation In short, except for some differences 
here and there, what the Europeans do in their courts of law is what the Azande do 
with their oracle. The important thing to note is that the Azande are emphasising the 
human element. To the Azande what is important is forgiveness rather than 
compensation Genuine forgiveness strengthens or cements human relations among 
the Azande. With or without material compensation, social relations are restored 
through forgiveness. Compensation on its own does not remove the injury from the 
afflicted. Sending the culprit to jail is not enough for the Azande. To them, physical or 
psychological injury must be removed through forgiveness. This comes as another 
human element characteristic in the Azande approach. In addition to looking for 
meaning behind what appears to be accidental, the Azande approach contributes the 
notion of cementing human relationships through genuine forgiveness. This is placed 
over and above material compensation. Perhaps this is what Europeans could look 
into and consider adopting (5.3.4). 
1.4.5 Frameworks lor Inter-Cultural Learning: Further Application 
In Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, we finalise our discussion on the method for 
inter-cultural knowing with an application of this method to the frameworks of inter-
cultural learning. 
We would like to make it clear that in our discussion of the frameworks for 
inter-cultural learning, we do not present these frameworks in order of superiority or 
inferiority. We present them as precepts for inter-cultural understanding, each 
framework with its own characteristic. In fact we are critical of scholars who attempt 
to grade them as superior or inferior to one another. Here we give an example of a six-
year old compared to a twenty-year old. Actions of a twenty-year old may appear 
superior to that of a six-year old. But this does not mean that the mind of a twenty-
year old is superior and that of a six-year old is inferior. The fact is, the two are at 
different levels of development and exposure. In fact the six-year old may be 
potentially superior to the twenty-year old. Our frameworks are not meant to reflect 
chronological superiority of inferiority 
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Here we turn first to Mbiti's and Cisternino's accounts of traditional African 
wisdom How are we to understand proverbs? We turn again to the cognitional theory 
of Lonergan, in particular as developed in his later book, Method in Theology (1975), 
and in particular, the idea of "interiority". But it is Cronin who, again, develops this 
idea in a way that suits our own problem These frameworks include the common 
sense framework. We expose the characteristic of this framework. This framework is 
compact in a sense that all activities such as political, social, religious, moral and 
economic tend to intermingle and overlap. That means there is a general lack of 
definition and differentiation in almost everything. There is little difference between 
the symbol and the symbolised. Interests of society are placed above the interests of 
the individual. Society is run on accumulated wisdom, with little initiative from 
individuals. Because oflack of definition and differentiation ambiguities are prevalent 
(6.1.1.1). 
We look at specific cases that reflect characteristics of the commonsense 
framework, beginning with Bantu proverbs. Proverbs are a reservoir of a culture's 
wisdom Proverbs, if properly exploited, are a pedagogical means that can teach a 
large section of people. Within the common sense framework there is no area that 
they do not cover. They focus on the good and bad elements of human life. They 
inform about phenomena and noumena They relate the human being to supernatural 
forces and to nature in general. A list of the pedagogical potentiality of proverbs is too 
large to present here, but what is lacking is a comprehensive method with which to 
extract the richness of meaning in them (6.1.1 .2). 
We look briefly at Mbiti's (1969), idea of the concept of religion and time in 
the common sense framework. In these categories we experience acute cases of 
compactness and lack of definition Almost all phenomena and noumena are 
perceived in terms of religion. This is where names of people carry religious 
meanings; rocks and boulders are religious objects, the eclipse of the moon and the 
sun carry catastrophic messages. The notion of time has no academic significance in 
the common sense framework. Time is looked upon in tenm of events past and 
present. Events that have not taken place fall into the category of "non-time." Mbiti' s 
examples prove the aspect of compactness in this framework (6.1 .1.3). 
We look at the dichotomy of this framework in Africa, before and after 
colonialism, and the subsequent vagueness that ensues. Some philosophers describe 
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traditional reasoning as inexact and characterised by confusion. Others look at some 
pedagogical aspects such as folklore and the genres therein as full of wisdom Others 
look at ethno-philosophies as characteristic of pre-industrial and pre-scientific, with 
no relevance to a modem philosopher. This scenario calls for clarification (6.1.1 .4). 
We search for this clarification in the framework of theory. Theory makes a 
move to attend to the problems of common sense. Compactness, the lack of 
differentiation and definition, has a tendency to breed vagueness, ambiguity and 
therefore confusion. In a state of lack of clarity there is no distinction and no control. 
In order to show that the problems of common sense framework are not unique to 
some African communities such as the Azande, we stretch our horizon to the Greek 
myths. We do this to show that if the Greeks could make an attempt to overcome the 
problems of common sense so can all communities that are still operating largely 
within this framework (6. 1.2.1). 
In their move towards the framework of theory, the Greeks started by 
criticising their own rich mythology. It no longer seemed correct for the gods to have 
human weaknesses such as getting drunk and engaging in sexual activities. This 
endeavour generated a crop of thinkers who attempted to seek explanations as to why 
in the universe things happen the way they do. This was a positive transition towards 
definition and differentiation. The emergence of geometry, for instance, marks a move 
from common sense to theory. With this development a new control of meaning 
emerges, followed by the formulation of arguments. Systems begin to take shape, 
logic and grammar are differentiated, and distinction between politics and ethics 
becomes clearer. This is a stage at which much of the confusion in the common sense 
framework is cleared up (6. 1.2.3). 
The struggle against confusion is particularly marked during the period of 
modem philosophy. This is when efforts towards freedom of thought against, for 
instance, the authority of the church, become succinct. The principle thinkers in this 
movement were Descartes, Hume and Kant. They founded systems that were 
theoretical and critical and that needed no religious beliefs but sensation and reason 
(6.1.2.3). 
The realm of theory slowly takes shape and direction that gradually leads to 
the explosion of the ''theory in the scientific revolution." This is when scientists begin 
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to appeal to sensation and experimentation instead of the authority of the church. It is 
when remarkable expansion in mathematics is realised. Problems begin to get solved 
through measurement and counting. Technology leads to discovery. Problems of the 
common sense framework slowly begin to appear to be getting solved. However, 
theory does not adequately solve the problems of the common sense framework 
(6.1.2.4). 
Sooner or later, theory gets caught up with its own shortcomings. These 
include failure to account for itself: failure to deal with contrary theories and the 
problem of being subjected to constant revisions and change. We try to show that it is 
clear that the common sense framework, and the theory framework, useful as they are 
in their own capacities, are not comprehensive enough to lead us to all knowing. This 
shortcoming calls for the third framework, which is interiority. Interiority is not a 
theory among theories. It is a theory about theories. It goes beyond common sense 
and theory frameworks. It is characterised by awareness of the actual process of 
human intellectual knowing. It is a framework that leads to complete understanding. It 
demonstrates that there are norms which are immanent in intelligence which make us 
know that we have understood correctly or incorrectly. Though it is human to make 
mistakes, we can discover these mistakes and effect corrections. In fact, the 
framework of interiority is comprehensive enough to solve the problems in the 
frameworks of common sense and theory. After establishing the three frameworks, 
that is the framework of common sense particularly evident in the pre-modern period 
and whose centre of meaning is in common sense, the framework of theory 
particularly evident in the modem period and whose centre of meaning is in theory, 
and fmally the framework of interiority, particularly evident in the present-day, whose 
centre of meaning is in the subject-in-act, we proceed to show how the subject-in act-
leads to inter-cultural dialogue that finally leads to learning from one another inter-
culturally (6.1.3). 
We deal with the question of how dialogue can be conducted effectively 
through inter-cultural debate that would lead to inter-cultural knowing, that would, in 
tum, lead to inter-cultural fertilisation and pedagogical enrichment. This endeavour is 
made possible by following the slogan ''Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and 
be responsible." We show that following this slogan works in all traditions and 
contexts. By being attentive we are alert to the data of our senses and imagination. 
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This, in itself, may prove to be satisfactory or not. In case we are not satisfied we 
move to the second level and that is of intelligence. Here we use our intellect to spot 
the cause of our dissatisfaction at the first level and effect a correction. The truth in 
our data is established at the third level of reasonableness. Finally, we take 
responsibility; we take a stand and commit ourselves to it. What is admirable in this 
commitment is that it creates room for open-mindedness and does not allow bias and 
prejudice to creep through. What is gratifying also is that it works in the frameworks 
of common sense, theory and interiority itself It is comprehensive and all-engrossing, 
that is knowing or understanding at any level presupposes data to be understood This 
data is available within experience. It comes through the data of the senses, through 
memory or through imagination. This level caters for many of the problems envisaged 
within the common sense framework. This is where the subject-in-act engages in the 
operations of defming, classifying, relating, correlating, conceiving, supposing, 
classifying, explaining, identifying, measuring, counting and calculating, to mention a 
few. The compactness is broken, differentiation is effected and control is made 
possible. Through these operations, contestants, no matter from what culture or 
tradition, can be accommodated at one round table. 
We note that theory, understood in the scientific sense, is characterised by 
coherence, systematisation, precision, principles and methods. We argue that this is 
not a treasure to be enjoyed by Europeans only. Through the set of cognitional 
operations, members, who are still largely operating at the common sense level, like 
the Azande, can gradually function within the framework of theory, as the pre-modem 
or pre-industrial revolution communities did. At this level it is the criterion of 
intelligence that is predominantly functioning. We note that this is a function for all 
human beings, irrespective of framework. Using the cognitional set of operations, or 
the subject-in-act, we can overcome the problems of compactness, definition and 
differentiation in proverbs. Mbiti ' s problems of religion can be associated with 
everything and also the problems associated with time. Using the same approach, we 
can overcome the problems associated with ambiguities evident in the pre-and post-
colonial philosophies. Our method possesses the ability to bring African philosophers 
with opposed views to a round table. It can bring Winch, MacIntyre and Evans-
Pritchard to a round table and help to harmonise their thinking. The same can be said 
for any philosophers from any walk of life (6.1.3.1). 
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We expose how to pursue the journey to interiority. It begins with an 
assumption that when we pursue knowledge we pursue the unknown. This pursuance, 
however, is conscious, intelligent, rational, deliberate and methodical. Within a 
human being there is an ideal that moves someone towards knowledge. This ideal is 
innate. It is an ideal that brings together other ideals such as empiricism, rationalism 
and all the others, in their multiplicity. In order to attain this ideal one has first to 
undergo the process of self-appropriation, that is self-appropriation involves the 
perfection of the ideal of knowledge. This ideal of knowledge is the subject-in-act, or 
the self as intelligent, as asking questions, as requiring intelligent answers. The 
journey to self-appropriation begins by "moving in there." This is the same as looking 
in there, but not in Wittgenstein's ocular sense. It involves being present to the self 
The subject must first of all be present to herself before anything else can be present 
to her. The knowing of all reality begins with self-knowing. This is a prerequisite for 
knowing everything else. It is absolutely vital that we first undertake the journey to 
self-knowledge as conscious, intelligent, reasonable and responsible knowers. It is 
this move which will make us ultimately basic for all knowing. Thereafter we move to 
inter-cultural knowing. Through the cognitional set of operations, or the subject-in-
act, we can move towards knowing all reality in all traditions, cultures and systems. It 
is that mission which this thesis sets out to accomplish (6.1.4). 
1.4.6 Chapter Linkage 
Before we proceed with the discussion of the problem of the lack of an ultimate 
foundation to knowing in all spheres, let us recapture the trend of our ideas in the 
entire thesis. In Chapter One, we give the major problem and assumption as guiding 
principles to our thesis. As a starting point to our problem, in Chapter Two, we 
introduce some of Wittgenstein' s views regarding the SUbject. We point out that 
placing the subject at the limit of the world and not regarding her as part of it with no 
functional role to play was erroneous. This discovery takes to Chapter Three where 
Lonergan introduces us to the idea of a self-appropriated subject whom we call the 
subject-in-act. We refer to her as the subject-in-act, because in the realm of knowing 
reality in all its aspects, the subject is acting all the time. She acts in all traditions and 
all systems of knowledge. She is always asking a further relevant question in order to 
reach the ultimate of knowing in all circles. This discussion takes to Chapter Four, 
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where the idea of intercultural learning is introduced by Winch. This serves as a 
buffer chapter to our thesis. In this chapter we attempt to show that any method that 
does not apply the idea of the subject-in-act is bound not to take us to knowing in all 
respects. Chapter Five helps us to anchor our idea of the subject-in-act more firmly. 
Barden comes in as proof to our claim that any attempt to disregard the subject-in-act 
may not successfully lead to intercultural learning or any other type of learning, 
scientific or otherwise. We conclude, in Chapter Six, with a further application that 
the idea of the subject-in-act works in all tradition European and African and it also 
works in all systems of knowledge, scientific and non-scientific. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FROM FORMAL LOGIC TO LANGUAGE-GAMES: 
WIITGENSTEIN 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in Chapter One, the present thesis proposes the subject-in-act as the 
foundation for knowing. In this chapter we look at Wittgenstein's attempt to see logic 
as foundational and also his later language-game approach. As mentioned, we contend 
that the subject-in-act, in the sense that we will explain more fully in Chapter Three, 
should be ultimately basic or foundational in the understanding and explaining reality 
around us in all its manifestations. 
In our analysis, as mentioned, we use mainly Wittgenstein's ideas to help us 
discuss this. In doing so we examine some of his early thoughts in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus1 and some of his later thoughts in the Philosophical 
Investigations. 2 
Again as mentioned, we shall show that the subject-less approach in the 
picture theory, as it is put in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, does not work. The 
same is the case in following a rule in the language-game approach, as in the 
Philosophical Investigations. 
2.1.2 Commentlltors 
To help argue the case, we shall use ideas from commentators who motivate and help 
us to explain Wittgenstein's thoughts. These include: Hudson, (1968); Van Peursen, 
(1969); Fogelin, (1979); Stroll and Popkin, (1979); MeynelL (1980); Harris, (1987); 
McCarthy, (1992); Taylor, (1997); Cop~ (1998); Hacker, (1997); McGinn, (2000), 
among others. 
IWittgenstein, L. [1921] 1974. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Hereafter, Trac. 
2Wittgenstein, L. [1953] 1997. Philosophical Investigations. Hereafter, PI #. 
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We fmd Stroll and Popkin (1979) helpful, because they present the two sides 
of Wittgenstein: the earlier Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus Logical-Philosophicus and 
the later Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations. The text places 
Wittgenstein in the middle of the debate of the analytic movement in contemporary 
philosophy. This is the movement which is of the view that the problems of 
philosophy are largely due to conceptual confusion Such confusion, to some extent, 
arises out of the misuse oflanguage. 
It was against this background that two streams of the movement were formed, 
namely what came to be known as "the formalist point of view," led by Alfred North 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell in their mathematica110gic. According to this stream, 
mathematical logic was an ideal language and much more precise, in which 
... . ambiguities, equivocation and other forms of misrepresentation could not 
occur in its symbolism (Stroll and Popkin, 1997: 445). 
Wittgenstein' s atomic or elementary propositions in the picture theory, where formal 
logic is supposed to reflect all reality, fits in well in this stream of the "formalist point 
of view." 
The second stream came to be known as the "ordinary language point of 
view." This stream was led by G.E. Moore, John T. Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, J.L. 
Austin and, of course, Wittgenstein himself, in his later thoughts in the Philosophical 
Investigations. This stream was of the view that problems of philosophy could be 
solved through clarification of ordinary language. Although Wittgenstein, in his later 
philosophy of the language-game, does not talk of clarification, still he fits in this 
stream This is because he abandons his former position of formal logic, reflecting all 
reality, in his sense, to the language used in the social context and "following a rule" 
in the language-game. He abandons the language of pure symbolism and joins the 
debate on ordinary language. 
We fmd this text of Stroll and Popkin useful, as mentioned, mainly because it 
presents the two diametrically opposed views of Wittgenstein It is these two sides of 
Wittgenstein which help us to present our case. For us we argue that it was not right 
for Wittgenstein to place the subject at the limit of the world and accord him a 
metaphysical place, about which nothing could be said, as evidenced in the 
propositions: "There is no such a thing as a subject that thinks or entertains ideas" 
(Trac. 5.631). "The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is the limit of the 
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world" (Trac. 5.632). 'The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human 
body, or the human soul. .. but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world-
not part of it" (Trac. 5.641). 
It was also not right in the language-game to assign the subject the role of 
following a rule, as laid down by society, without questioning it. As a result of 
looking at the two sides ofWittgenstein we are enabled to show that, either way, it is 
the subject-in-act that is ultimately basic. 
Fogelin (1979) makes a comprehensive criticism of both the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations. He examines critically the atomic 
ontology of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. More specifically, he looks at how 
Wittgenstein structures the "simples" to make the facts in the logical space, his 
version of the states of affairs and the world and how he defends his ontological 
atomism Then he examines how Wittgenstein structures the propositional signs from 
atomic facts, making atomic propositions a source of knowledge for all reality. He 
looks at how Wittgenstein draws logical inferences from logical truths, how he 
structures logical propositions from variables and logical constants or connectives and 
how these propositions reflect objective reality. 
Turning to the Philosophical Investigations, Fogelin interprets Wittgenstein as 
advocating the following of the rule blindly as actual blind following. He concentrates 
more on the weaknesses of Wittgenstein than on his merits. He makes elaborate 
criticisms of how Wittgenstein handles some of the rules oflogic and points out that it 
was a big weakness for Wittgenstein to advocate following the rule blindly. 
Although Fogelin is concerned more with pointing out the weaknesses in the early 
and later thoughts of Wittgenstein, our concern is to show the anomaly of not 
engaging the subject fimctionally, both in the formal logic and in the language-games. 
We believe that the subject plays a functional role in both formal logic and in 
following a rule. 
Van Peursen (1969) examines the early and later Wittgenstein. In the early 
Wittgenstein he divides his ideas into sections, dwelling on the major themes. He 
examines Wittgenstein' s "logic of speech" by dividing it into minor sub-themes, 
looking specifically at Wittgenstein' s propositions as they project the world as states 
of affairs, then atomic propositions and how they picture reality, tautologies or a 
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priori propositions, truth-table matrices and the general use of the rules and laws of 
logic. 
Then he proceeds to Wittgenstein' s "metaphysics of silence", portraying and 
explaining some of the propositions referring to "showing" and "saying" and finally 
looks at language-games. In the language-game, he uses some of Wittgenstein' s early 
thoughts such as the use of truth-table matrices and logical variables and constants to 
explain some of the ideas in the language-game. 
He does this to show how Wittgenstein himself realised the problems in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and tried to address them in his later thoughts. What 
Van Peursen succeeds in doing is giving a balanced judgement on the strength and 
weaknesses of both the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical 
Investigations. 
This fact, together with dividing Wittgenstein's ideas into major themes, such 
as the logic of speech, the metaphysics of silence and the language-games, and the 
analysis and criticisms therein, help us to show the shortcomings resulting from 
setting the subject at the limit of the world and not realising her foundational 
presence. We are enabled to show how a subject-less logic cannot work, contrary to 
what Wittgenstein had envisaged, and following rules would be indeed blind 
following if the subject does not continuously challenge their relevance in the 
changing world. 
Harris (1987) and McCarthy (1992) concentrate on showing how the rules of 
logic can only work on objective realities. They project this scenario in order to show 
how Wittgenstein's idea Of formal logic, representing all reality, does not work. This 
is because the world we are living in comprises both the general and the particular, or 
the objective and the subjective realities. 
In our case we are arguing that there is something more foundational than 
formal logic, which can move from subjective realities to objective realities. This is 
made possible by the set of operations. To explain this fact we are assisted by Meynell 
(1980) with the idea of a ''transcendental psychology." He believes that there is the 
subject that can be described by a ''transcendental psychology" which, through the set 
of operations, can reach objective reality or knowledge by moving from particular 
subjective realities. 
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This fact helps us to present the case clearly that the subject-in-act is more 
foundational or ultimately basic and the unquestionable starting point towards 
understanding reality in all cases. It is the subject who thoughtfully, intelligently, 
rationally and responsibly functions in all rules, all traditions, all contexts and all 
SCIences. 
Hacker {l997), among others, provides a motivation for us to investigate 
Wittgenstein's ideas in the Tractatus. He says that by the time Wittgensteinjoined the 
debate on logic, which was spearheaded by Russell, Frege and Moore, who were 
debating the philosophy of mathematics and its complementary concern with the 
nature of logic, the thrust was centred on areas such as the indefinables of logic, the 
use of logic, the use of variables in the specification of the laws of logic, the analysis 
of negation and also generality of logic and the theory of types. Wittgenstein's 
specific contribution was to be located in his interest in the proposition, especially its 
essential nature. He extended his interest from the formulations of logic to the nature 
of the world. 
It is at this stage where our interest comes in. Wittgenstein attempts to make a 
proposition, which he later reduces to the status of an atomic proposition, 
foundational for the knowing of all reality. However, as mentioned, Wittgenstein 
leaves out the idea of a functional subject in the activity of knowing. Our contention is 
that this was not correct. We are arguing that it is the subject-in-act who is 
foundational for a proposition 
We are using Wittgenstein's ideas because he contends that a subject-less 
logical reasoning operating on atomic or elementary propositions is ultimately basic 
or is a starting point for explaining and understanding the world. We will argue that 
Wittgenstein's attempt fails . We shall show that his ideas are still unacceptable, to us 
even in his later thoughts where he puts forward the approach of following the rule in 
the language-games as being adequate for understanding and knowing reality in all 
aspects. In our case we intend to argue that it is not logic, a set of principles, or sets of 
propositions that are ultimately basic. 
Regarding "understanding," Goldfarb {l992: 109), is of the view that what he 
calls a "dark point" in Wittgenstein's idea concerning understanding, needs to be 
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clarified. This dark point concerns Wittgenstein's attempt to reject mental states or 
processes of the subject. As he puts it, 
Wittgenstein's treatments . .. of the cognitive or intentional mental notions are 
evidently meant to persuade us that, in some sense, understanding, believing, 
remembering, thinking and the like are not. .. definite states or processes; or 
... there are no particular states or processes that constitute the understanding, 
remembering, etc (1992: 109). 
Our concern here is that, though Wittgenstein wishes to deny these states, he himself 
talks of "a state of mental apparatus" (PI # 149). He also talks of "a state which is the 
source of correct use" (PI # 149). Goldfarb calls this paradoxical, because when one 
understands, say, a word, a sentence or a principle of a series one must be in a 
particular state, that is the state of understanding that particular word, sentence or 
principle. These states and processes are a reality. Therefore Wittgenstein's denials 
need to be investigated and elaborated on 
Goldfarb's discussion goes into empiricism, science and psychology, in which 
we are not interested. He motivates us with his mention of Wittgenstein's denials of 
"states" and, at the same time, recognises that it is the "states" which are the source of 
correct use. We are also interested in his expression that in order for one to 
understand, one must be in the state of understanding. These views, as we shall argue 
are akin to Lonergan's idea of the "presence to self" That is, we do not only 
understand but we understand that we understand. This is tantamount to one being in 
a state of understanding in order to understand. 
In our case, states such as being present to self are real and processes which 
are remembering, thinking and the like are operations of the subject. We are in 
agreement with Goldfarb's suggestion that Wittgenstein's denials of the states and 
processes which, in our case, are characteristic of the subject-in-act, actually need 
clarification. In the next chapter we shall examine more closely these processes or 
operations of the subject. 
McGinn (2000) calls our attention to Wittgenstein's ideas concerning 
language and explanations which he presents as follows. "We must do away with all 
explanations ... " (PI # 126). Instead we should redirect our efforts to the investigation 
of language. His belief is that the problems that confront us in philosophy are rooted 
in the misunderstanding of the logic of our language (PI # 93). McGinn, in presenting 
Wittgenstein's view, points out that language is both the source of philosophical 
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problems and the means to overcome them Hence, "Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (PI # 109). 
McGinn agrees with Wittgenstein on this matter of solving philosophical 
problems through clarification of language. He recognises Wittgenstein's idea of "a 
grammatical investigation" (2000: 13) as being central to Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy. 
We argue that the aspect of "a grammatical investigation" is an approach or a 
method like any other, just as formal logic is. It is one of the methods that lead to 
understanding. The means itself is not ultimately basic. What is ultimately basic is 
what puts the means into practice or what makes judgement about whether the means 
works or not and that is the subject-in-act. Neither is following the rule, in the case of 
the language-games, that is ultimately basic. What is ultimately basic is a set of 
operations, defining the subject-in-act: the subject wondering and asking questions, 
seeking to understand and critical of his own interpretations. We now proceed with 
our discussion of the general exposition of Wittgenstein's ideas. Thereafter we shall 
discuss his attempt to make atomic propositions foundational to knowledge and 
fmally discuss his views on following a rule in the language-games. 
2.1.3 Resumi of Wlttgenste;n's Ideas on Atomic Propositions and on Language-
Games 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein aims at establishing a structure of atomic propositions. 
These propositions represent facts. It is these facts which picture the world. He 
developed Whitehead's and Russell's legacy of logical symbolism comprising 
variables and constants - variables representing simple statements linked together by 
logical constants. His endeavour was to create a logical language that would serve as 
a measure for reflecting the facts in the logical world. This would free them from the 
semantic vagueness found in the ordinary language. Wittgenstein wanted to create a 
logically perfect language based on logical syntax operated by rules and laws oflogic. 
Using logical rules, laws and symbols, he emphasised logical syntactical structure 
more than deep semantic structure. In other words, logical symbolism should have a 
one-to-one representation with the facts which they symbolise. This would help to 
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reduce the confusion caused by the multifarious semantic interpretations characteristic 
in ordinary language. 
He developed the picture theory. In this theory Wittgenstein advanced an 
argument that while words in ordinary language could be multi-definitional a picture 
could not. The picture would map reality as it was. This conviction made him divide 
propositions into two clear-cut categories. These were the a priori or pur~ly logical 
propositions, which were certain and indubitable, and the a posteriori, which were 
synthetic and probable. The a priori propositions yielded tautologies or logical truths; 
this meant that the rest of the natural and social sciences could be reflected in the a 
posteriori or synthetic propositions. He created a situation where propositions were 
either logically determinate or empirically determinate. This fact is implied in his 
propositions, such as "All deductions are made a priori (Trac. 5.133). "The 
propositions of logic are tautologies" (Trac. 5.133). "What is certain a priori proves 
to be something purely logical" (Trac. 6.3211). 
However, with time, Wittgenstein became disenchanted with logic altogether 
and turned to ordinary language. He shifted from the position from where atomic 
propositions pictured reality, to language use. He advanced a new theory that 
language played a social role and therefore should be looked at in terms of its 
functions in society. The concern of the individual was to learn and strictly follow the 
rules that governed language use. It was the mastery and expertise in this endeavour 
that enabled the individual to play what Wittgenstein called the language-games. He 
introduces the idea of "language-games" by using the analogy of a teacher pointing to 
objects and naming them; and the student repeating what the teacher had uttered. He 
says, 
In the practice of the use of language ... one party calls out the words the other 
acts on them ... the learner names the object.. . when the teacher points ... I 
shall ... call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven, the "language-games" (PI # 7). 
Although Wittgenstein introduces the idea of the language-games rather 
simplistically, this new development marked a fundamental change in his thinking. 
He shifted from a position where language played a dual role: that of pure logic and 
that of fact. His perspective changed from that of logical relations, states of affairs, 
propositional symbols, and what they symbolised or pictured, to semantics in the 
language use. He was disappointed by his earlier thought that though tautologies 
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carried "value true", all the time, as demonstrated in the use of truth-table matrices, 
they had no epistemic value. That is they could not give factual information. He 
points out that: "one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use 
and learn from that" (PI # 340). 
Here Wittgenstein is placing language in a social context. He concluded that 
logic was now a spent force as a way of fully capturing our knowledge, or as an 
adequate framework for all our knowledge. It was high time for him to devise another 
modus operandi - the language-games - in which the formal structural symbols were 
replaced by semantic usages of human language. He became aware of the infinite 
variety of ways in which language could be used. It was not proper to reduce language 
to mere naming of objects and describing states of affairs. Language, with its many 
uses, played a cardinal role in society. 
To illustrate his thoughts, we shall look at his own example of following a rule 
m the language-game. In the example in section 2.3, Wittgenstein argues that 
knowledge and understanding of reality can be achieved by looking at what 
everybody is doing in society and folloWing it. We now turn to the atomic or 
elementary propositions. 
2.2 Fonnal Logic as Ultimately Basic to Knowing 
2.2.1 Atomic Propositions Foundation fOT knowing: TTactotus Logico-
Philosophicus 
In his earlier thoughts in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is concerned with establishing a 
language that can give knowledge of all reality or the world as he sees it. He divides 
the world into atomic facts and not things. These facts are expressed by atomic or 
elementary propositions. He structures these propositions in logical form He uses 
logical symbols and connectives to construct propositional signs. It is these 
propositional signs, constructed in logical form, that picture the whole of reality. It is 
this idea of finding a pure language in the form of atomic or elementary propositions 
that preoccupies Wittgenstein's mind in his earlier thoughts. 
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2.2.2 Atomic (Elementary) Proposition Reflecting Knowledge of all Reality: Some 
of WlItgenste;n's Early Assumptions 
In this particular section we shall quote extensively from Tractatus. This is because 
of the uniqueness in Wittgenstein' s style of writing. He writes using propositions 
which he numbers. An attempt to change this style to the ordinary continuous prose in 
order to summarise his ideas would mean paraphrasing the numbered propositions. 
Since these propositions are in some cases cryptic and in some cases technical, the 
attempt to paraphrase them could result in loss of their original meaning. So we quote 
his propositions the way he puts them, in order to retain their originality. We will 
select only those propositions that have direct relevance to formal logic picturing all 
reality in Wittgenstein's sense. 
2.2.2.1 Reality: the World is Facts 
Wittgenstein begins by placing the reader in the framework of the world as he sees it, 
that is, all reality. In doing this he is preparing the reader for the picture theory that is 
supposed to picture the entire world through atomic or elementary propositions. 
The world is all that is the case (Trac.1). The world is the totality of facts, not 
of things (1.1). The world is determined by facts, and their being all the facts 
(1.11). For the totality offacts determines what is the case and also what is not 
the case (l.12). The facts in the logical space are the world (1.13). The world 
divides into facts (1.2). What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of 
affairs (2). A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects 
(things) (2.0.1). It is essential to things that they should be possible 
constituents of states of affairs (2.0 ll). 
In the above statements, Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to two_cardinal 
elements. There is the element of things or objects and the element of states of affairs. 
By states of affairs he means that the world is orderly and organised. If that were not 
the case, then the world would be made up of scattered objects and things without any 
order whatsoever. So it is vital that things and objects be organised in states of affairs. 
It is this orderly world - states of affairs - which constitutes facts. The world_therefore 
is made of facts, not of things. That is what he means by "world" or reality, is what 
the whole thing means (to us): how it is configured. You never get "objects" alone, in 
isolation. 
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1.1.1.1 Configuration of Objects 
Wittgenstein proceeds to consolidate his idea of states of affairs and facts through 
what he called the configuration of objects. 
Objects, the Wlalterable, and the substance are one and the same (2.027). 
Objects are what is and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and 
unstable (2.0271). The configuration of objects produces states of affairs 
(2.0272). In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like a link of a chain 
(2.03). In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate position with one 
another (2.031). The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which 
states of affairs do not exist (2.05). The sum total of reality is the world (2.63). 
In the above statements, Wittgenstein provides a clear perspective of what he means 
by "The world is all that is the case" (Trac. 1). He establishes relationships between 
what he calls substance and states of affairs or facts, which, in turn, are supposed to 
make up reality. It is clear that there are objects. These objects configure into states of 
affairs that are tantamoWlt to facts. It follows that the structure of states of affairs 
forms the structure of facts. It is this arrangement that gives us the pattern of facts as 
we see them 
In a state of affairs objects do not relate to one another in a haphazard manner. 
They stand in a determinate position, fitting into one another like a link of a chain. It 
is that orderly scenario which projects the world intelligibly. 
1.1.1.3 Picturing Reality 
In the propositions below Wittgenstein moves from the configuration of facts to how 
these facts are projected in picture form 
We picture facts to ourselves (2.1). A picture presents a situation in the logical 
space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs (2.11). In a picture 
objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them (2.13). In a 
picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (2.131). 
What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a 
determinate way (2.14). The fact that the elements of a picture are related to 
one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one 
another in the same way. Let us call this connection of the elements the 
structures of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the 
pictorial form of the picture (2.15). That is how a picture is related to reality. It 
reaches right out to it ... (2.1511). What a picture must have in common with 
reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in the way it 
does, is itself pictorial form (2.17). A picture can depict any reality whose 
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form it has. A picture can depict any thing spatial, a coloured one any thing 
coloured, etc (2.171). 
For Wittgenstein, practising the epistemology of empiricism, it is only the material 
objects that make sense to him We saw that, according to him, the material world 
fIrst confIgures into states of affairs and facts within the logical space. Now we see 
that facts are captured in pictorial form. This form is in a state of symbols and 
propositional signs. A propositional picture is enough to reflect the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs or facts . 
In the logical space, objects and their elements get assimilated in the picture, 
making determinate relationships. These determinate relationships, among the 
elements of the picture, constitute a structure. The structures of the elements are 
tantamount to its form. The pictorial form reflects a commensurate relationship 
between things or objects and the elements of a picture. It is this scenario that projects 
the relationship between the material objects that makes sense to him We saw that, 
according to Wittgenstein, the material world first configures into states of affairs and 
facts within the logical space. Now we see that facts are captured in pictorial form. 
This form is in a state of symbols and propositional signs. A propositional picture is 
enough to reflect the existence and non-existence of states of affairs or facts. 
In the logical space objects and their elements get assimilated in the picture 
making determinate relationships. These determinate relationships among the 
elements of the picture constitute a structure. The structures of the elements are 
tantamount to its form. The pictorial form reflects a commensurate relationship 
between things or objects and the elements of a picture. It is this scenario, which 
projects the relationship between the picture and reality. There is a correlation 
between the picture and what is pictured. The picture and what it depicts must be 
identical in form. Above all, what is cardinal between the picture and what is pictured 
is the pictorial or propositional form That is what enables the picture to depict any 
reality whose form it has. 
2.2.2.4 Facts in Logical Form 
Still within the picture milieu, Wittgenstein extends his propositions to logical form, 
as stipulated in the propositions below. 
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What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality in 
order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is 
logical form, i.e., the form of reality (2.18). Every picture is at the same time a 
logical one. (On the other hand, not a very picture is, for example, a spatial 
one) (2.182). Logical pictures can depict the world (2.19). A picture has 
logical - pictorial form in common with what it depicts (2.2). A picture depicts 
reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of 
affairs (2.201). A picture represents a possible situation in logical space 
(2.202). A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, 
true or false (2.21). What a picture represents it represents independently of its 
truth or falsity, by means of its picture form (2.22). In order to know whether a 
picture is true or false we must compare it with reality (2.223). It is impossible 
to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false (2.224). 
It is evident that Wittgenstein exemplifies systematicity in his presentation He 
moves from objects or things to states of affairs or facts and then to pictorial form He 
now extends his line of thought to logic. In his exposition he shows that reality is not 
pictured haphazardly. States of affairs or facts are pictured in a logical form Logical 
pictures depict the world. This is so because a picture has logical-pictorial form with 
what it depicts. A picture is supposed to agree or not to agree with reality. If it is not 
logical then its correctness or incorrectness, truth or falsity cannot be determined. 
Here we must add that comparing a picture with reality can sometimes be hugely 
problematic. This is particularly so as the picture may be two-dimensional and reality 
is three-dimensional, not to mention other realities such as hunger, wish, hate and 
love. These may be difficult to symbolise or picture. In that respect it is difficult to 
envisage how a picture, and what it depicts, can have a one-to-one representation 
2.2.2.5 Logic and Thought in a Subject-Less Milieu 
In the propositions below, Wittgenstein combines logic and thought in a subject-less 
milieu 
A logical picture of facts is a thought (3). A state of affairs is thinkable: What 
this means is that we can picture it to ourselves (3.001) The totality of true 
thoughts is a picture of the world (3.01) .... what is thinkable is possible too 
(3.2). Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should 
have to think illogically (3.03). We use the perceptible sign of a proposition 
(spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of 
projection is to think of the sense of the proposition (3.11). I call a sign with 
which we express a thought a propositional sign .... (3.12). 
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Perhaps unaware, in combining logic, facts and thought, Wittgenstein presupposes the 
operations of the subject. That is, the subject examines this combination and judges 
the truth in what constitutes it. He crystallises a logical picture of facts into a thought. 
In saying that a state of affairs is thinkable, he presupposes an operation, which is 
implied in the phrase " ... we can picture it to ourselves." The expression " ... true 
thoughts ... " implies an operation The establishment of truth also involves judgement; 
judgement is an operation Thus, when he says that the totality of true thoughts is a 
picture of the world, he implies that the world can be understood after the operation of 
judging the thoughts as being true. If thoughts cannot be illogical and since thinking is 
an operation, it is because of this operation that we cannot think illogically. He says 
that the method of projection is to think of a sense of a proposition 
We know that Wittgenstein's method is to project facts by mappmg or 
picturing them in propositions. If the method of projection is to think of the sense of 
what is projected, and thinking is the operation of the subject, then the entire method 
of projecting is subject-based. This will be argued in full in the section on analysis. 
Combining facts, thought and logic is problematic outside the framework of the 
operations of the subject. This problem remains as long as Wittgenstein continues to 
regard the subject as a metaphysical limit outside the framework of the world of facts . 
A full discussion of our alternative notion of the subject is set out in Chapter Three. 
2.2.2.6 Deductive Derivation 
In the propositions below Wittgenstein introduces a case that is particularly relevant 
to deductive logic. It is a case where truth of the premises necessarily leads to truth of 
the conclusion; or where the truth of the conclusion is necessarily derived from the 
truth of the premises. 
If all truth-grounds that are conumn to a number of propositions are at the 
same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then we say that the truth of 
a proposition follows from the truth of the others (5.11). In particular, the truth 
of a proposition ' p' follows from the truth of another proposition ' q' if all the 
truth-grounds of the latter are the truth-grounds of the former (5. 12).The truth-
ground of the one are contained in those of the other: p follows from q (5.121). 
Ifp follows from q, the sense of'p' is contained in the sense of'q' (5.122). A 
proposition affirms every proposition that follows from it (5.124). Logic must 
look after itself.. .. In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic 
(5.473). 
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The above case stipulates consistency in deductive reasoning. As far as logic is 
concerned there is no problem; as long as we adhere to the rules of logic, as the 
computer does, we may not make mistakes, but if logic is to map the world of facts of 
ordinary life then there is a problem. This is because propositions, which picture facts 
in ordinary life, may not necessarily adhere to strict application of the rules of logic, 
as implied in the above case. 
2.2.2.7 Subject-Less World of Facts 
The propositions below show Wittgenstein' s views on the subject. Wittgenstein' s 
world is the world of facts. The subject appears only as a metaphysical entity, with no 
functional role in this world. 
There is no such a thing as a subject that thinks or entertains ideas ... . (5.631). 
The subject does not belong to the world; it is a limit of the world (5.632). 
Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a 
non-psychological way. What brings the subject into philosophy is the fact 
that ''the world is my world". The philosophical self is not a human being, not 
the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather 
the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world, not a part of it (5.641). 
According to Wittgenstein, it is the atomic propositions that reflect all knowledge 
about the world. So the thinking subject who entertains ideas is unnecessary in the 
world of pictured facts. Wittgenstein projects the world as he perceives it; it is his 
empirical world in which the subject forms the boundary. The subject is neither a 
material body nor a psychological soul, but a function-less metaphysical self 
This stand, when linked to Wittgenstein' s earlier propositions, "A logical 
picture of facts is a thought" (Trac.3). And "I call a sign with which we express a 
thought a prepositional sign ... " (3.121) creates a problem which Wittgenstein does 
not solve. It is difficult to envisage the existence of a thought-less metaphysical 
subject at the limit of the factual world, playing no role in that world, in the former 
propositions, and at the same time talk of "thought", which is the operation of the 
subject in the latter propositions. Thought is a function of the subject; whether that 
subject is metaphysical or otherwise. The operations of the subject must participate in 
the factual world if that world is to be intelligible. We can see that Wittgenstein holds 
a spectator's view of knowledge. His problem is that he needs an unquestioned 
starting point, that is, the point outside the world of objects that identifies the objects 
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or names them The problem here is that if the subject is also an object then how can 
we have knowing and naming? As we shall argue in the next chapter, this spectator 
view of knowledge is solved by Lonergan's idea of the presence to self 
2.2.2.8 Transcendence of Logic 
As far as logic is concerned, the proposition below crowns Wittgenstein's stand on 
logic. "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. Logic is 
transcendental" (6.13). Because it is not a body of doctrine therefore it is 
transcendental. In our case, we assert that logic (formal logic) is not transcendental. It 
is the subject-in-act who is transcendental, that is to say, the subject-based set of 
operations participate both in logic and in the world. Since logic is a social activity it 
is part of the world. 
2.2.3 Scope of Human Knowledge: Hudson's Clarification of W'lItgenstein's Early 
Thought 
We begin our analysis of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, namely that the scope of 
human knowledge can be founded on atomic or elementary propositions, with 
Hudson's clarification. While other authors like Fogelin, (1979) concentrate on 
criticising Wittgenstein's views, Hudson, (1968) helps us to give a general overview 
of what Wittgenstein's earlier thought in the Tractatus was all about. In the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein was working out the logic of the view that the meaning of language is its 
referent, or that language is truth functional. That was the foundation of his thought in 
working out his theory that reality can be represented by atomic or elementary 
propositions. By the term referent, Wittgenstein means the object to which language 
refers. As he puts it, "A name means an object. An object is its meaning" (Trac. 
3.203). He proceeds to say that an object can be indicated either verbally, by 
definition, or ostensively, by pointing. For instance, we can identify a typewriter by 
defining or pointing at the typewriter. By pointing we are indicating the thing to 
which the word "typewriter" refers. The expression, "the meaning of a word is its 
referent" is equivalent to the expression "language is truth functional. " In other words, 
for meaning to be meaning there must be a referent. As we shall see in this chapter, 
this is what forms the basis ofWittgenstein's early thought. 
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Wittgenstein' s principal task was to show that the world, in his sense, could be 
understood through logical language. In fact, Hudson reminds us that 
Wittgenstein was not concerned as the philologist or physicist might have 
been, to show how ... words are used or the world is made. His investigation 
was not empirical, but entirely logical (1968: 8). 
So what Wittgenstein is trying to establish is how the world can be known through the 
pure logical language. 
At the initial stages of his thought, he talks of logical "simples" and matches 
these logical simples with "objects" and from there he proceeds logically to language 
and reality. 
At the beginning of his thought he makes it clear that in order for meaning to 
be meaning it must satisfy two criteria The first criterion is that there must be an 
object to which meaning refers. In other words, there must be a referent or referents. 
The second criterion is that meaning must be determinate. That is, it must refer to one 
"simple" or one object. In that respect, logical language must follow the following 
trend. First, it must have meaning. Secondly, this meaning must refer to an object, or 
else it will not be meaning at all. Thirdly, this meaning must be determinate. It must 
refer to one and only one object; or else meaning will be ambiguous. He puts it as 
follows, "A proposition has one and only one complete analysis" (Trac. 3.25). That 
is, meaning must designate what something is and nothing else. Discourse must refer 
to something specific or else it would be logically impossible for us, as he puts it, to 
differentiate between meaningful and meaningless discourse. 
Here Hudson helps us to point out Wittgenstein's view that if meaning is 
referent and must be determinate then we can draw two types of inferences from that 
position. We can draw inferences concerning language and we can draw inferences 
concerning the world. 
We can say that these types of inference form the foundation ofWittgenstein's 
entire edifice of his earlier thought in the Tractatus and that is, as he puts it, " ... all 
meaningful language must in the last analysis be reducible to '" ' elementary 
propositions'" (Trac. 4.221). What could this possibly mean? In order to understand 
what Wittgenstein meant, Hudson, for purposes of illustration, takes us through the 
following example. "The motorcar is in the garage" (1968: 10). Wittgenstein's 
argument is that in order for this statement to be determinate it must be referring to a 
57 
particular motorcar. But, the problem is that this proposition is descriptive and 
therefore general. It does not tell us which particular motorcar is in the garage. The 
statement does not give us a determinate meaning. That means it is a complex 
proposition That makes it imperative to break it down into simpler propositions. It is 
these simpler propositions that will eliminate its indeterminateness. Hudson gives us a 
possible breakdown of this complex statement. In our analysis we can be more 
specific and say that the motorcar in question is a Ford Zephyr. But still this does not 
help us, because there are so many Ford Zephyrs. This means we shall go on with our 
analysis until we reach one statement, which refers to one particular or specific Ford 
Zephyr, that is, a statement which will be determinate. It will be that one proposition 
which will be atomic or elementary. It will be that determinate proposition which will 
have meaning, because it makes the object what it is and nothing else. 
After establishing the case that an atomic proposition must be both 
determinate and meaningful, the next question that Wittgenstein examines, is how to 
get to the atomic proposition. He proceeds as follows: "An atomic proposition 
consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names" (Trac. 4.22). In other 
words, we come to an atomic proposition through names. But then another question 
emerges and that is, what does Wittgenstein mean by "name"? Hudson helps to clarify 
what Wittgenstein means. Wittgenstein does not mean a proper name such as 
"Smith. " He uses the term name in the logical sense or, as Hudson puts it, 
.... It was not proper names but the logically proper names of simple objects. 
A "name" or a "simple sign" is a term which does not describe but designates 
or denotes, that of which it is the name: and so it can refer to that and that 
alone (1968: 11). 
Here Wittgenstein means that it is such names that are meaningful and determinate 
which, when combined, constitute atomic propositions. If a nexus or a concatenation 
of names is meaningful and determinate, then the propositions made of such a nexus 
are also meaningful and determinate. It is such a case which eliminates the possibility 
of a procedure which would have turned out to be ad infinitum, that is, where 
propositions replace other propositions or words replace other words. According to 
Wittgenstein, it should not be possible for propositions to go on replacing other 
propositions or words replacing other words. Words must refer directly to things, or, 
as Wittgenstein puts it, "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the 
requirement that sense be determinate" (Trac. 3.23). So from this exposition 
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Wittgenstein draws his basic proposition, as explained by Hudson, " ... the ultimate 
constituents oflanguage must be ' elementary propositions and names'" (1968: 11). 
This is how Wittgenstein formulates his maxim that atomic or elementary 
propositions are basic to reality, reality according to Wittgenstein being the logical 
world. 
This exposition reflects how Wittgenstein projects his first inference, which 
concerns the logical language. After this exposition a question emerges: what is the 
world in the Wittgenstein sense and how do we come to know it? As an answer to this 
question, Wittgenstein proceeds to draw the second type of inference which concerns 
the world or reality. The world, according to Wittgenstein, must, in the final analysis, 
consist of "simple objects". We can only use language to refer to them by naming 
them and not by describing them This is because language can only refer to simple 
things, if it is to be referent and determinate. Descriptions are to some degree 
indeterminate. It therefore remains logically necessary for the world to which 
language refers to consist, in the last analysis, of simple objects; as Wittgenstein puts 
it, "Objects make up the substance of the world ... " (Trac. 2.021). From this, 
Wittgenstein proceeds to assert that these objects do not exist in isolation. They 
translate into a nexus or a concatenation of facts. As he says, "The world divides into 
facts" (Trac. 1.2). "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects 
(things)" (Trac. 2.01). From there, his second inference then comes, while language 
reduces to atomic or elementary propositions which consist of names, the world or 
states of affairs consist of objects. 
This is how Wittgenstein' s maxim emerges that we can come to know the 
world or reality through atomic propositions. For the present case, as we shall argue, 
the atomic or elementary propositions, or any other type of propositions emanating 
from other systems like natural sciences, or propositions such as postulates or axioms, 
are only a means to knowing reality, indeed all reality but not basic or foundational to 
this knowing. It is the subject-in-act, who in the first place is responsible for the 
creation, or the formation, of these propositions and who is basic or foundational to 
them 
That said, however, we have not answered the question fully of how, 
according to Wittgenstein, we get to know his world or reality. Wittgenstein attempts 
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to answer this question using his idea of the picture theory. His position here, as we 
shall discuss later in this chapter, is that, as Hudson summarises, "language reduces to 
elementary propositions which consists of names: the world to states of affairs which 
consist of objects" (1968: 13). In other words, it is the atomic or elementary 
propositions which represent the world or reality. 
We now proceed to see, through Hudson, how Wittgenstein attempts to enable 
us to know the world through the picture theory. First of all, what is the picture 
theory? This is a theory that a proposition is a logical picture of a situation. In order 
for this to be the case, Hudson identifies three conditions which must be fulfilled. The 
first one is that the elements of the proposition must correspond one-for-one to the 
elements of the states of affairs, or the atomic fact, represented. In other words, there 
must be as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents. What does 
Wittgenstein mean by this? Perhaps, before we proceed, we should clarify what 
Wittgenstein means by "states of affairs" and "situations". States of affairs consist of 
elements that are simple objects. These objects are expressed through names. A 
concatenation of these names makes an atomic fact. An atomic fact is a combination 
of simple objects. Situations, on the other hand, comprise molecular facts. They can 
be broken down and analysed into simple facts. 
Since situations are molecular facts, they are therefore deceptive. That means 
they cannot represent reality. It is the atomic facts, which comprise simple objects, 
which can represent reality. This clarification explains why the first condition is 
necessary. As we said, in order to have reality the elements of the proposition must 
correspond one-for-one with the elements of the states of affairs or the atomic fact 
represented. For instance, if an artist draws a picture of a glass and a jug on a tray, 
then in that picture there must be a representation of a glass, a jug and a tray. 
The second condition, which must be fulfilled before the atomic proposition 
can picture reality, concerns the features of the proposition and the simple object, 
which are represented or expressed. In the picture, there must be a featuristic 
representation Objects which are represented in the picture are "simples" expressed 
by names. Wittgenstein' s point is that a mere list of names cannot represent a state of 
affairs. These names must form an atomic fact, which represents reality. As 
Wittgenstein puts it, "Only facts express a sense, a set of names cannot" (Trac.3.142). 
In other words, a picture should portray a logical arrangement. The simples or the 
60 
objects, which form the atomic fact must portray a logical structure or framework. 
The simples should not be scattered haphazardly, but must be arranged in the picture 
in a way that what they represent is arranged in reality. 
The third condition, which must be fulfilled if the picture is to represent 
reality, is that the proposition must be correlated by the law of projection with the 
states of affairs which it represents. As he puts it, "A proposition is a propositional 
sign in its projective relation to the world" (Trac. 3.12). Here we again ask 
ourselves what Wittgenstein means by this condition. Before we answer this, it is 
essential to differentiate at this level between a proposition and a prepositional sign. 
Hudson reminds us that, according to Wittgenstein, a propositional sign is a sentence, 
which may be written or spoken, which expresses the proposition. The propositional 
sign consists of words. It is what these words express which is the proposition. 
Hudson gives the example of "the cat is on the mat". This example consists of the 
proposition and the propositional sign. The propositional sign is made of six simple 
signs, but the proposition itself is not. 
What Wittgenstein means by a proposition must be correlated by a law of 
projection with the state of affairs, which it represents, is exposed in following 
example. 
There is a general rule by means of which a musician can obtain the symphony 
from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the 
groove of the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score 
again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between things, which seem 
to be constructed in such an entirely different way. And that rule is the law of 
projection, which projects the symphony into the language of musical 
notation. It is the rule of translating this language into the language of 
gramophone records (Trac. 4.0141). 
In simple terms, what Wittgenstein is saying here is that there must be a correlation 
between the words that constitute the propositional sign and the named simples or 
objects. If that were not the case it would be impossible for one to make sense from 
the propositional sign of the proposition that it expresses. In order for an atomic 
proposition to represent reality, it must fu1fi1 those three conditions. 
The explanation of how atomic propositions picture reality could not be 
completed without discussing the relationship between names of objects, which 
constitute the atomic or elementary propositions, and the atomic propositions 
themselves. According to Wittgenstein, propositions, whether true or false, do make 
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sense, as Hudson exemplifies. He gives the example of "Edinburgh is the capital of 
England" (1968: 15) as making sense, though the statement is false. The proposition 
is false but still meaningful. It is meaningful because it is a possible picture of a 
situation. To reiterate, a "situation" comprises molecular facts, which are analysable 
into atomic facts. In the example above, the proposition remains meaningful but it is 
the situation that it pictures that is not available. That does not make the proposition 
nonsensical or meaningless. That said about propositions, what about names? In order 
for a name to make sense or to have meaning, it must have a referent. A name without 
a referent is meaningless or nonsensical. Hudson gives the example of "Ipe", (1 %8: 
15) which is a name. The expression "Ipe" will not make sense to anyone unless it is 
explained first. But a proposition such as "Wittgenstein once thought of becoming a 
professional musician", whether it is true or not, still makes sense, as long as we know 
the objects which the names in the final analysis refer to. 
Wittgenstein concludes that names have reference and propositions have 
sense. What is common to both is meaning. So if we are to understand the meaning of 
simple signs or words, they must be explained to us first. With propositions, however, 
Wittgenstein continues to say, we make ourselves understood, as long as we know the 
meaning of the simples that constitute the proposition So all in all we get to know 
reality by comparing it with the atomic propositions which represent it. 
But, that said, Wittgenstein in the picture theory still has one more question to 
answer, and that is the role of the "logical constants" in the propositions. What role do 
constants, such as the negation or the ampersand, play? Wittgenstein is of the opinion 
that logical constants are not representative. This is because logical constants do not 
name objects as other non-logical words do. For instance, we can take "not" as an 
example. If "not" named an object in the expression such as "- - P" we would have a 
situation where ''P'' would name an object and two other objects. By using the logical 
rule of double negation, it would be impossible from "- - P" to get "P", because the 
logical constant "not" cannot logically refer to any object. 
This aspect is fundamental because, as Hudson reminds us, Wittgenstein 
regards all propositions as truth functions of atomic or elementary propositions. What 
this means is that any complex proposition can be broken down, in the last analysis, 
into propositions consisting only of objects. This would mean that the truth or falsity 
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of the complex proposition would depend on whether the atomic facts, or the states of 
affairs to which these refer, do, or do not, exist. 
To illustrate this point, Hudson gives the following example. Let "A" 
represent the proposition "Tom is in the house and Mary is in the garden". In this 
proposition "and" is the constant. The whole proposition can be broken down into 
simpler propositions: Al ''Tom is in the house" and A2 "Mary is in the garden". 
Accordingly, if Al is true and A2 is also true then A is true. On the other hand, if 
either Al or A2 or both are false, then A is false. This means that the truth-value of A 
depends only on the truth-values of Al and A2. The constant "and" only connects 
them So "and" is simply a connector and not a representative of any object. That is, 
in order to know whether Al or A2 is true or false, we do not need to know the truth-
value of "and", as distinct from the truth-values of Al and A2. 
We can say that it is this brief exposition which underlies or forms the 
foundation for the whole of Wittgenstein's early thought in the Tractatus. We now 
proceed with the analysis of the Tractatus itself Our main objective in this analysis is 
to show that Wittgenstein was not particularly right to make atomic or elementary 
propositions basic to the knowing of all reality without the subject-in-act. We shalL 
therefore, in the rest of the thesis, show that it is not the atomic propositions which are 
basic or foundational to the knowing which can be uncovered in all disciplines and 
areas of inquiry, scientific, historicaL theological and commonsense, to mention a 
few. What is basic is the subject-in-act. 
2.2.4 The Subject as a Necessary Factor in the Projection of all Reality: Analysis 
and Critique of Wittgenstein's Early Assumptions 
In this section we wish to reflect on Wittgenstein's early assumptions, giving our view 
on them We also wish to introduce the concept of the set of operations defining the 
subject-in-act: the subject wondering and asking questions, seeking to understand, and 
critical of her own suggested interpretations. 
Although Wittgenstein begins by putting us in the framework of the world of 
states of affairs and facts, he does not mention the architect of the states of affairs and 
facts. Though later he talks of the metaphysical subject, he makes him the limit of the 
world. In other words, the subject is like any other object without the mind, or 
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someone who is unable to really advance in knowledge. Yet objects need to be 
organised into states of affairs or facts, by the mind. Clearly, this does not happen by 
accident. States of affairs should be organised at two levels: the empirical level and 
the rational level. 
It is clear that, hitherto, Wittgenstein has shown the basic structure of any 
thing that we can know or the world. He has also shown that the world of facts is the 
configuration of states of affairs. So far, so good. However, still he does not mention 
how the configuration comes to be. He projects the states of affairs and the 
configuration in a finished form By doing that he creates a gap. Neither the states of 
affairs nor the configuration of facts have the capacity to put themselves into 
existence, except through the mind. It could be argued, though, that configuration can 
be explained by the rules of natural science, for instance through the science of 
evolution. Even if that were to be the case, still it is the subject-in-act who interprets 
the rules of science. The subject-in-act questions science by examining its methods 
and making a decision on whether these methods are adequate or not. So it is this 
subject-in-act who puts the world of facts in place. He does this through a set of 
operations. He thinks about a certain scenario and thereafter generates suitable 
propositions which are commensurate with that scenario. 
So we contend that the generation of knowledge of states of affairs or facts 
come to be through deliberate operations of the subject-in-act. It is the subject-in-act 
who formulates states of affairs from "things" or "objects" into facts . It is still the 
subject-in-act who configures these facts . The world of facts exists as a consequence 
of deliberate operations by the subject. 
Our concern is that, even in the picture theory, there is no way Wittgenstein 
can alienate the subject-in-act. Wittgenstein' s very statement, "we picture facts to 
ourselves" is indicative of the presence of the subject-in-act. Picturing facts to 
ourselves presupposes perception and interpretation We are not exposing the objects 
to a blank film A subject is supposed to make sense out of the picture. This fact calls 
for the set of operations to perceive, analyse, synthesise and pass judgement about 
what has been projected. In Chapter Three, using Lonergan' s concept of the subject, 
we shall elaborate on the operations of the subject-in-act. 
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Wittgenstein, with his idea of picturing facts, succeeds in starting us on what 
may be regarded as the philosophical method. But he does not complete it. Meynell 
summarises what we will show in detail on Lonergan in Chapter Three. He shows 
how the subject acquires knowledge in a way that is particularly relevant to 
philosophy. This is how: The subject, 
... has attended to the evidence relevant to his topic; he has thought of a 
number of ways in which that evidence can be accounted for; and he has 
preferred the account which best explains the evidence (Meynell, 1980:154). 
So it is not just picturing facts to ourselves that leads to our knowing or understanding 
the facts. Picturing facts can only be serving as the initial stage towards acquiring 
evidence, but the subject-in-act proceeds with the set of operations to verify what is 
pictured. 
This is how a knower - the subject-in-act - acquires knowledge. Her method is 
definitely different from that of a psychologist investigating knowledge. To a 
psychologist, knowledge may be acquired through feeling. For instance, the way one 
feels hunger, pain, anger, pleasure or depression. Although these may be described as 
knowledge, they are knowledge, but at the elementary level. They can be verified at 
that level. This type of verification is for the psychologist. Looking at it from this 
angle, understanding a fact of this nature is more or less automatic. It is a type of 
chain of cause and effect. There is almost no conscious effort required. If one is 
denied what is due to one, one becomes annoyed; and if it is given one is happy. This 
is particularly relevant to psychology. 
But, looking at facts, which in the Wittgenstein sense are consternations of 
atomic propositions, knowledge cannot be acquired simply through picturing. 
Picturing will only serve as the initial stage. In the philosophical sense the subject 
proceeds with the set of operations to verify what is pictured. To a knower - the 
subject-in-act - conscious effort to understand a fact is essential. Evidence must be 
acquired and examined intelligently and judgement as to its truth and relevance 
passed. So knowledge is not picturing and knowing as Wittgenstein puts it. In order to 
understand what is pictured, the subject-based operations must be involved. That may 
be described as the typical philosophical approach to knowing what is pictured. The 
philosophical approach includes 
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· .. wondering, envisagement of possibilities, forming of judgements and so 
on ... (Meynel~ 1980: 155). 
We can see that this is not causal knowledge, which may be acquired by 
exciting a sense so that a response is t riggered off; like someone seeing something 
they like most and laughing; neither is it getting trapped in one' s thought, as the 
Cartesian approach implies. But it is the subject-in-act involving a set of operations, 
self-conscious and present to herself: trying to reach objective truth from the level of 
picturing or the senses, all through rational intelligence to judgement of truth or 
relevance. In picturing and knowing the pictured facts Wittgenstein may be stopping 
at the elementary, or sense evidential level. That is only the beginning of the approach 
to knowing the facts . Wittgenstein succeeds in bringing us to this first level. 
We remain strongly convinced that agreement or disagreement between 
logical form or a logical picture and reality presupposes judgement. Again, 
correctness or incorrectness and truth or falsity presupposes correlation between the 
pictorial form or logical form and reality. A logical picture is a fact. We know that 
facts are constructed by a set of cognitional operations. Facts are states of affairs and 
states of affairs are thinkable. We know that thinking is the operation of the subject; 
so is judgement and correlation. Therefore the totality of true thoughts, which is a 
picture of the world, cannot be pictured by logical form alone, outside the operations 
of the subject. We must mention here, as will be shown, that the set of cognitional 
operations is still missing in Wittgenstein in his later attempted solution in the 
Philosophical Investigations. 
2.2.5 Summary of What Went Wrong in the Atomic Proposition Theory: Various 
Commentators 
2.2.5.1 Attempt to Make Atomic Propositions Basic 
In this section we shall use Wittgenstein' s ideas and those of the commentators on his 
work to show that it is not the atomic or elementary propositions in the picture theory 
or forrnallogic that are basic; but what is basic is the subject-based operations. 
Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, argued that all reality, in Wittgenstein' s sense, 
could be structured in atomic facts and then expressed through atomic propositions. It 
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is these atomic propositions that were to serve as a basis for understanding all reality. 
If all reality could be reduced to the ultimate atomic facts and then expressed in the 
atomic propositions, each proposition would have a one-to-one meaning with the fact 
it expresses. This situation would ensure that there is no more misunderstanding in 
philosophy, which would mean that the problems of philosophy would have been 
solved. 
Wittgenstein was not the first to think in terms of atomic ideas. The idea "of 
simples and ultimate entities .. . " (Stroll and Popkin, 1997: 45) emerged from the 
ancient Greek thinkers: Democritus and Epicurus. It is then picked up by RusselL 
who concludes that in the world there are two basic things, " .. . simples and facts ... " 
(1997: 448). According to Russell it is these simples which constitute facts; and it is 
these facts which make statements true or false. It is still Russell' s idea that 
... the world can be thought of as being the totality of facts there are (1997: 
449). 
At this stage Wittgenstein picks up the idea of facts with which he opens the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 'The world is the totality of facts ... " (Trac. 1. 1). 
Wittgenstein thought that he would solve the problems of ambiguity by constructing 
atomic structures through which atomic facts would be expressed. Since an atomic 
fact can have one and only one meaning, atomic propositions would eliminate the 
problems of ambiguity. The problem here is the thinking that objects in the world can 
be reduced to their ultimate simples, where each simple has one and only one 
meaning; then construct these simples into atomic propositions and finally make these 
propositions the basis of understanding all reality. 
Here we are concerned with Wittgenstein's failure to recognise the fact that 
establishing an atomic fact with one ultimate meaning requires the subject-in-act to 
examine an assortment of all possible meanings that can accrue to that atomic fact 
under different circumstances and conditions. Wittgenstein fails to realise that, even if 
atomic propositions were to express all reality, at the base of it all there would be 
need for the subject-in-act to determine the truth of those propositions. It is possible 
that an atomic proposition can mean one thing under certain conditions and a totally 
different thing under different conditions, a fact which Wittgenstein recognises later 
in the language-games. In order to determine whether an atomic proposition expresses 
truth or not, there should be the subject-in-act to make the right judgement. 
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2.2.5.2 Creation of one Universal Language (Formal Logic) 
The early Wittgenstein tries to establish a pure fonnal logical language, comprising 
logical syntax devoid of ordinary prose discourse, in which matters of reality could be 
established. In the process of advancing his efforts, he took logical empiricism to its 
logical conclusion, that is philosophy having no subject matter. He puts forward 
logical calculus, based on symbols or variables, and constants operating on laws and 
rules of logic as a language, which would objectively describe all reality. In order to 
comprehend all reality, all one needed was to calculate these symbols and one would 
be sure to reach objective truth. He confirIm this in his own words: "One can 
calculate whether a proposition belongs to logic, by calculating the logical properties 
of the symbol" (Trac. 6.126). 
We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalised 
propositions, i. e. without first correlating any name with a particular object 
(Trac. 5.526). 
His strong conviction was that form, or logical signs, could fully describe all reality, 
in complete disregard of content. FogeJin (1976) confirms Wittgenstein's conviction: 
He does believe that in a logically constructed language all logical questions 
can be settled without an appeal beyond the symbols themselves (1976: 53). 
McCarthy (1992) helps to shed light on Wittgenstein's problem He quotes 
him as saying, 
The logical constants and tautologies and contradictions are not semantically 
correlated to any strand of reality .... Logical constants have meaning without 
reference; tautologies have truth values without correspondence (1992: 106). 
McCarthy points out the problem between the logical structure and reality. Usually 
the sense of a proposition is seen in terms of its semantics. If there is no semantic 
correlation between the logical structure and reality, then it becomes difficult to see 
how the logical structure relates to reality. This is so because formal logic expresses 
form, while semantics express particularities. Hudson (1968) crowns this problem by 
pointing out that Wittgenstein " ... had been wrong ... because he had tried to impose 
on language preconceived ideas ... " (1968: 45). This is so because Wittgenstein had 
attempted to put in place one ideal language (formal logic) that would reflect all 
reality. What Hudson is saying is that language handles both general and particular 
matters. So for Wittgenstein to attempt to impose a kind of language (formal logic) as 
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a language that would reflect all reality was indeed misconceived, because logic 
would only give generalised truths, at the expense of particular truths. This would be 
expressing reality, but only partly. 
The problem that emerges with suggesting logic as the language that can give 
knowledge of reality is that logic leads to generalised knowledge. But reality is both 
general and particular. We live in the real concrete world of both the general and the 
particular. So a standard that focuses on the general, at the exclusion of the particular, 
in itself is not adequate as a means for expressing our affairs. 
Our concern in this particular respect is not very much whether logic can or 
cannot reflect reality, neither are we much concerned with whether symbols, laws and 
rules of logic can express reality better than ordinary prose language. Our concern is 
that logical language cannot be basic to the subject-in-act. Before logical language is 
put in place it has to be formulated first. This formulation requires the subject-in-act. 
It is for the subject to draw a distinction between what is logical language and what is 
not logical language; or whether the language in question is being used logically or 
not. At the level of the operation or functioning of the language, the subject-in-act is 
consciously and intelligently deciding whether the language in question is being used 
logically or not. This fact places the subject-in-act at the base of logic. He is 
inevitably placed in a position where he can judge its effectiveness. 
Apart from the application of logical language, even the formulation of the 
laws and rules of logic presupposes the subject-in-act. That is, intelligence, 
rationality, justification and judgement are required at this stage. Although logical 
symbols - variables and constants - may be arbitrary, it is for the subject-in-act to 
decide on what symbols, laws and rules are conveniently applicable in the 
construction of the logical language. Again it is for the subject-in-act to judge whether 
the variables, the constants, the rules and the laws are in appropriate interplay. So 
whether we look at logic at the level of applicability, or that of its formulation, it 
remains a fact that it is the subject-in-act who is basic or the starting point to the 
understanding and knowing of reality in al cases and not a subject-less logic. 
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2.2.5.3 A Non-functional Metaphys;col Subject 
The serious problem created by Wittgenstein is failure to recognise the role of the 
subject-in-act. This anomaly puts Wittgenstein in a contradictory position, as seen in 
"There is no such a thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (Trac. 5.631). 
This declaration seems to contradict the proposition made earlier "Everything that can 
be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put in words can be 
put clearly" (Trac. 4.116). It is clear that Wittgenstein is deliberately using the third 
person indirect expression in order to avoid the subject-in-act. "Everything that can be 
thought ... . " This expression presupposes the subject-in-act, that is the subject doing 
the thinking. 
Wittgenstein' s contradiction is amplified in his statement, 
A state of affairs is thinkable: what this means is that we can picture it to our 
selves (Trac. 3.001). 
We know that, according to Wittgenstein, "a state of affairs" is the atomic 
proposition. If a proposition is thinkable then inevitably there must be a thinker. What 
remains missing is the subject whose role would be to operationalise them 
So Wittgenstein is not particularly right in his assertion: 
.... What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that the world is my world. 
The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the 
human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, 
the limit of the world - not part of it (Trac. 5.641). 
In this assertion Wittgenstein creates a problem He accepts the presence of a 
metaphysical subject. However, he does not assign him any role in the knowable 
world. He actually excludes him from the world of knowable reality. This is a 
mistake. Formal logic cannot operate on its own, without the conscious and active 
operations of the subject-in-act. 
Precisely what went wrong was that Wittgenstein attempted to r~move formal 
logic from its context, that is the subject-in-act. In this he failed. The subject must 
continue to participate in the formulation and interpretation of the rules and laws of 
logic. He attempted to create a logical language in form of atomic or elementary 
propositions, which would map or picture the whole of reality, without involving the 
subject-based set of operations. Again he failed in this endeavour. 
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2.2.6 Relevance ofWlItgenstein's Ideas on the Operations of the Subject. Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus: Various ConUMntators 
In this sub-section, we shall show that formal logic functions in its context. The 
context of logic is the subject-in-act whose operations are to observe, wonder, ask 
questions, reason or make justifications and judgements. 
Wittgenstein's stand on the atomic or elementary propositions in the picture 
theory, or formal logic representing all reality, was bound to fail. He admits this fact 
himself 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical ... . (Trac. 6.54). 
We cannot agree more with Fogelin (1979), when he says, "Wittgenstein's approach 
... is not only destructive but self-destructive" (1979: 112). Van Peursen (1996) helps 
to illustrate this problem with an example where, 
... the logical symbolism of a proposition ... and language are unable to express 
their own factual agreement with reality (1996: 44). 
We express this fact in the use of the truth table calculus; where a proposition 
such as "- (P v Q)" is logically equivalent to "- P & - Q". Both propositions have the 
same truth values: 
P Q -(P v Q) - P & - Q 
T T E T T T FT E FT 
T F E T T F F T E TF 
F T E F T T T F E FT 
F F I F F F T F I TF 
This fact is in consonance with the rules of logic. That is, whatever truth values of ''P'' 
and "Q", the two sentences agree on truth value. As we can see, the two propositions 
are only equivalent in logical form. The case will be different, however, if the two 
propositions are expressed in prose or content form, that is when actual propositions 
substitute the symbols. Let us look at some examples from the English language. "It is 
not true that I go to town or I have some tea" This means that I might do neither. I 
71 
might have some coffee at home instead. Or "It is not true that I go to town and it is 
not true that I take some tea." This means nothing about what I might do. Another 
example is, "P v Q" where "P" is ' '1 have some tea" and "Q" is ' '1 have some coffee. " 
In the English language "I have some tea or I have some coffee" means not both. In 
logic, however, it means some tea, some coffee, or both. 
These examples help to emphasise the fact that logic separated from content 
continues to express general principles and leaves out the particulars. Since reality 
consists of both the general and the particular, a situation that reflects only the general 
is not adequately reflecting reality in all cases. 
There is no justification for Wittgenstein to side-step or marginalize the 
subject-in-act in favour of atomic propositions or formal logic, however justified he 
might think he is. In this respect, Wittgenstein' s proposition, "logic must look after 
itself' (Trac. 5.473), becomes null and void and should be appropriately replaced by: 
logic should be looked after by the subject-in-act. Although Wittgenstein is at pains to 
avoid the subject, at times he fmds himself face to face with the subject, as is evident 
in the following assertion 
Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a 
body of doctrines but an activity. Philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions", but rather in 
the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy 
and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries (Trac. 
4.112). 
Wittgenstein's trend of reasoning had hitherto reflected that propositions, 
whether logically determinate or referentially determinate, are supposed to picture or 
mirror reality. But now, according to the quoted assertion above, philosophy is not 
projected as substantial alongside other sciences such as physics, biology or 
psychology, but operational. In the operational status it becomes an activity. It is 
common knowledge that an activity, in itself, cannot operate. Wittgenstein points out 
that 
The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is 
not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical 
propositions", but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear 
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and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and 
blurred (Trac. 4.112). 
If philosophy is not substantial but operational, what can "its" possibly mean? If 
elucidation is operational and philosophy has also become an operation; how can an 
operation carry out another operation? Wittgenstein has cornered himself into a tight 
position, where he cannot underrate the function of the subject-in-act. Wittgenstein's 
proposition, (Trac. 4.112) could be restructured so that the "it" becomes the 
"knower"- the subject-in-act - who carries out the elucidation and the clarification of 
propositions in order to remove the cloud and indistinctness in thoughts. Again, since 
it is the subject-in-act who is elucidating and clarifying the propositions, they cannot 
be basic to him. 
We recall the statement, "What can be shown cannot be said" (Trac. 4.1212). 
This comes in the wake of definitions becoming infinite; when a definition describes a 
concept by means of another concept, which is, in turn, defined by another concept, 
up to the time when no more definitions can be given. This is when the saying stops 
and the showing begins. However, as is common knowledge, the showing may cause 
more confusion than the actual definitions. (Wittgenstein, though, agrees with this 
problem later, in the Philosophical Investigations). Many interpretations may result, 
leading to the misunderstanding of the issue altogether. At this stage the subject is 
needed to give a kind of "quasi-ostensive definition.,,3 This is where the pointing, the 
defining, the explaining and, where necessary, the illustrating, are all done 
simultaneously. This could be followed by the subject-in-act soliciting a response, to 
ensure maximum comprehension. This means that Wittgenstein is not particularly 
right in saying that ''what can be shown cannot be said." This is because, with the 
empirical approach, proper understanding may require the application of more than 
one sense. That is, applying the visual and the audio senses at the same time, but the 
audio cannot be shown. For instance, a proposition such as: "A nice cup of tea is on a 
clean table," expresses a state of affairs or a fact. It may be a bit difficult to show this 
fact with the visual only. So Wittgenstein, as mentioned, is not particularly right in 
3This expression is picked from Copi, I.M's Introduction to Logic. He says, " .. . an ostensive 
definition refers to the example by means of pointing or some other gesture ... gestures are 
invariably ambiguous. To point to a desk is also to point to part of it, and also its colour and 
its size and its shape and material ... and to every thing that lies in the general direction of the 
desk including the wall behind it and the garden beyond .... This ambiguity can be reduced by 
addition of some descriptive phrase ... the result being a quasi ostensive definition" (1998: 
141-142). 
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saying that what can be shown cannot be said. As we see, showing can result in 
ambiguity. After showing, saying may be inevitable. Here the subject-in-act is needed 
to point and explain at the same time. 
In clarifying Wittgenstein's position, Van Peursen reiterates Wittgenstein' s 
claim that 
.. . so long as one obeys the logical rules, it is impossible to talk nonsense, or 
even to ask an illogical question. If one does in fact ask such a question, 
someone can always point out an improper use of words or an illogical 
relation between meanings of words so that the question can then be 
reformulated .... (1969: 61). 
We again have the sense of the subject-in-act in the "someone." It is this someone 
who notices that a norm of logic has been violated and therefore correction is 
necessary. This someone does not only stop at pointing out anomalies but helps to fill-
in or clarify situations or states of affairs where the rules of logic are inadequate. In 
this respect the "someone" - the subject-in-act - possesses a capacity and ability to go 
beyond the rules of logic. That makes him more foundational than the rules. In fact, 
he can establish further foundation for the rules. 
Wittgenstein leaves us wondering whether it should be logic to set limits to 
what can be thought or the subject-in-act. 
It must set limits to what can be thought: and, in doing so, to what cannot be 
thought. It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards 
through what can be thought (Trac. 4.114). 
In this case Wittgenstein not only alludes to the subject-in-act but creates a problem 
If we perceive states of affairs through symbols and pictures, how is it possible to 
"work outwards''? 
In his own words, Wittgenstein says that 'There is no such a thing as a subject 
that thinks ... " (Trac, 5.631). If that is the case the alternative is to reach states of 
affairs through the rules of logic. Ifit is not the subject-in-act that can lead us to what 
can be thought, then the alternative is the rules of logic. If it is the rules of logic that 
can lead us to what can t>e thought then we wonder whether or not there exits rules of 
logic applicable to working outwards, that is beyond their applicability. In the absence 
of these rules we remain uncertain whether working outwards falls within the ambit of 
logic or not. 
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It is obvious that we know what to expect when we follow the rules. However, 
Wittgenstein does not give us the criteria to follow when we are working outward. Do 
we reverse the elements in the states of affairs or in the atomic propositions or do we 
reverse the entire propositional sign? That omission notwithstanding, we still remain 
with the subject-in-act to do the thinking. In the absence of the method for working 
outward, the subject-in-act is left with no alternative but to do the inward or the 
outward thinking. That concludes our criticism of Wittgenstein's early analysis of 
logic as basic. We tum our attention to his revised thinking, that language acquires 
meaning from social use. In our argument we focus on two central ideas: language-
games and following a rule. 
2.3 Language-Games and Rules Functional in Society 
2.3.1 "Following a Rule" in the Language-Game: Later Wittgenstein 
As in Wittgenstein' s early thought in the Tractatus, Hudson helps us to clarify his 
later thought in the Philosophical Investigations. In Tractatus, Wittgenstein was of 
the view that atomic propositions formed a foundation for knowledge. But he 
abandons this idea in his later thought, in favour of following a rule in the language-
game. Hudson gives a good introduction to his ideas. In this sub-section he gives us 
an overview of what following a rule in the language-games is all about. In this 
exposition he covers many other aspects, such as the religious beliefs. Our interest lies 
only in his views on following a rule in the language-games. We now proceed with 
his exposition 
Wittgenstein, in his later thought in the Philosophical Investigations, made an 
attempt to expose the defects in his earlier thought in the Tractatus. As he puts it, 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus had attempted to show that "A proposition has one and 
only one complete analysis" (Trac. 3.25). It is this position which seems to have 
formed a foundation of his arguments in the Tractatus. As Wittgenstein had argued, 
such a proposition is supposed to comprise simples or words that have referents. In 
order for a word to have meaning it had to correspond to something. That is the sense 
in which an atomic proposition is foundational. But in his later thought he repudiated 




· .. a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. - It is important to note 
that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing 
that "corresponds" to the world. That is to confound the meaning of a name 
and the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of 
the name dies, not that the meaning dies ... (PI # 40). 
Here Wittgenstein repudiates his earlier stand that in order for a "simple" or a word to 
have meaning it must have a referent. He proceeds to say that it does not make sense 
to speak of an absolute one-one correspondence between the simples of language and 
those of reality. The picture theory had required breaking reality down absolutely, into 
its simples. Now Wittgenstein is of the view that this does not make sense anymore. 
He proceeds to say that analysing a proposition into more elementary 
propositions does not make its meaning necessarily clearer. To illustrate this he gives 
the example of a broom 
Iffor instance someone said, not "The broom is in the comer" but "The broom 
stick is in the comer and the brush is in the comer and broomstick is fixed in 
the brush .. . " (PI # 60). 
If this were to be the case, the hearer, instead of understanding him better, would 
wonder as to why he was talking in such an odd and roundabout manner. 
Wittgenstein also repudiates his earlier stand in the picture theory, that a 
proposition has no meaning if it does not have an absolute determinate sense. As he 
puts it, 
If I tell someone "Stand roughly here" - may not this explanation work 
perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too? (PI # 88). 
Though he uses the word "roughly", which constitutes a refusal to say exactly to 
which place the speaker is referring, we can still understand perfectly what the 
speaker means. He points out that other explanations could fail because however 
precisely you told someone where to stand he could always ask you to be more exact. 
In his later thought, Wittgenstein repudiates this outlook as well. According to 
his new stand, meaning is not just given to the proposition, which is distinct from 
uttering an arbitrary sign What the case is now is that the propositional sign or the 
words in the proposition find meaning in the use to which they are put. For instance, 
according to Wittgenstein, you cannot say, " ' It' s cold here' and mean ' it' s warm 
here. ' " (PI # 510). In other words, you cannot intend by the act of mind to say that "it 
is cold here" - and because the prepositional sign that signifies the intended act of 
mind is arbitrary - say, "it is warm here". It would not make sense to say that one 
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intended "warm" but then said or uttered "cold". But here, Wittgenstein could be 
challenged that it would still be sensible for one to say that one had invented a game 
or a code in which "it is cold here" meant what is normally meant by "it is warm 
here". 
It is this situation that motivates Wittgenstein to carry out an enterprise in 
which he explains all that he meant by language-games and following a rule. This 
new turnaround meant that Wittgenstein had given up his basic idea in the Tractatus; 
including the very basic idea that atomic propositions were foundational to all reality. 
In fact, he gives up the idea of foundations altogether. Instead he redirects his energy 
to the language-games and following a rule in these games. 
1.3.1 "Language-Games": Hudson's Clarifications 
We turn now to examine exactly what Wittgenstein meant by language-games. Again 
Hudson' s introduction is useful. In the language-games, Wittgenstein shifts from his 
former position of the atomic proposition picturing all reality, in his own sense. In an 
effort to show us how language, objects and actions interrelate, he uses the example of 
a builder, A, and his assistant, B. In their activity of building they are using stones, 
pillars, blocks, slabs and beams. These two inevitably have to use language consisting 
of the words, "block", "pillars", "slab" and ''beam''. Their relationship is such that 
when A calls for stone, B brings a stone. When A calls for slab, B brings a slab and so 
on. According to Wittgenstein, B brings the right thing at the right time because he 
has learnt what to do. 
The crucial question here is what B will need to know in order to respond 
correctly to A' s call? The answer is that B will need to know three things. One, what 
naming is. He must be able to interpret the word "slab" when it is uttered Two, B 
must know the object which is being named. That is, the object to which the word 
"slab" refers. In order for this to happen, B must know the correct interpretation of the 
name. For instance, if "slab" is defined to him ostensively and it turns out that it is at 
the same time rectangular or white, then when A calls for "slab" B may bring him any 
object which may turn out to be rectangular or white. So B must know correctly the 
object to which the name refers. Three, B must know the action that is required of him 
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when A utters the expression "slab". B must know that A is not just uttering the word 
"slab" for its own sake, but he wants a slab passed on to him 
The important point that Wittgenstein is raising here is that B requires training 
in all the three aspect, the naming, the object being named and the required action In 
other words, this training will take two strands. The first is training in the uses to 
which words are put in such linguistic activities such as naming, questioning, 
commanding and so on. The second strand should be training in the activities with 
which words are interwoven such as obeying the command. In other words, B should 
not only know the linguistic sense of a word or a proposition but the activity to which 
it relates. So we could say that, after training, the language-game becomes a game of 
language and action to which language is put. 
To extend his argument further, Wittgenstein compares words to the pieces in 
chess and asserts, " .. . the meaning of a piece is its role in the game ... " (PI# 563). In 
order to understand the rules, the point and what is going on in each case, one needs 
some training. Hudson, explaining Wittgenstein, clarifies that in a game there are 
players and spectators. In relation to this, he compares a moralist who uses words like 
"right" and "ought" in what he calls the first-order way, to chide or exhort, to a player 
in the language-game. He also compares a philosopher who engages in the second-
order activity of trying to understand what the rules and the point of moral discourse 
are in the language-game, to a spectator. Here he clarifies that the philosopher can 
only understand morality by watching what the moralist does with words. Similarly, a 
spectator can only understand soccer by watching what the players do with the ball. 
(He explains that watching includes reading and hearing about it). 
At this point Wittgenstein realises that he had been wrong in the first place in 
his attempt in the Tractatus to tty to impose on language preconceived ideas of what 
it was not. Now the appropriate thing to do is to "look" at the actual uses to which 
words are put and learn from these. If one undertakes this activity, the first thing one 
learns is the enormous variety of the kinds and uses ot: for instance, sentences, 
assertion, questions, commands, symbols and words; with new language-games 
emerging and others becoming obsolete. 
With that in place, Hudson reminds us that Wittgenstein made a very 
important point about the language-games. He expresses it as follows: 
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· .. the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that 
the speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life (PI # 23). 
To clarify further, Hudson uses Pitcher' s summary emanating from Wittgenstein' s 
statement, "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (PI II: 223). He 
imagines the following scene with the lion: 
"Goodness, it is three o' clock; I must hurry to make that appointment" [the 
lion remarks], but he continues to lie there, yawning, making no effort to 
move .. . Assuming that the lion' s behaviour is in every aspect exactly like that 
on an ordinary lion... we could not say that he has asserted or stated that it is 
three o' clock even though he has uttered suitable words. We could not tell 
what, if anything, he has asserted, for the modes of behaviour into which his 
use of words is woven are too radically different from our own. We would not 
understand him, since he does not share the relevant form; of life with us 
(Pitcher in Hudson, 1968: 46-47). 
Therefore, since language and activity are not isolated from each other, but are 
interwoven, and since language activities are a form of life, therefore language is a 
form of life. 
Hudson has just shown us that Wittgenstein, in his later thought, realises that 
formal logic cannot form a foundation for knowledge, as he had envisaged it would 
do. He recognises the fact that formal logic can at best be one of the language-games 
ofthe many. This realisation makes him shift his attention from formal logic per se to 
his new theory of the language-game. In the language-game, one follows a rule, as 
stipulated in social interaction There is no need for explanation or justification Any 
attempt at explaining or justifying a rule may lead to misunderstanding. What one 
does is to see what everybody in society is doing and then follow without question. 
1.3.3 Following a Rule in the Language-Game 
In his later thought in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein discusses how 
language relates to reality. He develops the theory of the language-game. The world 
or all reality can no longer be expressed in terms of facts alone. It can also be 
expressed in term; of things or events. All of these are " ... just an account of one 
world in three languages." (Wisdom in Pitcher, 1964: 173). The three languages are: 
the language of facts, of the things, and ofthe events. Wittgenstein's new stand seems 
to be that each aspect in the world, that is facts, things, or events, can be expressed 
through its own language-game. All one has to do is to follow a rule of the language-
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game of that particular aspect. The procedure is like that of playing any other game, 
provided one follows its rules; bearing in mind that each game has its own unique 
rules. For instance, the rules of playing football are different from those of playing 
chess. To play any game successfully one should follow the rules as they are laid 
down. This implies that the rules should be followed without question, otherwise 
attempting to explain to someone how a rule is followed can be problematic. This is 
because one explanation can lead to another and another to another, in a manner that 
may be endless. The best option is to show him how the rule works and ask him to 
follow. Wittgenstein exemplifies this problem below. He feels that one follows a rule 
in common practice and not through explanation. 
2.3.4 Following a Rule Exemplified 
In this particular case, Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a teacher, ~ and his student, 
B. He is demonstrating that it is not easy for one to understand a rule through 
explanation Attempting to explain a rule to someone may lead to misunderstanding. 
He is putting across a point that in society one understands a rule by looking at what 
others are doing, or through social interaction, and simply following what is in 
common use. For example, following a certain formation rule, B is to write down a 
series of signs. The first series is to write down natural numbers in decimal notation. 
The problem which arises immediately is that how is B going to understand this 
notation? A embarks on the task of making him understand. First he assists him in 
copying the numbers, then asks him to copy them independently. In the process of 
copying the numbers, any of the following might happen It is possible that he may 
copy the numbers in a disorderly and random manner; a reflection that B has not 
understood. It is also possible that B may make a frequent or a systematic mistake - it 
does not matter which mistake he makes - for instance, he copies the series, 
0,1,2,3,4,5, ... as, 1,0,3,2,5,4. (PI # 143). This still shows that the student has not 
understood. A may try to correct him from his bad habit and teach him the correct 
way of copying the numbers. Still B may not understand. 
On the other hand, after several attempts, B may write down the series 
correctly, say 0 to 9 (PI # 145). After A's explanation and emphasis of certain points, 
B is able to continue on his own. He may demonstrate that he has mastered the 
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system Even then, according to Wittgenstein, the problem still remains. How far does 
he need to continue the series in order for A to say that B has mastered the system? 
Wittgenstein asserts that the limit cannot be stated. 
On the other hand, suppose B is able to continue the series up to the hundredth 
place. A will say that B has understood the system However, Wittgenstein still 
wonders whether B' s understanding depends on continuing the system up to this or 
that number, or whether it depends on the application of his understanding. 
Wittgenstein wonders if understanding is a mental process. Where is B's 
understanding when he suddenly says, now I understand? 
We are trying to get hold of the mental process of understanding, which seerm 
to be hidden ... but we do not succeed; or, rather, it does not get as far as a real 
attempt. For even supposing I had found something that happened in all these 
cases of understanding why should it be understanding? And how can the 
process of understanding have been hidden, when I said "now I understand" 
because I understood?! And if it is hidden - then how do I know what I have 
to look for? I am in a muddle (PI # 153). 
Wittgenstein seems to be arguing that understanding is not a mental process, but is 
something which makes its appearance in a moment but we cannot say how. To 
illustrate this fact, Wittgenstein again uses a numerical example. Once again A and B 
go through sets of numbers. While A is writing down numbers, 1, 5, 11, 19, 29, (PI # 
151), B is busy trying out various algebraic formulae on the numbers which had been 
written down. Then B says he now knows how to go on On the other hand, B may 
not think of any formula but simply watches A writing out the numbers, such as 4, 6, 
8, 10 (PI # 151), and recognises the difference in the series and is able to continue. 
Wittgenstein wonders whether that could be described as understanding. He 
argues that it is imaginable that the formula may occur to B when he has not 
understood, or that it occurs to him under certain circumstances. In fact he affirrm 
that: 
Try not to think of understanding as a "mental process" at all - For that is the 
expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what 
kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, 
the formula has occurred to me? -
In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are 
characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process ... when he 
suddenly knew how to go on ... it is the circumstance under which he had such an 
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experience that justifies him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he 
knows how to go on (PI # 154- 155). 
As will be evident in the next chapter, the circumstances are important, but it 
is the judgement that justifies the understanding correctly. To Wittgenstein, mental 
processes are such things as "pain" or ' 'hearing''. In fact in bringing in the notions of 
experience and circumstances, he is trying to do away with the possibility that 
understanding is an activity or a subject-based operation He is advancing an idea that 
understanding is an occurrence, which suddenly happens as a consequence of what is 
going on at the moment. B watches A writing down even numbers or odd numbers 
and recognises the series. It suddenly occurs to him that he can now go on His 
understanding of the sequence involved has nothing to do with "understanding" by the 
active subject. That is how Wittgenstein seems to interpret B ' s understanding. 
He proceeds to argue, however, that B can use the formula because he had 
learnt it or had previously used it. In that case his utterances are short of the 
description of the circumstances in which he utters them There is also a possibility of 
B ' s saying that ''now I can go on" and actuaIIy does go on when nothing has 
happened in his mind, or he has not used the formula He emphasises his point in his 
statement that 
And in this case too we should say - in certain circumstances - that he did 
know how to go on (PI # 179). 
Wittgenstein is sustaining his argument that it suffices for B just to look at what A is 
doing and know how to go on. He points out that the expression ' 'I know how to go 
on" is not a description of a mental state. He calls it a "signal". He goes on to say that 
we judge whether the signal was rightly used by what B goes on to do. 
Here we can argue that, though a signal may participate in what it signals, for 
instance a red flag signalling blood, the situation becomes different when it comes to 
mathematical symbols or propositions. These may not necessarily participate in what 
they describe. There may arise a situation where the mathematical signals or 
propositions may be mistaken. In that case the conviction of going on may become an 
illusion, simply because your statements or propositions may turn out to be false. 
Illustrating the problem of misunderstanding, Wittgenstein proceeds with yet another 
numerical example. From natural numbers, A proceeds to making B write down other 
series of cardinal numbers. 
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Now - judged by the usual criteria - the pupil has mastered the series of 
natural numbers. Next we teach him to write down the other series of cardinal 
numbers and get him to the point of writing down a series of form 0, n, 2n, 3n, 
etc. at an order of the form "+n"; so at the order "+1 " he writes down the 
series of natural numbers. - Let us suppose we have done exercises and given 
him tests up to 1 000. Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) 
beyond 1000 - and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him: "Look 
what you've done! " - He doesn' t understand. We say: 'You were meant to 
add two: Look how you began the series! " - He answers: 'Yes, isn' t it right? I 
thought that was how I was meant to do it." - Or suppose he pointed to the 
series and said: ''But I went on in the same way." - it would now be no use to 
say: "But can' t you see .. .. ?" - and repeat the old example and explanations. -
In such a case we might say, perhaps: It comes natural to this person to 
understand our order with our explanations as we should understand the order: 
"Add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on" 
Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person reacts to the gesture 
of pointing with the hand by looking at the direction of the line from fmger-tip to 
wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip (PI # 185). 
The point being made by Wittgenstein is that, in order to carty out the order 
correctly, a new intuition or insight is needed at every step. Both A and B must take 
the right step at every stage. "The right step is the one which accords with the order, 
as it was meant. At every stage A and B must make a new decision on how to carty 
on, or else a new appropriate instruction must be given." What Wittgenstein is 
demonstrating is that teaching a rule should be by example and practice and not by 
explanation 
Concretely, what Wittgenstein seems to be saying, by giving these examples 
of a student and a teacher, is that there are many language-games in society. Each 
game has its own rules. In order to play that game the player must follow a rule 
specified for that game. The player must see what everyone is doing in common 
practice and follow accordingly. In this respect no explanations are necessary, or else 
explanations may turnout to be endless. A rule is learnt through interaction and not 
through explanation. It is basic to any co-operative social behaviour and it cannot be 
understood without understanding the activity. 
Nothing would function as expected in any society, including understanding 
and science, without rules. Our point of departure from Wittgenstein's central view is 
placed against his insistence that a rule must be obeyed without seeking for 
explanation, because explanations can be endless. Though he has gone through pains 
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to show how an attempt to explain a rule can be an unending venture, we contend that 
seeking explanations and justifications is a necessary component of human 
intellectual nature. In order to know or to understand anything, questions must be 
asked; not only, in the manner a child asks, ''Why? Why? Why?", but in accordance 
with the subject being present to himself, consciously and intelligently seeking 
knOWledge. Explanations and justifications must also be given. As an answer to 
Wittgenstein' s objection, we say that asking questions leads to the engaging of the 
operations, including thinking, reasoning and judging whether the rule we are 
following is still relevant in the given circumstances, or it is serving the purpose it 
was designed to serve? Our position will be made clearer in the following section in 
our discussion on Taylor's perspective on following a rule. 
2.3.5 Monologica/ versus Dialogical Consciousness: Taylor 
In another development, Taylor (1993) sets out to interpret Wittgenstein' s theory of 
following a rule. We recall that from the time of modem philosophy great puzzlement 
has arisen about rules when we try to understand their place in society, in particular, 
and in life in general. Taylor points out that Wittgenstein pressed this fact more 
acutely and famously in his Philosophical Investigations. This puzzle concerns what it 
means to understand a rule. 
Taylor presents Wittgenstein using the example of a stranger in his bid to 
emphasise the problem of endlessness in an attempt to explain. He points out that 
what may seem perfectly clear to us may be completely confusing to the stranger. To 
us, going to town may simply mean only to follow the arrows. This is natural to us. 
But what is natural to us may mean the opposite in the stranger' s culture. For us we 
understand what it is to follow arrows towards a point. But the stranger may not 
understand. 
The consequence of this example is that it raises a problem between 
Wittgenstein and the intellectualist philosophical culture. According to this culture, 
one has a set mental framework that serves as a foundation for understanding 
anything, including a rule. This conflicts with Wittgenstein's view that understanding 
is simply looking at what society is doing and then following it in regular or common 
practice. 
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According to the intellectual culture, if we are to follow a rule, or arrows, then 
somehow, consciously or unconsciously, a premise has been laid in our minds. When 
we realise the stranger's confusion, we can explain to him what he should do. But, 
again, this presupposes that we have an explanation, so the thought of following 
arrows must be residing somewhere in us. Otherwise, if that were not the case, we 
would not know how to follow the arrow if we approached the place from another 
direction 
This fact is contrary to Wittgenstein's view. An attempt to explain a rule to a 
stranger might not stop the confusion. So the intellectualist stand of explaining to the 
stranger might only cause more misunderstanding. He puts it that 
the number of potential misunderstandings is endless .... There is an indefinite 
number of points at which, for a given explanation of a rule and a given run of 
cases, some one could nevertheless misunderstand ... (PI # 87). 
Wittgenstein proceeds to emphasise the problem of misunderstanding using prose 
examples. 
He gives the example of the biblical "Moses" (PI # 187). Moses is a man who 
led the Israelites out of Egypt. But his interlocutor may have had problems with the 
words ''Egypt'' and "Israelites", which Moses may have used because they may have 
been absent in the interlocutor's social context. Equally words like ''red'', "dark" and 
"sweet" may not be understood through explanation. What Wittgenstein means here is 
that terms with which the interlocutor is not familiar, because they are not in his social 
context, may lead to misunderstanding. So it remains that the explanation of these 
terms may in itself fail to prevent misunderstanding. In the previous section, we saw 
how Wittgenstein illustrated the problem of endlessness in explaining with numerical 
examples. In this section, we recapture his example as Taylor sheds light on it in his 
interpretation. In this particular case, Taylor emphasises Wittgenstein's conviction 
that, much as prose explanations cannot resolve the problem of misunderstanding, so 
also are numerical explanations. As we saw, a student is given figures such as 0, 2, 4, 
6, 8 ... and asked to carry on The student carries on until he reaches 1000 and then 
writes, 1004, 1008, 1012. The student becomes indignant when he is told that he is 
wrong; that he was expected to add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so 
on. (PI # 185). This example illustrates the fact that the student had misunderstood the 
rule governing the sample range. 
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Wittgenstein calls these cases deviant and therefore wonders whether i( in 
order to understand directions or know how to follow a rule, we have to know that all 
these deviant cases are deviant and, if this means that we must have already 
formulated thoughts to this effect, then we need an infmite number of thoughts in our 
heads even to follow the simplest instruction; something he regards as crazy. 
Wittgenstein is of the view that we do not have to resolve issues through 
explanation. This is because, 
... any explanation leaves some potential issue unresolved, it stands in need of 
further explanations to back it up. Further explanation will have the same 
disability, and so the job of explaining to somebody how to do some thing will 
be literally endless. But then how does an explanation help me to understand, 
if after all is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; 
so I still do not understand what he means, and never shall! (PI # 87). 
According to Taylor, the above remarks by Wittgenstein are meant to undercut the 
mindset of the intellectualist tradition from Descartes onwards. This tradition thought 
that secure foundations for knowledge and explanations that were self-explanatory or 
self-authenticating could be found. It is the obsession with this foundationalism which 
made the modem intellectualist tradition fail to see the issue of misunderstanding as a 
problem 
Taylor projects Wittgenstein as saying that we are always bound to 
misunderstand an explanation This is evident in the two questions asked and the 
answers given to them These are: Why can someone always misunderstand? Why 
don' t we have to resolve all these questions before we can understand ourselves? 
Wittgenstein's answers to these problems are: Understanding is always against 
the background of what is taken for granted, or just relied on Anyone outside the set-
up is bound to misunderstand. But at the same time this set-up is not the locus of the 
resolved questions because it is unarticulated or unarticulatable. That is, it cannot be 
explained without needing further explanation. 
So Wittgenstein's answer to the problem of endlessness in explaining is, as 
he puts it, 
... obeying a rule is a practice .. . Giving reasons for one's practice in following 
a rule has to come to an end. My reasons will soon give out. And then I shall 
act without reasons ... .If I have exhausted my justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: This is simply 
whatI do ... I obey the rule blindly (PI # 217- 219). 
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This stand of Wittgenstein puts us in a position where we can interpret him as saying 
that we should obey a rule without involving our intellect. In fact, this notion prompts 
Taylor to come up with two interpretations of Wittgenstein' s ideas on following a 
rule. 
One is of Kripke, who interprets Wittgenstein as saying that we act without 
reasons. That is because connections, which form our backgrounds, are just, as a 
matter of fact, links that require no justification or reasons. Society imposes them on 
us. They are sort of "wired in", and therefore conditioned to act "automatically." He 
gives the example of the blinking of the eye when an object approaches it. No 
justification or reason is given for that. It is just automatic and therefore brute reaction 
or sense-based instinctive reaction. 
Kripke' s interpretation, on the surface, looks credible. This is evident in 
Wittgenstein' s choice of words. He uses terms and expressions such as "bedrock", 
"my spade is turned", "this is simply what I do", and "when I obey a rule I do not 
choose. I obey it blindly." These expressions indicate that we operate within the limits 
of society. Our acts have been practised over and over again; there is no need for 
questions or justifications. 
The second interpretation is that of Taylor himself, following Pierre Bourdieu, 
the social anthropologist. This new interpretation takes into account the fact that 
background incorporates understanding. Taylor is of the view that although things still 
remain unarticulated, there remains room for reason and explanation In this case 
things are not just as they are, but make some kind of sense. 
While in the first interpretation understanding is based on brute connections, 
__ the_s_econd intemretation of understanding is that it makes a kind of unarticulated 
sense of things. To affirm this point, Taylor quotes Wittgenstein's expressions, such 
as 
... following a rule is not like the operations of a machine .. . to use a word 
without justification does not mean to use it without right (PI # 289). 
Taylor clarifies that these remarks provide an instance of Wittgenstein's point that 
following a rule is a social practice. He takes the linking of background to society as 
an alternative vision to the intellectualist mono logical outlook, led by Descartes, that 
dominated the philosophical epistemological tradition. Taylor is in conformity with 
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this second interpretation; and, to him, Wittgenstein' s insistence that following a rule 
is a social practice is a positive move. It removes the individual from the inner space 
or from being the centre of monological consciousness. It links him directly to society 
and its social practices; making him act harmoniously with everybody else in all 
respects; but not like a machine and without taking away his creativity. 
The main reason why he gives Wittgenstein credit is that he is one of the 
contemporary philosophers who attempt "to get out of the ' cul-de-sac' of the 
monological consciousness .... " (1993: 169). This is the situation which still pertains 
in modem philosophy at this time. According to Taylor, Wittgenstein deserves this 
credit because he shifts understanding from the inner space, the locus of the mind, and 
places it in social practice. To Taylor this is more realistic than having mental 
representations in the mind, as stipulated by Plato, or being trapped in thought, as 
reflected in Descartes. 
Taylor projects Wittgenstein as shifting from what he calls "monological acts" 
to "dialogical acts". Modem philosophy thought of understanding as monological. 
That is, an attempt to understand reality by engaging more in ones thoughts rather 
than being more attentive to practical reality by the use of the senses as a starting 
point. Taylor regards Wittgenstein' s placing of understanding in social practice as 
dialogical, in-between understanding as an inner activity and understanding as social 
practice, Taylor observes that understanding is an activity that is embodied. as he puts 
it, 
... our understanding itself is embodied. Our bodily know-how, and the way 
we act and move, can encode components of our understanding of self and 
world (1993: 170). 
He points out that one can move from place to place freely, but may be at a loss when 
asked to describe the directions to a stranger. Or one manipulates or plays familiar 
instruments in one' s world in an unarticulated manner, that is without being able to 
explain how they work. In addition to that, the sense of the self is also embodied. 
That is, one' s attitude to the world and to others is encoded in the way one projects 
oneself in public space. 
In all these instances one may not possess the descriptive terms or appropriate 
vocabulary to portray one's behaviour. Although the guiding norms are unformulated 
or unarticulated, one can tell the difference between right and wrong from one's point 
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of view and that of others. Taylor describes this scenario as social understanding or 
the "habitus',4, which is tantamount to background understanding. 
Taylor reiterates that social practices that encode understanding are not only 
acts of a single agent but flow from a single agent to others and back to the agent in a 
harmonious manner. He gives examples of people engaged in a conversation, where 
the interlocutor not only listens but participates, for example with head nodding, or 
"unh-hunh" and sometimes the semantic tum passes over to the other by a common 
movement. 
Taylor is emphasising Wittgenstein' s point of the importance of social 
practice. He is reflecting the partners engaged in a conversation, gripped in some form 
of common rhythm where body language reflects mutual understanding or some sense 
of common purpose. He presses home the point that it is difficult to understand 
human life merely through the "disengaged subject" who forms representations about 
others. The fact is that the disengaged subject must become part of the ''we''. This is 
because much of our understanding of the self: society and the world is carried out 
through dialogical actions. 
He reiterates that 
... background understanding, which underlies our ability to grasp directions 
and follow rules, is to a large extent embodied ... .It is a making sense of things 
and actions; at the same time it is entirely unarticulated ... it can be the basis of 
fresh articulation .... My embodied understanding does not only exist in one as 
an individual agent, but also as the co-agent of common actions. This is the 
sense we can give to Wittgenstein's claim that obeying a rule is a practice 
(1993: 174). 
In this quotation we find views that help to explain what Wittgenstein means by the 
expression of a rule such as a signpost or an arrow. Following a rule does not simply 
mean that one has been trained to react to a sign in a certain way and, when 
confronted with such a sign, one reacts as expected. This would be nothing more than 
reacting due to causal connection, or due to the tendency to react. One goes by a 
signpost because there is a standing regular use of the signpost, that is when it is a 
custom 
Taylor insists that, 
'Taylor borrows this term from Pierre Bourdieu which he coined during his anthropological 
studies of society. 
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· .. this standing use makes the connection and it is not to be understood as 
merely a causal one. The standing use gives my response its sense. It doesn't 
merely bring it on through brute causal link. But the sense is embodied but not 
represented (1993: 174). 
That is how Taylor expresses Wittgenstein's notion of following a rule. It is this 
social practice that gives one's actions the meaning they have. Following a rule is 
reflected in social acts such as how one conducts oneself in front of someone of a 
higher social class, how women conduct themselves in front of men in different social 
environments and how children relate to adults. All these are neither done 
haphazardly nor are they acts of reflex, but they follow a rule. For example, in a 
society where the giving of gifts in exchange for favours is a normal practice, one 
must know to whom and when to give gifts; and also how and when to reciprocate to 
the same treatment. All these are testimonies of understanding the background as a 
social embodiment operating on unarticulated rules. 
Taylor observes and recommends that 
Just as intellectualist epistemology made deep inroads into social science to ill 
effect, so it is important that the scientific consequences of embodied 
understanding be developed (1993: 174). 
In this section, Taylor attempts to exonerate Wittgenstein from Kripke's 
interpretation. Kripke took Wittgenstein literally, by saying that what Wittgenstein 
meant by "follow a rule blindly" was actually blind following. He gives his own 
interpretation of ''following a rule". According to Taylor, following a rule is not blind 
following. He demonstrates that this is a positive contribution by Wittgenstein. 
Taylor makes a good move to link Wittgenstein's theory of following a rule to 
social practice. For instance, he says, 
But much of our intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it usually is to our 
situation and goals, is carried on unformulated. It flows from an understanding 
that is largely inarticulate (1993: 172). 
We have agreed that intelligent action is partly formulated, as may be defined by 
instinctive actions. However, that is not all. This is because intelligent action 
presupposes conscious observation of data and its interpretation, weighing of 
evidence and, at times, employing a theory before drawing a conclusion. Again, 
intelligent action presupposes activity from the subject-based operations. Moreover, 
understanding that is largely unarticulated can be described as experience. lie says, 
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Background understanding, which underlies our ability to grasp things and 
follow rules, to a large degree is embedded .. . it is a form of understanding, a 
making sense of things and actions; at the same time it is entirely 
unarticulated; .. .it can be a basis for fresh articulation (1993: 173). 
Saying that background understanding can be a basis for fresh articulation is a 
good point. But this is not Wittgenstein's point. Wittgenstein's point is that 
understanding can be explained by following a rule. So Taylor's point here can help 
to address the problem we have identified of not according the subject-based 
operations an active role in the exercise of following a rule. The key notion from 
Taylor is in the expression, "fresh articulation." We feel that the idea of following a 
rule does not necessarily explain how understanding occurs. The subject should 
always ask the question "why?" This is necessary, because the rule needs to be 
continuously updated in order to justify its relevance. We need to add that there are 
mainly two kinds of understanding that need to be differentiated. The first one, for 
example, is that of a cat understanding that this is milk or it is not milk. The second 
one is that of understanding resulting from questioning, suggesting, explaining and 
judging. The second kind involves arguments where the subject-in-act has to see that 
the arguments are sound or unsound, whether they make sense or not and whether the 
conclusions follow or not. We must say that both kinds of understanding are real; but 
for the first kind we see the causes of "understanding" in the needs of the cat, while 
the second one is human understanding. 
In order to argue for the subject-based set of operations more confidently, let 
us look at understanding in the following two ways. The first one is understanding 
things as we fmd them in a tradition. These things include beliefs, practices and 
values. They are full of meaning and make sense to us even though we cannot explain 
their ultimate foundation. One thing is explained by another. For instance, a witch-
doctor administers a local herb to a patient suffering from malaria and the patient is 
cured. But if this doctor is asked to explain the chemistry behind the whole process, 
he cannot explain it, but he knows and understands that it works in that particular 
situation. 
However, one way of describing such a situation is that it is a tradition. It was 
handed down to him by his father and from his grandfather. He believes in it because 
from experience it works. In this case belief makes sense to him. But we may say that 
perhaps the only reason for him to believe and trust the practice is that it works. He 
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knows the rules of his game very well, he knows how to apply them and they work. 
The doctor is following a rule of the tradition as it was handed down to him and since 
it has worked thus far, there is no problem 
But let us look at the issue from another angle. Suppose malaria becomes 
resistant to the herb? The rule will not work anymore and the belief will be shaken 
But that is not the end of the matter. The doctor will be forced to think. He will have 
to engage the subject-based set of operations, in order to tackle the challenge, ifhe is 
to remain a doctor. This is the issue that the present work is addressing. 
This is the second way of understanding, that is, by consciously engaging the 
subject -based set of operations in the task of understanding reality. Traditional reality 
may be embedded and unarticulated, but let us not take understanding of how to 
participate in society through accepting beliefs, practices and values as an end in 
itself Let this type of understanding form the basis for our conscious operations. Let 
our operations defme all understanding. 
2.3.6 Relevance of the Subject-in-Act in the Language-Games 
In this sub-section, we are examining Wittgenstein' s discrediting of formal logic in 
favour of language and its social role. We argue that, his criticism notwithstanding, 
the role of the subject-in-act still remains fundamental, even when language is playing 
a social role. Wittgenstein, in the Philosophical Investigations, still does not recognise 
the need for the subject-in-act in the language-games. In his earlier thought, it was the 
atomic propositions which pictured and mapped reality. The subject played only a 
metaphysical role but had no functional role to play at all in the knowable world as 
Wittgenstein understood it. This was erroneous, as Wittgenstein pointed out, hirmelf, 
in his later thought. 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and you know 
your way about; you approach the same place from another side and you no 
longer know your way about (PI # 203). 
Even with this realisation we still say that it is not enough to shift from atomic 
propositions to playing language-games by merely learning and following the rules 
involved. Even with a mastery of the rules, since language is a labyrinth of paths, and 
since reality is explained in terms of these paths, operational reasoning by the subject-
in-act becomes eminent. 
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Wittgenstein' s perpetual avoidance of the subject-in-act does not help. Van 
Peursen brings out Wittgenstein' s ideas well: 
.. . philosophy as a guardian of grammar can actually grasp the nature of the 
world, not only in the propositions of language, but in the rules of this 
language which exclude meaningless combinations of signs .. . disentangles the 
knots which we have meaninglessly tied in our own thinking.. .. When the 
system or notation of our language dissatisfy us, here philosophy must step 
in ... . The task of philosophy is to remove this mental cramp (1969: 76 -78). 
These ideas help to emphasise the significant role of the subject-in-act. In the first 
place, one of the main reasons why we are switching to language-games is that the 
rules of logic can no longer adequately explain reality outside their context. That is 
the subject-in-act. What remains apparent is the self-appropriated logician - the 
subject-in-act - who uses the rules of logic and reason to carry out the investigations. 
So we can comfortably substitute for logic the self-appropriated logician and, 
for philosophy, the self-appropriated philosopher. These are subjects-in-act equipped 
with the tools of logic and philosophy, ready to conduct functional operations. As Van 
Peursen puts it, the philosopher becomes the "guardian of grammar". It is the 
philosopher - the subject-in-act - using philosophical analysis who is to "grasp the 
nature of the world". It is him using the rules of logic and grammar to "disentangle 
the knots" which we have meaninglessly tied in our own thinking. When we get tired 
of the "systems or notations oflanguage" it is the subject-in-act who must step in; and 
it is the philosopher using reason who must remove the "mental cramp". It is the 
subject-in-act to effect the "depth-therapy elucidation" It is the subject-in-act to look 
carefully at the mixed pieces of the ''jigsaw puzzle" and rearranges them It is up to 
the subject-in-act to ''help the fly out of the bottle", into which it has flown. Matters 
get worse when Wittgenstein says, as Van Peursen explains, 
there can and must be more than one use of logical measure... when language 
becomes "chameleon-like" ... the same signs and words ... display very 
different application possibilities (1969: 85). 
This situation leaves a thicket of confusion, which calls upon, more than ever before, 
the discerning operational powers of the subject-in-act. 
Perhaps what is new in Wittgenstein is the re-linking of logic to content, as 
V an Peursen explains, 
There are no questions here of static reflection of things in words. Rather there 
is a total dynamic pattern of words and actions. It does not belong to the 
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descriptive language which says what is and what is not the case ... but to 
language which does something and generally to the context of social 
activity . .. words are not separate entities of isolated objects, but part of a 
lattice of human actions, where language itself can be a form of action .. .. 
Language is part of an activity or a form of life (1969: 82-83). 
In this respect Wittgenstein is placing language in the social context. He is shifting 
from his former position, of logic being foundational to looking at language, as being 
functional in the social milieu. 
Wittgenstein had looked at atomic propositions, which were logically 
determinate in form of truth-values, which determined situations, which were the case 
or not the case. Logical truths were certain on logical grounds, that is to say were 
based on no conditions at all. They were rule-based tautologies. At the same time, 
atomic propositions in the logical space reflected states of affairs and not content. 
It is in this new development that we begin to see the formal structure of 
atomic propositions changing identity, so that together with language, they playa 
social role, as Van Peursen explains: 
we now get a situation where ... language is seen less as mosaic and more as a 
living organism, and .. . no longer ... from a single view point, that of a pellucid 
logic, but from the many view points of everyday life .... (1969: 83). 
However, even with this new development, language still remains a problem Without 
the discerning powers of the subject-in-act, its use in the social context would remain 
a nightmare. 
2.4 Conclusion 
We conclude this chapter by reiterating that Wittgenstein was not completely correct 
in his earlier thought to assume that all reality, in his sense, could be pictured in the 
atomic propositions. It was still not right for him to think that he would create a pure 
logical language, formal logic, which would have little or nothing to do with content. 
It was not realistic for him to limit the role of the subject in the operations oflogic. 
Even after realising his own anomalies, he forgets the epistemic and rational 
endowments of the subject-in-act. He now imagines that reality can be better 
understood not by following the rules of logic per se but by learning and mastering 
the rules of language use. This mastery would enable him to play language-games in 
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society and that would constitute the alpha and omega of all societal semantic needs. 
As we have pointed out, this was an incorrect estimation by Wittgenstein 
In this Chapter Two we have seen that, though we continue to recognise the 
fundamental role played by logic in the reasoning operations and that of language in 
playing lan~age-games, the subject-in-act continues to playa pivotal role, both in the 
edifice of logic and that of language. We have seen that the subject-in-act is basic to 
both logic and language, because she has operational powers to make, moderate and 
even change the rules of logic or those of language. It is evident that logic grows and 
develops; language use is exposed to the same situation. Events outgrow language use 
and situations and some aspects of language become either archaic or obsolete. The 
fact that the subject-in-act keeps abreast with all these changes and not only that but 
participates in the making of these changes is enough proof that the subject-in-act is 
ultimately basic to both logic and language. 
Must we allow Wittgenstein' s claims make us forget Protagoras' epigram, that 
man is the measure of all things? (In our case, "man" is the subject-in-act). We 
therefore do not agree with Wittgenstein that "there is no such thing as a subject that 
thinks or entertains ideas." It is the subject-based operations which make the world of 
facts possible. 
In Chapter Three we proceed, assisted by Lonergan (1997) and other 
commentators, with discussion of the idea of the subject and how the subject turns out 
to be foundational to knowledge. In Chapter Four we shall use Winch's (1972) and 
other commentators' ideas to discuss the problem of inter-cultural learning. In 
Chapter Five we shall use Barden' s (1990) ideas to show how the problem of a 
foundation to the understanding and establishing of reality in all its manifestations is 
solved. This we shall do by bringing in the subject-based set of operations, as 
elucidated by Barden. We shall show that it is actually the subject-in-act, the set of 
operations that is foundational, consequently solving the problem of how reality in all 




THE SUBJECT AS FOUNDATIONAL FOR KNOWING: 
LONERGAN 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter One we looked at the major problem of the thesis and that was lack of a 
foundation for knowing that was ultimately basic. We also presented a major 
assumption which proposed the subject-in-act who acts in all traditions: African, 
European, Oriental and in all systems of knowledge, scientific and non-scientific. We 
also looked at the literature overview that gave us an on-spot-check for the literature 
of each and every chapter culminating in the resume of the whole thesis. 
In Chapter Two we discussed the attempt of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus to establish a foundation that would expose all departments of 
reality through the subject-less formal logic. This did not seem to be successful. Even 
in the Philosophical Investigations, following a rule in the language-game without the 
intervention of the subject does not seem to establish a foundation that would 
eventually lead to the knowing of reality in all cases. 
In this chapter, Chapter Three, we present the argument that this thesis comes 
as a consequence of Lonergan' s concern for the lack of a foundation in philosophy. 
Philosophy seems to have lost trend and direction, as evidenced mainly by 
philosophies that emerged from the modem to the contemporary period. Philosophy 
has been divided and factionalised, as can be seen in the philosophies of Descartes, 
Hume and Kant and, more recently, Wittgenstein, who, for example, treats us to a 
melodramatic scenario of proposing the subject-less logic as foundational and then 
rejecting it himself We feel philosophy should be redirected to its befitting, 
traditional role of being foundational to the understanding and knowing of all reality. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the desired foundation is rooted in the subject. This 
chapter is dedicated to arguing for that proposal. In our subsequent discussions we 
shall refer to the term "subject", in terms of "subject-in-act", "the basic pattern of 
operations" or the idea of "transcendental method" or "self-appropriation" and "basic 
pattern of operations", as used by Lonergan himself, or the idea of "interiority", as 
used by Cronin, or "the basic set of operations", as used by Barden, who we will 
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discuss in Chapter Five. The main purpose of Chapter Three is to discuss the nature of 
the subject and what his functions are. 
In this discussion our main references are to include: Bernard Lonergan, 
(1975). Here Lonergan establishes a foundation in the subject. We shall specifically 
look at his book Insight (1970). It is in this book where he introduces us to the 
fundamental idea of our thesis, which is self-appropriation. In addition to this we shall 
also look at his other key text which is Method in Theology (1975). In this text he 
introduces the idea of the "Basic Pattern of Operations" which he uses synonymously 
with the tenn "Transcendental Method" which in our terms is the same as the subject-
in-act, which is the foundation we are trying to establish. We shall also use his other 
text, Understanding and Being (1990) (ed. Morelli, E.A & M. Morelli). It is in this 
text where all the operations that are involved in the process of self-appropriation are 
discussed. 
We shall see much of Lonergan's ideas through Brian Cronin (1999) who 
restructures and simplifies Lonergan's ideas in his book, Foundations of Philosophy: 
Lonergan's Cognitional Theory and Epistemology (1999). In this text Cronin helps us 
to explain the need for a foundation to all knowledge. On top of that he carries us 
through Lonergan's idea of self-appropriation, as we have said, in a manner which is 
simplified and down to earth. This makes our discussion easier and manageable. 
We shall also use ideas from commentators, namely, Augustine Shutte and 
Patrick Giddy who will help us to elucidate the idea of the subject as foundational 
further. Shutte in his paper, "Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition in Theories of 
Knowledge" [n. pub.], talks of the " .. . basic unity of method that takes different forms 
in every different field." This is Lonergan's Transcendental Method, in our terms, the 
subject-in-act. It is the inevitability of this method that we are trying to establish in 
our thesis. Giddy also, in his paper, 'The African University and the Social Sciences: 
the Contribution of Lonergan' s Epistemological Theory" (1989), pursues the same 
idea of the inevitability of self-appropriation and endeavours to consolidate its 
inevitability in all walks of life, traditional and modem. 
3.1.1 Setting the Problem: Cronin 
Cronin begins in a state of wonder and asks, 
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Is there a trans-cultural philosophy equally relevant to Europeans, Africans, 
Americans and others? What would it look like? Where was it to be found? 
(1999:1). 
Cronin feels that it is difficult, at least as exemplified in contemporary philosophy, to 
establish foundations of philosophy " .. . without falling into dogmatism, relativism or 
nihilism" (1999: 5). He is rejecting the fact that in order to have a foundation you 
must belong to a certain faction of philosophy. He reiterates Lonergan's idea that 
there is a foundation that is trans-cultural, trans-philosophical factionalism, and that is 
the subject. 
He reminds us of the fact that, in the past, traditional societies were fairly 
stable. It was relatively easier for one to know where one stood. Beliefs and practices 
were passed on from generation to generation. No personal discrimination from the 
individuals was required. The welfare of the individual was in the hands of the entire 
community. What the individual was required to do was simply to conform. So a 
traditional society seemed capable of providing a foundation. But today things are 
changing too fast, not only in scope but also in meanings and values. As Cronin 
confirms, "Cultures are changing, intermingling, shifting, and incorporating new 
elements all the time" (1999: 5). Changes are apparent everywhere, in politics, 
economic and cultural institutions. These changes introduce new meanings. The 
present seems to be becoming more and more different from the past. Cronin wonders 
whether there is anything anymore which remains the same and whether there is any 
permanent truth and where this permanence is to be found. 
Cronin observes that traditional philosophy used to play the role of solving the 
overall problems of truth and value. But now philosophy is factionalised into 
philosophies. Today a philosopher has the option and choice of a faction to belong to. 
If tradition can no longer provide a foundation, can science then stand in for tradition? 
Cronin points out that science has been successful and has accomplished many tasks. 
For example, by using technology science seems to have solved many problems in the 
universe, in the fields of health, transport, agriculture, and engineering, to mention but 
a few. However, even with wonderful breakthroughs, science per se cannot be taken 
as foundational. For instance, as Cronin points out, science does not express itself 
much conceming morality. 
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Science is not good at giving an account of its own methods, apart from 
asserting them as the only correct model. As things stand, it seems we cannot find a 
foundation in science, either. Cronin wonders if we can find a foundation through the 
eclectic method of choosing from science, philosophy, New Age, Eastern Meditation 
or from other sources. Taking this option, he warns, would be like building a house on 
sand, with all the risks of its falling at any time. 
He invites us to look for unity within diversity. We are confronted with many 
theories and cultures. So instead of continuing to produce armchair theories we need 
to find guidance in the subject. He warns us against the standing belief that in order 
for knowledge to be knowledge it must be absolutely certain, completely necessary 
and pennanentIy true. To him this is setting unreasonable expectations that would 
never enable us to reach our goal. He instead advises us, through the basic set of 
patterned activities, to see what we can know and then judge whether that knowledge 
is necessary or contingent, probable or certain, temporary or pennanent. We should 
try to break through the existing belief of thinking that knowledge can be obtained 
either deductively or inductively. The categories of "deductive" and "inductive" are 
less basic ways of thinking about how knowledge is obtained. What we need to do is 
to engage the basic pattern of operations right from the sense data, all the way through 
to judgement. 
According to Cronin, this set of patterned activities is integrative. Otherwise, 
if philosophy does not meet the requirement of being integrative then it fails in its task 
of integrating other disciplines. The task of philosophy is to see how other specialised 
and different areas of study fit together. Because of that enormous but necessary task 
it should remain the broadest of all disciplines. It must reflect the view of the whole. 
The present practice of factionalising philosophy reduces it to the level of a 
specialised science. Although, as Cronin puts it, philosophy should not be the whole 
of knowledge, nevertheless it should be a whole in knowledge. Philosophy can attain 
this credibility through the patterned set of operations that can follow data from the 
level of questioning to that of judgement. It remains a fact that much of the data is 
drawn from culture. Therefore it is legitimate to have different cultures, but at the 
same time we should know that culture and philosophy is not one and the same thing. 
To make his case clearer, Cronin proceeds to draw a distinction between a 
culture and philosophy. A culture is a set of beliefs and values expressed in a common 
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way of life, while philosophy is a fonnal, critical, systematic presentation of a set of 
methods and conclusions. This clarification leaves him wondering whether, in the 
factionalised system of Western, African, Eastern and other philosophies, there exists 
a different foundation in each and every one of these philosophies. This is definitely 
not the case. He puts it that all human beings have a common foundation, which is 
neither Western nor African nor Eastern. That common foundation is the patterned set 
of cognitional operations that we describe in this chapter. This is part of our common 
heritage to which we all appeal. This foundation does not depend on any authority but 
on what we are, as human beings. For our part, we ask ourselves a similar question; 
what is it that is basic or foundational to all human beings, irrespective of race and 
culture, that can serve as a starting point for understanding, knowing and explaining 
reality in all spheres of knowing? So it remains apparent that you cannot easily find a 
foundation in what a philosopher says, or in what is said by his followers. What is 
said may hold today, but only because the circumstances and conditions demand so. 
But when these circumstances and conditions change, the idea which appears 
fundamental changes with them A new idea is put in place; gets challenged, then 
another one, ad infinitum, leaving a trail of ideas, but all of them contingent and 
fragmented. This is because it is the previous ideas that provoke philosophers to think 
of new ones, and, to use Hegel's thinking; new ideas may contain traces of the old 
ideas. In that respect, it is wise to say that we cannot find a foundation in what is said, 
but rather a foundation is found in what puts what is said in place, the subject. When 
the idea gets out-dated or out-moded the subject can still generate another idea to suit 
and fit either the circumstances or the conditions. So what is basic or foundational still 
remains the subject. 
Cronin tells us that, 
We need to be wise in order to learn from wisdom .. . philosophies are many 
and we already need criteria in order to discriminate among them (1999: 5). 
We ask ourselves where this wisdom and these criteria are to be found. In any case, 
while a philosopher can be the source of ambiguity she can at the same time be the 
source of clarity. She can be the source of ambiguity if she applies, for instance, the 
methods of common sense or the methods of science where empirical measures of 
verification were used to play the role of philosophy but outside the context of 
philosophy. This is attempting to make positivism foundational. 
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Because of ambiguities which are inherent in posItIvIsm, we see, many 
factions such as the case of Whitehead and Russell putting forward mathematics as 
foundational, Wittgenstein putting forward fonnal logic or picture theory as being 
foundational and Ayer putting forward ordinary language as being foundational. We 
have been arguing that it is clear that this trend or scenario cannot lead us to what is 
truly foundational. We have said that, while philosophers can be a source of 
ambiguity, they can simultaneously be a source of clarity. This reality guides us to 
where to find a foundation. We find this foundation in the philosophy of Lonergan. 
He directs us, we will argue, to the correct and most appropriate method of 
establishing a foundation and that is self-appreciation. This is the only relevant 
method that can genuinely and convincingly lead us to an authentic foundation that is 
the subject. 
Cronin draws our attention to the success of science and scientific methods. 
But if one looks at the success of science it seems to have opened ground mostly in 
the empirical fields. Science with its technology and systematic research has, for 
example, tackled the problems of health through mechanised medicine; through 
mechanisation, such as computing, mechanics and electronics, most of the chores of 
life have been significantly simplified. 
Science continues to break new grounds all the time and it continues to 
promise greater and greater success. Systematic research seems to be leading us to 
greater and greater horizons in tenns of discoveries and inventions. Given that 
documented success and promise, are we sufficiently persuaded to accord science the 
status of being foundational? 
As mentioned above, science seems to have registered success mainly in the 
empirical spheres. It appears to have little to contribute in areas concerning human 
relations. Scientific method, systematic and logical as it is, seems to lack the 
component of addressing the issues of the values of common humanity. Without 
human values humans are likely to be reduced to robotic machines. With this state of 
affairs it is difficult to find a foundation in science either. Although science has 
recorded success in many walks of life, in fact it is the subject who is responsible for 
this success. It is the subject who discovers the laws of nature, identifies problems, 
sets hypotheses, devises methods and eventually invents something. It is the same 
subject who can think about the consequences to humanity of her discoveries and 
102 
inventions. That leaves us with the option of nowhere to search for a foundation 
except in the very same subject herself 
For us, our thesis argues for a foundation. This foundation is the subject-in-
act. It is largely based on Lonergan' s epic that is propounded by Cronin as, 
... foundations are not to be found in the fonnulated propositions of 
philosophy or in a tradition. They are to be found in a patterned set of 
.. . activities by which we think and know and decide. This set... is common to 
all philosophies, cultures and traditions; this set of activities by which we 
discern the truth and evaluate moral and religious questions is, in fact, the 
source of all philosophies, opinions, truths and beliefs ... . By identifying these 
activities we can make explicit the foundation of our own intellectual life, 
while at the same time honing a tool for discriminating between the various 
philosophies present in the contemporary culture. Implicit in the procedure of 
thinking and knowing are the norms and imperatives which are the source of 
all logics, moral laws and methods (1999: 6). 
This quotation serves as a beacon for our thesis. It makes a complete turn from the 
common beliefs that what is foundational resides in the premises of philosophy or, as 
the early Wittgenstein put it, in the subject-less logic. Much as this is not possible, 
neither can we find a foundation in a tradition or a science. The true and real 
foundation cannot be found in all these facets. All these, in Lonergan' s sense, can 
only serve as data to what is truly foundational and that is the subject, or the patterned 
set of activities as Cronin prefers to put it. 
It is this patterned set of activities which asks questions within, around and 
about this data Through asking questions, analysing and judging, the subject can 
challenge all philosophies, all rules, all institutions, all traditions and all laws. This 
patterned set of activities, that enables the subject to question and challenge 
everything, makes the subject, understood in this way, truly foundational to 
everything. This thesis proposes that what is foundational is the subject. The subject is 
indeed dynamic and the source of both pennanence and change. 
Cronin, like Lonergan, is not suggesting a new theory. He is inviting us to join 
in the task of self-discovery. We do the same. We first invite ourselves and everybody 
else to join in this task under the leadership of Lonergan as presented by Cronin. Like 
any other subject who is not yet self-appropriated, we are still in our native 
bewildennent and confusion. We need to begin with the task of self-appropriation, 
with a reminder that philosophy is not just a matter of learning about definitions, 
principles and conclusions. Philosophy is a series of spiral movements forwards and 
103 
backwards, moving slowly towards clarity, comprehension and depth. This is the 
approach that is characteristic of self-appropriation. 
In trying to establish a foundation, Cronin reminds us that we are trying to 
look for unity behind diversity. This diversity is presented to us by contemporary 
culture. There is need to find a foundation that would serve as a guide, to see us 
through the challenges posed by this diversity. This state of affairs, According to 
Cronin, inevitably generates a succession of questions, such as where do theories 
come from? What purpose do they serve? These theories eventually lead to the notion 
of cultures in which we live, in the process generating more questions, such as why 
are there so many cultures? Are they all equal? Can we criticize the cultures of 
others? It remains a fact that we are surrounded by a pluralism of cultures, life- styles, 
moral values, different levels of education, class differentiation and ethnic diversity, 
specialisations and job stratification. This paraphernalia leaves Cronin wondering 
what is legitimate and what is not legitimate, what is authentic and what is not 
authentic, what might be the source of our intractable disagreements about the 
philosophy of life, why are there so many alternative theories of knowledge and how 
are we to choose among them? So what do we do? 
We need to engage the patterned set of operations to guide us through the 
series of questions, through the analysis of data, to the conclusions and at the same 
time judge the truth of these conclusions. This task can only be accomplished through 
the subject. It is the subject who can identify both the data of the facts of material 
reality and the data of the human mind. According to Lonergan, the data of the mind 
is as real as the data of the material reality. This data, which is referred to as "an 
invariant cognitional structure" (1999: 9), constitutes the patterned set of operations. 
It is this pattern which can guide us through this multiplicity of theories, cultures and 
life-styles. 
3.1.2 Insight: Aim and Practical Good 
It must be emphasised that the main concern of this chapter is not so much to discuss 
all the contents in InSight, but to use some of Lonergan' s ideas in InSight, together 
with some of the ideas from his commentators, to help us argue our case, which is that 
it is the subject-in-act who is foundational to knowledge and not the subject-less 
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fonnal logic, as the early Wittgenstein had suggested, or any other approach. The 
Morellis, in their book The Lonergan Reader (1997), in which they edit Lonergan' s 
work of Insight: A Study of Human Understanding5 (1957), present to us an 
introduction to Insight which discusses the aim and the practical good of Insight. The 
Introduction presents Lonergan's "The Original Preface", the second "Preface" and 
Lonergan's "Introduction to Insight." We are told that, in their judgement, in Insight 
Lonergan initiated a prolonged effort to meet the demands of our age. Lonergan offers 
a vision of the new cultural situation that characterises, as he puts it, the basic 
problem as a crisis of self-knowledge and emphasises the programmatic nature of 
Insight. The crisis of self-knowledge is to be met by insight into insight and insight 
into oversight, that is understanding what it is to understand and understanding why 
people run away from understanding. This task will be accomplished by unfolding the 
philosophic implications of insight into insight and by transposing the acquired self-
knowledge to practical spheres of human affairs. Insight succeeds, we are told, in 
achieving Lonergan's strategic objectives. 
We are also told that Lonergan' s leading question about knowledge regards 
facts and not mere possibilities. The reason why he emphasises instances of insight 
from science and mathematics is to illustrate their value in bringing to light the nature 
and significance of insight. Lonergan begins by asking the reader to attend to his own 
intellectual perfonnance and invites him to take possession of it. This is because that 
task forms the beginning of the transfonnation to self-appropriation. One should begin 
by examining what one has grasp of, that is the content of one' s discipline or field and 
then proceed to examine ones rational self-consciousness, which he describe as 
follows : 
Rational self-consciousness is a peak above the clouds. Intelligent and 
reasonable, responsible and free, scientific and metaphysical, it stands above 
romantic spontaneity, psychological depths, historical determinism and social 
engineering, the disconcerted existential subject and the undeciphered symbols 
of the artist and modernist (Lonergan, ''Insight, The Original Preface," in 
Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 33). 
Lonergan proceeds to tell us that if a person can scale the summit of her inner 
being, there is no way she can advert to the possibility of ascent or begin the climb, 
only to lose her way. What he means here is that the only way to reach the level of 
5Lonergan, B. (1957) Insight. A Study of Human Understanding. Henceforth. Insight. 
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rational self-consciousness is through self-appropriation That is, "scaling the summit 
of his inner being. " 
For Lonergan, Insight is a programme rather than an argument. It does not 
begin by assuming premises, but by presuming readers. It does not advance by 
deducing conclusions, for example, from religious faith or the principles of 
philosophy. It instead invites the reader, as he puts it, 
... ever more precisely and more detailed, to apprehend, to appreciate, to 
envisage in all its consequences, the inner focus of their own intelligence and 
reasonableness. That focus is ... insight. But to apprehend the focus is to gain 
insight into insight to piece the outer verbal and conceptual exhibitions of 
mathematics, of science and of commonsense, and to penetrate the inner 
dynamism of intelligent enquiry and critical reflection. To appreciate the focus 
is both to know and to know what it is to know one' s own intelligence, one's 
own reasonableness, one' s own essential and restricted by effective freedom. 
To envisage the focus in its full range of its implications is to discover for 
oneself what is meant by being, by objectivity, by metaphysics, by ethics, by 
God, and by evil (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 34). 
This long quotation in a way summarises what Lonergan' s theme of self-
appropriation is all about. He is claiming that insight is understanding in his own 
sense, that is not merely taking a look So Insight focuses on the reader rather than the 
premises. It invites us to envisage the inner focus of our own intelligence and 
reasonableness, rather than the principles of philosophy, for example. That is one side 
of insight. The other side is to comprehend what this focus is. That is, to gain insight 
into insight or to understand what it is to understand. It is these two sides of insight 
that complete the process of self-appropriation, in our case the idea of the subject-in-
act. 
On the practical good of insight, Lonergan has the following to say: 
... insight is the source not only of the theoretical knowledge but also of all its 
practical application, and indeed of all intelligent activity. Insight into insight 
then will reveal what activity is intelligent, and insight into oversight will 
reveal what activity is unintelligent. But to be practical is to do the intelligent 
thing, and to be unpractical is to keep blundering about. It follows that insight 
into both insight and oversight is the very key to practicality (Lonergan, 
"Insight, Second Preface, " in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 38). 
Here we are told that it is insight into insight that brings to light the cumulative 
process of progress. Again insight into insight for concrete situations gives rise to 
insights that issue into policies and courses of action. The consequence of this is that 
action transforms the existing situation to give rise to further insights, better policies 
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and more effective courses of action. Again we are told that what follows from this is 
that, if insight occurs, it keeps recurring and at each recurrence knowledge develops, 
action increases its scope and situations improve. 
Lonergan not only stresses the positive elements of insight into insight. He 
says that, on the other hand, insight into insight reveals the cumulative process of 
decline. This is because, as he puts it, the flight from understanding blocks the 
insights that concrete situations demand. What follows from this is the unintelligent 
policies and inept courses of action. The deteriorating situation demands still further 
insights which get blocked, resulting in policies becoming more unintelligent and 
actions more inept. What is worse, he points out, is that this deteriorating situation 
seems to provide the uncritical, biased mind with factual evidence in which the bias is 
claimed to be verified. From this situation, he concludes that in ever-increasing 
measure, intelligence comes to be irrelevant to practical living, with the consequence 
that human activity settles down to a decadent routine and initiative becomes the 
privilege of violence. 
Lonergan observes that this is unfortunately the situation which is existing in 
every age, that is insight and oversight are commonly mated. The same can be said for 
progress and decline. Our love of truth is reinforced with a practicality that is 
equivalent to obscurantism. Old evil is corrected with a paSsion that mars the new 
good. He laments that we are not pure. We tend to compromise and hope to meddle 
through. Lonergan advises us that we have to learn to distinguish sharply between 
progress and decline and also to learn to encourage progress without putting a 
premium upon decline. Above all, we have to learn to remove the tumour of the flight 
from understanding without destroying the organs of intelligence. 
So much for the practical good of Insight. Lonergan proceeds to highlight the 
aim of Insight in a five-point summary. The first point is that Insight does not 
necessarily address the existence of knowledge, but precisely what its nature is. 
Secondly, while we cannot disregard the content of knowledge, it is to be only in the 
schematic and incomplete fashion needed to provide a discriminant or determinant of 
cognitive acts. Thirdly, he does not aim at setting forth a list of abstract properties of 
human knowledge, but to assist the reader to effect in a personal appropriation of the 
correct dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative in his own cognitional 
activities. Fourthly, such an appropriation can only occur gradually and, as he says, so 
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there will be offered, not a sudden account of the whole of the structure but a slow , 
assembly of its elements, relations, alternatives and implications. Finally, he 
concludes, the order of the assembly is not governed by abstract considerations of 
logical or metaphysical priority, but by concrete motives of pedagogical efficacy. In 
this survey we have looked at the aim and the practical good of Insight. However, we 
must emphasise it here that we do not intend to follow Lonergan through the stages of 
Insight. Our interest is only in the method of knowing, as Lonergan helps by 
summarising: 
.. . our primary concern is not the known but the knowing. The known is 
extensive, but the knowing is a recurrent structure that can be investigated 
sufficiently in a series of strategically chosen instances. The known is difficult 
to master, but in our day competent specialists have laboured to select for 
serious readers and to present to them in an adequate fashion the basic 
components of the various departments of knowledge ... the known is 
incomplete and subject to revision, but our concern is the knower that will be 
the source of the future editions and revisions (Lonergan, "InSight, 
Introduction," in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 41). 
In our case, the knower is the subject-in-act. It is the subject-in-act who forms the 
foundation for all knowing. 
In reacting to Lonergan's ideas, in this survey, we say that the demand of our 
age is the method that integrates the content of knowledge and the knower. That is, 
understanding both knowledge and the understanding subject. Lonergan characterises 
the basic problem of human self-knowledge as a crisis. So Insight aims to offer a 
programme that would help in overcoming this crisis. Insight, as we shall discuss in 
this chapter, meets effectively the demands of our times. His slogan in Insight, which 
is expressed as 
Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you 
understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will 
possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening up all further developments 
of understanding (Lonergan, "Insight, Introduction," in Morelli and Morelli, 
1997: 44), 
This provides a foundation for our thesis, that is the subject-in-act is foundational to 
knowledge. It is in this slogan that the theme of Insight, which is self-appropriation or 
the appropriation of one's own rational self-consciousness, is rooted. It is this theme 
that will be the driving force behind our discussion of the subject-in-act. 
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What Lonergan calls "rational self-consciousness" is in consonance with our 
idea of the subject-in-act. This is because, if the subject is a "peak above the clouds", 
then he is transcendental. That means he can examine and check knowledge of all 
reality. Therefore he forms a foundation to all knowledge. 
3.2 The Subject 
In the two sub-sections in this section we are following Lonergan (1996) A Second 
Collection: Papers by Bernard J. F Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli (1997). 
3.2.1 The Neglected and Truncated Subject 
We now proceed with the exposition of the subject, as presented by Lonergan. 
Lonergan is of the view that in order to get knowledge of any kind, be it mathematics, 
science, or even common sense knowledge, one must first of all know oneself 
Knowledge of the rest of reality is simply further knowledge. However, what has 
happened so far is that the subject has been neglected or sacrificed at the altar of 
objective truth. Empiricism has it that objective truth can only be reached through 
sense knowledge. Rationalism has it that objective truth can only be attained through 
reason, but according to Lonergan it is neither empiricism per se, nor rationalism per 
se, that can lead to objective truth. As he puts it, 
... a subject may be needed to arrive at truth .. . what is true at anytime or place 
can be contradicted only by falsity. No one can gainsay it .. . . The fruit of truth 
must grow and mature on the tree of the subject before it can be plucked and 
placed in the absolute realm (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 422). 
According to Lonergan, this can only be reached at the level of judgement. Judgement 
is only possible through the subject-in-act or through the set of operations. This is a 
fact which empiricism, rationalism, or any other philosophy, has overlooked, as we 
shall now argue. 
Lonergan gives another reason why the subject is pushed into the background, 
namely a metaphysical account of the soul. Metaphysically it was held by Aristotle 
that plants, animals and men have souls. So emphasis was put on the study and 
analysis of the essential differences of these souls. The study of the soul was regarded 
as totally objective. There was a move of turning from the soul to its potencies, its 
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habits, its acts and its objects. The method used to study plants is the same as the one 
used to study animals and men and the results turn out to be completely universal. 
Lonergan regards this metaphysical account as some form of obscurantism. 
According to him, it steered away attention from the subject to the soul, making the 
dualism between body and soul distinct, creating a belief that it was the soul that was 
fundamental. Lonergan, by contrast, feels that 
The study of the subject is quite different, for it is the study of oneself in as 
much as one is conscious. It prescinds from the soul, its essence, its potencies, 
its habits, for none of these is given in consciousness. It attends to operations 
and to their centre and the source, which is the self It discerns the different 
levels of consciousness, the consciousness of the dream, of the waking subject, 
of the rationally reflecting subject, of the reasonable deliberating subject. It 
examines the different operations on the several levels and their relations to 
one another (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 424). 
The message here is that the subject and the soul are not mutually exclusive, 
but to focus attention on the soul leads to the neglect of the subject. This temptation is 
akin to that of the empiricists, who concentrate on sense knowledge, and the 
rationalists, who concentrate on reason. Much as we cannot find a foundation in 
empiricism alone or rationalism alone, the same can be said about the soul. Searching 
for a foundation in the soul inevitably leads to the neglect of the subject-in-act or the 
set of operations. The foundation rooted in the soul per se would not lead to the 
understanding of all reality. Lonergan is concerned about the subject who has been 
neglected. As he says, 
. . . . The neglected subject does not know himself, the truncated subject, not 
only does he not know himself but is also unaware of his ignorance and so, in 
one way or another concludes that what he does not know does not exist 
(Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 424). 
We see that efforts have been switched from the subject to other areas because of the 
neglect. The subject now is not only self-unappropriated or ignorant about herself, but 
is in a position to conclude that what she is ignorant of does not exist. This is a very 
unfortunate situation, which needs to be overhauled or revamped and redirected. The 
subject has been reduced to a mere object in existence, like any other being which is 
occupying space. It is high time that the subject be given her befitting status as a 
foundation to all knowledge. The subject is not only a being in existence but also a 
being in act, a being who attends to the data of the senses, who analyses this data and 
who passes judgement about this data. What we have to know is that the subject is 
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constituted by all the operations and not merely a part of them He is a set of 
operations in the conscious act. Through self-appropriation she is self-knowing and 
through the set of operations she accesses knowledge in all its circles; therefore 
becoming truly foundational to all paraphernalia of knoWing. 
Lonergan is of the view that it is not enough to confine knowledge to sense 
data and the structures of mathematical logic, as positivists do. Neither is it enough to 
divert attention to action and results, as pragmatists do. In order to emphasise the 
practicality of the subject, Lonergan introduces the trend generated by conceptualism, 
that is certainty of concepts, as inferred from linguistic usage or scientific generality. 
The notion of conceptualism is of relevance here, because we are in a debate 
concerning logical and scientific generality and language use as a means of knowing. 
Conceptualism leads to a strong affirmation of concepts. We again say that 
conceptualism per se cannot in itself lead to knowledge of all reality. Lonergan points 
out three defects emanating from conceptualism He calls the first defect an anti-
historical immobilism. As he puts it, 
.... Human understanding develops and, as it develops, it expresses itself in 
ever more precise and more accurate concepts, hypotheses, theories, and 
systems. But conceptualism as it disregards insight, so it cannot account for 
the development of concepts. Of themselves concepts are immobile. They ever 
remain what they are defined to mean. They are abstract and so stand outside 
the spacio-temporal world of change. What does change is human 
understanding and, when understanding changes or develops, then defining 
changes or develops .. . while concepts do not change on their own, still they 
are changed as the mind that forms them changes (Lonergan, in Morelli and 
Morelli, 1997: 425). 
Lonergan is pointing out the fact that human understanding - the trend towards 
knowing all reality - is in a perpetual state of change. It is a dynamic enterprise. It is 
the subject-in-act responding to inquiry, grasping the intelligible from the sensible 
representations, formulating definitions on linguistic usage or inferring scientific 
generalities. The subject guides the path to knowledge. If the road is straight the 
journey towards all reality becomes easy. On the other hand, when there are obstacles 
on the road; the subject seeks to redefine the concepts. If it becomes impossible, the 
subject may choose to abandon them and formulate new definitions. Because the 
subject is dynamic, she can lead us to look forwards or backwards until we reach the 
desired goal. Given the dynamism in the development of knowledge, there is no way 
the subject or the basic pattern of operations can be sidelined or neglected. 
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The second defect of conceptualism which Lonergan identifies is that of 
excessive abstractness. He points out that the generalities of our knowledge are 
related to concrete reality in two distinct manners. There is the relationship of the 
universal to the particular, of that man to this man, of that circle to this circle. 
There is also the far more important relationship between the intelligible and 
the sensible, between the unity or the data captured by insight and the data in which 
the unity or pattern is grasped. The universal abstracts from the particulars, but the 
intelligibility grasped by insight is immanent in the sensible and, when the sensible 
datum, image or symbol, is removed, the insight vanishes. But conceptualism ignores 
human understanding and so it overlooks the concrete mode of understanding that 
grasps intelligibility in the sensible. It is confined to the world of abstract universals 
and its only link with the concrete is the relation of the universals to particulars. This 
notion of the universal and particular leads us to obscuring the subject. This is another 
area which has led to the obscuring of he subject. The contrast between conceptualism 
as a mode to the knowing of all reality and the basic pattern of operations, also as a 
mode to the knowing of all reality, is that conceptualism is passive while the basic 
pattern of operations is dynamic. Being passive conceptualism gets to reality by 
simply relating the concepts to objects. Again, being passive it lacks the mechanism 
of being self-corrective. In case of the concepts requiring redefinition, or even 
overhauling the entire meaning of the concept, conceptualism has no mode of self-
adjustment. This is further proof that the subject cannot be brushed away and simply 
pushed into the background. So, while conceptualism reflects tendencies of passivity, 
the set of operations, on the other hand, reflects dynamism. It has a mechanism for 
self-correction. This comes as a result of its inherent quality of the desire to know. 
This desire leads to knowledge through inquiry. It grasps knowledge intelligently. 
Though questions it checks itself Though this process of self-correcting the ability 
to redefine concepts makes the subject foundational to conceptualism. 
As Lonergan points out, in conceptualism the link between the abstract 
universals with the concrete is the relation of universal to particular, but that is to 
ignore human understanding. The subject is not confined to the world of universals. 
She reaches out to the concrete reality of the sensible, conscious of the concrete world 
of the senses and conscious of herself as grasping intelligibility in the sensible. This 
way she can gain complete knowledge of the sensible because she is using 
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intelligence or she proceeds through the process of asking questions where things do 
not fit together and then corrects them. 
Lonergan traces the third weakness of conceptualism in the notion of being. 
He points out that conceptualists think of being as an abstraction, in fact as the most 
abstract of all abstractions. According to Lonergan, the notion of being is not abstract 
but concrete. The reason he gives is that it intends everything about everything, 
prescinding from nothing whatsoever. He observes, 
... . But to advert to this clearly and distinctly, one must note not only that 
concepts express acts of understanding but also both acts of understanding and 
concepts respond to questions. The notion of being first appears in 
questioning. Being is the unknown that questioning intends to know; that 
answers partially reveal that further questioning presses on to know more 
fully. The notion of being then is dynamic, proleptic, an anticipation of the 
entirety, the concreteness, the totality, that we ever intend and, since our 
knowledge is finite, never reach. (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 
426). 
Lonergan here projects conceptualists as being erroneous in their presentation of the 
notion of being. Contrary to their belief that being is abstract, he corrects that being is 
actually concrete. That it intends everything about everything - as we have said -
prescinding from nothing whatsoever. The fact that the notion of being frrst appears in 
questioning, that in itself makes it dynamic. The fact that it is the unknown that 
questioning intends to know, subjects it to the level of intelligence. The fact that the 
answers partially reveal that further questioning presses one to know more fully, does 
not only make the notion of being essentially dynamic but operational. That is, the 
notion of being fully falls within the investigative ambit of the set of operations. 
Lonergan, up to this point, is being unambiguous about the fact that, to date, 
we lack a foundation that would lead us to all understanding and to the knowing of all 
reality, simply because philosophers and philosophies have searched in the wrong 
directions. This has not only left the subject neglected but also truncated, that is the 
subject lacks both the knowledge of herself and the account of human knowledge. Let 
us now tum to a discussion of what we mean by the subject being foundational. 
3.2.2 The Foundational Subject 
Lonergan reminds us that, though the subject has been thought to be "within", she 
does not remain totally "within " His knowing involves an internal self-transcendence 
113 
that is applying the basic pattern of operation in the process of knowing and being 
aware, at the same time, of what is taking place. It is the typical case where one can 
account for one's knowing. A neglected or truncated subject lacks that ability and so 
is merely the immanent subject. The subject remains ''within'', so is partly hidden. 
The problem with an immanent subject is his inadequate conception of objectivity. 
Human knowing, Lonergan explains, is not a single uniform property but a 
complexity of different operations. He points out that it involves, 
... an experiential objectivity in the givenness of the data of sense and the data 
of consciousness. But such experiential objectivity is not the one and only 
ingredient in the objectivity of human knowing. The process of inquiry, 
investigation, reflection, coming to judge is governed throughout by the 
exigencies of human intelligence and human reasonableness ... (Lonergan, in 
Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 426-427). 
Lonergan is emphasising the fact that the subject is an integrated whole who cannot 
be looked at in terms of fragments such as an immanent subject or the soul or the 
body or the combination of all these. The subject is conscious and present to herself 
both within the data of sense and the data of consciousness. This is the only trend 
which leads to absolute objectivity. He further explains that we can reach absolute 
objectivity when we distinguish sharply between what we feel, imagine and think 
when it seems to be so and when it is so. 
In this regard Lonergan helps us to draw a distinction between the subject of 
our thesis who is the foundation of knowing and the sort of mistaken subject - whom 
we have discussed in the previous section - who appears in the old schemas such as 
rationalism and conceptualism The subject of the old schema is fragmented. It would 
be difficult for anything which is - in Lonergan's argument - fragmented to form a 
foundation; especially when these fragments are in direct conflict. 
In order to make the subject of our thesis stand out clearly, let us recapture the 
notion of the mistaken subject, who is moulded on the pre-modem schema before the 
advent of Lonergan. The schemas of the old categories do distinguish faculties such as 
intellect and will, or do distinguish different uses of the same faculty such as 
speculative and practical intellect. They also distinguish different types of human 
activity such as theoretical inquiry and practical execution. According to Lonergan, 
none of these activities adverts to the subject as such. He regards these schemes as 
irrelevant and proceeds to help us build a scheme that will reflect the correct subject 
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who would actually serve as a foundation for knowing reality in all spheres of 
knowing. He draws six degrees, which constitute an integrated and complete subject: 
At the lowest level, when unconscious as in dreamless sleep, or in a coma, we 
are merely potentially subjects. Next, we have minimum degree of 
consciousness and subjectivity of our dreams. Thirdly, we become experiential 
subjects when we awake, when we become the subjects of lucid perception, 
imaginative projects, emotional and connotative impulses, and bodily action. 
Fourthly, the intelligent subject sublates the experiential, i.e. it retains, 
preserves, goes beyond, completes it, when we inquire about our experiences, 
investigate, grow in understanding, express our inventions and discoveries. 
Fifthly, the rational subject sublates the intelligent and experiential subject, 
when we question our own understanding, check our formulations and 
expressions, ask whether we have got things right, marshal the evidence pro 
and con, judge this to be so and that not to be so. Sixthly, finally, rational 
consciousness is sublated by rational self consciousness, when we deliberate, 
evaluate, act ... (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 430) 
That is our unfragmented and complete subject, a foundation for understanding and 
knowing all reality. Lonergan helps us interpret what we mean by unfragmented and 
complete subject. In the process of getting to reality the most common trend is to 
begin from commonsense experience, or from the data of our senses, namely hearing, 
seeing, taste, smell and feel. Then the data of our senses is passed on to the intellect. 
That means human intelligence goes beyond human sensitivity. Yet, and this is very 
important, it cannot get along without sensitivity. Intelligence asks questions about 
the data of the senses. Without this data there will be no questions for the intelligence 
to ask, so sense data without the intellect will remain raw. If raw data is not analysed 
by the intellect it may not qualify as reliable knowledge, yet the intellect will not act 
in isolation, either. There must be data for the intellect to analyse. There is thus a 
necessary thread running through sensitivity and intelligence. It is necessary that 
human judgement goes beyond sensitivity and intelligence, but in order for it to 
function it must be in close collaboration with them. In other words, it cannot function 
except when in conjunction with them. We see the thread running through the whole 
enterprise from human sensitivity to human intelligence in an integrated and complete 
manner. We say reality is reached when this process of functional interdependence is 
completed. 
This successive sublation of human sensitivity, human intelligence, and 
human judgement is referred to by Lonergan as the levels of consciousness. He 
summarises the procedure of the levels of consciousness as follows: 
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... the levels of consciousness are united by the unfolding of a single 
transcendental intending of plural, interchangeable objectives. What promotes 
the subject from the experiential to intellectual consciousness is the desire to 
understand, the intention of intelligibility. What next promotes him from 
intellectual to rational consciousness is a full unfolding of the sense intention: 
for the desire to understand, once understanding has been reached becomes the 
desire to understand correctly; in other words, the intention of intelligibility, 
once an intelligible is reached, becomes the intention of the right intelligible, 
of the true and, through truth, of reality (Lonergan, in Morelli and Morelli, 
1997: 431). 
Lonergan finds it opportune to remind us here that the subject is not just an intellect or 
just a will and his legitimacy is not just results, as pragmatists would put it; neither is 
it practical intellect or practical reason, as Aristotelians or Kantians might say. The 
subject, instead, is at the base of both actions and results. This is because results 
proceed from action, actions in tum proceed from decisions, decisions proceed from 
evaluations, evaluations proceed from deliberations and all these emanate from the 
subject-in-act who, deliberates, evaluates, decides, acts and finally brings about 
results. He or she forms the foundation of the whole enterprise. 
Lonergan consolidates this position with an assertion that from the subject, we 
easily pass into the whole human world founded on meaning, a world of language, art, 
literature, science, philosophy, history, of family and mores, society and education, 
state and law, economy and technology. That human world does not come into being 
or survive without deliberation, evaluation, decision and action 
In this section we have encountered the reasons why, hither to, we have lacked 
a foundation to all knowing. The subject has either been grossly neglected or not 
accorded her proper functional status. On top of that, she has been truncated. Efforts 
from different philosophers to fragment the subject have led to obscurantism about the 
dynamic actuality in the potentiality of the subject. 
Lonergan helps us to revamp this state of affairs. We now have a foundation in 
the form of the subject-in-act, who is not only foundational to all knowing and all 
reality but to all activity. Below, Lonergan helps us to expose what the basic pattern 
of operations is all about. 
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3.3 Basic Pattern of Operations 
In this section we are following Lonergan's (1975) Method in Theology, Chapter One. 
3.3.1 Composition and Description of the Basic Pattern of Operations as a Method 
leading to Knowing in all cases 
Lonergan projects the basic pattern of operations as including, 
seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling, inquiring, imagining, understanding, 
conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, 
judging, deliberating, evaluating, deducing, speaking and writing (Lonergan, 
1975: 6). 
This pattern forms the edifice, which constitutes the subject-based method. It is in this 
method that we shall find the broad road towards understanding all aspects of reality, 
natural and human. 
Lonergan proceeds to show us how the subject and the object relate. There is a 
direct relationship between the subject-in-act or the operations and the object being 
perceived. In other words, ,the subject intends the object or, as he puts it, 
.. . to say that the operations intend objects is to refer to such facts as that by 
seeing there becomes present what is seen, by hearing there becomes present 
what is heard, by imagining there becomes present what is imagined ... (1975: 
7). 
Here, by intending, Lonergan means that the subject becomes aware of the object to 
be perceived and becoming aware of the object and what is perceived, the object 
presents itself to the subject. 
Lonergan refers to the subject as an operator; and the operations are operations 
of the subject. This subject operates consciously, that is this operation is a voluntary 
operation. There would be no operation to talk of if the operator was in a coma or 
under the influence of drugs. While operating, the subject is aware of herself 
operating and is experiencing herself operating. She is conscious and the intended 
objects occur to her consciously and by them the intending subject is fully conscious. 
The point which Lonergan is making is that this relationship between the 
subject and the object is psychological and not mechanical. A mechanical operator 
would function according to the prescribed rule or set of rules. If something went 
wrong, a mechanical operator would not effect a solution, or even a correction, unless 
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the correcting rule or set of rules are invoked. The relationship between the subject 
and the object is psychological, because the subject is constantly aware of the 
intended object. If something goes wrong in the operation, the subject, through 
intelligence, will effect the necessary correction, or call upon a specialist if the 
problem is beyond her grasp and then the function will proceed. This is not possible 
with a mechanical operation. With the mechanical operation, if anything goes wrong 
then the whole function will stall. The subject does not only intend the object but she 
attends to the object which is intended. To use the example of seeing, the subject 
gazes at the object. The presence of the subject, however, resides in the gazing or the 
attending. In this situation it is the subject who is basic to the object. This is because 
she intends the object consciously. She may give her whole attention to the object as 
intended or attend to it and, at the same time, remain fully conscious of herself as the 
attending operator. 
What makes the intending subject superior to the intended object is that, in the 
process of intending, she experiences herself operating. However, Lonergan explains 
that this experiencing is not another operation. This is because, when the subject is 
experiencing herself in the operation, she is not intending any object at all, but is only 
being conscious of herself in the activity of operating. In other words, it is not another 
operation over and above the operation being experienced. Lonergan says that it is 
that very operation which, besides being intrinsically intentional, is also intrinsically 
conSCIOUS. 
Lonergan is introducing not only a new but also a fundamental idea of 
objectifying the subjective experience. Lonergan' s fundamental idea helps us to solve 
a number of problems. He helps to solve the problem raised by Wittgenstein in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, discussed in Chapter Two, of the subject-less formal 
logic. It also helps us to solve the problem raised by Hume of sense knowledge being 
true knowledge, on the basis of sense experience only. 
Lonergan identifies two aspects which are characteristic of the subject-based 
pattern of operations. These are consciousness and intentionality. These aspects are 
present whenever the subject is in operation. They operate at four successive, related, 
but qualitatively different, levels. Lonergan marshals these levels as follows. The first 
one is the empirical level. At this level the subject senses, perceives, imagines, feels, 
speaks and moves. The second one is the intellectual level. This is the level at which 
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the subject inquires, comes to understand, expresses what she has understood and 
works out the presuppositions and implications of her expressions. In close 
succession, the rational level follows this one. This is where the subject reflects, 
marshals the evidence, passes judgement on the truth or falsity; or certainty or 
probability of a statement. The fourth and last one is the responsible level. This is the 
level where the subject is concerned with herself, that is her own operations and her 
own goals. It is also the level at which the subject deliberates about possible courses 
of action, evaluates them, makes decisions and carries out her own decisions. 
Lonergan stresses that, at all the four levels, all the subject-based operations 
are both conscious and intentional. There is, however, a qualitative progression 
evident as one moves from level to level and, at the same time, both intentionality and 
consciousness differ from level to level. Within each level, many operations involve 
further differences. For instance, consciousness expands in a new dimension when, 
from mere experiencing, the subject turns her efforts to the understanding of what has 
been experienced. This leads to the intellectual level of analysing what has been 
experienced and then to the third and more qualitative dimension and that is of 
rationality. There is the level where what emerged as the data of sense at the 
experiencing level and analysed at the intellectual level stands out as a bright idea and 
the subject has to confirm it as really so or not so or really the case or not the case. It 
is at this level where facts are judged as reality or truth and therefore accepted as 
knowledge. Because we are human beings and not machines, which may stop at 
functional reality, the subject proceeds to the fourth level and this is the level where 
we have to decide what to do with this knowledge. 
At all the four levels Lonergan reminds us that the subject is aware of herself 
But still, as she progresses from level to level, it is the fuller self which the subject 
experiences. More Lonergan reminds us that this awareness of the subject, as she 
moves from level to level, is different. For instance, as empirically conscious the 
subject does not seem to differ from higher animals. Unlike the animals, however, the 
empirical awareness and intentionality are only a substratum for further operation. 
This is because the data of the senses provokes inquiry in the subject. It is the inquiry 
that leads to understanding. Once something has been understood it is expressed; and 
this is done through language. 
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Lonergan reminds us that without the data there would be nothing for the 
subject to inquire about and there would be nothing to be understood. Inquiry, on the 
other hand, does not seek another datwn. Questions, which emerge at the level of 
inquiry, seek ideas or form or the intelligible unity or relatedness, which organise data 
into intelligible wholes. It is evident that there is a higher and different form of 
awareness from the empirical awareness. Empirical awareness involves coming into 
contact between the intender, the subject - and the intended - the object. The 
operation of sight hits the object and knowledge is acquired there and then. The nose 
smells food and knowledge that dinner is ready is acquir~. No questions are asked. 
But the second level of awareness - the level of enquiry - may involve conflicting 
results. This is a more challenging level of awareness than the empirical one. This is 
appropriate because judgement would not be feasible without first sorting out these 
conflicting results in order to find out which is the real case or the true case and which 
is not. This requires a higher and qualitative level of awareness and consciousness. 
Lonergan tells us that as different operations yield qualitatively different 
modes of being conscious subjects, they equally yield different modes of intending. 
Here he draws the distinction between the intending of our senses and the intending of 
our imagination. The intending of our senses, he points out, is normally selective but 
not creative. The intending of our imagination may, however, be representative or 
creative. That notwithstanding, he points out that the most fundamental difference in 
the modes of intending lies between the categorial and the transcendental. The 
categorial mode of intention yields a determinate or specialised type of knowledge. 
Lonergan contrast tIns type with the set of operations. According to him, the 
set of operations is not only comprehensive in connotation but also unrestricted in 
denotation and invariant over cultural change. He draws a further distinction that even 
though categories are needed for purposes of putting determinate questions and giving 
determinate answers, the set of operations, on the other hand, is contained in questions 
prior to the answers. This mode is the radical intending that moves us from ignorance 
to knowledge. He points out that this mode is a priori because it goes beyond what we 
know to seek what we do not know yet. Furthermore, it is unrestricted because 
answers are never complete. Instead they give rise to further questions. It reflects a 
characteristic of being comprehensive because it intends the unknown whole or 
totality of which our answers reveal only part. 
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Lonergan makes a compendium of the whole account of the modes of 
operations, as follows: 
... intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how 
and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the answers of intelligence to 
ask whether the answers are true and whether what they mean is really so. 
Responsibility goes beyond fact and desire and possibility to discern between 
what truly is good and what only apparently is good (1975: 11). 
In order to form the transcendental concept of the intelligible we have to objectify the 
content of intelligent intending. In order to form the transcendental concept of the true 
and real, we have to objectify the content of reasonable intending. In order to get the 
transcendental concept of value or the truly good, we have to objectify the content of 
responsible intending. This is so because we are the subject-in-act consciously 
operating. Such a progression entails dynamism of the subject' s conscious intending, 
which promotes the subject from mere experiencing towards understanding. This, in 
turn, promotes her from mere understanding towards truth and reality and from 
factual knowledge to responsible action This dynamism, apart from being a product 
of cultural advance, is the condition of its possibility. This is the case because culture 
itself is not static but dynamic. This dynamism can be better facilitated by the patterns 
of operations. Lonergan refers to the ignorance or error, negligence or malice, that 
may lead to the blocking of that dynamism as obscurantism in its most radical form. It 
is the energy which propels the subject towards acquiring all reality, from the most 
elementary to the transcendental level. 
This exposition has unfolded before us the operations that intend objects. In 
order to make us have a clearer view or understanding of objects, Lonergan proceeds 
to draw for us the distinction between elementary and compound objects, or the 
distinction between elementary and compound knowing. Elementary knowing takes 
us back to the cognitional operations of seeing and hearing; in a nutshell, all sense 
knowledge. Consequently, elementary objects are those that are intended in the 
elementary knowing. Compound knowing, conversely, on the other hand is a 
combination of several instances of elementary knowing into a single knowing. The 
compound object comes as a result of uniting several elementary objects. In this 
respect it follows that 
... the process of compounding is the work of transcendental notions which, 
from the beginning, intend the unknown that, gradually, becomes better 
known. In virtue of this intending, what is experienced can be the same as 
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what is understood; what is experienced and understood can be the same as 
what is conceived, what is experienced and understood and conceived can be 
the same as what is affirmed to be real; what is experienced, understood, 
conceived, affirmed, can be the same as what is approved as truly good. So the 
many elementary objects are constructed into a single compound object and, in 
turn, the many compound objects will be ordered into a single universe (1975 : 
12). 
Here we are made to see how truly foundational the basic pattern of operations is, or 
the subject is. The subject can intend objects at the most elementary level of sense and 
proceed, though intelligence and judgement, to responsibility. The conscious 
dynamism enables her to integrate knowledge up to its utmost comprehensiveness and 
conclusiveness. 
After experiencing many conSCIOUS and intentional operations, and after 
arranging them in a succession of different levels of consciousness, we construct into 
large wholes the many elementary objects. We have also combined many operations 
into a single compound knowing. Lonergan proceeds to show us that even the many 
levels of operation are merely successive stages in the upholding of a single thrust. 
As he puts it, to know the good the subject must know the real. It follows that to know 
the real the subject must know the true. The subject gets to the truth from the 
intelligible and consequently, in order to know the intelligible, the subject must attend 
to the data It is like emerging from slumber, from which the subject emerges to 
attend to the data Her observation of data leaves her intelligence puzzled, something 
that propels her into inquiry. In tum, inquiry leads her into insight but insights may be 
many. At this stage, critical reasonableness leads to doubt and it is doubt that makes 
her check the competing alternatives in order to make sure. This is where alternative 
courses of action present themselves, leaving the subject wondering if the most 
attractive is the truly good. Lonergan observes that these successive transcendental 
notions are so intimate that they require specialised differentiation of consciousness 
for the subject to withdraw from the ordinary ways of leaving and devote herself to a 
specialised one. He gives the example of pursuing moral goodness, philosophic truth, 
scientific understanding or artistic beauty. 
We crown this section with a reminder that the basic pattern of conscious and 
intentional operations is dynamic. It is dynamic both materially and formally. It is 
dynamic formally in a sense that it calls forth and assembles the appropriate 
operations at each stage of the process, for instance, as Lonergan puts it, the way a 
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growmg organism puts forth its own organs and lives by their functioning. 
Concretely, 
... this doubly dynamic method is not blind but open-eyed; it is attentive, 
intelligent, reasonable; it is conscious intending, ever going beyond what 
happens to be given or known, ever striving for a fuller and richer 
apprehension of the yet unknown incompletely unknown totality, whole, 
universal (1975: 13). 
Lonergan posits this method as whole and universal. In the next section we explore 
the extent to which it is a method that transcends all methods. 
3.3.2 Subject: Basic Pattern of Operations as Truly Foundational to the 
Understanding of all Reality 
We begin this section with a couple of questions. Is the basic pattern of operations a 
method at all? If so, is it a transcendental method? Let us begin by asserting that the 
transcendental method is indeed a method. From Lonergan's point of view, it is a 
method because it is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations, which 
yield cumulative and progressive results. It is indeed a transcendental method, 
because its results are not limited categorially to some particular field or subject. This 
method yields any result(s) that could be intended by the completely open 
transcendental notions. This ability of the pattern of operations of being open to any 
field elevates it above all other methods which aim at meeting the exigencies and 
exploiting the opportunities pertaining to particular fields, as confirmed by Lonergan. 
... transcendental method is concerned with meeting the exigencies and 
exploiting the opportunities presented by the human mind itself It is a concern 
that is both foundational and universally relevant (1975: 14). 
Now if it is acceptable that everyone has the potential of being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable and responsible, and these are the precepts of transcendental method, then 
this method is open for application by anyone, irrespective of their field of 
specialisation. What is required of this one - for all method, as Lonergan says, is a 
matter of heightening one's consciousness by objectifying it. As a matter of fact, that 
is the unavoidable task, which this thesis is inviting all of us to do. Because 
transcendental method is foundational, and therefore a necessary tool for everyone, all 
of us should not only be aware of it but be obligated to practice it in our daily lives. 
The question now is, in what sense is this method foundational to everyone? 
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Lonergan gives us the answer. He reiterates the fact that heightening one' s 
consciousness by objectifying it is something that each and every one of us, 
ultimately, has to do for herself On top of that, it should be obligatory for every one 
to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible. Being attentive, intelligent, 
reasonable and responsible involves the operations as experiencing, understanding, 
judging and deciding. These operations are both conscious and intentional, since what 
is conscious can be intentional, so what Lonergan means by applying the operations 
as intentional to operations as conscious is summarised as follows: One experiences 
one's experiencing, experiences one' s understanding and experiences one's judging. 
This is, at the first level. At the second level, one understands the unity and relations 
of one' s experienced experiencing, understands the unity and relations of one's 
understanding, understands the unity and relations of one' s judging and understands 
the unity and relations of one' s deciding. At the third level, one affirms the reality of 
one' s experienced and understood experiencing, one affirms the reality of one' s 
understanding, one affirms the reality of one' s judging and one affirms the reality of 
one' s deciding. At the fourth level, one decides to operate in accord with the norms 
immanent in spontaneous relatedness of one' s experienced, understood, affirmed 
experiencing, understanding, judging and deciding. Lonergan elucidates: 
... there are to be experienced one's experiencing, understanding, judging, 
deciding. But this fourfold experience is just consciousness. We have it every 
time we experience, or understand, or judge, or decide. But our attention is apt 
to be focussed on the subject, while our conscious operating remains 
peripheral. We must, then, enlarge our interest, recall that one and the same 
operation not only intends an object but also reveals an intending 
subject .. . that discovery of course is not a matter of looking, inspecting, gazing 
upon. It is awareness, not of what is intended but of the intending. It is finding 
in oneself the conscious occurrence, hearing, whenever an object is heard, and 
so forth (1975: 15). 
What Lonergan is explaining is that if our questioning is unlimited we must 
question what questioning is, try to understand it and judge it. Secondly, that 
transcendental method is a method for all humanity, but which is largely in its latent 
state. In order to understand this correctly one can use the metaphor of sugar in a cup 
of tea. If sugar is added to the tea and left undisturbed, it will settle at the bottom of 
the cup and the tea will continue to taste sugarless. It is only when one uses a spoon 
and stirs the sugar that the presence of the sugar will be detected in the tea Once this 
has been done it will no longer be possible for the tea to be tasted separately as bitter 
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and the sugar to be tasted separately as sweet. Both the tea and the sugar, though 
different items, will taste as one and the same thing. The same can be said for 
transcendental method. The onus is on us to function as a subject, the basic pattern of 
operations. In order to gain intelligibility, or to move in the direction of acquiring all 
knowledge, we should not only intend the objects but also be aware and conscious of 
what we are intending. We should be prepared to function as one integrated whole, as 
we move from seeing, understanding and being reasonable and responsible. 
Transcendental method carries us through all the stages that will finally lead us to 
understanding and knowing reality in all aspects. 
At this stage, it is reasonable to say that gaining intelligibility at the sensual 
level is relatively simpler, because one can advert to them whenever there is an object 
which one intends to know. One reason why this method has not been taken seriously 
is that it gets more and more challenging as one climbs the rungs of the ladder that 
leads to knowing in all circles. Here Lonergan cautions that some forethought and 
ingenuity is required when it comes to heightening one' s consciousness of inquiry, 
insight, formulation, critical reflection, weighing the evidence, judging and deciding. 
In this progression, knowledge of the precise meanings of each of these words 
becomes necessary. In addition to this, Lonergan points out that one has to produce in 
oneself the corresponding operation and keep on producing it until one gets beyond 
the object intended to the consciously operating subject. 
All these, as a matter of fact, have to be done within the appropriate context, 
that is it should not be a matter of inward inspection but of inquiry, enlarged interest, 
discernment, comparison, distinction, identification and meaning. One has to be 
prepared in order to undergo all these operations, because they are not experienced 
singly but in their relations, that is they are not merely conscious operations but also 
conscious processes. 
At this stage one may wonder to what extent this claim is authentic and 
acceptable. As Lonergan puts it, 
... on the empirical level, it is true, process is spontaneous sensitivity; it is 
intelligible only in a sense that it is understood ... with inquiry the intelligent 
subject emerges, and process becomes intelligent; it is not merely an 
intelligible that can be understood, but the active correlative of intelligibility, 
the intelligence that intelligently seeks understanding, comes to understand, 
and operates in the light of having understood. When inquiry comes to a term 
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or an impasse, intelligence intelligently yields place to critical reflection; as 
critically reflective, the subject stands in conscious relation to an absolute. The 
absolute that makes us regard the positive content of the sciences not as true 
and certain but only as possible. Finally, the rational subject, having achieved 
knowledge of what is and what could be, rationally gives way to conscious 
freedom and conscious responsibility (1975: 16). 
What comes out glaringly from this encounter is the fact that - as Lonergan puts it -
the operations stand within a process that is formally dynamic, that calls forth and 
assembles its own components, doing so intelligently, rationally and responsibly. That 
means it is a unity and relatedness that exists and functions before we manage to 
advert to it explicitly, understand it and objectify it. Lonergan points out that it is a 
unity and relatedness quite different from the intelligible unities and relations by 
which we organise the data of sense, because these are merely intelligible but the 
unity and relatedness of conscious process is intelligent, reasonable and responsible. 
These are the characteristics that make the subject a rock to build on. We now proceed 
to show why this is the case. 
3.3.3 The Subject: a Rock to Build on 
We have no doubt in our minds that the exposition which we have demonstrated so 
far regarding the method, which is foundational and can lead to knowing, is 
unassailable. In this exposition the notion of operations does emerge succinctly and so 
does the understanding of their unity and relatedness. Now we have to consider the 
sense in which the basic pattern of operations is a rock on which to found all other 
methods, that is why it is foundational to all of them. Lonergan guides us through this 
justification by posing a number of questions. These are: do these operations actually 
occur? If so, do they occur in the described pattern? Is that pattern not just 
hypothetical, sooner or later due for revision, and when revised sooner or later, due 
for still further revision? 
Is it possible, Lonergan wonders, whether there is any lecturer, for example, 
who can claim that she prepares her lectures without any experience of intellectual 
curiosity, or of inquiry or of stri ving and coming to understanding, or expressing what 
she has grasped by understanding. Would it be possible for anyone in the literary 
field to remind her readers that never in her life did she experience anything that 
might be called critical reflection? Or that she never thought about the truth or falsity 
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of propositions, that she is not aware of herself making any judgement or, if she did, it 
was mere appearance? Or is there anyone who may claim that never in her life did she 
have any experience of acting responsibly? In view of this, Lonergan asserts, 
... conscious and intentional operations exist and anyone that cares to deny 
their existence is merely disqualifying himself as a non-responsible, non-
reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist (1975 : 17). 
The next question is whether these operations occur as we have described. It 
must be noted here that operations are not experienced in isolation. For instance, we 
arrive at the pattern which links operations together through the process of inquiring 
and discovery. On top of this the unity of consciousness is given. It is also the case 
that the pattern of operations is part of the experience of the operations. Above all, 
inquiring and discovery are needed to analyse this unity. The situation would be 
different if there was no analysis. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to discern 
and distinguish the several operations that link the operations together before the 
operations are distinguished. It is inquiring which brings the pattern of operations to 
light. Before that happens however, the subject is already conscious. This means that 
when the relations are formulated they prove to be objectifications of the routines of 
our conscious living and doing. 
Spontaneously we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; and 
spontaneity is not unconscious or blind ... it is constitutive of our conscious 
intelligence, just as the absence of the effort to understand is constitutive of 
stupidity .. . spontaneously we move from understanding, with its manifold and 
conflicting expressions, to critical reflection; again the spontaneity is not 
unconscious or blind; it is constitutive of our critical rationality, of the demand 
within us for sufficient reason, a demand that operates prior to any formulation 
of a principal of sufficient reason; and it is the neglect or absence of this 
demand that constitutes silliness ... (1975 : 18). 
Lonergan explains the necessity of this spontaneity and the problems that would arise 
if it were neglected. He tells us that this spontaneity moves to judgement and from 
judgement of fact or possibility to judgement of value that culminates in the 
deliberateness of decision and commitment. He reminds us that this spontaneity is not 
unconscious or blind. It is the one which constitutes us as conscientious and 
responsible persons. 
On the question of whether this pattern is not just a hypothesis that can be 
expected to undergo revision after revision, as one's self-knowledge keeps 
developing, Lonergan's response is that we must draw a distinction between the 
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normative patterns immanent in our conscious and intentional operations, on the one 
hand, and the objectification of that pattern in concepts, propositions and words, on 
the other. The only area which can be affected by revision is the objectifications. 
There is no way revision can change the facts of the dynamic structure of human 
consciousness. Instead, revision can bring about a more adequate account of the 
structure of human consciousness. For revision to take place, certain conditions must 
be fulfilled. For instance, it may appeal to data which was either overlooked or missed 
altogether. That appeal takes us straight to the empirical level of operations. Any 
revision worth the name will definitely appeal to the intellectual level of operation. 
This is because it will be seeking to offer a better explanation of the previous data It 
follows that the new explanation will have to appeal to the rational operations because 
it has to demonstrate that the new case is certainly the case, or is true. This is 
precisely what transcendental method is all about. What all this means, as Lonergan 
puts it, is that the activity of revising consists of such operations, in accord with such 
a pattern, so that any revision which rejects this pattern will be rejecting itself At this 
juncture, the time has come for us to say that here is the rock which this thesis is 
offering. No method can bypass or sideline this rock. It is the foundation for all 
methods. Later, in Chapter Four, we will see how it can apply even to witchcraft. 
3.3.4 Functional Usefulness of the Foundational Method 
We feel that, without doubt, we have established the fact that the subject based 
method is foundational, or basic, or transcendental, to all other methods. Now the 
pertinent question that we have to ask ourselves is : is this method functionally useful 
to everyone? Should everyone, irrespective of area of specialisation or field of 
scholarship, take it as basic to the methods which are relevant to his own field? The 
answers to these questions are our next main concem 
Lonergan escorts us through this exploration He points out that transcendental 
method executes a normative function. This happens to be standard to all methods, 
because all special methods, by their very nature, consist of making specific the 
precepts of the transcendental method. These precepts are: be attentive, be intelligent, 
be reasonable and be responsible. They belong to the transcendental method because 
before they are formulated in concepts and expressed in words they have prior 
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existence and reality in the spontaneous, structured dynamism of human 
consciousness. Since the transcendental precepts rest on the operations themselves it 
means that the specific categorial precepts rest on the operations, operating in a 
specific field . This means that whatever is contained in the categorial method is 
ultimately based on the precepts of transcendental method. On this particular point, 
Lonergan surmises that 
.. . the ultimate basis of both categorial and transcendental methods' precepts 
will be advertence to the difference between attention and inattention, 
intelligence and stupidity, reasonableness and unreasonableness, responsibility 
and irresponsibility (1975: 20). 
The point here is that the standards of special methods are all-inclusive in the 
transcendental method. This makes transcendental method humanly basic and useful 
to all methods. 
On top of a normative function, transcendental method executes a critical 
function Lonergan calls it a "scandal", where scholars agree on the scientific 
questions but tend to disagree most outrageously on basic philosophical issues. They 
disagree on the activities of knowing; they also disagree on the relations of those 
activities to reality and stretch their disagreement even to reality itself In this respect, 
when we say that transcendental method executes a critical function, what do we 
mean exactly? 
In answering this question, Lonergan points out that disagreements can be 
resolved by looking at the different levels of knowing which lead to all knowledge. 
Differences on the data of senses can be resolved at the level of intelligence and 
differences at the level of intelligence can be resolved at the level of judgement and 
differences at the level of judgement can be resolved at the level of responsibility; 
where one has to make responsible decisions. Once again, this critical approach is 
commensurate to all special methods because the critical function is all-inclusive in 
the special methods, but it works on the principles of the normative pattern of the 
transcendental method. In addition, transcendental method is systematic. Before we 
see what this involves, we would like to point out that if a discipline is not systematic 
then it is likely to be disorganised. There must be order of progression in any field, or 
else the results of a disorderly approach will be unpredictable. All along, we should 
witness systematicity from the data of sense to intelligence, right through judgement 
to responsibility. As we have demonstrated, this holds for any method Lonergan tells 
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us that the systematic function characteristic of the transcendental method is 
isomorphic. That is, it has it in itself a capacity to construct the elementary acts of 
knowing into compound knowing and then proceed to construct the elementary 
objects of knowing into compound objects. The point here is that the systematic 
function ensures continuity and this holds for any special method. Another 
characteristic or the usefulness of the function of the transcendental method to special 
methods is that, though it ensures continuity, it does it without rigidity. What does this 
mean? In this respect we have concrete reality and we also have human cognitional 
process. The relationship between the two is that we perceive concrete reality through 
human cognitional process. There is no other way. It is the same movement from the 
sense data right through to responsibility. It is the movement from data to sense that 
leads us towards our intended, all reality. Transcendental method allows a reverse 
movement from responsibility to sense data It oscillates from root to top and from top 
to root. That is, an aspect to be known, in the Lonergan sense, moves from sense data 
to intelligence and finally to reasonableness. It is at this level where its truth is judged. 
Should any doubt arise or further challenging questions emerge, there is a downward 
checking of the truth of that aspect of knowledge. This is a movement from 
reasonableness, back to intelligence and finally to sense again, so any 
misunderstanding or errors in this movement are corrected or confounded during 
these oscillations. This two-way traffic reflects systematicity for any method. 
Apart from reflecting the characteristics of systematicity, transcendental 
method serves a heuristic function. Lonergan reminds us that in any field there is the 
intending - the subject - and the intended, the object. What is intended is the 
unknown, which is to be known. This is normally through inquiry. The function of 
inquiry is to transform the unknown into the known. This makes inquiry fall in 
between ignorance and knowledge. Lonergan points out that inquiry is less than 
knowledge. If it were not, there would be no need to inquire. It is more than sheer 
ignorance because it is the one which exposes ignorance and at the same time, strives 
to replace it with knowledge. We wonder whether this does not hold for any method. 
Lonergan elaborates: 
Fundamentally transcendental method is the exploitation of such intending, for 
it outlines the steps to be taken if one is to proceed from the initial point of 
intending the question to the eventual knowing of what has been intended. All 
along within transcendental method, the uses of heuristic device is 
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fundamental. They consist in designing and naming the intended unknown, in 
setting at once all that can be said about it and in using this explicit knowledge 
as a guide, a criterion, and/or a premise in the effort to arrive at a fuller 
knowledge (1975: 22). 
It is evident that what Lonergan is saying about transcendental method is 
characteristic of all methods. Lonergan gives examples in disciplines such as algebra, 
where a variable such as ''x'' becomes the intended unknown and through inquiry 
leads to the known. Such is also the function in physics of indeterminate and generic 
functions and the classes of functions specified by different equations. Because it 
brings to light the activity of intending and its correlative, the intended, transcendental 
method fulfils the heuristic function Through experiencing, understanding and 
judging, it brings to note the intended object by the subject. This is what all methods 
aim at, namely the revelation of the unknown through the pattern of operations. 
At this stage, using the example of theology, Lonergan exposes the functional 
usefulness and relevance of the transcendental method Theology, just like any other 
discipline, has its own special method. This method involves special classes and 
combinations of operations. It is true that theology, natural sciences and human 
sciences for example, all intend differently. But what remains fundamental, and this is 
the point we are making here, is that none of these disciplines diverge from the mode 
of transcendental method and opt to proceed from attention to inattention, also from 
intelligence to stupidity or from reasonableness to silliness or from responsibility to 
irresponsibility. 
Lonergan emphasises the point of the foundational nature of transcendental 
method by reiterating that theology does not lie outside the transcendental field. (Here 
we must mention that for the purposes of this thesis theology is being used as a case 
in point, but the case is meant to hold for any discipline). This is because 
transcendental method is unrestricted. As Lonergan expresses it, outside 
transcendental method there is nothing at all. He explains that this unrestrictedness 
does not lie in the fact that the notions of transcendental method are abstract. On the 
contrary, the notions of transcendental method are not necessarily abstract, but 
comprehensive. Their greatest merit is that they intend everything about everything. 
So, far from being abstract, it is from them that we intend the concrete, that is all that 
is to be known about a thing. It is true that human knowing is limited; nevertheless the 
transcendental notions are not just a matter of knowing but of intending. It is the case 
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that they intend what each and every one of us has managed to learn. It is also the 
case that even now they intend all that which remains unknown. That is, Lonergan 
surmises, 
... the transcendental field is defined not by what man knows, not what he can 
know but what he can ask about; and it is only because he can ask more 
questions than he can answer that we know about the limitations of our 
knowledge (1975: 24). 
Once again this is a characteristic readily available in all special methods. The subject 
intends and objectifies all reality, largely through questioning. Questioning reveals 
our ignorance and the intending subject proceeds to explore the unknown. As 
Lonergan explains, transcendental method is the concrete and dynamic unfolding of 
human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. It provides a key 
to all developments towards all knowing. These are the developments, for instance, in 
unified sciences. This is contrary to the immobility of the Aristotelian ideal, which 
conflicts with the developing natural science, the developing human sciences and with 
theology. In addition, transcendental method is in harmony with the development in 
the human mind, which in turn, affects all other developments. 
On the functionality and usefulness of transcendental method, Lonergan 
expands on the note of hope that understanding the subject or the basic pattern of 
operations, 
... through the self knowledge, the self-appropriation, the self-possession that 
result from making explicitly the basic nonnative pattern of the recurrent and 
related operations of human cognitional process, it is possible to envisage a 
future in which all workers in all fields can find a transcendental method, 
common norms, foundations, systematics, and common critical and heuristic 
procedures (1975: 24). 
He makes such a hopeful assertion because he believes that the basic pattern of 
operations act in all fields however differentiated they might be. It operates in these 
fields in radically the same way, hence making it foundational to all of them It is the 
only method which can generate harmony in the human race, which can eradicate 
egoism through making people rational and responsible and which can make people 
focus in the same direction in a principled manner in search for reality in all possible 
cases. 
Lonergan concludes this section on transcendental method as follows: 
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... there is the foundational function. Special methods derive their proper 
norms from the accumulated experience of the investigators in their several 
fields. But besides the proper norms, there are also common norms. Besides 
the tasks in each field, there are interdisciplinary problems. Underneath the 
consent of men as scientists, there is their dissent on matters of ultimate 
significance and concern It is in the measure that special methods 
acknowledge their common core in transcendental method, that norms 
common to all sciences will be acknowledged, that a secure basis will be 
attained for attacking interdisciplinary problems, and that the sciences will be 
mobilised within a higher unity of vocabulary, thought, and orientation, in 
which they will be able to make their quite significant contribution to the 
solution of fundamental problems (1975: 22-23). 
There is the subject, the foundation, the basic pattern of operations, the transcendental 
method with which Lonergan helps us to propose a method which transcends all other 
methods. We now proceed with our discussion of the foundation of knowledge, 
assisted by views from commentators. 
3.4 Commentators 
In this chapter we are arguing for a foundation for knowing in all possible circles. To 
help us in this endeavour we are using the ideas of Lonergan himself: in his best-
known book, Insight (1957), his IOOre resent publication Method in Theology (1975) 
and collections in Morelli and Morelli (1997). Here Lonergan helps us to establish a 
foundation in the subject. We are seeing many of Lonergan's ideas through Cronin, 
who restructures and simplifies Lonergan's ideas, in his book, Foundations of 
Philosophy: Lonergan's Cognitional Theory and Epistemology (1999). 
We are using Cronin because he introduces us to the debate concerning a 
foundation of knowledge as it has unfolded through the history of philosophy up to 
the present. Through the process of "interiority" he takes us through the stages of self-
appropriation as propounded by Lonergan. He shows us how the process of 
understanding and knowing unfolds from comroon sense to theory to judgement. His 
ideas are appropriate in this thesis because we are also in search for a foundation to 
knowledge. We are in search of a method that can co-ordinate all other methods, in 
other words a method that is transcendental. We locate this method in the idea of the 
subject-in-act. We are opposed to Wittgenstein's idea of regarding the subject as a 
functionless metaphysical being who has no role to play in formal logic which he had 
taken as foundational to knowledge. We say that the subject-in-act is foundational to 
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knowledge. Through the idea of interiority, Cronin helps us to argue for the subject-
in-act to be foundational to knowledge. 
We are also using ideas from other commentators, namely Augustine Shutte 
[n.d] and Patrick Giddy (1996), who are helping us to further elucidate the idea of the 
subject as foundational. We are interested in Shutte' s ideas because he feels that in 
order to get to knowledge in the true sense of the term, we must start with the subject. 
Otherwise our philosophy is without a foundation. In his arguments he supports the 
idea of the subject being foundational. It is in that sense that his ideas do find a place 
in our thesis. 
Giddy compares the philosophies of empiricism, rationalism and Lonergan's 
philosophy of self-appropriation. He points out that empiricism stresses the role of 
sense-experience in the constitution of knowledge, while rationalism stresses the role 
of ideas. Giddy exalts Lonergan's philosophy of self-appropriation, in the sense that, 
as he puts it, 
attention has to be paid to the role of that further questioning by means of 
which the enquirer considers his or her own grasp of the nature of the object 
(1996: 143). 
Giddy puts emphasis on the precepts of self-appropriation or the subject. It is in this 
sense that his arguments fit in with our discussion. What is interesting about Cronin, 
Shutte and Giddy is that all of them are writing in the context of teaching and learning 
philosophy in Africa 
3.4.1 Dynamism and Self-Assembling of Transcendental Method: Shutte 
Shutte, in his paper "Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition in Theories of 
Knowledge", projects Lonergan as one of Aristotle' s liveliest representatives in the 
twentieth century. Shutte is of the view that Lonergan, in his work 
supplies precisely what we feel the lack of in Aristotle's own, a theory of 
knowledge based on a philosophical reflection of the knowing subject herself 
and the various mental processes that are involved in gaining her knowledge 
of reality [n. d. ]. 
Shutte regards Lonergan as an integrating philosopher. In fact as he says, Lonergan, in 
his model, takes into account knowledge gained from natural science and 
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mathematics, human sciences, psychoanalysis, commonsense, interpersonal 
knowledge and from ethics and religion 
He reiterates Lonergan' s assertion that knowing is a complex and dynamic 
activity. It is complex in that it involves many distinct and irreducible activities. 
These include activities of the senses, of the intellect and of judgement. Knowing is 
dynamic in that it is self-assembling and self-constituting. It puts itself together, one 
part summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached. He reminds us of Lonergan' s 
point that this does not occur with the blindness of natural process, but consciously, 
intelligently and rationally; that experience stimulates enquiry and enquiry is 
intelligence bringing itself to act. 
What Shutte is saying about Lonergan form; a foundation for our argument. 
He presents Lonergan's approach as self-assembling, a method that takes into account 
all fields of learning. It is a method that is self-corrective, that is it has a mechanism 
that helps it to check itself when things go wrong. This is what we are looking for in 
our thesis. We are looking for a method that is foundational to all knowing. We have, 
to some extent, seen why up to and until the advent of Lonergan, philosophy lacked a 
foundation Shutte is one of the philosophers whose views help us to clarify this point 
further. He states: 
Indeed philosophy right up to the time of Descartes was in some sense naIve. 
It took for granted that we know, read, concentrate on giving the best possible 
descriptions of reality we know. It did not ask Descartes critical question 
about the grounds for our conviction about our knowledge of the real. It was 
thus, in spirit, extrovert, focused on the object of our knowledge: rather than 
introvert, focusing on the knowing subject herself We however ... must start 
with the subject, with ourselves, without such prolegomena to our thinking, we 
feel our philosophy is without foundation [nd.]. 
Here Shutte takes us back to the Ionian period. The foundation at that time was in the 
stuff that constituted the universe. The concern at that time was merely cosmological. 
Indeed, the answer to what was foundational was oriented towards objects. So we get 
water, as proposed by Thales; fire, as proposed by Heraclitus and air as proposed by 
Anaximanes, as answers to what was foundational. The minds of these historical 
philosophers were focused on the object of knowledge, rather than on the subject of 
knowledge. 
One reason why we have hitherto lacked a foundation was this focusing on the 
cosmos. This is a legacy that has-carried through to the contemporary period, as we 
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witness in empiricism However, Lonergan now gives us the answer that Shutte 
agrees with and which we also agree with and that is the subject in act, or the basic 
pattern of operations. With the basic set of operations at our disposal, we cannot 
afford to continue focussing on the objects per se. We have to engage Lonergan's 
model of sensation, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. Continuing to 
defend other models such as the scientific method as foundational to all knowing will 
take us nowhere. The subject-in-act should be actively involved in human science and 
technology, commerce and business and the human enterprises, without exception. 
Shutte gives us advice that we must start with the subject. He is correct when 
he says that without such a prolegomena to our thinking our philosophy remains 
without a foundation. 
In our case, we are not promulgating the abrogation of the present edifice of 
philosophy, but if the status quo is maintained, we shall be doing philosophy the 
disservice of making it fail to perform its fitting role of being foundational to 
everything else. It is glaringly clear that the enlightened philosophers, like Lonergan 
and others, can see through the confusion between empiricism and rationalism and 
also between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. Yet this confusion is 
unwarranted. The arbiter lies in the basic set of operations. Empiricism and 
rationalism can be amicably harmonised by the set of operations at both the sense and 
rational levels. Such an endeavour will re-link the chain which has been severed and 
the gap between them will be bridged, bringing to an end the confusion in philosophy, 
which has been caused by the disagreement between them At the moment philosophy 
is without a foundation because philosophers have either focused on objectivism to 
the total exclusion of rationalism, or focused on rationalism, to the total exclusion of 
empiricism Even in cases where an attempt has been made to bring the two together, 
as in Kant' s "subjective idealism" (this is where empiricism and rationalism are 
brought together in the process of determining knowledge), the method of perfecting 
this endeavour had not clearly emerged until the onset of Lonergan's basic set of 
operations and their norms of functioning. 
Shutte reminds us of the complexity and dynamism that are characteristic in 
the transcendental method. The activities in it are many, distinct and irreducible. They 
include seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, understanding, conceiving, 
reflecting, weighing the evidence and judging. Shutte reminds us of what Lonergan 
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stipulated, namely that none of these activities alone and by themselves might be 
called human knowing. As Lonergan puts it, 
an act of ocular vision may be perfect as ocular vision; yet when it occurs 
without any accompanying glimmer of understanding, it is mere gaping 
(Lonergan, in Shurte, [n.d.]). 
The point being made here is that these operations need the intellect to sort out their 
relations and then synthesize them into comprehensible and credible reality. 
Shutte reminds us of the dynamism involved in knowing. Knowing is, 
... self-assembling, self-constituting. It puts itself together, one part 
summoning forth the next, till the whole is reached... (Lonergan, in Shutte, 
[n.d.]). 
It remains obvious that some philosophers, precisely due to the lack of an integrating 
method, have mishandled the components that happen to be constituting philosophy at 
the moment. Here we need to mention that this fragmentation of the components is 
not evident in the components themselves only, but also in their subsequent 
subdivisions. For instance, epistemology, whose chief function is knowledge, is 
fragmented into empiricism and rationalism; where each component downgrades the 
other. Within empiricism itself there is the "picture theory" and ''the ordinary 
language point of view" where, again, each downgrades the other. We again come 
across the fragmentation, where empiricism is downgrading metaphysics and the 
battle continues ad infinitum. This is not a healthy atmosphere in which to establish a 
foundation In any case, with things as they stand, no foundation can be established. 
Either the major components or the subcomponents within the major components will 
want to claim that foundation. 
In Chapter Two we saw Wittgenstein claiming a foundation to all reality with 
formal logic. As development of positivism, we also saw the ordinary language point 
of view claiming a foundation. These claims may be principled, but are not integrative 
in the sense of ensuring unity within diversity. 
The question remains, can a foundation be established in the upper 
components? Much as it cannot work in the subcomponents, it will still be difficult, 
even in the upper components. This is because epistemology will claim to be 
foundational and metaphysics will do the same. This may be the case for other 
philosophies, too. In that case where does that leave us? As Cronin puts it, it leaves us 
on the top of the fence. In that case what right does philosophy have to claim to be 
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foundational to all reality? Such a situation places it in a worse situation than the 
natural sciences and the arts. The natural sciences can demarcate their boundaries 
with a certain measure of conviction. For instance, when biology is mentioned we can 
easily tell its constituent components as different from physics and, even when the 
sub-components are mentioned, for example botany, one will know that, botany is the 
biology of plants, which is different from zoology, which is the biology of animals. 
Now when it comes to philosophy and one mentions epistemology, what does 
one understand? How do we get to knowledge? To the same question, Hume will say 
through senses, Descartes will say through reason and Kant will say through both. 
Now who is right and who is wrong? Given that state of uncertainty, this thesis is 
inviting us to join Lonergan to embrace the basic pattern of operations in its entirety. 
This is the only salvation for philosophers. Lonergan invites us all to put aside our 
petty squabbles, sober up and simply call to attention our conscious awareness and the 
set of operations, equip ourselves with these human endoWIrents and follow the 
suggested road of attentiveness to the data of sense, intelligence to the puzzling 
questions of theory and hypothesis, reasonableness to the challenges of judgement of 
truth and responsibility to the call of choice. If this road is trodden carefully and 
faithfully, with determination and without reservation, it will slowly but surely lead 
all of us without exception -10 the desired goal of understanding and knowing all 
reality; hence making our discipline truly basic, foundational and transcendental to 
everything else. Lonergan is not inviting us to try this method as one more philosophy 
out of the many. It is instead a method that integrates all methods and all 
philosophies. Its truth can be critically found because it is the only method, as will be 
evident in our discussion, that has within itself a mechanism of self-checking. The 
subject-in-act can check her operations. 
It should be mentioned here that, by being attentive to the data of the senses, 
we are likely to address, among other things, Hume's problem of empiricism, as well 
as its sub-components. By being intelligent, we areJikely to address, among other 
things, Descartes' problem of rationalism and all its subcomponents and also, being 
reasonable, we are likely to address, among other things, Kant's squabbles of 
subjective idealism. Of course, by being reasonable, we are demonstrating that we 
have walked the road towards understanding and knowing all reality exactly the way 
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it should be done. In other words, we have reached self-transcendence. We are now 
authentic and genuine philosophers. 
Shutte cautions us that our contemporary climate of thought can make it 
difficult to understand Lonergan's explanation. This is because we are in a climate 
where empiricists understand objectivity from sense experience alone; where 
knowledge is thought of as taking a look at, or accepting, what is sensed through 
vision as the only reality. On this matter Shutte points out that 
. .. our senses do not give us things but only sensation, our experience is not of 
things, of what is real, but only data For rationalists objectivity is given by the 
way in which each item of knowledge fits into the total scheme... (Shutte, 
[n.d.]). 
Here Shutte echoes Lonergan, in that ultimately, unless knowledge is complete, it is 
not knowledge at all. These conceptions of objectivity are false and blinding to a 
contemporary who is trying to get to a true understanding of knowledge. To drive this 
point home, Shutte elaborates: 
... objectivity is in act, because it resides not in a single operation but a 
structured manifold of operations, is not some single property of human 
knowing but a component of quite different properties. Empiricists have tried 
to find ground for objectivity in experience, rationalists have tried to place it in 
necessity, and idealists have had recourse to coherence. All are partly right and 
partly wrong, right in their affirmation but wrong in their exclusion (Shutte, 
[n.d.]). 
This quotation helps to emphasise the problem that is characteristic of philosophers 
who try to locate a foundation by fragmenting philosophy. When philosophy is 
fragmented into sections and subsections, the foundation so found will be directly 
related to those sections and subsections. As emphasised by Lonergan, the empiricist 
will try locating a foundation in experience. While this is happening on one side, on 
the other side the rationalist will be busy locating the foundation in necessity. As 
experience tells us, these are two areas that are not only directly opposed to each other 
but are, at the same time, confrontational. As if that were not bad enough, the idealists 
will be busy locating their foundation in coherence. The problem here is that these so-
called foundations will be mutually exclusive, and oriented to particular specific 
directions, which will later turn out not to be all-inclusive. This is the problem we 
have had, it is the problem we have now and it is the problem we shall continue to 
have. It is worrying that the foundations that are established in these fragmented 
scenarios are not foundations at all. 
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Shutte, using Lonergan, helps to explain this problem The explanation is that 
the sensible only provides a clue to the real, but it is not the real. For anything to be 
real it has to be verified - in Lonergan's sense - and not just simply experienced. The 
problem posed by rationalists would be solved by pointing out that partial knowledge 
is a possibility, as it is witnessed in science. It is the case that each autonomous 
science gives partial knowledge. For instance, biology may expose knowledge of 
botany and zoology, but may not reflect what happens in physics and geology. 
Consequently, as Shutte interprets Lonergan, there is no such a thing as a super-
science, in which all the sciences are reduced to one that comprehends the whole of 
reality. 
On the contrary, the subject is obedient to the edicts of transcendental method 
of attentiveness, intelligence and reasonableness. As with Lonergan, we remain 
wondering whether there is any other alternative to this method. It is obvious that it is 
very unlikely that one's judgement will be well founded if one does not attend to the 
data of sense. Similarly, it is very unlikely that one's theories and hypotheses will fit 
the facts if one ignores the precept of intelligence. Is there any possibility of one's 
wealth of experience and the brilliance of one's insights counting for anything if one 
is unreasonable in one's judgement? It is reasonable to say that any possibility that 
will finally lead to the understanding and knowing reality in all cases inevitably calls 
for the intervention of the basic pattern of operations or the subject-in-act. The same 
basic set of operations provides an impeccable standard against which to judge the 
certainty, probability or ]X>ssibility of other items or knowledge. Shutte confirms, 
... the fundamental process of coming to know is the same in every field of 
knowledge, this is so partly because every kind of knowledge is an example of 
experiencing, understanding and judging. The unity of knowledge is achieved 
not by reduction of all the sciences to one science, or by reduction of reality to 
one kind of a thing, but by this basic unity of a method, that takes different 
forms in every field (Shutte, [n.d]). 
In this respect, scientists do put forward experiments and measurements as the only 
way of achieving objectivity. This makes them erroneously go to the extreme of 
claiming that scientific method is the model method for all knowledge. Shutte 
clarifies that, given the basic pattern of operations, it is clear that the scientific 
experimental procedure can be appropriate only to certain aspects of the real. That 
being the case, the basic pattern of operations, that covers all fields of knowledge, 
undermines fundamentally this claim of the scientists. The scientific method on its 
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own cannot lead us to all reality. What underlies scientific method IS the 
transcendental method. 
A very important aspect that makes the basic pattern of operations, or the 
subject-in-act, fundamental, is that while all the other methods cannot account for 
their operations the subject-in-act can. For instance, if a certain mode in physics or 
biology or mathematics is found to be wanting, what will be required at the moment 
will be the attention of the subject. It will be up to the subject to make the correction 
where possible, or abandon the enterprise altogether. 
The transcendental method, however, is self-corrective and, in addition, it is 
self-accounting for its operations. Shutte once again helps us to see what is meant 
here, by quoting from Lonergan. This helps us to answer the question: can the subject 
in principle get to all knowledge or is he a knower? Before we see how that question 
is answered, let us first look at one radical difference between the subject-in-act and 
any other method. The subject is conscious and aware of the dynamism in her 
operations. She is aware of herself as an operational method on all other methods. 
That is how she becomes self-corrective. None of any other existing methods has this 
capacity. 
Returning to our question on whether the subject can get to reality in all 
departments of knowing, or whether she is a knower, Shutte quotes Lonergan: 
Am I a knower, the answer, yes, is coherent, for if I am a knower, I can know 
that fact. But the answer, no, is incoherent, for if I am not a knower, how 
could the question be raised and answered by me? No less the hedging answer, 
I do not know, is incoherent. For if I know that I do not know, then I am a 
knower; and in do not know that I do not know, then I should not answer. 
Am I a knower? If I am not, then I know nothing. My only course is 
silence. My only course is not the excused and explained silence of the 
sceptic, but the complete silence of the animal that offers neither excuse nor 
explanation for its complacent absorption in merely sensitive routines. For if I 
know nothing, I do not have excuses for not knowing. If I know nothing, then 
I cannot know the explanation of my ignorance (Lonergan, 1957: 329). 
Shutte once again emphasises the sense in which the subject is self-corrective. The 
subject knows that she knows. She has knowledge of herself as a knower. If she 
knows about herself: then she has the capacity to know what is right and what is 
wrong about herself How does she do that? She does it through the basic pattern of 
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operations. It is this knowledge of the self that leads to the knowledge of everything 
else or to the knowledge of reality in all spheres. 
Up to this point, Shutte has helped us to shed light on the transcendental 
method, in its entirety. That is of its dynamism and self-assembling, of its progression 
from sense data to judgement and how it helps to solve the problem of fragmenting 
philosophy as it happened in empiricism and rationalism, for example. 
Patrick Giddy switches our attention from Shutte's ideas on the subject as self-
assembling and self-accounting to his indeterminism He does this in his paper, "The 
African University and the Social Science: The Contribution of Lonergan's 
Epistemological Theory" (1996). We proceed with our analysis, assisted by Giddy's 
ideas. 
3.4.2 Indeterminism of the Subject-in-Act: Giddy 
Giddy (1996), in his discussion on Lonergan's view of knowledge, categorises 
Lonergan as an integrative philosopher. He points out that Lonergan's view of 
knowing does not presuppose the dualism of subject and object but entails a 
heightening of the presence to self This position is in lieu of the "standard 
empiricist", whose view of knowing posits a notion of scientific objectivity that is 
achieved through the elimination of subjective elements. He points out the 
lopsidedness of the empiricist and rationalist stand and instead exalts Lonergan's 
approach of self-appropriation He discusses the precepts of self-appropriation, that is 
being attentive to sense data, being reasonable and being rational in manner that 
projects Lonergan's approach as being integrative and therefore foundational to 
knowledge. He is of the view that following Lonergan' s approach helps to refute any 
form of determinism This is because self-appropriation implies self-transcendence. 
At this level, one is entirely responsible for what one does. 
Giddy concentrates on the subject as being self-transcendent. He emphasises 
the fact that the subject has, within hersel( the ability to check whatever she does. 
One can question one's activities and judge their truth. Giddy' s discussion tends to 
take a moral tone, but it is relevant to our thesis in the sense that it presents the subject 
as transcendental, in our case, foundational to knowledge. So we discuss Giddy's 
paper under the notion of the indeterminism of the subject in its activities. 
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First of all we ask the question whether the subject is free in her 
operations, and, if so, to what extent? We ask this question because if the subject is 
not free, then it will be difficult for her to be transcendental. Giddy explains: 
Under the exigency of rationality one stands back and interrogates one's own 
ideas. Similarly as responsible, one is able to consider the moral quality of 
ones commitments, to consent to or withhold consent from any particular 
desire according to ones judgement of its worth to guide one's course of 
action. The implications of this are that any form of determinism is refuted 
(Giddy, 1996:145). 
What this means is that rationality is subject-based. It is an endowment in which the 
operation of interrogation is rooted In addition to checking and cross-checking sense 
data, it also analyses and again checks and cross-checks the operations at higher 
levels, that is at the levels of judgement and responsibility. One is capable of standing 
back and interrogating one' s ideas. This is self-accounting in its strict sense. We 
accept that the ideas may not be immanent in the individual subject. They may be 
rooted in the history of one' s culture, or they may be imported, or a combination of 
the imported and those from one's culture or one's immanent ideas. Whatever the 
case may be, the subject has that rational endowment to interrogate them The onus is 
on her, personally, depending on the evidence available, or lack of it, to accept the 
ideas wholly, to accept them after amending them or to reject them completely. 
Again, using one's endowment of rationality, the subject is in an unrestricted position 
of considering the moral quality of one' s commitments. The subject will personally 
choose to consent or not to consent or to withhold the urges from her desires. The 
choice is entirely her own. She may choose to withhold action as she engages the 
levels of intelligence and reasonableness, in order to absorb fully the consequences of 
her action to herself and to all those who may be affected by her actions. The choice, 
once again, is entirely her own. Giddy is refuting any form of determinism This state 
of affairs leaves the subject fully self-accounting for whatever she does or says. If 
mistakes arise in the process, the remedy is to resort to the second level of interiority 
and that is engaging intelligence in the operation of interrogation. After sufficient 
examination and cross-examination, the anomaly is put right. 
In refuting any form of determinism, Giddy' s point here, which is in 
consonance with the objective of this thesis, is that the field in which the subject is 
operating does not matter. He is using the ethical and moral dimensions but these can 
be taken as a case in point, for instance, in science, law, medicine, or in other practical 
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enterprises, such as business. There is no field, as long as one is a human being, where 
one may not interrogate not only one's ideas but also those of his close associates, 
business partners and even those at the receiving end of the consequences of one's 
actions. One has, no matter with what transactions one is engaged in, to consider the 
moral quality of one's commitments. Once again we would like to reiterate the point 
being made and that is using the precepts of transcendental method of being sensible, 
being intelligent, being reasonable, and being responsible. There is no way the subject 
can create excuses for unacceptable behaviour or transactions. This is because she can 
oscillate forwards and backwards from sense to responsibility. Similarly she cannot 
use the excuse of being determined, because she has the capacity and ability to 
interrogate herself and effect a correction So Giddy's point, of self-accounting by the 
subject and refuting any fonn of determinism that would have led the subject to 
creating excuses under the guise of being determined, helps to promote the subject 
further as truly transcendental. 
Another idea which emerges out of Giddy's submissions is that a human being 
can be understood through various sciences, with each contributing towards the 
understanding of a human being at different levels. These are chemical, biological and 
psychological, to mention a few. Knowledge from all these areas can all be integrated 
into an understanding of the self and therefore of self-determining. We are used to 
conceptions or philosophies where a person is either a body of senses, as purported by 
empiricism, or just a mind, as purported by rationalism, or a dualism of body and 
mind, as purported by subjective idealism If we make the mistake of accepting such 
descriptions, then we are faced with the problem of locating the correct component of 
man in which to establish a foundation Attempting to do this would be to waste time, 
as the history of philosophy reveals, and as we have clearly demonstrated in our 
discussions concerning the efforts of the empiricists, rationalists and subjective 
idealists and many other past and contemporary philosophers. 
From Giddy's exposition, a human being is much more than a mere collection 
of senses or a mere mind or a combination of senses and mind. A human being is an 
integrated set of operations or a subject-in-act, aware and conscious of her actions. 
Giddy still raises questions such as, 
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How does the intellect affect a change in the will? How do those two faculties 
interact? And isn't the notion of the will arbitrarily choosing between good 
and evil, implausible? (1996: 149). 
These questions may carry an ethical tone but they help to throw light on our thesis, in 
the sense that they portray the composition of the subject before the philosophies of 
the modem period. (For purposes of this discussion, we are using the term, subject, 
person, human being and human person synonymously.) 
In the period of modem science, that is before Lonergan, the subject was 
regarded as a body, a mind, or a combination of both; or else he was regarded, as 
Giddy puts it, 
.. . the human will operating autonomously of the deterministic laws of 
physical nature, and the intellect - supposed to be unaffected by those laws -
guiding the will (1996: 149). 
What we are learning from these expositions is that before we know what the subject 
is it is difficult to know what the subject is capable of knowing. If we pretend to 
understand and know, then our doing so will remain either partial or grossly 
impoverished. What does this mean? We may know the subject's knowing only from 
the empirical level, as in the case of the empiricists, or we may know the subject's 
knowing from the rational leveL as rationalists do, or we may know the subject's 
knowing from the subjective idealism level, as Kantians do, or else we may be 
trapped in the Hegelian triadic circle. None of these approaches will adequately lead 
us to what the subject is and therefore to what he can know. 
Giddy brings in a new dimension which goes beyond the traditional 
description of a human person of either empiricaL rational, or both empirical and 
rational. He tells us that in order for the human person to reach the level of self 
determining - in Lonergan's sense - she must first of all be understood and 
understand herself in terms of a multiplicity of sciences such as chemical, biological 
and psychological. The subject is an integration of all these aspects. 
What makes the subject transcendental is that she has the capacity to know 
herself in terms of all these components and, above all, she is aware and conscious of 
this fact. In the modem philosophy the focus on knowing was fragmented. There was 
the subject here and the object over there. The subject looked at the object over there 
and knew what it was. 
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Fortunately, with the onset of Lonergan' s method, all the questions about the 
nature of a person, what a person can know and what she cannot know and the means 
by which she can know, are all answered in the precepts of the transcendental method 
of the senses, intelligence, reasonableness and responsibility. lbrough self-
appropriation, the subject is enabled to know not only herself but to know that she is a 
knower. This fact helps to solve the epistemological problems of the relationship 
between the knower and the knowable. 
The message that Giddy is giving us is that the subject is not a vacuum, to be 
ftlled in the empirical sense She is not only a mind to function on forms and ideas, or 
any fragment, but a being that can relate herself to herself In this way, as he puts it, 
the subject is in a position 
... to integrate the various influences, on the various levels - physical, 
biological, economic - codetermining one's condition (1996: 151). 
In other words, the subject can relate to herself and to everything else. She is 
conscious and aware of this and therefore can correct herself or any other anomaly 
where it surfaces. The choice is ours; either we accept transcendental method as the 
only salvation to our problems of understanding and knowing all reality, or else we 
risk remaining at the sense level, as empiricists do, or at the mind level, as rationalists 
do, or remain trapped in the dualism of body and mind, as Kantians do, or continue to 
circulate in the triadic circle, as Hegelians do. Once again, the only option is the 
transcendental method, which is a method for all methods. Let us therefore, as a 
matter of necessity, embrace the transcendental method in its entirety. We have 
portrayed our views regarding the foundation for knowing assisted by ideas from 
commentators. Now let us look at the notion of belief - in Lonergan's sense - and see 
how it fits in with the transcendental method. We are doing this because in Chapters 
Four and Five we will be looking at traditions and how the transcendental method fits 
m. 
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3.5 Knowledge, Belief and Science: Some Implications of Lonergan's Method 
In this section we shall mainly follow Cronin's (1999) Foundations of Philosophy: 
Lonergan 's Cognitional Theory and Epistemology and Lonergan (1975). 
3.5.1 Belief and Transcendental Method 
The question that we have to ask ourselves at this juncture is the extent to which 
transcendental method relates to the existing fund of knowledge. This question 
emerges at the level of judgement. It is clear that if one is to avoid being duped, one is 
to establish the truth of data through intelligence. In the picture, we have a person 
who has reached the level of self-appropriation. This person will not take 
responsibility or accept knowledge as true unless she has gone through all the levels 
of knowing, that is the levels of sense, intelligence and reasonableness. Perhaps a 
question that may appear worrying at the moment is that does what is being suggested 
not reduce the whole method to personal experience? If that becomes the case, then 
knowledge is reduced to what a person has personally experienced, subjected to his 
intelligence and personally judged as true. If that were to be the case, then knowledge 
would become private knowledge. If a person passes away his knowledge goes with 
him 
But Lonergan allays our fears on this matter by introducing the notion of 
belief He reminds us that most of the judgements we hold to be true are not 
immanently generated knowledge. It is not knowledge that we acquire after personally 
subjecting it to the precepts of the transcendental method. We find ourselves sharing 
knowledge in history, geography and economics and in the empirical sciences, too. 
We continue to accept this knowledge not because we have personally experienced 
the grounds of our judgements, but because it has been passed to us by distinguished 
specialists such as our teachers, authors, editors, publishers, photographers, reporters 
and all the trappings of scholarship. 
Cronin observes that the term belief has mistakenly been associated with 
religion and theology. Again, this is unfortunate, because the term belief is a neutral 
term which can be attributed to both religion and the empirical sciences. He makes a 
correction that the term belief is simply part of the human collaboration in the 
enterprise of knowing, which is applicable to all fields. In the growth and 
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development of knowledge, the notion of specialisation has emerged. Advancement of 
knowledge has made long strides in the fields of discovery and invention In stock, we 
have a wealth of knowledge in all disciplines, which include those in the empirical 
and social sciences, in the humanities and in the arts and also in philosophy. 
Consequently, there would be no need to repeat all the research and eX'Periments 
conducted by distinguished specialists in order to ascertain the truth of this 
knowledge. We have to believe these specialists and experts. In this context, belief is 
being used in the neutral sense and may be equally applicable to all disciplines. 
For the purposes of this thesis the term belief is being used in a technical sense 
and not loosely, as people often utter an expression such as " believe that is true." 
Belief in our sense is being based on our trust of the specialist's knowledge which is 
not necessarily uncritical and not based on imagination alone, as we discuss it below. 
With those clarifications in mind, let us see how belief fits in with the 
transcendental method We begin with a question. In order to accept belief as a 
legitimate activity, what is it that should be our guide? Cronin advises us to rely on 
judgement of value to assess the dangers we are leaving ourselves open to and also to 
have a firm grasp of the value of accepting belief as a reasonable part of human 
progress. We only need to take a glimpse at the current state of knowledge that has 
been accumulated in the sciences and all other spheres of learning. This includes 
research results, books, documents, table, and knowledge acquired from our 
traditions. The wealth of information is simply overwhelming. It: at this moment, we 
were to repeat all the experiments and observations, we would not even reach the state 
of knowledge of the nineteenth century. That notwithstanding, there is now a 
prevalence of interdisciplinary dependence, where different specialisations require 
instruments invented and developed in other areas of specialisation. For example, 
human and veterinary medicine continue to depend on electronics and computer 
technology developed in physics. Do we have to check these instruments personally 
in order to ascertain whether these instruments were correctly made? If not, then what 
is the alternative; do we choose primitive ignorance or do we opt for belief and accept 
it as a legitimate process that enormously facilitates learning. 
Belief is a kind of shortcut to learning. We do not have to repeat complicated 
calculations, which might even require expensive equipment. We might have to 
accept the results as true on the basis of our belief of the reports. We have to believe 
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that the instruments we are using are made to the correct specifications. Cronin 
wonders whether it would be possible and feasible to begin checking all the slide 
rules, barometers, thermometers, tables of logarithms, computer programmes, 
calibrated scales and all the measuring instruments currently in use. We have no 
choice but to believe that they are accurate, because it is distinguished specialists who 
made them 
On similar lines we have to believe our lecturers and professors on the basis of 
their academic excellence and professional integrity. We have also to believe in our 
history. As Cronin points out, our own immanently generated knowledge is limited to 
our short lifespan. We have to trust the whole series of human sources that have 
accumulated what really happened. In the archives of our history, we have reports, 
eyewitnesses, state documents, files in government offices, the annals of armies, 
diaries of individuals; some of which are compiled by distinguished historians across 
the ages. We have to believe in these. Otherwise, Cronin reminds us for example, that 
our immanently generated knowledge of geography is limited to what we have seen 
and heard; probably we have travelled a little or not at all. We have to depend on 
honest publications, say from meteorologists on weather, maps on physical features 
and locations, photographs on flora and fauna and oral communications from 
specialists and experts in their respective fields. In this respect, reasonable belief 
becomes the alternative to ignorance. Belief is not blind acceptance, but simply trust 
in the distinguished experts and specialists. It would be unreasonable and unnecessary 
to attempt to check each and every aspect of knowledge personally, in order to accept 
it as true. Cronin assures us that belief can be quite certain. 
There still, however, emerges a question of the relationship between 
judgement, in Lonergan's sense, and belief Is it not possible that judgement, which 
has to undergo the rigorous nOI"Im or precepts of transcendental method, is certain, 
while belief, which is not subjected to this scrutiny and discipline of transcendental 
method, however much we may try to defend it, still remains dubious? Again Cronin 
allays our fears. As he says, 
... we do not distinguish judgement and beliefs on the basis that judgements 
are certain and beliefs are slightly dubious. We distinguish them on the basis 
of how we come to grasp the true as true. In the case of judgement we rely on 
the grasp of the sufficiency of evidence for the conclusion; for the belief we 
rely on trustworthiness of the source to communicate truthfully. But 
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immanently generated knowledge as in the empirical sciences may only reach 
a degree of probability, whereas a belief can be quite certain (Cronin, 1999: 
211). 
So, in this respect, belief and judgement are both legitimate, each in its own context. 
Here we see a situation where belief may command certainty, compared to the 
revelations of the empirical sciences. This realisation casts a shadow of doubt on the 
certainty of the empirical sciences and puts their status as models for other methods in 
a .questionable light. 
From this account we see that belief - in Lonergan's sense - would not be 
outlandish in the context of transcendental method. In matters of truth or reality, 
however, a genuine and authentic, self-appropriated subject cannot afford to take 
chances. Much as there can be mistaken judgments, there can also be mistaken 
beliefs. We must thus always stick to the precepts of transcendental method. Even in 
belief: as in judgement or any other aspect of knowing, there is always the possibility 
of being duped. Cronin warns us to be on our guard all the time. The question is how 
we go about it, as far as belief is concerned. He suggests three ways: the first one is to 
look at the source of information. We should check the trustworthiness of the source. 
If it is a person, we check his honesty, we try to establish whether it would be in his 
interest to tell lies or slant the truth. We may also look for evidence of bias, prejudice, 
self-interest and self-glorification. Our overall objective would be to establish the 
neutrality of the source, or to use an observer who is non-involved or someone who 
has nothing to gain personally. We have also to look for competence. For instance, a 
sick person should believe, and have faith in a medical doctor and not a veterinarian. 
The second way is to look at communication. It is obvious that sometimes 
there are communication gaps between the source and the target or the believer. 
Problems could emanate from translations, that is the translation may misleadingly 
focus more, for example, on the interpretation of the text itself or on the message, or 
sometimes on the whims and fancies of the interpreter. In between the original source 
and the believer there might be an assortment of intermediaries, such as publishers, 
editors and reporters. All these cause an ever-increasing gap between the source and 
the believer: the wider the gap the more the wandering from the original truth or 
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reality. So a self-appropriated subject has to establish the authenticity of the 
communication process. 
Finally, we have to consider the message itself. We have to consider its 
credibility and reasonableness and see whether it fits not the context of what we 
already know. In this case, we have to summon the weight of our education, which 
should have prepared us, as Cronin says, to build up a knowledge of what is possible 
or what is probable, what does fit in and what does not. Where we anticipate doubt we 
check or, if necessary, conduct the experiment ourselves. Cronin reminds us that, in 
life, situations are as many as the conditions leading to them and the contexts are as 
many as the circumstances. He advises us to stick to Lonergan's slogan of ever being 
attentive, intelligent and reasonable. A self-appropriated subject should not be easily 
gulled or be too credible. That said, although transcendental method impresses on us 
to stick to the prescribed precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
responsible, we cannot altogether avoid believing. On the other hand Cronin points 
out that it may be more reasonable to believe than to want to see all the evidence for 
ourselves, especially that from trusted sources, such as the distinguished specialists 
such as professors, or authors of international standing. 
Cronin sums up the notion of belief: 
Belief requires a value judgement .. . that this particular person is worth 
believing in this specific instance. Belief involves an assent, a decision, a 
willingness to collaborate in the process of human knowing and a willingness 
to accept this person' s word for his truth. Belief differs from judgement in 
motive and origin. Judgement is motivated by the strength of the evidence, but 
belief is motivated by the desire to collaborate reasonably in the search for 
knowledge. The origin of judgement is rational necessity; the origin of belief 
is a free and responsible decision to believe (1999: 213). 
Belief, however, still falls within the realms of transcendental method. We have seen 
that reasonable believing is unavoidable, but where we anticipate or detect anomalies 
we can always switch back to transcendental method, that is to subject the suspicious 
data to intelligence. We add that belief brings in tradition and co-operation in 
knowledge, and so avoids the idea that it is the isolated individual who founds 
knowledge. Having seen the value of belief in the process of acquiring knowledge, 
coupled with the foundation in the form of the subject-in-act, who is not only 
foundational to all knowing and intends all reality but to all activity as welL still we 
ask ourselves the question, in what sense is the basic pattern of operations 
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foundational? To answer this question, Lonergan picks on the scientific approach or 
method as an example and juxtaposes it with the basic set of operations. It is ·to that 
aspect that we now turn our attention It is also of importance for our debate around 
Winch in the next chapter. 
3.5.2 The Scientific Approach 
In order to show conclusively the transcendence of the basic pattern of operations 
over and above any other method, we examine it in relation to the scientific method. 
Lonergan points out that the scientific method is characterised by the tendency of 
recurrence. It presupposes inquiry, observation and description. All these, Lonergan 
points out, recur. The scientific approach praises discovery and it is known that 
discoveries recur. Discoveries are formulated in hypotheses. Hypotheses also recur. 
Implications deduced from hypotheses recur. Experiments are devised and performed 
to check the implications of these hypotheses against observable facts. Processes of 
experimentation also recUT. 
We can see that what is prominent in these operations is the chain link of 
relatedness, that is mere experience is transformed by inquiry into the scrutiny of 
observation In turn, description pins down what is observed. Inevitably, problems do 
arise due to contrasting descriptions. As we have seen, discoveries are expressed in 
hypotheses, then implications are deduced from hypotheses and these, in turn, suggest 
the performance of experiments. We see that there is relatedness among the many 
operations, which aggregate into a pattern which defines the right way of how 
scientific investigations are conducted. 
What is apparently clear is that what emerges out of these investigations is that 
the results are both cumulative and progressive. This is due to the fact that the process 
of experimentation yields new data. Experiments also yield new observations and new 
descriptions, which mayor may not lead to the confirmation of the hypotheses that 
are being tested. The hypotheses may be confirmed or not. Where they are confirmed 
the process is deemed to be correct and where they are not confirmed the hypothesis 
may be modified, a trend which may lead to new discoveries, deductions and even 
new experiments altogether. 
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Lonergan observes that the wheel of the scientific method does not only tum 
but rolls along. What is discovered as new is added to the old. The formulated new 
hypotheses and theories do not only express new insights, but also bring all that was 
valid in the old to the fore. This trend gives the scientific method a cumulative 
characteristic. It creates an onward urge to pursue the conviction that the goal of the 
complete explanation of all phenomena is now closer than it was before. This account 
seems to constitute the scientific method, which is characteristic of natural sciences. It 
culminates in what Lonergan calls 
.. . a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative 
and progressive results (Lonergan, 1975: 5). 
This account seems to cover the field of natural sciences sufficiently. It raises the 
question, however, of whether it could be prescribed as a model to be transposed to all 
fields of knowledge and whether it would lead to an understanding which intends 
reality in all departments of knowing. 
3.5.3 Observations on the Scientific Method 
First of alL the scientific method is generally regarded as a set of rules. This means 
that if one follows them meticulously they would yield the desired or expected results. 
However, we can say that the same would be true even if one followed them blindly. 
A good example may be cited in a car assembly. It is the same result all the time. One 
wonders, however, about what happens when not only cumulative but also 
progressive results are required. What happens when there is need for new, sustained 
discoveries? Such a case requires analysis and synthesis of the old and the new valid 
insights. But Lonergan observes, " ... neither discovery nor synthesis is at the beck and 
call of any set of rules" (1975: 6). In this particular respect the scientific method 
seems to lack comprehensiveness. At this juncture Lonergan finds it opportune to 
compare the scientific method with the basic pattern of operations or the subject-
based method. He points out that the basic pattern of operations is not a set of rules 
but a normative pattern of operations from which rules may be drawn or derived. He 
indicates that the operations envisaged are not limited to strictly logical operations. 
That is to operations on propositions, terms and relations. The subject-based 
operations include describing, identifying problems, formulating hypotheses and 
deducing implications. It also includes inquiry, observation, discovery, experiment, 
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synthesis and verification. So even at the preliminary level the subject-based method 
is relatively more comprehensive than the scientific method, in the sense that it is not 
limited to specific rules, as the scientific method would demand. 
Lonergan notes that modem science derives its distinctive character from 
grouping together the logical and the non-logical operations, in the sense that the 
logical tends to consolidate what has been achieved, while the non-logical keeps what 
has been achieved open for further advancement. According to Lonergan, 
.. . the conjunction of the two results in an open, on going, progressive and 
cumulative process. This progress contrasts sharply not only with the static 
fixity that resulted from Aristotle' s concentration on the necessary and the 
immutable but also with Hegel' s dialectic which is a movement enclosed 
within a complete system (1975: 6). 
So, in a way, the scientific method seems to be a step ahead of the Aristotelian "static 
fixity", Hegel's "enclosure within a complete system" and Kuhn's idea of "normal 
science". 
Our concern in this thesis has been to establish a method that would lead us to 
the understanding and knowing of all departments of reality. So far we have seen that 
the method of science succeeds in starting the journey towards this goal, but it does 
not complete it. It leads us from common sense knowledge, where "looking is 
understanding", to the theoretical leve~ where intelligibility is rooted in theory and 
hypothesis. 
This journey to knowledge in all aspects of knowing is, however, suddenly cut 
short, because it does not succinctly proceed to the philosophical level of judgement 
and responsibility. Although this method does not necessarily lead us to all 
knowledge, it is comparatively a step ahead of Aristotle' s concentration on the 
necessary and immutable, which Lonergan describes as fixed and static, and that of 
Hegel' s dialectics, which he describes as a movement enclosed within a complete 
system It is a step ahead in a sense that it leaves the gates open for cumulative and 
progressive results. It also leaves room for a sustained succession of discoveries. 
Lonergan makes observations in which he shows us that the scientific method can 
start us on the journey towards knowing, but it does not conclude this journey as 
adequately as transcendental method does. 
154 
3.6 Conclusion 
We end this chapter with a message from Lonergan: 
For it is a paradox of man that what he is by nature in so much less than what 
he becomes; and it is the tragedy of man that the truth, which portrays him as 
actually he is, can descend like an iron curtain to frustrate what he might be 
(Lonergan, "Introduction to InSight," in Morelli and Morelli 1997: 33-34). 
The lesson which we glean from this message is that too much time has been wasted 
while looking in the wrong directions and searching in the wrong places. The Ionians 
searched for a foundation in cosmology, to the exclusion of the subject. Thereafter the 
drama that ensued was to search for a foundation in the fragments carved by different 
philosophers in different fields. These fragments lacked a chain to link them together. 
Even where the chain appears to have been present it was either incomprehensive or a 
non-progressive trap, like that of Descartes, Kant and Hegel. 
Empiricists searched for a foundation in sense data, rationalists searched for a 
foundation in the mind. Some even searched for a foundation in principles and rules, 
as in the case of Wittgenstein. What we can say is that because we have focused and 
searched in the wrong directions we have, at the lower level, missed what the subject 
really is; and at the upper leveL missed what he can become. As Lonergan describes 
it, this is indeed tragic. The more we continue to search in the wrong directions, the 
further we shall move away from what the subject really is. For instance, if you asked 
a biologist what the subject is, it is likely that he will describe him as a biological 
being; a sociologist will describe him as a social being, a psychologist will describe 
him in terms of behaviour; a theologian will describe him in terms of soul or spirit. 
These provide some of the examples of looking in the wrong directions. What 
we should know is that the subject is not only anyone of these divisions, but an 
integration of all of them, and much more, each performing a specific function as an 
operation. Lonergan gives the progression of the subject's self transcendence. This 
can only be done through self-appropriation For clarity's sake we shall not 
paraphrase this progression, but give it in its original form. Lonergan tells us that the 
road to self-transcendence is realised in stages. 
The first is the emergence, of consciousness in the fragmentary fonn of a 
dream, where human substance yields place to the human subject. The second 
is waking when our senses and feelings come to life, where our memory 
recalls pleasure and our imagination anticipates fears, but our vitality 
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envisages courses of action, the third is enquiry which enables us to move out 
of the mere habitat of an animal and into our human world of relatives 
friends, acquaintances, associates, projects, accomplishments, ambitions: 
fears. The fourth is the discovery of the truth, which is not idle repetition of a 
"good look" but the grasp in the manifold of data of the sufficiency of 
evidence for our affirmation or negation. The fifth is the successive 
negotiation of the stages of morality and/or identity till we reach the point 
where we discover for ourselves what we have to make of ourselves, where we 
decisively meet the challenge of that discovery, where we set ourselves apart 
from the drifters. For drifters have not yet found themselves. They have not 
yet found their own deed and are content to do what every one else is doing. 
They have not yet found a will of their own, and so they are content to choose 
what everyone else is choosing. They have not yet developed minds of their 
own, and so they are content to say and think what everyone else is thinking 
and saying. And everyone else, it happens, can be doing and choosing and 
thinking and saying what others are doing and choosing and thinking and 
saying (Lonergan, "A Post-Hegelian Philosophy of Religion" (1980) in 
Morelli and Morelli, 1997: 596-597). 
This long quote invites us to focus in the right direction and search for a foundation in 
the right place. It reflects the fact that self-appropriation is an integrated movement 
encompassing the subject and the intended objects, or the understanding and knowing 
of the self and everything else; and above all the involvement of awareness and the 
consciousness of the knower in the process of knowing. In short, it demonstrates how 
the entire enterprise of self-appropriation is started and accomplished. We are shown 
that operations flow qualitatively from the lower levels of higher animals to the upper 
levels of human responsibility. We are shown that we have to move consciously from 
sense data, of taking a good look, to the grasping of data, through sufficiency of 
evidence, and later make judgements of affirmation or negation after reasonableness. 
Above alL it is incumbent on us to engage fully our basic pattern of operations. 
In Chapter Three we have responded to Wittgenstein's problem oflooking for 
a foundation in non-functional subject-less formal logic. This failed to work and led 
him to yet another venture of following a rule, in the language games. This venture, 
we argued, also fails, because the subject becomes simply a social being, conforming 
to rules. 
This chapter succeeds in establishing a foundation in terms of the subject- in-
act or the basic pattern of operations, which we have referred to as transcendental 
method. We have seen that transcendental method is a method for all methods and 
therefore it has all it needs to enable us reach reality in all possible spheres. This is so 
because it functions on the precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and 
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responsible. We have also seen that there is no discipline or field of inquiry which 
escapes this progression. Transcendental method is a method which is self-corrective; 
one cannot criticise it without criticising oneself in the process. Furthermore, we can 
say that it is a method which comes as salvation to philosophy, by rescuing it from 
some philosophers who fragment it and then proceed and try to find a foundation in 
these fragments. 
Transcendental method is the only method which can restore the identity and 
dignity of philosophy in making it play its befitting traditional role, which is to be 
foundational to all learning. We end this chapter by reiterating that in Chapter Two 
Wittgenstein provokes us into action when he attempts to establish a foundation in the 
subject-less formal logic. We disagree with him in favour of Lonergan, who 
establishes a foundation in the subject. As we have demonstrated in Chapter Three, 
the basic pattern of operations turns out to be the method for all methods, in short, a 
foundation to knowing. In Chapter Four, Winch suggests the inter-cultural approach, 
in which one culture can learn from another culture. Good as he sounds, he does not 
follow up this idea to its logical conclusion. He does not tell us how this can be 
accomplished. For example, how can someone who is deeply biased towards the 
scientific approach as the only correct method learn from someone who thinks that he 
can get to reality through the oracular approach and vice versa? A solution to this 
problem is suggested in Chapter Five, where Barden emerges with the notion of the 
actualisation of the subject-in-act. In that chapter, Barden makes Lonergan's method 
of the subject-in-act functional. He does this by applying it to traditions, contexts and 
systems. He helps us to put the ideas of Lonergan into practice. He helps us to show 
practically that the subject-in-act is the only method that can truly lead us to the 
knowing and the understanding of reality. It is to Winch's refutation of the scientific 




INTER-CULTURAL LEARNING: SCIENTIFIC AND NON-
SCIENTIFIC CULTURES 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we shall mainly follow Winch's "Understanding a Primitive Society," 
Chapter Two of his Ethics and Society (1972), in which we encounter Winch's ideas 
on inter-cultural learning. Inter-cultural learning foIlllS the main theme of our 
discussion in Chapter Four. 
In Chapter Two we saw how Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus Logico-
Ph ilosophicus, attempted to make formal logic basic or foundational to the 
understanding and knowing of reality in all departments. He realised that this could 
not work. We saw him shifting his centre of gravity from formal logic to following a 
rule in the language-games. Here we argued that reality in all spheres could not be 
understood on the paradigm of isolated language-games. The subject was needed to 
link up these games and accord them integrated meaning in relation to the societies in 
which they were operating. In Chapter Three Cronin (1999), following Lonergan 
(1990), carries us through different episodes and philosophers, attempting to establish 
a foundation or what is basic to all knowing. He takes us through the ancient period to 
contemporary philosophers like Wittgenstein. Still, he argues, the problem of what is 
foundational to reality in all its entirety remains unsolved and he points us to 
Lonergan, who provides the subject as a foundation that would lead to the 
intelligibility of knowledge or reality in its totality. This task will be picked up by 
Barden (1990) in Chapter Five, who in turn, using the ideas of Lonergan (discussed in 
Chapter Three), helps us to solve our problem of establishing a foundation to the 
intelligibility of knowledge or reality in its completeness. 
In this chapter we discuss Winch (1992), who attempts to solve the problem of 
intelligibility in two cultures. One of the cultures, the science culture, uses theory to 
gain intelligibility. The second culture, the non-science one, uses common sense 
knowledge to gain intelligibility. The science culture sets the scientific approach as 
standard for gaining intelligibility in all cultures. Peter Winch exposes the problems in 
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this scenario. He uses the ideas of Wittgenstein, as reflected in Chapter Two, to 
illustrate the problems therein We are using Winch is this chapter because he helps us 
to show that attempting to gain intelligibility - in our case reality in its completeness -
without a foundation does not work. In this section, we examine how Winch presents 
his case. 
4.2 Rationality Relative to Culture 
4.2.1 Evans-Pritchard's Problem of Understanding a Primitive Culture: Winch 
Winch begins by pointing out what is likely to happen when a social anthropologist -
of European origin - carries out a study among a primitive people such as the 
African Azande. He points out that these people may be holding some beliefs which 
cannot possibly be shared by the Europeans. The Azande engage in practices which 
are peculiarly difficult for the European to comprehend. For instance, they hold a 
belief that some of their members are witches who are capable of exercising a 
malevolent occult influence on the lives of their fellows. They, in order to safeguard 
themselves, engage in rites to counteract witchcraft. They also consult oracles to 
reveal witches and at the same time protect themselves from harm by using magic 
medicines. 
4.2.2 Likely Attitude of the European Anthropologist Studying a Primitive Culture: 
Winch's View 
An anthropologist, Evans-Pritchard for example, wishing to study the beliefs and 
practices of a primitive society like the Azande, may first of all become interested in 
making these beliefs and practices intelligible to himself and the readership from his 
cultural background. (By primitive, we do not in anyway mean inferior. We mean a 
society, from whatever part of the world, whose beliefs and practices are still 
characterised by compactness that is, lack of clear definitions of these beliefs and 
practices and to some extent lack of clear differentiation). Such an anthropologist 
would face the problem of presenting an account of such beliefs and practices in a 
manner that would satisfy the criteria of rationality demanded by the culture to which 
he and his readership belong. 
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The problem here is that his culture is already deeply influenced and 
therefore affected by the achievements and methods of science. To such a culture, 
belief in magic and the practice of oracular consultations are almost a paradigm of the 
irrational. Consequently, the anthropologist is likely to adopt a biased position that the 
Azande belief in the influence of witchcraft, the efficacy of magic medicines and the 
role of the oracles in revealing what is going to happen, are mistaken or illusory. This 
is so because the scientific methods of investigations show conclusively that there are 
no relationship of cause and effect, as may be implied in these beliefs and practices. 
The task of the anthropologist would be to show how such a system of mistaken 
beliefs and inefficacious practices would maintain itself in the face of objections that 
seem so obvious in the face of European culture. 
Winch helps us to see that, although Evans-Prichard tries to project the 
situation as it is among the Azande, he himself suffers from an attitudinal problem 
Winch points out that in Evans-Pritchard' s book Witchcraft, Oracle and Magic 
Among the Azande (1937), he makes several remarks such as, 
. .. "obviously there are no witches" and he writes of the difficulty he 
found ... with the Azande, in shaking off the ' 'unreason'' on which Zande life is 
based and return to a clear view of how things really are (Winch, 1972: 9). 
Evans-Pritchard 's attitude is partly a consequence of the fact that he comes from a 
scientific culture. That difficulty not withstanding, Evans-Pritchard, in his 
expositions, expresses it clearly that we are all born in a certain culture. That culture 
has its own beliefs and practices. Members of each culture simply inherit these beliefs 
and practices so it would not be appropriate to regard one culture as superior and the 
other as inferior in intelligence or one culture as rational and the other as irrational. It 
would also be inappropriate to say that one culture thinks more logically than the 
other. 
4.2.3 Logic Equally Present Anwng the European and the AzIlnde Approaches 
Evans-Pritchard clearly states that in as much as we cannot say of one institution, with 
its beliefs and practices, that it is more rational than the other, neither can we talk of 
one institution as being more logical than the other; although de facto the European 
institution is scientific. Winch shows Evans-Pritchard illustrating this fact: 
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Scientific notions are those which are in accord with objective reality, both 
with regard to the validity of the premises and the inferences drawn from their 
propositions ... . Logical notions are those in which according to the rules of 
thought inferences would be true were the premises true, the truth of the 
premises being irrelevant.. .. A pot has broken during firing. This is probably 
due to grit. Let us examine the pot and see whether this is the cause. That is 
logical and scientific thought. Sickness is due to witchcraft. A man is sick. Let 
us consult the oracle to discover who is the witch responsible. That is logical 
and unscientific thought (Pritchard, in Winch, 1972: 10 - 11). 
What is being demonstrated here is the fact that what is not scientific is not 
necessarily illogical. A similar operation takes place in both the scientific and the 
unscientific cases. Something has gone wrong. In the scientific, a pot breaks; in the 
unscientific a man falls sick. There is a problem which necessitates action in both 
cases. The respective problem raises the question of who or what is responsible. In the 
scientific it is probably grit and in the pre-scientific it is probably a witch. In each 
situation an investigative procedure is conducted. In the scientific case the pot is 
examined; in the pre-scientific the oracles are consulted. When it comes to rationality 
both the Europeans and the Azande are equally rational. However, the problem which 
emerges between Evans-Pritchard and Winch is that of reality. Winch presents Evans-
Pritchard as registering the fact that a member of the scientific culture has a different 
conception of reality compared to the Azande believer in magic. Evans-Pritchard 
proceeds to make this difference clearer. He infers that it is the scientific conception 
that agrees with reality and the magic conception does not. 
Winch thinks that Evans-Pritchard is not only saying that the scientific 
European and the non-scientific Azande have different conceptions of reality, but says 
that in the final analysis it is the scientific conception which agrees with what reality 
actually is, whereas the magical conception does not. 
4.2.4 Reality Determined by Language Use Within the Context of a Particular 
Culture 
Winch finds the above conviction taunting and attributes this problem to the 
expression "agreement with reality", which he describes as ' 'unwieldy and 
misleading ... " (1972: 11). He points out that we should not lose sight of the fact that a 
person's beliefs and ideas must be checked by reference to some independent reality, 
of which he makes two related points. He associates these points, like Wittgenstein, 
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with language use. His first point is that ''the check of the independent real is not 
peculiar to science" (1972: 12). He attributes the bias toward science to the 
fascination with science that has made it easy for the adoption of the scientific form as 
a paradigm against which to measure the intellectual respectability of other forms of 
discourse. 
Winch uses the idea of God to put across the first point. He says 
God's reality is certainly independent of what any man may care to think, but 
what that reality amounts to can only be seen from the religious tradition in 
which the concept of God is used, and this use is very unlike the use of 
scientific concepts, say of theoretical entities (1972: 12). 
In this quotation Winch is exemplifying the first point, that the conception of God's 
reality has its place within the religious use of language or discourse, much as the 
practice of witchcraft is in the primitive discourse. 
Winch's second point, that he relates to language is the following: 
Reality is not what gives language sense. What is real and what is not real 
shows itself in the sense that language has. Further, the distinction between the 
real and the unreal and the concept of agreement with reality themselves 
belong to our language (1972: 12). 
He points out that certain concepts may be missing in a language. For instance, it is 
possible to imagine a language without the concept "wetness", but it is difficult to 
fmd a language of which there is no way of distinguishing between the real and the 
unreal. Winch's second point could be interpreted to rrean that there is no way in 
which one can distinguish the real from the unreal without first of all understanding 
how this distinction operates in the language. Consequently, the intelligibility of 
concepts depends on examining the actual use they do have in a particular language 
discourse. 
Winch is advancing a criticism on Evans-Pritchard's attempt to work with the 
conception of reality without taking it to its actual use in language and instead looking 
for something against which that use can be appraised. According to Winch, this is 
not possible, either in scientific discourse or any other. He cites a scientific example 
to explain this problem He takes a case in which someone may begin by asking 
herself whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality. One proceeds to 
test it, using experiment and observation. He says that, given the experimental 
methods and the established use of the theoretical terms entering into the hypothesis, 
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according to Evans-Pritchard, the question whether it holds or not is settled by 
reference to something independent of what I, or anybody else, care to think. 
Winch observes that the general nature of the data revealed by the experiment 
can only be specified in terms of criteria built into the methods of the experiment that 
are employed. In turn, these make sense only to someone who is well versed or 
conversant with the kind of scientific activity within which they are employed. 
If, on the other hand, someone who is illiterate in science is asked to observe 
and later describe the results of the experiment in an advanced physics laboratory he 
would not be able to do it in terms relevant to the hypothesis being tested. In such a 
situation it is impossible to talk of the results of the experiment. 
According to Winch, Evans-Pritchard is not particularly right when he implies 
that what constitutes a true link between the ideas of the Europeans and an 
independent reality are the criteria applied in the scientific experimentation. This 
would imply that the characteristics of other systems of thought, such as the magical 
systems, do not constitute a true link between the Azande ideas and an independent 
reality. For Winch, however, there can be many ways of making the link, not just the 
scientific. 
4.2.5 Oracular System in the ContexJ of the Azande Leads to Reality 
Understandoble to Them 
As Winch puts it, the above situation raises the question whether 
.. . a primitive system of magic, like that of the Azande, constitutes a coherent 
system of discourse like science, in terms of which an intelligible conception 
of reality and clear ways of deciding what beliefs are and are not in agreement 
with this reality can be discerned .. . (1972: 14). 
Before dealing with this question, Winch warns that a system of magical beliefs 
like that of the Azande forms one of the foundations of their whole social life. This 
reality should be distinguished from that in which someone learns or acquires magical 
beliefs, practices and rites when that person is from an alien culture. 
Evans-Pritchard recognises this fact, and tries to clarify, it as follows: 
When a Zande speaks of witchcraft he does not speak of it as we speak of the 
weird witchcraft of our own history. Witchcraft to him is a comnxm 
happening and he seldom passes a day without mentioning it.. .. To us 
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witchcraft is something which haunted and disgusted our credulous 
forefathers. But the Azande expects to come across witchcraft anytime of the 
day or night ... . (Evans-Pritchard in Winch, 1972: 15). 
What this means, as Winch explains, is that the indigenous Azande is entangled in a 
web of beliefs and practices with strands which are all dependent on one another. It is 
a fine mesh from which the Azande may not easily disentangle. This web is the very 
texture of Azande thought and not an external structure in which he is enclosed. It is 
the only world he knows. The case is different from that of the European attempting 
to understand the thought systems, beliefs and practices of the Azande. The European 
enters from outside when he is already influenced by the thought systems, beliefs and 
practices of his culture. In this case the temptation to regard his approach - the 
scientific - as a paradigm with which to gauge other approaches, like that of the 
Azande, becomes difficult to resist. 
After that caution Winch proceeds to answer the question, namely whether it 
is the case that a primitive system of magic, like that of the Azande, constitutes a 
coherent universe of discourse like science, in terms of which an intelligible 
conception of reality and clear ways of deciding what beliefs are and are not in 
agreement with this reality can be discerned. He attempts to answer this question by 
examining the institutions described by Evans-Pritchard, in order to determine the 
extent to which his claims are justified. Winch further explains that witchcraft is the 
mainstay of the Azande. It is a mystical means by which certain individuals harm 
others. Witches are detected by oracles. This is a procedure where benge, a poisonous 
drug, is administered to a live fowl. According to this ritual the fowl is supposed to 
die or survive. The survival or death of the fowl reveals the presence or absence of a 
suspected witch. This is in consonance with Azande beliefs and practices. 
Winch argues that, apart from revealing the presence or absence of witches, 
" .. . witchcraft explains why events are harmful to man and not how they happen" 
(1972: 17); proceeds to explain that the Azande perception of how events occur in 
daily life is as clear as that of the European. They understand the chain of cause and 
effect. For instance, 
Azande .. . does not see a witch charge a man but an elephant. He does not see a 
witch push over the granary but termites gnawing a way its supports. He does 
not see a psychical flame igniting thatch but an ordinary lighted bundle of 
straw ... (1972: 17). 
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To make his point clear, Winch likens the importance of witchcraft to that of an 
engineer in European society, who may be required to build a bridge without the use 
of mathematical calculations, or a military commander, who may be required to 
mount a co-ordinated military attack without the use of a clock. Winch presents these 
analogies to show that the Azande cannot function without the witchcraft facilitation, 
much as the European cannot function without the facilitation of instruments. 
However, he brings out a very important point, which may emanate from the 
European, who may argue that 
... the Zande practice of consulting the oracle, unlike my technological and 
military examples, are completely unintelligible and rest on an obvious 
illusion (1972: 18). 
Winch notes that the Azande do conduct their affairs to their own satisfaction 
and are at a loss when forced to abandon their practices. In any case, Winch wonders 
as to whom the Azande practices are alleged to be unintelligible. It is difficult for the 
European to understand what the Azande are up to when they consult their oracles, 
much as it is difficult for the Azande to understand how the engineer' s motions with 
his slide rule could have any connection with the stability of his bridge, or how a 
commander's mechanical clock, rather than the gun, could have any connection with 
the efficiency of the troops on the battlefield. 
Here Winch is emphasising the fact that someone with a scientific background 
would have a problem of intelligibility when exposed to the mystic approach. Equally, 
someone whose understanding is embedded in witchcraft would find it difficult to 
understand the ways of someone with a scientific background. 
4.2.6 The Sense in the OracuJor Approach 
At this moment we may need to ask ourselves whether the oracular approach makes 
sense in itself or not. It seems obvious that belief in witchcraft and oracular practices 
does not necessarily make sense to Europeans, however satisfied the Azande may be 
with them and vice versa: that is, the scientific approach may not make sense to the 
Azande, however satisfied the European may be with them 
Here again a question arises and that is, what would be the criterion for 
ascertaining that something does or does not make sense. Winch's partial answer is 
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that if a set of beliefs and practices involves a contradiction then it does not make 
sense. 
Looking at the Azande way of consulting the oracles, contradictions are bOlmd 
to arise and they do arise in two ways. Two oracular pronOlmcements may contradict 
each other, or future experience may contradict a self-consistent oracular 
pronoWlcement. In the first instance, the oracle may say "yes" and later say "no" to 
the same question. Obviously this amoWlts to a contradiction, but this occurrence does 
not make the whole enterprise of consulting oracles futile. What we have to note is 
that, over time, the concept of oracle gets built into the whole network of Azande 
beliefs and practices. In the process, a mechanism for explaining away the 
contradiction, according to the Wlderstanding of the Azande, has been instituted For 
instance, it may be said that: 
bad benge is being used; that the operator of the oracle is ritually Wlclean; that 
the oracle is being itself influenced by witchcraft or sorcery; or it may be that 
the oracle is showing that the question cannot be answered straightforwardly 
in its present form .. . (1972: 19-20). 
This shows that the Azande, in their own context, which may be difficult for 
Europeans to understand, have their own ingenious ways of interpreting the behaviour 
of the fowl, which may be under the influence of benge. Although the enterprise may 
look contradictory to Europeans, it does make sense to the Azande. The case holds in 
a similar manner in a situation in which a subsequent experience may contradict an 
earlier oracular pronoWlcement. 
In any case, Winch reminds us that the function of the oracles is to reveal the 
presence or absence of mystical forces. The ways of revealing this presence or 
absence do not correspond with the empirical confirmation or refutation of hypotheses 
in the context of the scientific approach. The mystical approach is different from the 
scientific experiment-based approach. The Azande do not treat the oracular revelation 
as confirmation or refutation of hypotheses. Therefore oracular revelations are not 
treated as hypotheses. It is important to note that oracular practices are the main way 
through which the Azande decide how they should act. To the Azande this issue is not 
a matter of intellectual interest that mayor may not involve contradictions. This point 
will be explained later, in Barden 
Another important point which Winch emphasises is that 
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· .. if the oracle reveals that the proposed course of action is fraught with 
mystic dangers from witchcraft or sorcery, that course of action will not be 
carried out; and then the question of confirmation or refutation just will not 
arise (1972: 20). 
What Winch is saying is that it is not correct to look at the oracular approach, whose 
purpose is mainly to reveal mystical dangers, in the same way as the scientific 
approach whose main purpose is to refute or confirm scientific-based hypotheses. 
Winch is of the view that Evans-Pritchard would have concurred with him up 
to this point, but, according to Winch, Evans-Prichard, judging by his trend and 
expositions " ... would have wished to add: and the European is right and the Azande 
wrong" (1972: 22). Winch regards this judgement of right and wrong as illegitimate. 
We will now discuss how he proceeds to demonstrate his views on this illegitimacy. 
4.2. 7 Non-Scientific Nature of the kande Oracular System 
It is clear that the Azande have mechanisms for explaining away oracular 
contradictions. However, there are situations in which what appear to be obvious 
contradictions to the Europeans are left where they are and apparently unresolved. 
According to Winch, 
Perhaps this may be the foothold we are looking for, from which we can 
appraise the "correctness" of the Azande system (1972: 24). 
Apart from the role the oracle plays in establishing whether one is a witch or not, 
there is a more direct way and that is by the post-mortem examination of the suspect's 
intestines for "witchcraft substances. " What this demonstrates mainly to the 
Europeans is that if a man is proven to be a witch then it follows that the whole of his 
clan are ipso facto witches. This is because the Azande are related to one another 
through the male line. The Azande see the sense of this argument but do not accept its 
conclusions. Were they to do so, it would involve the whole notion of witchcraft in a 
contradiction. This would be the case because the results of a few scattered post-
mortem examinations of the intestines would prove that everybody was a witch and a 
few scattered negative results would prove that nobody was a witch. 
This case would be so in the context of the Europeans, but Winch suggests 
that 
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· .. Azande do not perceive the contradiction as we perceive it because they do 
not have any theoretical interest in the subject and those situations in which 
they express their interest in witchcraft do not force the problem upon them 
(1972: 24). 
This leads Winch to make a number of observations. First observation: the Azande 
oracular system involves a contradiction and, moreover, they make no attempt to 
remove it. This situation appears to provide sufficient grounds for sustaining the case 
of the " .. . superior rationality of the Europeans over the Azande thought.. . " (1972: 
25). At this juncture Winch wonders whether Azande opinion on this matter really 
involves a contradiction, according to the understanding of the Azande. 
Second observation: Evans-Pritchard presents the Azande case in such a way 
that they do not bother to stress their ways of thinking about witchcraft to the point 
where they would be mvolved in contradictions. 
This situation may also present a case. It may be pointed out that 
the irrationality of the Azande in relation to witchcraft shows itself in the fact 
that they do not press their thought about it to its logical conclusion (1972: 
25). 
Winch again wonders whether, in the understanding of the Azande, the conclusion 
that is being forced on them is indeed a logical one, or whether someone trying to 
impose this conclusion on the Azande is being more rational than they are. 
In the final analysis, Winch points out that the scientific approach of the 
Europeans does not render the Azande approach of witchcraft obsolete. This is 
because 
They have no theoretical interest in the subject. This suggests strongly that the 
context of our scientific culture is not on the same level as the context in 
which the beliefs about witchcraft operate. Zande notions of witchcraft do not 
constitute a theoretical system in terms of which Azande try to gain a quasi-
scientific understanding of the world. This in turn suggests that it is the 
European, obsessed with pressing the Zande thought where it would not 
naturally go - to a contradiction - who is guilty of misunderstanding, not the 
Azande. The European is indeed committing a category mistake (1972: 26). 
Winch is reminding us that the oracular approach and the scientific approach are 
operating at two different levels. The second approach involves a theoretical system, 
while the Azande system does not. The Azande system does not necessarily lead the 
Azande to the understanding of the world from the scientific point of view. The 
contexts in which the two systems are operating are entirely and clearly different. The 
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conclusions drawn in one context are different from the conclusions drawn in the 
other, so the obsession of the Europeans attempting to press the Azande thought 
where it would not naturally go is committing a category mistake. Instead, efforts 
should be made to understand how the Azande system operates. 
In addition to this, Winch points out that 
... the forms in which rationality expresses itself in the culture of a human 
society cannot be elucidated simply in terms of the logical coherences of the 
rules according to which activities are carried out in that society ... . There 
comes a point where we are not even in a position to determine what is and 
what in not coherent in such a context of rules, without raising questions about 
the point which following these rules has in the society (I72: 27). 
What Winch is saying here is that the way rationality operates in a certain society can 
be better elucidated, not only in terms of logical coherence of the rules governing 
activities in that society, but by understanding the point which following those rules 
has in that particular society 
4.2.8 The Point in FoUowing a Rule: Consideration of Winch's Comparative 
Analysis of Wlttgenstein and Evans-Pritchard 
So far Winch has led us to the stage where he points out that it is not correct to use 
one approach such as the scientific approach a paradigm upon which to gauge the 
intelligibility and the intellectual respectability of other approaches such that of the 
Azande oracular approach. Attempting to do that would be to commit the same 
mistake Wittgenstein committed in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein 
presented formal logic as an ideal language that would reflect all reality in the sense 
of the Tractatus . What Winch is saying is that attempting to make the scientific 
approach a standard paradigm would not work, much as attempting to make formal 
logic an ideal language for reflecting reality in all areas could not work. 
Winch shows us that Evans-Pritchard is right in recognising the two 
approaches - the European and the Azande - each in its own right. This is again 
comparable to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Each of the approaches is 
a game with its own rules. But, according to Winch, where Evans-Pritchard goes 
wrong is in purporting that it is the European " ... concept of reality which is a correct 
one and the Azande are mistaken" (1972: 23). 
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In the subsequent discussion, Winch attempts to illuminate his objection by 
comparing his disagreement with Evans-Pritchard to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus 
and the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations. Winch points out that in the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein sought the general form of propositions. To Wittgenstein, a 
proposition was an articulated modeL consisting of elements standing in a definite 
relationship to each other. The truth of the proposition had to correspond with the 
arrangement of elements in reality. 
The proposition was capable of saying something because of the identity of 
structure, of logical form, in the proposition and in reality (1972: 22). 
Winch points out that Evans-Pritchard's stand is similar to that ofWittgenstein at this 
level. This similarity is emphasised by Wittgenstein's expression that 
.... The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. Logic fills the 
world: the limits of the world are also its limits .. . (Wittgenstein in Winch, 
1972: 22). 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein looked at formal logic as the only correct language 
through which all reality could be reflected. 
Winch reminds us that by the time Wittgenstein composed the Philosophical 
Investigation he had rejected the whole idea that there must be a standard form of 
proposition He instead emphasised an infinite number of different uses that a 
language may have and that these uses need not have anything in common in the 
sense intended in the Tractatus. The similarity between Wittgenstein and Evans-
Pritchard, which Winch wants us to see, is that at the time of the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein 
... spoke of "language" as if all language was fundamentally the same kind and 
must have the same kind of "relationship to reality" (1972: 23). 
Unlike Wittgenstein, Evans-Pritchard is confronted with two languages: the 
language of the Europeans and that of the Azande. To use Wittgenstein's language of 
the Philosophical Investigations, each group - the Europeans and the Azande - is 
playing its own language game and each game has its own rules, which are largely 
different from those of the other group. The Europeans are playing the scientific 
language-game while the Azande are playing the oracular mystic language-game. Up 
to this point Evans-Pritchard's thinking is closer to Wittgenstein's thinking in the 
Philosophical Investigations. But, at the same time, his thinking bends towards the 
Tractatus when 
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· .. he wants to go further and say: our concept of reality is the correct one, the 
Azande are mistaken (1 972: 23). 
This thinking is similar to Wittgenstein' s thinking in the Tractatus, that there should 
be one correct language - fonnallogic - that would reflect all reality. 
The issue which Winch is raising and wants us to see is that of the paradigm 
with which to establish what is "correct" and what is "mistaken " Again, in order to 
establish what is correct and what is mistaken one must first of all understand the 
concepts in the way they are taken in a particular language in the relevant context. So 
it is not correct for Evans-Pritchard to say that the European approach must be used to 
establish what is correct and what is mistaken. But let us examine what the 
commentators on Winch have to say. 
4.3 Commentators 
4.3.1 Meaning in Mystical Thinking: Barden 
Barden (1990) looks at the analysis made by Winch in his book6 ofEvans-Pritchard's 
study of the witchcraft, oracle and magic among the Azande.7 The case involves a 
man who happens to be passing by a bam which falls on him, causing him bodily 
injury. Two interpretations emerge out of this happening. One interpretation from the 
Europeans is that the happening is merely a coincidental accident and they stop at 
that. 
Another interpretation, from the Azande, is that there is something else 
beyond mere accidental coincidence. They understand that the bam falls because 
termites have eaten its beams, but what they do not understand is why it falls at the 
time the man happens to be passing. Their question is what does it all mean? They 
want to establish the meaning behind what the Europeans regard as mere accident, so 
they consult the oracle. The oracle is supposed to answer the question of meaning. 
Barden gives us the ideas that help us to clarify the problem of the method of inter-
culturalleaming between the Europeans and the Azande. He interprets Winch's idea 
about the two systems to mean that the Azande and the Europeans are simply acting 
within two different worlds. This creates a problem that what seems rational to the 
~inch, P. 1958. The Idea o/a Social &ience. 
7Evans-Pritchard, 1937. Witchcraft, Oracle andMagic Among the Azande. 
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Azande seems irrational to the Europeans. He projects Winch and Evans-Pritchard as 
showing that everyday behaviour is contextual. 
People did X because they assumed Y to be the case, but people differed in 
their context and so produced different responses (Barden, 1990: 90). 
Our interest in Barden is in his efforts to try and find a common practice beneath these 
contextual differences. Because of the contextual differences, the Azande are playing 
their own language-game and the Europeans are also playing their own language-
game. But this difference notwithstanding, the two groups share the same operations 
that Barden calls "basic." 
When the barn falls on a passer-by, the Azande do understand the physical 
cause as being termites. To the Europeans this would be coincidence, but the Azande 
do not stop at coincidence. They ask a further question: why did the barn fall exactly 
at the time the man was under it? For the answer to this question, they turn to 
witchcraft. The Azande want to account for this coincidence. Because they ask a 
further question, it means that they live in the same rational world as the Europeans. 
(This fundamental point will be discussed further in this chapter and expanded in 
Chapter Five on Barden). Again we are interested in Barden, because he gives us the 
method that Winch failed to give to members of different contexts or traditions to use 
in order to extend their intelligibility to one another in the process of inter-cultural 
learning. This method is the basic set of operations. 
4.3.1 Cross-Cultural Generalisation: MacIntyre 
In connection with the Azande practice of witchcraft, MacIntyre (1974) points out 
that Winch, from the point of view of scientific culture, thinks it is impossible to ask 
whether the Azande beliefs about witches are true. A member ofthe scientific culture 
can only get the truth of the Azande beliefs in the institution of witchcraft if she asked 
the question within the Zande system of beliefs. But if she asked the same question 
within the context of modern science, the answer would be no. At the same time, a 
member of the scientific culture cannot ask a question such as ''which system of 
beliefs is the superior in respect of rationality and truth." Asking such a question 
would be to invoke criteria that can be understood independently of any particular 
way of life. According to Winch there are no such criteria 
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From MacIntyre's point of view, when it comes to cultural 'Comparison, this is 
erroneous. He advances two arguments against Winch. The first is that Winch' s view 
makes certain actual historical transition unintelligible. Here MacIntyre is referring to 
transitions from one system of beliefs to another that are necessarily characterised by 
raising questions of the kind that Winch rejects. He gives the example of seventeenth 
century Scotland. Then a question such as "are there witches?" could not be but 
raised. It: for instance, Winch asked a question such as from within which way of 
social life or under which system of life this question was asked, according to 
MacIntyre the answer would be 
it was asked by men who confronted alternative systems and were able to 
draw out of what confronted them independent criteria of judgement .... Many 
Africans today are in the same situation. (MacIntyre, ''The Idea of a Social 
Science," in Wilson: 129). 
In his second argument, MacIntyre considers the expression made by a Zande 
theorist and a modem sceptic. Suppose the Zande theorist says "there are witches" 
and the modem sceptic says 'There are no witches." In MacIntyre's own words, 
unless one of these statements denies what the other asserts, the negation of the 
sentence expressing the former could not be a correct translation of the sentence 
expressing the latter. Thus, if the Europeans could not deny from their own standpoint 
and in their own language what the Zande asserts in theirs, the Europeans should not 
be able to translate their expression into their language. From MacIntyre's point of 
view, cultural idiosyncrasy will have entailed linguistic idiosyncrasy and cross-
cultural comparison will have been rendered logically impossible. But as McIntyre 
puts it, translation is not impossible. 
MacIntyre is criticising Winch' s view that one society cannot go beyond 
another society' s own self-description without first grasping the criteria embedded in 
that self-description. We must say that MacIntyre raises a very important point here, 
that is if the Europeans cannot deny from their own standpoint and in their own 
language what the Zande assert in theirs, then the Europeans should be unable to 
translate the Zande expression into the European language. According to MacIntyre, 
this is not correct, as demonstrated by the possibility of translation 
Another implication of Winch's view is that translation would be difficult in 
differently contingent conceptual schemes and institutional arrangements of different 
societies. This would also make cross-cultural generalisation difficult. 
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Here we have two perspectives, that of Winch, who is of the view that in order 
to explain social behaviour of a certain group of people, one must do so according to 
their own self-description. Macintyre, representing the modem scientist, is of the view 
that explaining social behaviour should be based on some kind of theory. This 
scenario becomes relevant to our thesis in the sense that both Winch and MacIntyre 
are not likely to come to a compromise if each one of them maintains their present 
stand. We say that, though each of them may be intolerant of the other, they have 
something in common which can bring them to a round table and that is the basic set 
of operations. The basic set of operations can bring the two to a common 
understanding. It is a method that links all the methods, as we shall demonstrate in 
Chapter Five. 
4.3.3 Translational Understanding and Mystical Thinking: Horton 
Horton comments on two ideas from Winch's essay, ''Understanding a Primitive 
Society" in Ethics and Society (1972). These include the idea of ''translational 
understanding" and the idea of "mystical thinking." The first idea stipulates that in 
order to understand utterances made in an alien culture, first find the point that these 
utterances have for them This point can be discovered by placing these utterances in 
the context of the social life within which they arise. It is after this discovery that one 
will be in a position to say which utterances associated with one's own conceptual 
system are the appropriate translation instruments. While one is searching for 
translation instruments, one should be as open-minded as possible. One should not 
exclude, in advance, any ofthe previous universes of discourse available to one. 
Another related point put forward by Winch is that, while trying to understand 
an alien culture, one should not attempt to project a point or purpose that is looming 
high in one's mind, but which may turn out to be peripheral or not feature at all in the 
minds of those whose life and thought one is trying to understand. The temptation is 
to try and project a preoccupation with explanation, prediction and control that is 
central to the sciences and technology that may have little or no importance in the life 
of non-Europeans. At this point Horton raises a number of problems emanating from 
Winch's thinking thus far. 
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The first problem is that of desperation. There is a possibility that different 
cultures may happen to be perusing totally different goals, so that their utterances may 
have totally disparate points. The second problem is that of the specification of the 
kind in utterances that have similar points, since the understanding of an alien culture 
depends on this similarity. 
On this matter, Horton points out that Winch' s suggested procedure can only 
form the first phase of comprehension It does not engross all phases. For instance, the 
fact that certain aims or purposes may provide the point of vast corpus of utterance in 
one culture, but be of peripheral importance in another, may be confronted with 
patterns of purpose that may happen to be irreducibly different in their phases. If one 
attempts to further one's understanding in these cases, one will not be able to avoid 
bringing in the kind of causal analysis that Winch leaves no room for. 
Horton goes on to say that Winch's idea of translational understanding does 
not only represent the first phase of a multi phase interpretive process, but the very 
idea itself suffers from serious internal defects and incompleteness. For instance, 
Horton points out, 
Winch holds an unduly restricted view of the situational and motivational 
common ground that makes translational understanding possible. In taking 
birth, sexual relations and death as the locus of universal human strivings and 
purposes ... will be well received by those who prefer to think of man as poetic 
and religious rather than coldly pragmatic in his essence; for these precisely 
are the situations which, in western culture at least, favour homo poetico-
religiosus as against homo scientijico-techno!ogicus (Horton, 1994: 140). 
Horton points out that, looking at Winch's idea more coolly, one finds that his 
view of the range of universal human strivings is inadequate. He proceeds to give 
counter strings to Winch's. These include the strivings to satisfy hunger and thirst, 
strivings to avoid extreme heat and cold and strivings for power. Though these 
strivings appear to be peculiarly tied to biological needs, these and many other 
unromantic and remarkable strivings are common to all human beings in all ages and 
all places. The inventory of strivings is longer than that what Winch offers. 
Suppose we take Winch's limiting situations, that is birth, sexual relations and 
death, which supposedly give rise to universal attitudes, emotions and aims. These in 
tum form a kind of intercultural bridge that permits translation and completes the 
process of understanding. As a case in point, does Winch provide us with an answer 
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of how one cultural group can move from what others share with it to what they do 
not share? Winch's answer to this problem is that a human being, in co-operation with 
his fellows, pursues his aims, which are mediated by language, and which involves 
planning, foresight and the following of rules. 
Horton's response is that, though Winch has put considerable stress on this 
point, he has not followed it to its full implications. For instance, co-operative 
endeavours ofthis kind would be impossible for the Europeans without their everyday 
conception of material objects which exist and persist independently of them; or 
without their everyday special and temporal concepts; or without their everyday 
differentiation between persons and non-persons; or without their everyday notion of 
causality; without their everyday idea o( and attitude to, contradiction and without 
their everyday concepts of truth, falsity and agreement with reality. 
Winch, as Horton says, exposes the whole apparatus of inter-cultural concepts 
and attitudes as belonging to the Europeans. But Horton and other philosophers, who 
are critical of Winch, are of the view that it is this apparatus which provides the 
crucial infrastructure of all the more specialised universes of discourse and forms of 
life in all cultures. Horton emphasises that this conceptual apparatus is a prerequisite 
not only for the everyday business of staying alive, but also for the possibility of 
assembling at given times and places. He asserts that it is also crucial to the viability 
of more specialised forms of life such as the religious, the artistic and the scientific. In 
Horton's words, 
.. . the universal conceptual apparatus provides ... the raw materials from which 
all the more specialised "universe of discourse" are built up .. .. Thus a great 
deal of light can be thrown on the more esoteric features of .. . modem Western 
Christianity, modem Western Science (not to speak of traditional African 
Religion)(1994: 142). 
On the issue of translational understanding, Horton implies that if the 
apparatus of inter-cultural concepts and attitudes, and also the availability of the more 
specialised forms of life such as the religious, the artistic and the scientific, have been 
built up by an extension or an over-extension of the concepts of language, then the 
problem of translational understanding is solved. Otherwise the problem remains. So 
much for the idea of translational understanding. We now tum to the issue of mystical 
thinking. According to Horton, mystical thinking involves unobservable entities of 
spiritualistic nature, such as gods and witchcraft emanations. In considering the issue 
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of mystical thinking, Winch uses, as his test case, the Azande of Southern Sudan. 
What he says about the Azande, by implication, is applicable to some other African 
regions or any "primitive" people anywhere in the world. In this particular case 
Winch is concerned with how the European anthropologist, such as Evans-Pritchard, 
interprets this mystical thinking. He thinks that they tend to project on to a vast body 
of alien utterances, strivings and purposes which are centrally important in the culture 
of the interpreters, but which have little or no importance in the alien culture. 
So when Evans-Pritchard and his colleagues interpret mystical utterances as 
statements of hypothesis, whose point lies in the area of explanation, prediction and 
control of everyday events are simply projecting their own obsession with the goals of 
science and technology on to the cultures where such goals are of peripheral 
importance. The situation would have been different if they had made a serious effort 
to discover the point of such utterances for those concerned. In other words, Winch is 
against the idea of the Europeans such as Evans-Pritchard developing their translation 
instruments from an area of Western discourse geared to explanation, prediction and 
control of events, that is from the language of science and technology, but not from 
the Azande point of view. So, as we shall discuss in this chapter, that is Winch's point 
in criticising Evans-Pritchard and other European anthropologists about their 
interpretation of the Azande way oflife. But now let us tum to Horton's disagreement 
with Winch. 
Looking at Winch' s ideas, Horton is of the view that it is Winch himself and 
not the European anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard, MacIntyre and Horton, 
who is the most appropriate target for the methodological caveats of understanding a 
primitive society. In order to make his point clearer, he begins by giving us a 
compendium of the true picture of Evans- Pritchard's ideas. Evans-Pritchard explores 
the Azande concept of mystical influences involving the operation of witchcraft, 
oracle and magic. He places mystical concepts in their full context of everyday usage. 
According to Horton, this makes Evans-Pritchard's work a model of the kind of 
conceptual analysis that Winch and his disciples advocate. Evans Pritchard shows 
mystical concepts mobilised in connection with the concern to account for and 
remedy present misfortune and also with the concern to predict and avoid future 
misfortune. He portrays the Azande as people who struggle constantly, manfully, and 
cheerfully to overcome their troubles in this world. The Azande have little place in 
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their thought for serene or resigned contemplation. Their system of mystical belief, 
serving as a comprehensive apparatus for explanation, prediction and control, adds the 
principal means whereby they are able to maintain this attitude. 
Horton points out that this seems to counteract Winch' s interpretation of 
Evans-Pritchard. It does not reflect Evans-Pritchard' s obsession of scientific-
technological discourse distorting his report of individual instances of belief and 
behaviour and social context of the Azande 
What we are faced with here is that all these philosophers, no matter what 
their orientations and trends of thought are, are looking for a method. They are 
looking for a method in different social set-ups, contexts and traditions. They are all 
looking for a method that will help them understand the ways of life, either in their 
own social set-ups or other peoples ' ways of life. Evans-Pritchard attempts to 
understand what takes place in the Azande community. 
Winch attacks his approach as being Western or European oriented. MacIntyre 
defends Evans-Pritchard by pointing out that it is difficult to understand an alien 
culture outside one's norms of rationality. Winch attacks MacIntyre's defence of 
Evans-Pritchard by pointing out that in order to understand an alien culture one has to 
do so from the point of view of the alien culture. What we are faced with here is a 
battle of thinkers or philosophers, all trying to find the best way of understanding 
human behaviour, either from one's point of view or from that of others. However, 
what has eluded them is the best way to go about this crucial business of 
understanding. We must say that our thesis encourages these debates, but at the same 
time we observe that these debates will go on and on ad infinitum, with one 
philosopher or group of philosophers attacking the other, while the other philosopher 
or group of philosophers goes on the defensive. Our thesis proposes that one method 
that can minimise or put to an end these attacks and counter-attacks, and bring these 
thinkers to a common understanding, is the idea of the subject-in-act. Le us precede 
with the examination of Winch's idea of learning from other cultures. 
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4.4 Learning from Other Cultures 
4.4.1 Conception of a Stock of Available Descriptions 
In this section Winch is analysing the standards of a primitive society - the Azande -
and those of a scientific society, the Europeans. He does this through a criticism of 
MacIntyre's views in his two publications. 8 
MacIntyre points out that human action -can be identified through description. 
He emphasises the importance of possibilities of descriptions for the conception of 
human action. At this stage Winch agrees with McIntyre in a sense that descriptions 
do not exist in isolation. As he observes, they occur in constituents of beliefs, 
speculations and objects. He also agrees with him when Macintyre points out that 
these are continually criticised, modified, rejected or improved. It is a fact that the 
stock of descriptions changes. Macintyre explains that the changes in human action 
are thus intimately linked to the thread of rational criticism in human history. 
Macintyre goes on to say that the notion of rational criticism requires the 
notion of choice between alternatives. This is so because there is need to explain what 
the agent's criterion was and why he opted for that particular criterion rather than the 
other; and also to explain why the use of that criterion appears rational to those who 
invoke it. MacIntyre explains that we cannot omit reference to the rationality or 
otherwise of those rules and conventions in explaining action in a given social order. 
He adds 
... the beginning of an explanation of why certain criteria are taken to be 
rational in some societies is that they are rational. And since this has to enter 
into our explanation we cannot explain social behaviour independently of our 
own norms of rationality (MacIntyre in Winch, 1972: 28-29). 
It is the ideas in this quotation which create problems for Winch and hence mark a 
point of departure between Winch and MacIntyre. 
MacIntyre points out that to identify the limits of a social action in a given 
period, therefore, is to identify the stock of descriptions current in that age. This is 
where Winch wonders how a candidate for inclusion qualifies for admission to the 
stock. Unless there are limits, Winch is of the view that MacIntyre's talk about 
8MacIntyre, A "Is understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?" (1994); and "A 
Mistake about Causality in the Social Sciences" (1962). 
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possibilities of description circumscribing possibilities of action becomes nugatory. 
According to Winch, 
... there would be nothing to stop anybody inventing some arbitrary verbal 
expression, applying it to some arbitrary body movement, and adding that 
expression to the stock of available descriptions (1972: 29). 
He points out that, though the description must be intelligible, its intelligibility cannot 
be decided by whether or not it belongs to an existing stock of deceptions. Doing so 
would rule out the idea of the addition of new descriptions to the stock. Winch 
explains that "what can be intelligibly said" is not equivalent to ''what has been 
intelligibly said". Admitting that is accepting that it would never be possible to say 
anything new, or that it would never be possible to do anything new. However Winch 
admits, 
.. . the intelligibility of anything new said or done does depend in a certain way 
on what has already been said or done and understood (1972: 29). 
Winch explains this situation to mean that, although it is the case that a new 
description of action must be intelligible to the members of the society into which it is 
introduced, as MacIntyre suggests, Winch is ofthe view that 
. .. what determines this is the further development of the rules and principles 
already implicit in the previous ways of acting and talking. To be emphasised 
are not the actual members of any stock of description; but the grammar they 
express (1972: 30). 
Winch explains that, through this, we will not only understand their structure, sense 
and mutual relations but also the sense of new ways of talking and acting that may be 
introduced. Again Winch explains that although these new ways or changes in the 
way of talking and acting may involve modifications in the new grammar, we can 
only speak thus if the new grammar is, to its users, intelligibly related to the old. 
The fact which Winch is emphasising is that changes in the stock of 
descriptions will be made intelligible largely through the grammar of a particular 
culture, that is the grammar of that particular culture expresses the changes in the 
stock of descriptions. The stock of descriptions on its own may not help in identitying 
human action of that culture. Winch is saying that, instead of looking at descriptions, 
look at how these descriptions are expressed in the language of the people in question. 
That is, as we have said, when the new grammar is, to its users, related to the old one. 
Here we would like to add that in order to learn from another culture, our norms and 
stock of descriptions could be modified through other influences. 
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4.4.2 Differences in the Criteria of Rationality and Intelligibility between the 
Europeans and the Azande 
Macintyre states that intelligibility of human action in an alien culture can be sought 
through the agent's stock of descriptions. Winch, on the other hand, is of the view that 
human action in a particular culture can be identified through the expressions of 
grammar in that culture. In other words, action can be identified through the daily use 
of language, rather than through descriptions. 
Another issue, which immediately follows that of intelligibility through 
language use, is that of rationality of actions in an alien culture. Winch presents 
MacIntyre's idea as follows: 
The explanation of why in society certain actions are taken to be rational, has 
got to be an explanation for us; so it must be in terms of concepts intelligible 
to us. If then in the explanation, we say that in fact those criteria are rational, 
we must be using the word rational in our sense (1972: 31). 
It is apparently clear that MacIntyre is emphasising the fact that it is difficult to 
explain other people' s behaviour outside one's norms or rationality. Even the word 
"rationality" itself: for example, is defined according to one's norms, so in order to 
judge cultures we use our own standards of rationality. 
puts it, 
MacIntyre adds that there is a possibility of coincidence in standards. As he 
If what is seen to be the case is common to them and us, it must be referred to 
under the same conception for each of us (1972: 31). 
Winch still finds a problem with this position. He observes that standards of 
rationality in different societies do not always coincide. If so, this leads to the 
possibility that standards in an alien culture like that of the Azande are different from 
those of Europeans. According to Winch, it does not make sense to assume that 
members of the alien culture will necessarily make discovery of something which has 
been discovered by the Europeans. In order for such a discovery to take place, it 
would presuppose initial conceptual agreement. 
In making this observation, Winch is taking us back to the importance of 
language in a particular culture. An action will be accepted as being rational 
according to how members of that culture understand it in their own context. We 
know that contexts differ from culture to culture. This fact makes it difficult, though 
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not impossible, to obtain conceptual agreement. This is because standards of 
rationality do not always coincide. This fact leaves Winch wondering what MacIntyre 
means when he asserts that certain standards are taken as criteria of rationality 
because they are criteria of rationality. Winch is left wondering about whose criteria? 
According to Winch, MacIntyre does not stop at that but extends this 
confusion from criteria of rationality to the standards of intelligibility. This is evident 
in his paper: "Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?,,9 In this paper 
he argues, 
.. . when we detect an internal coherence in the standards of intelligibility 
current in an alien society and try to show why this does not appear, or is 
made tolerable to that society' s members, "we have already invoked our 
standards" (Quoted in Winch, 1972: 31 - 32). 
Winch wonders about the sense in which this claim is true. It is not clear to him how, 
in order to detect and show how something is done, it is done in a sense which is 
intelligible to Europeans. It is the case that Europeans may be limited by what counts 
for them as "detecting" and "showing" something. It is also possible that the interest 
in showing and detecting something is peculiar to European society. Europeans may 
be doing something in which members of the alien society exhibit no interest simply 
because the institutions in which such an interest would develop are missing or 
lacking. It may also be the case that the pursuit of that interest in the European culture 
has led to the developments of techniques of inquiry and modes of argument, which 
may not be found in the alien culture. 
So, according to Winch, it is not correct to assume that the methods and 
techniques which have been used in the past, for instance in elucidating the logical 
structure of arguments in the European language and culture, are going to bear the 
same fruits in the new alien context. Perhaps if they are to work they may need to be 
extended and modified. 
Winch affirms that if these methods and techniques are to have any logical 
relation with the European forms of investigations, then the new techniques will have 
to be recognisably continuous with the previously used ones. But, above all, Winch 
observes, they must also extend the conception of intelligibility of the Europeans. It is 
9 Referred to a moment ago. 
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this extension which will make it possible for the Europeans to see what intelligibility 
amounts to in the life of the society which is being investigated. 
Winch proceeds with a criticism of MacIntyre for trying to make what is 
intelligible in the alien context, intelligible in the European context, that is making 
what is intelligible to the aliens also intelligible to the Europeans, on the basis of the 
European conception of intelligibility. That means creating a new unity for the 
concept of intelligibility, which has a certain relation to the European old one that 
may perhaps require a considerable realignment of the European categories. 
Here Winch observes that it would not be correct to seek a state in which 
things will appear to the Europeans just as they do to the aliens. He expresses a 
feeling that perhaps such a state may not be attainable. What is being looked for, 
Winch points out, is a way of looking at things, which goes beyond the European 
previous way, in the sense that it has in someway taken an account ot: and 
incorporated, the other way of looking at things, which members of the alien society 
have of looking at things. As Winch puts it, 
Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our own 
- not simply to bring the other way within the already existing boundaries of 
our own. .. (1972: 33). 
MacIntyre's idea rekindles Wittgenstein's problem in the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein looks at his method of formal logic as standard, with which to reflect all 
reality. To echo his words, logic fills the world; the limits of the world are also its 
limits. The limits of my language also mean the limits of my world. The difference 
between Wittgenstein and MacIntyre is that for MacIntyre the European set of 
standards is just what he happens to have. He cannot get out of it to look at things 
from a "neutral" point of view. For Winch, however, in order to gain intelligibility in 
"another way of life" you must first of all seek to extend your own way of life and not 
simply to import the other way of life into the boundaries of your own. 
Winch explains how the extension of the way of life from one cultural context 
to the other may be achieved, something that MacIntyre does not take sufficient 
account of According to Winch, rationality and intelligibility are not Irere concepts 
that must be learnt in language lessons, just like other concepts are learnt. To the 
contrary, rationality and intelligibility must be circumscribed by language use, a use 
which is established in that particular cultural context. In other words, rationality and 
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intelligibility are not concepts which a language may have or not have. Instead 
intelligibility and rationality are concepts which are necessary for the extension of a 
language. He informs us 
.. . to say of a society that it has a language is to say that it has a concept of 
rationality (1972: 33). 
Like Wittgenstein, Winch is putting across an understandable fact that rationality in 
an alien culture is in accord with the sense in the common use of that culture. In order 
to understand what is rational and what is not rational in a particular culture one 
cannot use one's standards that are foreign to the language in common use in the alien 
culture. 
4.4.3 European Norms of Rationality: not a Finite Set 
Winch extends his argument on rationality to its norms. After criticising Macintyre's 
view of the conception of a "stock of available descriptions", Winch extends his 
criticism to MacIntyre's criteria of intelligibility and rationality. Now, in order to 
make us see the necessity of extending one's way oflife in order to gain intelligibility 
in "another way of life," he advances his argument to the norms of rationality of 
Europeans. 
Winch's criticism of MacIntyre in this matter is that if MacIntyre is taking the 
European norms of rationality as forming a fmite set then he is not correct. Winch 
recognises the fact that we learn to speak, think and act rationally through being 
trained to adhere to particular cultural norms. He emphasises that after all that 
learning, rationality does not consist in having been trained to follow those norms. He 
explains: 
... we must ... be open to new possibilities of what could be invoked and 
accepted under the rubric of "rationality" - possibilities that are perhaps 
suggested and limited by what we have hitherto accepted, but not uniquely 
determined thereby (1972: 34). 
Winch advises that, instead of taking the European norms of rationality as a finite set, 
it would be more correct to adopt the same rubric as when one learns one' s norms of 
rationality, instead of being limited or uniquely determined by those norms. The 
approach of learning how to think, speak and act rationally can be applied to the 
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possibilities of the European grasping forms of rationality, which are different from 
her own in an alien culture. 
Winch admits that, though these possibilities are limited by certain formal 
requirements centring on the demands for consistency, the formal requirements say 
nothing about what in particular is to count as consistency. Winch likens this situation 
to the rules of propositional calculus which limit, but do not themselves determine, 
what are to be proper values of variables such as P, Q, R. ... Just as in propositional 
calculus, the proper values of variables can be calculated by determining the wider 
context of life in which the activities in question are carried on. Winch emphasises 
investigating a wider context of life rather than being narrowed down by a set of finite 
rules. 
Efforts should be made to investigate the norms of rationality in an alien 
culture. Specifying only the rules governing the carrying out of activities may not be 
enough. Europeans should endeavour to gain intelligibility of the members of an 
alien culture and understand their own activities according to the conception 
prevailing in their own language. Winch reminds us that what MacIntyre is proposing, 
that is making the norms of rationality in the European language the unavoidable 
framework, could be advanced in any language. lbis is because every language has 
criteria of rationality and concepts. These, in turn, have their history. This history is 
unique to that society, so using standards from a different society as a model or 
paradigm to expose what may appear as difficulties or incoherencies in a different 
society may not be very realistic. 
4.4.4 Europeo.n Norms of RaJionality in the ClassijicaJion and Evaluation of Beliefs 
and Practices of the Aztuu/e 
Winch has shown us that norms of rationality from one culture, like that of 
Europeans, may not successfully reflect what is in the beliefs and practices of another 
culture when used as a standard or a paradigm He elucidates this fact through, once 
again, an examination of MacIntyre's views of the Azande system of magic. 
MacIntyre explains: 
The Azande believe that the performance of certain rites in due form affects 
their common welfare; this belief cannot in fact be refuted. For they also 
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believe that if the rites are ineffective someone present at them had evil 
thoughts. Since this is always possible, there is never a year when it is 
unavoidable for them to admit that the rites were dully performed, but they did 
not thrive .... The belief of the Azande is not unfalsifiable in principle ... but in 
fact it cannot be falsified. Does this belief stand in need of rational criticism? 
And if so by what standards? .. one can only hold the belief of the Azande 
rational in the absence of any practice of science and technology in which 
criteria of effectiveness, ineffectiveness and kindred notions have been built 
up. But to say this is to recognise the appropriateness of scientific criteria of 
judgement from our standpoint. The Azande do not intend their beliefs either 
as a piece of science or as a piece of non-science. They do not possess these 
categories. It is only post even tum in the light of later and more sophisticated 
understanding that their belief and concepts can be classified and evaluated at 
all (MacIntyre in Winch, 1972: 36). 
It is on this quotation that Winch bases his criticism of MacIntyre's ideas. First 
of all, Winch disagrees with MacIntyre's suggestion that the Azande ways of life 
should be classified and evaluated in term; of certain specific ways oflife to be found 
in the European culture, in terms of whether they do or do not measure up to what is 
required in the European ways of life. To do that would be, as Winch puts it, to 
confuse the sophistication of the interest in the classification with sophistication of the 
concepts employed in the classificatory work of the Europeans. 
Winch suggests that it would be in the interest of the Europeans to understand 
how the Azande system of magic is related to science. He feels that, although the 
concept of such a comparison would be a very sophisticated one, it does not mean that 
the unsophisticated practices of the Azande have to be seen in light of the more 
sophisticated practices of European culture, such as science, or see the Azande 
practice as a more primitive form of it. It is not correct to impose the image of the 
European culture on a more primitive one like that of the Azande. 
Winch warns that it is extremely difficult for a sophisticated person, coming 
from a sophisticated society, to grasp the idea of a form of life, which is simple and 
primitive. In a way she may have to jettison or discard her own sophistication, 
something that may be difficult to do. Given that background, obviously, the 
distinction between sophistication and simplicity becomes helpful at this point. Winch 
explains that there may be truth in what MacIntyre says, that the Azande do not have 
the categories of science and non-science. This assertion is, however, refuted by 
Evans-Pritchard, who states clearly that the Azande do in fact have a clear 
understanding of what is magical and what is practical or technical. The fact that at 
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one moment or another they may confuse this distinction does not mean that they are 
ignorant of this distinction. Such confusion should not be attributed to the Azande 
alone because it can be found in any culture. It is not a distinction that the Azande 
have developed a theory about. 
On the contrary, Winch points out, 
.. . a much more important fact to emphasise is that we do not initially have a 
category that looks at all like the Azande category of magic. Since it is we 
who want to understand the Zande category, it appears that the onus is on us to 
extend our understanding so as to make room for the Zande category, rather 
than to insist on seeing it in terms of our own ready-made distinction between 
science and non-science ... the sort of understanding we seek requires that we 
see the Azande category in relation to our own already understood 
categories ... (1972: 37). 
To make his point about standards clearer, Winch extends his criticism of MacIntyre 
to the way he presents his case about harvests. Winch present MacIntyre as having 
... no difficulty in showing that if the rites which the Azande perform in 
connection with their harvests are classified and evaluated by reference to the 
criteria and standards of science and technology, then they are subject to 
serious criticism He thinks that the Zande "belief' is a sort of hypothesis like, 
e.g., an Englishman's belief that all the rain we have been having is due to 
atomic explosions (1972: 38). 
Here Winch presents MacIntyre as believing that he is applying a sort of 
neutral concept, such as "A affecting B", as having equal applicability to both the 
Azande magic and Western science. Winch points out that, in this respect, MacIntyre 
is using or applying the concept with which he is familiar, which draws its 
significance from its use in scientific and technological contexts. According to Winch, 
this is wrong. Winch points out that there is no reason whatsoever for anyone to 
suppose that the Azande magical concept of "A affecting B" has the same 
significance as in the European context. The Azande concept of magical influence is 
quite different from that of the Europeans, although in their practical affairs, they too, 
apply - in a primitive form - something very like the European technological concept. 
Their thought about and their attitude towards magical rites are very different from 
those concerning their technological measures. Winch believes that there is every 
reason to think that their concept of magical "influence" is quite different from that of 
the Europeans. So, again, it is not correct to think that in a society with different 
institutions and ways of life and standards - European standards - the means for 
evaluating "causal influence" should be the same. 
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It is very clear that a good harvest to the Azande is of significant interest to 
them It is equally significant that they take all the necessary steps, technological, 
technical or otherwise, in their capabilities to ensure that they achieve good harvests. 
These steps include magical rites. But that is no reason, as Winch puts it, " ... to see 
their magical rites as ... a misguided step" (1972: 39). 
Winch further states that a man's sense of the importance of something shows 
or reflects in all sorts of ways. These ways, such as the Azande magical procedures, 
are contingencies. He points out that life, whether from the European or the Azande 
point of view, is subject to contingencies. This fact is clearly apparent in the Azande 
belief and in, practise of magical rites. Winch warns that MacIntyre fails to see, or 
ignores, this fact and instead concentrates on the connection between magical rites 
and consumption and good harvest. As Winch puts it, these rites are also fundamental 
to social relations, a fact that is more pronounced and emphasised in the Azande 
notions of witchcraft. 
We have a drama of resentments, evil doing, revenge, expiation, in which 
there are ways of dealing (symbolically) with misfortunes and their disruptive 
effects on a man' s relations with his fellows, with the ways in which life can 
go on despite such disruptions (1972: 40). 
Winch invites us to see the point of the rules and conventions that are followed 
in an alien form of life. MacIntyre reflects a view that the European' s rules and 
conventions are some sort of paradigm of what it is for rules and conventions to have 
a point, so that the task which arises remains in accounting for the point of the rules 
and conventions in another society. Winch feels, however, that such an attitude can as 
well come from another society and get directed to the European form; of rules and 
conventions, with the danger of showing that the rules from the European society are 
not immune to becoming pointless. Winch warns 
... an account of this matter cannot be given simply in terms of any set of rules 
and conventions at all: our own or anyone else's; it requires us to consider the 
relation of a set of rules and conventions to something else. That is, either 
coming from good harvest or giving meaning to life (1972: 40). 
This "something else", according to Winch, could be relating, for instance, the 
Azande magical rites to the significance of human life. This is an indisputable factor 
for someone trying to learn and understand an alien culture. In an effort to expand this 
factor, Winch once again links us to Wittgenstein's philosophical use of language-
games. 
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4.4.5 Relating the European Conception of Reality to those of other Societies 
Winch emphasises the human potential of learning from one another, no matter where 
they come from or what beliefs they hold or practices they engage in. Winch 
introduces Rush Rhees's comment on Wittgenstein to highlight this fact. As Rhees 
explains in Winch' s summary, 
.. . to tJy to account for meaningfulness of language solely in terms of isolated 
language-games is to omit the important fact that ways of speaking are not 
insulated from one another in a mutually exclusive systetm of rules. What can 
be said in one context by the use of a certain expression depends for its sense 
on the uses of other expressions in other contexts (different language-games). 
Language-games are played by men who have lives to live -lives involving a 
wide variety of different interests, which have all kinds of bearing on each 
other. Because of this, what a man says or does may make a difference not 
merely to the performance of activity upon which he is at present engaged, but 
to his life and to the lives of other people .. . . (1972: 40-41). 
What Winch is emphasising, and wants us to see from this comment, is the 
fact that it is not very helpful for anyone to look at one's norms of rationality as a 
standard measure for assessing the beliefs and cultures of others. Members of a 
particular culture have both the potential and the ability to learn from other cultures or 
language-games. This is a fact which the likes of Wittgenstein, Evans-Pritchard, 
MacIntyre and kindred, or those with similar attitudes, should learn to see. In other 
words, what one person or culture does may directly or indirectly impact on others. 
This may be true whether they are from one' s culture or an alien culture. No matter 
what one does one should be able to see unity in the person's multifarious interests, as 
well as activities and relations with other men, both in his own language game or 
culture and the language-games in other cultures. It is through recognising the fact 
that the sort of sense a man or culture sees in his or its life largely depends on the 
nature of this potential to learn from others. Winch tells us that by learning from other 
cultures we do not only acquire other possibilities or techniques of doing things; but 
we learn different possibilities of making sense of human life. According to Winch, 
this is precisely the point that MacIntyre misses in his treatment of the Azande. What 
he sees in the Azande is mainly a misguided technique of producing consumer goods. 
But Winch points out that a Zande's crops are not just a potential object of 
consumption 
.. . the life he lives, his relation with his fellows, his chances for acting decently 
or doing evil, may all spring from his relation to his crops. Magical rites 
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constitute a form of expression in which these possibilities and dangers may 
be contemplated and reflected on - and perhaps also thereby transformed and 
deepened. The difficulty we find in understanding this is not merely its 
remoteness from science, but an aspect of the general difficulty we find, 
illustrated by MacIntyre's procedure, of thinking about such matters at all 
except in terms of "efficiency of production" - production, that is, for 
consumption (1972: 41- 42). 
Here Winch is warning us of a possible misrepresentation of a people' s way of life, 
which may result from taking a casual and simplistic attitude towards them By 
maintaining the scientific approach as the only possible standard through which other 
cultures should be evaluated, MacIntyre reduces the Azande way of life to material 
consumption. As a consequence of this he overlooks the sense of the human 
component therein, in these approaches. Winch is calling for the opening, widening 
and extending of the horizons of the attitude and approaches of someone trying to 
gain intelligibility in a foreign culture. Otherwise, Winch warns, the blindness to the 
point of the primitive modes of life may be a corollary of the pointlessness of much of 
the life of one trying to understand a foreign culture. This concludes our summary 
account of Winch's analysis of inter-cultural learning. We now tum to relate this to 
the general thesis. 
4.5 Relevance of Winch's Views to the General Thesis 
4.5.1 Comment on the Exclusivity of the Scientific Conception of Objective Facts, 
Reality and Truth 
In this section we are confronted with views mainly from two sources namely Evans-
Pritchard and Peter Winch. Evans-Pritchard in his study of a primitive culture, the 
Azande, draws distinctions between the approaches found in his own culture, the 
European, which are mainly science-based, and approaches found in a primitive 
culture, the Azande, which are mainly non-science based. 
The science-based methods, those of the Europeans, are largely empirical and 
operating on the principles of theory and hypothesis. The non-science based methods 
are not necessarily operating on the principles of theory and hypothesis. They belong 
to a category that reveals certain realities by mystical or oracular means. 
It is against this background that Evans-Pritchard presents his submissions. 
The concern of this thesis is how Evans-Pritchard gains intelligibility about the 
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Azande. This concern makes him fall into the same category as Wittgenstein, who 
attempted to reach all reality through the subject-less logic. This attempt could not 
materialise. Upon realising this he made another attempt at reaching all reality 
through the language-games. His failure to accord the subject a distinctive role in the 
language-games made it difficult for this new approach to reach all knowledge or all 
reality. Here we have a similar problem presented by Evans-Pritchard, who attempts 
to gain intelligibility of a primitive society, the Azande. The cardinal question is how 
does he do it? What method(s) does he use or recommend to be used? We shall soon 
examine this aspect closely. 
Let us first take a closer look on the problems besetting Evans-Pritchard. It is 
through understanding these problems that we shall be able to see why his suggestions 
cannot work according to how he wants them to work. The first glaring problem is 
that of background. Being a European, his background is largely scientific. It is a 
background which mainly functions on set hypotheses and theory-based experiments. 
This fact, in itself, makes him suffer from an attitudinal problem, as reflected through 
his attitude to the effect that there are no witches and his judgement of the unreason of 
the Azande. His scientific background and the methods that go with it made him 
believe that the witchcraft institution of the Azande is just imaginary or simply does 
not exist. Whether he is right or wrong is what we are going to demonstrate in this 
discussion. The fact that he uses the word "unreason" to describe the Azande is, in 
itself, indicative of Evans-Pritchard's unfavourable thinking about the type of 
reasoning that is likely to emerge from the witchcraft institution, whose efficacy he 
greatly doubts. 
We can see that, much as Evans-Pritchard is trying to respect both the science-
based and the non-science based approaches, he is held in the tight grip of his cultural 
background, which is largely scientific, with little respect, if any, for other practices 
such as witchcraft. 
We can see clearly that for Evans-Pritchard to gain intelligibility or all 
knowledge, he defmitely needs more than the ordinary science-based methods, which 
go beyond the horizons of cause and effect in the empirical sense and whose criteria 
of rationality does not disrespect the efficacy of oracular revelations of witches. 
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With such an attitude, Evans-Pritchard' s attempt to get to grips with the Zande 
reality through a science-based set of rules may not work. The scientific approach can 
only succeed in exposing certain realities such as the empirical ones and leaving out 
other realities, for example, the concern of human value, which may be central in the 
Azande way of life but may not, strictly speaking, be revealed through the cause 
effect approach. As we shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, Evans-Pritchard may have 
to adopt Barden's approach of the set of operations and not the set of rules. The set of 
rules - like the laboratory hypothesis-based rules - manifests the danger of leading to 
the exposition of empirical reality, while the set of operations include the revelation of 
abstract realities such as the revelation of the capacity to reason. 
In the previous section, Evans-Pritchard makes an exposition on the aspect of 
logic. He agrees that both cultures, the European's and the Azande' s, are both rational 
and logical, but he does not mince words when he comes to the notion of objective 
facts, reality and truth. To him it is the Europeans' science-based approach which is in 
accord with objective facts, reality and truth. 
It is at this juncture that Winch joins the debate. He regards this position as a 
biased one and one with which he does not agree. We must mention that our thesis 
joins hands with Winch on this matter. First of all, objective facts, reality and truth 
cannot be reached through a set of rules from one culture, for instance the European 
culture, alone. To use Wittgenstein's expression, the two cultures are playing two 
different language-games. Each game has its rules, which are different from those of 
the other. That being the case, there is need for the two cultures to first of all agree on 
the meanings of those different concepts. Given the different language-games, it is 
very unlikely that both the Europeans and the Azande will reach a common defmition 
of those terms. This is because the Europeans will insist on using the version of the 
science-based set of rules, something that may not yield immediate nmtual 
comprehension by the Azande. These terms may be in existence in the Azande 
category, but understood by following the rules of their own language-games. This 
will still not yield mutual comprehension between the Europeans and the Azande. 
This is where our thesis becomes significant. We are hypothesising a 
foundation which is basic to us all. We cannot have a foundation which is basic to us 
all when we have some sections of us who hold and maintain that it is only their 
approach which can lead us to objective facts, reality and truth. This thesis is not 
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denying that this goal of objectivity cannot be attained. What it is protesting are the 
methods used and the attitudes held by those who are using them If one side insists 
on applying the rules which are operational in its own language-game without a 
deliberate and conscious efforts to explore the meanings of the rules applicable to the 
other language games, then we shall continue to operate like the railway lines which 
continue to run side by side and serve the same purpose, but without any possibility of 
ever meeting. 
Here we join hands with Winch, who advocates for an open policy in an 
attempt to establish what is truly foundational to us all. It is this open policy that will 
facilitate and open up oppq)1unities, as we shall show in Chapter Five, for us to 
engage the set of operations in a manner that will lead to an understanding of both the 
object of commonsense and of scientific method. Otherwise attempting to reach all 
reality from a set of rules from one particular culture will not work. 
Instead of being fanatic about the scientific method, we could begin by 
applying definition as an operation. This definition could be within the language 
discourse in which we are seeking to establish the notions of objective facts, reality 
and truth. Instead of trying to understand the concepts from the point of view of our 
own culture, for example the European culture, we could begin with an open mind, 
somehow free from our own cultural influences and try to understand concepts from 
the already-established concept of a foreign culture. 
In this respect, Winch helps us with an example of the notion of God. He tells 
us that the notion of God can best be understood in religious discourse. This is 
because God is eternal but the outcomes of science are contingent, so attempting to 
understand the concept of God through scientific discourse will lead to nothing more 
than confusion From there we can say that, much as we cannot gain the intelligibility 
of the notion of God fully through the scientific discourse, it is equally difficult to try 
to understand the notion of God through witchcraft. This is because the outcomes of 
the practice of witchcraft are not only contingent but also culture bound, so in an 
attempt to seek the reality of God, in the Christian sense, through oracular means, will 
be nothing more than illusory. What we are learning from these cases is that it is first 
of all better, in an effort to understand reality, to try and grasp it in the relevant 
discourse in the culture in which we are trying to grasp it. In this case the reality of 
God can only be sought more relevantly in the religious discourse. Even at this stage, 
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a non-religious person seeking the intelligibility of God still has to be careful because 
religious discourses differ from religion to religion The Islamic discourse differs 
from the Christian discourse. Someone who is neither a Christian nor a Moslem 
seeking intelligibility in the notion of God may get conflicting definitions. That is 
why Winch' s idea of the sense of reality being given by language in the respective 
culture or the relevant discourse is not, in our case, satisfactory. 
In our case we argue that the best alternative approach for bringing out all 
reality is that of the set of operations. This is because the set of operations examines 
all aspects of the relevant language, from the definitions to the propositions and the 
validity of the arguments. It is a comprehensive approach, which leaves no stone 
unturned, but seeking reality through the relevant discourse may degenerate from the 
sense or meaning, which the discourse gives to the reality in question, into a standard. 
For instance, it may be the case that Moslems believe that the reality of God can only 
be reached through the Islamic discourse. This situation takes us back to the standards 
of Wittgenstein and formal logic and Evans-Pritchard with his scientific approach. 
This is something similar to a vicious circle. In this respect none of these approaches 
becomes fundamental. Wittgenstein' s standard is that intelligibility of reality in all 
circles can be reached through understanding the concepts in daily language use or 
discourse of a particular culture. Evans-Pritchard's standard would be that 
intelligibility of all reality could be reached through the scientific discourse. In this 
respect, while Winch would agree with Wittgenstein to a certain extent, he would 
definitely not agree with Evans-Pritchard. Agreeing with Evans-Pritchard would mean 
accepting the application of one model as standard. 
Lonergan, on the other hand, with his pattern of operations, would neither 
agree with Wittgenstein' s standard nor Evans-Pritchard's standard. He would only 
accept what these two call complete standards of intelligibility, steps among the many 
steps of the pattern of operations that would be required to gain intelligibility of all 
knowledge. Intelligibility of reality would be reached only after the other elements of 
the pattern of operations have been applied. 
In our case, we purport that Lonergan's method is superior to that of 
Wittgenstein' s, because Wittgenstein' s method is not comprehensive enough when 
gauged against that of Lonergan Lonergan would rank Wittgenstein's attempt to gain 
intelligibility of reality in its entirety simply by observing what takes place in the 
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daily use of a language only as a beginning of the task that eventually leads to the 
understanding of all reality. What one gets at this preliminary stage is only data This 
data should be subjected to the court of intelligence and analysed before it is judged 
as true or not. Wittgenstein, in his submissions, does not go that far. This fact makes 
his approach, to some extent, inadequate as a means of enabling us to reach all reality. 
Evans-Pritchard, on the other hand, simply prescribes a perfect model for the Azande 
to adopt since, according to his understanding, it will lead to objective facts, reality 
and truth. 
4.5.2 LookingfoT Meaning: the non-Scientific Approach 
Winch at this stage would come in with a question such as whose reality or whose 
truth? He is of the view that the oracular method in the context of the Azande leads to 
reality that is understandable to them Here we would be reminded that magic fonm 
the foundation of the whole of the Azande social life. It is their mainstay, a web in 
which they are entangled and from which they cannot easily extricate themselves. 
This case is different from that of a foreigner like Evans-Pritchard attempting to gain 
intelligibility in their affairs. 
To illuminate this fact further we can use the analogy of a Hindu and a cow. 
To the European a cow is nothing more than a piece of property, which he can sell for 
cash to take his sick child to hospital. He sees a cow as nothing more than a complex 
element comprising meat for consumption, a hide for bags and shoes and bones for 
fertilizers. In other words a cow, is a commercial object. But to a Hindu and in the 
Hindu context the situation is actually the reverse. A cow is sacred and not merely a 
piece of property like any other. It is possible that a Hindu, in the true sense of the 
word, would be more willing to sacrifice his child for the cow. He would rather see a 
cow being given a decent "burial" instead of being made merchandise for cash. So, to 
a Hindu, his feelings for a cow are deep and more involved, while to the European 
they may remain at the surface. 
Winch seems to be warning us that the European attempting to gain 
intelligibility of the reality in the Hindu culture is likely to employ his own rrethod -
the scientific - which in this respect would be misallocated. This is because the 
overall consequence of his approach may not be in accord with his set hypothesis. 
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We could also use the analogy of the European, who may be conversant with 
the chemical composition of milk, and the illiterate Azande. To the European, milk 
can be separated out into powder and water. To the Azande it is one element, milk. It 
would be very difficult for the European to convince the illiterate Azande that milk is 
composed of powder and water and these are different elements which are totally 
unrelated. Even if Evans-Pritchard attempted to separate them in the presence of the 
Azande, it would not be in their interest to separate them This is because the Azande 
category lacks the theoretical base which explains chemical composition. To the 
contrary, the Azande watching the European in his laboratory separating milk from 
water are likely to regard him as a witch instead. In fact, during the colonisation of 
Africa Europeans using guns were regarded by Africans as witches. In their 
experience, war was fought with arrows and spears. Europeans were using loud noise 
from "sticks" to kill people. So Europeans were witches practising magic. 
This is precisely the problem which Winch is highlighting. Evans-Pritchard 
needs to explain what he means by objective reality. He still needs to explain whether 
different people, according to their understanding in their own contexts, would regard 
the scientific approach as objective, for instance to people like the Azande, who may 
be lacking a scientific theoretical base with which to explain objectivity. 
As we saw in the previous sections, it is clear to someone well versed in the 
theoretical workings of the slide rule how the strength of a bridge relates to the 
sketches of the engineer. This approach is objective, according to Winch, only to 
those in the scientific discourse. 
It is equally clear to somebody well versed with oracular experience how the 
directions of shells could reveal the presence or absence of a witch. These are two 
different experiences, however, which are totally unrelated, but nevertheless 
understood by members of each respective discourse. 
Evans-Pritchard would reject outright the outcome of the oracular revelation, 
because it would not be in accord with objective reality in his sense. Winch, on the 
other hand, would tolerate that outcome because he recognises the fact that the 
Azande have cognisance of cause and effect. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the Azande see an elephant chasing a man and not a witch. The granary falls because 
termites are gnawing its beams and not because a witch is pushing it over. 
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In this respect Winch invites Evans-Pritchard to try and see sense in the 
Azande discourse instead of attempting to impose his own discourse on them The 
reason is that the Azande discourse presents another dimension, which seems to be 
absent in the European discourse which is reflected in the question '~hy", which the 
European discourse does not overtly bring out. The European discourse seems to stop 
at empirical evidence or coincidence. This is what seems to come out when a granary 
falls on a passing man or the elephant charges a man. But the Azande discourse seems 
to move from the question ''how'', where Evans-Pritchard stops, and goes beyond and 
reaches the question '~hy". 
Here Winch makes a point by projecting the Azande's discourse - in their 
sense - going beyond the scientific discourse. They are trying to transcend the notion 
of mere cause and effect. The granary falls because the termites have attacked its 
beams. By asking the question '~hy", the Azande are looking for reasons beyond 
mere accidents and coincidences. The scientific approach seems to be -concerned more 
with empirical causes. 
The Azande appear to be looking for a way of elevating human life above that 
of a mere object like any other which is exposed to unexplained accidental 
happenings. They are obviously looking for meaning. For instance, a granary has 
fallen. What is the cause? Termites have eaten its beams. Someone is injured; cause? 
the granary has fallen on him The Azande, in their approach, are attempting to go 
beyond the ordinary visible causes to what the whole experience means to human life. 
In so doing, according to their own context, they are according a human being a 
special position, as opposed to the position accorded to any other object in nature. 
To the Azande, as it is to the European, the falling of the granary is a normal 
natural phenomenon. But the question of the granary falling on a particular man and 
not on any other, and falling at the exact time that a particular man is passing, calls for 
more investigation, which is clearly missing in the European or scientific approach. 
The scientific approach cannot give a satisfactory answer to the Azande fundamental 
question of meaning. 
Winch here calls upon Evans-Pritchard to reconsider his conviction as regards 
the method, which is rooted in his own cultural background as a model for all 
contexts. By being open to methods in other contexts with which he is not familiar 
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may widen the horizon of his intelligibility to what exists in other cultures, which may 
be genuinely lacking in his own culture. 
We must say, at this juncture, that our interest in this aspect is not very much 
in the outcome of the question "why", as asked by the Azande. We give the Azande 
credit for the initiative of asking that question in the first place. We think that 
Lonergan and Barden would agree with us that in asking a further question from 
"how" to '~hy" the Azande have gone beyond the prescriptive approach of Evans-
Pritchard, of prescribing the scientific method as a model for all contexts. 
By asking a further question, the Azande have made a further step towards the 
framework of the subject-in-act. The Azande' s situation of not being at the theoretical 
level in the scientific sense is understandable because this is a step outside their 
discourse, but due to the fact that they are able to ask a further question means that 
they can get there step by step. Asking a further question opens their intellectual gate 
wider. Here Winch would agree with us, because if the intellect is widened it would 
be a lot easier to lead the Azande into the scientific discourse, this time on conviction 
rather than imposition. 
Inter-cultural learning would be possible. We say this because, as we have 
discussed in Lonergan's sense in the previous chapter, and as we are about to discuss 
in Barden' s sense in the next chapter, both the Europeans and the Azande are 
endowed with the basic set of operations. This set of operations, in Lonergan' s sense, 
can lead anyone from the level of commonsense to that of theory and finally to 
judgement. 
Evans-Pritchard also deserves credit. He has reached a stage where reality in 
the scientific sense can be explained through theory. However, his approach is far 
from perfect because there are still other operations in the oifmg, which he has to 
effect before recommending his method as the ideal one for other cultures to emulate. 
These include assessing whether the non-empirical data, as found in witchcraft, can be 
explained through theory. All we are saying is that the scientific approach may be a 
distance ahead of the oracular approach, but below the level of being ideal to establish 
all reality in all contexts. That is a methodology that can coordinate all other methods 
in different discourses leading to all kinds of knowing. 
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We say that it would not be appropriate for Evans-Pritchard to say at this level 
that the Europeans are right and the Azande are wrong. We feel it is too early to make 
such a judgement. This is because the notion of theory - in the scientific sense - is 
still missing in the oracular approach. It is why the Azande do not recognise the 
contradictions in the oracular revelations, so saying that the Azande approach is 
wrong because of what is appropriate in the scientific method, but is not called for in 
the non-scientific method, will be right only in the scientific sense but not in the non-
scientific sense. The situation would be similar to imposing what is demanded by the 
context of science on what is not demanded by the context of non-science. Given the 
differences in contexts, that is those of the European and the Azande, it would be 
unfair to use what is demanded in one context to pass judgement of right and wrong, 
because a different context demands differently. 
In the previous section, Winch linked us to Wittgenstein in a bid to make us 
see clearly that it would not be appropriate to use a method from one culture to gain 
intelligibility of correctness and incorrectness in different cultures. Wittgenstein 
attempted this and it could not work. The language of formaIlogic could not be basic 
or foundational to all languages. He failed to demonstrate that it is only through the 
discourse of formal logic that reality in all aspects could be reflected. 
Similarly, though Evans-Pritchard had introduced two language-games, it is 
not proper for him to say that the Europeans are correct and the Azande are mistaken. 
There will be no game to talk of if the Azande attempted to play the European game, 
whose rules they are ignorant of 
In Chapter Two, Wittgenstein fails to make formal logic foundational. The 
question is, why? In the same chapter he introduces the idea of language-games. 
Winch helps us to see that, though language-games may be introduced, all r~ality may 
not be captured by following rules when, at times, we may not see the point in 
following these rules. Still the question remains, why did Wittgenstein fail to see the 
possibility of inter-relatedness in languages and the problems that were likely to 
emerge out of following the rules of each game? 
This is where Lonergan's idea of the subject - as discussed in Chapter 'Three 
and Barden's idea of the set of operations, to be discussed in chapter five - comes in 
As mentioned in the previous section, picturing reality by formal logic would be 
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described by Lonergan as a step among the many. The subject-less picturing would 
not be adequate to capture reality in all spheres. Logical reasoning, through 
elementary or atomic propositions, extends logic to the theoretical level. As Winch 
has clearly demonstrated, however, reality in all circles cannot be reflected through 
theory per se. So Wittgenstein's approach of formal logic could not work because it 
was not comprehensive enough as to include other operations such as the judgement 
of whether what he was advocating for could truly be reflected in his method. 
The same can be said in his approach to the language-games, much as it can be 
said of Evans-Pritchard' s science game. Lonergan and Barden would still say that 
what can reflect reality in its entirety and eventually lead to objective truth - if that is 
attainable - is not following rules per se as Wittgenstein puts it or prescribing the 
science discourse as being the correct one as Evans-Pritchard states, but applying the 
pattern or set of operations. 
For our concern and purpose it is these operations which constitute the subject, 
hence making the subject foundational to all theories, all rules and all prescriptions. 
4.5.3 Comment on Learningfrom other Cultures: MacIntyre 
In this section we shall look closely at MacIntyre' s view, that it is the norms of 
rationality from the science culture or context of the Europeans which cannot but act 
as a model to other cultures, such as the non-science culture or context of the Azande. 
MacIntyre begins his exposition with the example of the stock of descriptions. He 
stipulates that a social anthropologist - the European - attempting to gain 
intelligibility in a non-science culture such as that of the Azande may begin by 
looking at the stock of descriptions in that culture. He proceeds as follows: one can 
look at the constituents of their beliefs, speculations and objects. Winch may be 
agreeing with MacIntyre in many respects, except when it comes to the means of 
gaining intelligibility. Macintyre explains that the Europeans will gain intelligibility 
in the Azande stock of descriptions through the European norms of rationality, as he 
puts it, "our own norms of rationality". 
Winch strongly believes that MacIntyre cannot gain intelligibility of the 
Azande ways of life by using the scientific norms of rationality. Instead, the European 
can gain this intelligibility by looking at the sense that the Azande language gives this 
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stock of descriptions, which is rooted in the history of the Azande and not in that of 
the Europeans so it would be more appropriate to use Rhees' idea of looking at the 
Azande language and seeing how it reflects their beliefs and practices. 
We would agree with Rhees and say that looking at the stock of descriptions 
of the Azande' s way of life would only be the beginning of gaining knowledge about 
Azande beliefs and practices. Inevitably, the European may have to look at the sense 
which the Azande language reflects in these descriptions. As we know, every 
language has the surface and deep semantic structures, or the literal and the literary 
meanings. The literal structures give meanings according to the letters of the 
propositions. For instance, the expression "A cup oftea" in the literal sense means an 
object ("cup") with tea in it, while the same expression in a certain culture may mean 
a bribe. When MacIntyre talks of gaining intelligibility of the stock of descriptions of 
the Azande using the scientific norms of rationality, this falls short of the literary 
meanings in these descriptions. Depending on the culture in question, it may be the 
literary semantics which are more respected than the literal semantics. This may be 
the case, especially in primitive cultures, where proverbial language, for instance, is 
respected more than literal meanings. 
This is where Rhees' criticism of Wittgenstein becoIres relevant. Meanings 
happen to be interdependent. Following rules of a particular language-game may not 
bring out all reality in a particular culture. In this case a stock of deceptions, in 
Lonergan's sense, would be merely preliminary data, which would lead to 
intelligibility only after other operations had been engaged. 
Regarding the stock of a particular culture, we do not agree with MacIntyre 
that one gains intelligibility in this stock by using the scientific norms of rationality. 
We do agree with Winch, up to a point, where one needs to examine the sense that the 
Azande language gives these descriptions, bearing in mind that language gives both 
literal and literary meanings. We agree entirely with Lonergan's position, that the 
stock of descriptions can only serve as data that would serve as a starting point 
towards gaining intelligibility in the Azande stock of descriptions. 
From identifYing action through a stock of descriptions MacIntyre moves to 
the distinction of the criteria of rationality between the Europeans and the Azande. 
MacIntyre's view is that if something is explained as rational in a certain society then 
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that explanation has to be rational in the European sense, and if the criteria used are 
rational at all then they have to be rational in the European sense. According to him, 
the case holds also for intelligibility. If something is intelligible then it has to be 
intelligible in the European sense. 
Winch does not accept this position The Azande and the Europeans operate in 
different categories. For instance the category of the oracle is different from the 
category of the laboratory. In this respect, the category of the oracle and that of the 
laboratory are seen as designating the distinction between what is science and what is 
non-science. One can not use the criteria of the laboratory in the oracle. It simply 
cannot work. In addition to that, the European may want to base his actions on 
scientific theory and hypothesis. This may be absent in the category of the Azande. So 
how is the European standard going to determine rationality in this respect? 
MacIntyre is not being realistic when he says that for any action to be rational it must 
be so in the European sense. If that were to be the case, then whatever other 
communities like the Azande are doing which are not in consonance with the 
European standards of rationality, according to the norms of Europeans, would be 
irrational. Would that be a realistic assertion to make? It may be so, but only as far as 
Europeans are concerned. 
If a European is seeking intelligibility in a foreign culture and uses her own 
standards of rationality to determine what is rational and what is irrational, and what 
is intelligible or not, then whatever results she will get will reflect reality in a manner 
in which she wants it to be and not what it is in the real sense. In other words, it will 
be in her interest, dictated by her method, which may not be applicable in that 
particular context, or right according to the one applying it in a wrong context. 
MacIntyre's point here is that the European does not have any standard of rationality 
other than his own. This is where the set of operations appears in a timely manner. 
The two categories, that is the Europeans and the Azande, share this endowment of 
the set of operations. It is through this set of operations that the two communities can 
learn from one another. 
The categories ' institution and interest are different. Consequently, the norms 
of rationality should equally be different. That being the case, the standards of 
rationality in a scientific culture will not reveal realities in a non-scientific culture. 
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For the purpose of this thesis we agree with Winch that a European seeking to 
understand what transpires in a foreign culture should not impose his own standards 
of rationality and intelligibility on that culture. In other words, she should not import 
the stock of descriptions of a primitive culture into her own and begin to analyse them 
using standards which have no relationship whatsoever with what she is analysing. As 
Winch suggests, she should seek to extend her own intelligibility in the foreign 
culture which she is analysing. She should examine the sense which the language in a 
foreign culture gives to these descriptions. She should go beyond the boundaries of 
her own culture. TIlls can be achieved through the set of operations. 
In restricting the concept of rationality to science, one may be daring enough 
to say that, MacIntyre's case becomes worse than Wittgenstein's. At least 
Wittgenstein suggests following rules of a particular game; the right rules and the 
right game. MacIntyre, however, is faced with two games, his own game and that of 
the Azande. In the Wittgenstein case, his own game has its own rules, which are 
unique to that game. The Azande, on the other hand, have their own rules, which are 
equally unique to their game. MacIntyre is faced with the scientific game, whose rules 
he knows very well, and the Azande game, whose rules he is ignorant of In other 
words, he is suggesting the use of different rules to play a different game. However, 
we need to clarify that we are using the concept "rationality" not to mean a rule 
among rules or a game among games. Rationality is the way we think about 
everything. It is a potential that is common to both the Azande and the Europeans. So 
instead of confining himself to his own norms of rationality, Macintyre may seek to 
extend this potential to the Azande context. What we would suggest is for him, first of 
all, to follow Winch's advice of extending his own intelligibility into the Azande way 
of life. He can do this by imitating Lonergan and applying his pattern of operations 
into the Azande culture. That is the only way he can learn from the Azande. For 
instance, he could begin by seeking intelligibility in the literal and literary 
interpretations of their language aiming at gaining the sense which their language 
gives to their beliefs and practices and then proceed, in the Lonergan sense, with the 
basic set of operations of being alert, intelligent and reasonable in all the beliefs and 
practices of the Azande. Through that procedure he may gain knowledge of the 
Azande way of life. He should not continue to be limited to the scientific approach. 
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This is because, it is the Lonergan approach that co-ordinates and unifies all the other 
approaches. It thus remains a powerful tool for inter-cultural learning. 
In his argument, which to a large extent we agree with, Winch implies that the 
European norms of rationality are not a finite set, complete in itself and ready to be 
applied to all contexts. He advances a very important point in his submission that all 
of us, irrespective of culture of origin, learn to speak, think and act rationally through 
being trained to adhere to particular cultural norms. But that in itself does not mean 
that we have attained a complete finite package applicable to all contexts. 
Winch explains that we should remain open to new possibilities of what could 
be invoked and accepted under the rubric of rationality. In other words, we should not 
remain locked up in our own cocoons and contexts but remain completely open-
minded. 
We cannot agree more with Winch in his message that the approach of 
learning how to think, speak and act rationally can be applied to the European and 
enable her to grasp other forms of rationality, which may be different from those in 
her own culture. TIlls is a process that takes place in a particular culture or a particular 
context, but due the fact that we learn them in a particular culture or context does not 
localise them For example, if we learn how to speak English and how to think in 
English, it does not mean that it is the end of the matter. We can apply these skills 
similarly to any other language, culture or context. 
These skills - in our case operations, though not in the Lonergan sense of 
being integrated and complete in themselves - are common to all of us irrespective of 
the languages we speak and the cultural backgrounds we happen to come from All of 
us can speak, think and act rationally. In using the sense which our languages give to 
meanings we can distinguish what is rational and what is irrational. We can extend 
this capacity - and not necessarily the mode - to other languages and cultures. 
This is precisely what Winch is inviting MacIntyre to do. He should extend his 
capacity to learn from the mode of the Azande and not prescribe his own mode to the 
Azande culture. In other words - to use Lonergan's expression - Macintyre should 
extend his "pattern of operations" to the Azande language, categories and institutions; 
and consciously apply these operations ifhe wants to gain intelligibility in the cultural 
matters of the Azande. 
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For our part it should be rationality, rather than the noI1ll') of rationality, which 
should be emphasised. NoI1ll') of rationality, like the rules oflogic, can be subjected to 
the set of operations, that is they can be reflected upon and, if necessary, changed. 
Norms or rules are simply a guide and not a finite determinant. What is rational can 
change if circumstances demand it. Among some cultures, such as the primitive 
cultures, it was irrational for a woman to speak in public. But today we have women 
members of parliament, so what is rational today can be irrational tomorrow and vice 
versa, or what is considered rational in culture "x" may turn out to be irrational in 
culture ''y''. 
To use logic as an example, the rules of logic can determine what is rational, 
but circumstances can lead to the changing of these rules, and that will necessarily 
change the status of what they determine as rational. MacIntyre's position cannot 
survive this reality. His noI1ll') of rationality can change. If that turns out to be the 
case, then in what sense can these noI1ll') be taken as a model for other cultures to 
emulate? Worse stilI, they may not necessarily be applicable to the beliefs and 
practices of a particular culture. 
According to our thesis, what is really fundamental are not the noI1ll') of 
rationality either in the Azande or the European contexts, but rationality itself What 
is similar to all of us is not the norms but rationality. Because rationality is similar to 
all of us, that makes it fundamental or foundational to us all. 
In this chapter, Winch succeeds in pointing out problems posed by Evans-
Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard more specifically raises the issues of objective facts, reality 
and truth. Though he recognises and respects the non-science or common sense 
method, such as the oracular one practised by the Azande to deal with witchcraft, this 
method is not in accord with objective facts reality and truth. Winch does not agree 
with this position He feels that these issues need to be defined within the relevant 
context in which they are operating. It would not be appropriate to define objective 
facts and reality within the non-science context of the Azande using the scientific 
theory-based mode of the Europeans. 
He uses Wittgenstein's ideas to try to explain this scenario. Wittgenstein used 
the approach of formal logic to attempt to establish a foundation that would reflect all 
reality. This is equivalent to Evans-Pritchard' s idea of using the scientific approach to 
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reach objective facts, reality and truth. Wittgenstein himself realised that this could 
not work. Winch is using this example to explain away Evans-Pritchard's idea that 
you cannot use one approach in one context to gain all knowledge in the cultural 
contexts, for example, which are not scientific. Winch instead opts for the approach of 
the language-games. In the process he ends up creating an even bigger problem He 
points out that in order for the European to gain intelligibility of the Azande culture 
she should not use her own approach as standard but should instead seek to extend her 
own interest, unreservedly, into the Azande way of life and try to follow their own 
language-game. Language is rooted in a people' s cultural history. This means that 
even its rules are rooted in that history. Therefore what success does the European 
have of attaining intelligibility of a foreign culture playing a language-game whose 
rules are rooted in history which is alien to her? Here we are trying to emphasise 
Winch's problem of extending intelligibility inter-culturally. He creates a problem 
that he does not help us to solve. For instance, what happens when it comes to 
reaching reality through proverbial language whose meanings are rooted in a people's 
experiences which are absent in the European culture? Which rules is she going to 
follow and, since she lacks the self-correcting method because she is not a native, how 
is she going to know that she is following the right rules? While it remains a good 
idea for the European to learn from the Azande, there is also the danger of that 
learning giving the European superficial knowledge. We see that even following the 
rules of different language-games is not a solution for gaining intelligibility of reality 
in all circles. In the next chapter we will discuss how the problem of inter-cultural 
learning is solved through the set of operations. 
4.6 Conclusion 
We are still perusing the problem of a foundation to all knOWledge. We started with 
Wittgenstein, in Chapter Two, attempting to establish a foundation for knowledge in 
formal logic. In our case we argued that that was erroneous, since Wittgenstein did 
not give the subject-in-act a functional role and only designated the subject a 
metaphysical position of being the limit of the world. We saw that even in the 
Philosophical Investigations the subject-in-act does not play a foundational but a 
social role. The subject is to learn and follow the rule in the language-game as it 
functions in society. We argued that the subject-in-act should be ultimate to the rule 
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as it functions in the language-game. In Chapter Three, Cronin, following Lonergan, 
helps us to find a fOWldation to knowledge. This fOWldation comes as a result of 
"interiority" or self-appropriation, in our case the subject-in-act. In Chapter Four we 
have seen a case in point that helps us to discuss the inevitability of the subject-in-act 
in all situations, this time in society. 
We are using Winch's ideas in this discussion. He presents two societies: the 
scientific and the non-scientific. The scientific is represented by Europeans and the 
non-scientific by the Azande, who represent a primitive society. In order to get to 
knowledge, the scientific society uses the science-based theory and hypothesis, while 
the non-scientific consults with the oracle. Two points of view emerge out of this 
scenario. Evans-Pritchard and MacIntyre, who represent the scientific society, 
represent the first view. The second view is represented by Winch, who critiques the 
first view. The crux of the matter in Evans-Pritchard's argument is that it is the 
scientific approach that leads to objective reality and truth. MacIntyre argues that it is 
difficult for anyone to explain the social behaviour of a particular society or 
community outside ones norm; of rationality. This implies that it would be difficult 
for the scientific society of Evans-Pritchard and Macintyre to gain intelligibility in the 
primitive community of the Azande and vice versa. 
Winch opposes this view. For him it is possible for the scientific culture to 
extend its own intelligibility into the Azande culture. Winch, perhaps without 
realising it, creates a problem that he does not solve. He does not tell us how the 
Europeans can extend their own intelligibility into the Azande way of life. Extending 
intelligibility from one culture to another means that it is possible for one culture to 
learn from the other, but each culture is playing its own language-game and following 
its own rules. How are these societies going to learn from one another? This is the 
problem that Winch presents to us. 
In the next chapter, Barden talks of '7raditions" and "Operations". In his 
argument he shows how the basic set of operations is fOWldational to any tradition 
Barden, in addition to helping us find a solution to Winch's problem of a method that 
is common to both the Europeans and the Azande, namely engaging the basic set of 
operations, helps us to show that the subject-in-act is fOWldational to all methods in 
all societies or communities and all disciplines. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FOUNDATION FOR KNOWING, A CR05S-CULTURAL 
CONCEPT: BARDEN'S IDEA OF THE SET OF OPERATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three we discussed Lonergan's idea of the subject and the basic pattern of 
operations. It is this pattern which forms a foundation or the transcendental method. 
Barden picks it up from there and goes a step further and introduces the idea of 
systems in contexts or traditions. He argues that Lonergan's basic pattern of 
operations, which he calls the set of operations in their operation, begins from a 
particular context or a tradition. As we argued in Chapter Three, transcendental 
method is a method that is poised to function in all traditions. The point here is that it 
is not advisable for us to begin to look for knowledge in all traditions, as Winch 
suggests (see Chapter Four), without a firm grasp of the context in which we find 
ourselves. It is advisable, therefore, to begin in a particular tradition, our tradition, and 
expand from there to other traditions. Our own tradition is the ideal starting point for 
the actualisation of the transcendental method, because it is the tradition which is rich 
with data with which we are familiar. 
This is necessary, because beginning from a standpoint above all traditions 
may result in undesirable consequences of committing errors that are commonplace in 
philosophy. The case in point, for example, is in Chapter Two, where we see 
Wittgenstein making the context of formal logic foundational to all contexts. This 
venture does not work; he moves to following a rule in the language-games, but this 
does not work either. It would not be ideal for transcendental method to begin either 
in an alien tradition or in a vacuum It needs data of the senses, that is the context in 
which the propositions of a particular culture are fairly well known to the inquiring 
subject. From there the subject-in-act can expand her horizon to any context 
whatsoever. 
In Chapter Five we tie the loose ends of our thesis in order to project its 
complete . edifice. The chapter helps us to address and answer questions raised by 
Wittgenstein, Lonergan and Winch. We must point out, however, that Barden's book 
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After Principles (1990)10 - which is the main text for this chapter - chiefly focuses on 
ethics. But, as we know, ethics is a context like any other such as formal logic, 
mathematics and science. We recall that, in Chapter Three, we argued that our 
method, the transcendental method, does fit all contexts. Here we are using Barden's 
ideas, because he helps us to actualise transcendental method. Although he is mainly 
addressing ethical issues for us, we are taking ethics as a case in point or a context 
like any other. He presents the case for the operations of the subject in a manner that 
solves the problem of the foundation to knowledge, in particular as the question is 
posed in cross-cultural contexts, which is our concern in this thesis. 
5.1.1 Resume 
Barden presents two broad ideas, namely the idea of traditions, systems, cultures and 
their coherence and the idea of how we arrive at truth in inter-cultural debates. In 
other words, it puts across the fact that knowing is always knowing against a horizon. 
Therefore one culture can broaden its horizon by learning from another culture. In this 
chapter most of the answers raised to questions in Chapters Two, Three and Four of 
our thesis are found. In Chapter Five Barden discusses various cases, including 
traditions, as exemplified in the comparison between the Azande and the European 
traditions. This is an aspect which is discussed in detail in Chapter Four, with 
reference to Winch. In Chapter Five we shall find the answer to the problem raised by 
Winch concerning how to gain knowledge in different contexts such as those of the 
Europeans and the Azande. We now proceed with an exposition of the main issues in 
After Principles. 
5.1.1.1 We are Born in a Particular Culture or Horizon 
Barden begins his exposition by placing us within the context of a tradition. He is of 
the opinion that a person does not choose where to be hom She finds herself in a 
particular tradition In this particular tradition she finds rules, principles and laws 
already in place. She finds herself placed against the background of the history of her 
10 Hereafter, A P 
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ancestors. She does not participate in the formulation of this arrangement and it does 
not become the ultimate for her. It only serves as a launch pad to propel her to greater 
horizons. It is a catalyst to provoke her into further innovations for the transformation 
of her cultural practices and even her tradition. A person is born with the potential to 
grasp the linguistic structure of the cultural set-up she finds in place and whatever 
values are involved therein. 
Barden argues, though, that neither propositions/principles nor contexts are 
ultimately basic. Basic propositions are what are taken as given, or even innate 
presuppositions, principles or general guidelines that are basic or underlie or 
determine everything else in a cultural set up or a social group. But a person is not 
limited by the basic propositions of a tradition. She is born with the creative potential 
to influence change in whatever set- up she finds herself in. Although she does not 
choose the tradition in which to be born, where she ends is her personal responsibility. 
Barden provides various examples of what is generally considered basic in a 
cross-section of different traditions. He gives the example of St. Thomas Aquinas. For 
him the basic proposition was that God commanded only the good God could not 
command anything whatsoever but only what was good. For Occam, the basic 
proposition was that God commanded everything but the contradictory. For Occam, 
God's command became the criterion for all action. For Hobbes, it is the sovereign 
that is basic. It even replaces the command of God. It is also imagined that statements 
expressing God's law such as ''Thou shalt not steal; Thou shalt not commit adultery" 
(AP: 24) are basic propositions. Natural law theorists believe that natural laws are not 
only basic but also innate. Barden talks also of Collingwood's approach in his essay, 
"An Essay on Metaphysics" (Oxford, 1940), as suggestive of the fact that " ... the 
basic premises are culturally given .. . as absolute presuppositions". Barden puts it 
clearly that traditions do make sets of propositions basic. The case he is putting 
forward holds even for other systems in other fields such as logic and science. 
Barden not only rejects cultures and systems that put forward sets of 
propositions as basic, he also rejects the very notion of natural propositions. To him 
there is no such a thing as natural propositions. Propositions are neither innate nor 
natural. Propositions have to be learnt. It is what is contained in the proposition that 
could be natural. Much as he does not accept the notion of propositions as basic, 
equally he does not entertain the possibility of contexts being basic. Contexts may be 
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relative. For him it is possible, for purposes of expanding the horizons of knowledge, 
to use one context as one's standpoint, but seek answers in another context, which 
may happen to have the needed answer, which is absent in one's own context. We 
discuss this in 5.2.7.2 
5.1.1.1 Criteria for Judgement 
While moving from context to context in search of answers that may be inadequately 
or not properly answered in the previous narrower context, a very important question 
arises. That is the question of criteria for judgement. Barden introduces a discussion 
on criteria using the theory of naive correspondence. Having criteria is not only a 
necessary condition for navigating within contexts but for handling judgements as 
well. According to Barden, the theory of correspondence is, itself: not basic, even 
though it is useful in providing the method for the subject to link propositions to 
reality. In using the theory of correspondence, Barden is still emphasising the fact that 
it is the subject that handles this theory. He explains his stand with three examples. 
These are: using images such as a photograph to establish reality; using mechanical 
logic, such as the case in computer calculus; and using sentences and propositions to 
establish truth. We discuss these aspects in 5.3.1. 
5.1.1.3 Movingfrom the Purely Cognitive to the Realm of Belulviour 
In Chapter Five Barden recaptures Winch's comparative exposition of the Azande and 
the scientific traditions. He then moves to our problem, raised by Winch, of the 
method that can enable us learn from all contexts. He proceeds by making a 
comparative analysis of the beliefs and the judicial systems of the Azande and the 
European traditions. He points out that at times beliefs within traditions are accepted 
without criticism While to some European traditions beliefs may be based on reason, 
to the Azande certain beliefs are accepted without criticism For instance, there are 
situations where they believe that certain members within their society have innate 
powers or influences that can cause harm to others. In order to reveal who this is, the 
oracle is consulted. The difference between the two systems is that in the European 
system cases are referred to the courts of law in their grades, from the magistrate's 
courts to the highest court of appeal depending on the gravity of the case. In the 
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Azande tradition, different oracles are consulted according to hierarchy, agam 
depending on the nature and weight of the case. 
He points out that, in the European tradition, the intention of the jury is not to 
fmd out the guilty or the innocent but to establish what is due to whom The process 
of establishing the guilty and the innocent works only as a means to that objective. 
When this situation is put in practice the parallel between the two traditions becomes 
apparent. Taking the institution of justice as a case in point, in both traditions, before 
the issue of reparation or reconciliation is addressed, for example, there is need to find 
the guilty party. On this particular issue, Barden shows that though the Azande and 
the Europeans are addressing different content, they both have a structure or a 
framework of procedure from which each culture can learn something. We discuss 
this in sub-section 5.3.4. 
Though Barden's ideas focus mainly on ethics, they playa dual function, in a 
sense that section five of AP on traditions and operations deals more specifically with 
practical reasoning. However, this must not be understood in the narrower sense - but 
rather in all practical reasoning - for example, in traditions and other systems. In all 
these cases Barden is demonstrating the fact that it is the subject-based set of 
operations that is basic in the sense of providing a foundation for establishing further 
knowledge and understanding in each particular case. 
A foundation would need to provide standards for distinguishing myth and 
science, for example, or science and philosophy, or even between ethics and mere 
prejudice, such as "white" being superior to ''black. '' That is, the subject can explain 
or give reliable knowledge in all these cases. Ideas in this particular section are 
homogeneous with our case, which defines the subject-in-act functioning as the set of 
operations. 
5.2 Analysis of Ideas on Traditions and Operations 
5.2.1 Subject-in-Act: Operational in Traditions 
The main objective of Chapter Five is to address and resolve the issues raised by 
Wittgenstein in Chapter Two, to actualise the subject presented by Lonergan in 
Chapter Three and to answer the problem of the intercultural method raised by Winch 
in Chapter Four. We have discussed the ideas of these philosophers; it is now time to 
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concretise them into a foundation that can be used inter-culturally. We need to repeat 
that, while in Chapter Three Lonergan gives us a foundation, it is Barden in Chapter 
Five who helps us to apply it to these issues of cross-cultural problems. 
We reiterate that the overall objective of this thesis is to establish a foundation 
that would co-ordinate all other methods in different disciplines that lead us to the 
understanding, explaining and knowing of all reality 'Cross-culturally. With that 
objective in mind we are immediately faced with a question and that is where do we 
begin to look for our foundation? Let us examine the possible answer below. 
In practical affairs, no less than in science, we begin from our tradition 
since our tradition is not only where but also more profoundly, what we are (AP: 
51). In this assertion Barden is emphasising the fact that a tradition is not only a 
collection of beliefs and practices, languages, attitudes, values and artefacts over there 
and the subject right here and the two mutually interacting because they happen to be 
found in the same environment, that is a situation that is tantamount to having an 
individual and her tradition as separate entities with an individual drawing or 
searching for her identity in her tradition. This is not necessarily the case. Barden 
further emphasises this point in the above expression, " ... but, more profoundly, what 
we are." The subject and her tradition seem to be woven into a fine mesh or system 
The construction of this edifice commences at her birth right up to the present time. 
That said, however, in this edifice there is a set of operations in the idea of the 
subject-in-act. It is the subject-in-act who is foundational and not the tradition itself 
As he confirms, 
Real ethical traditions are rarely totally systematic. They are collections of 
accumulated wisdom It is, on the other hand, possible to make attempt to 
systematise a tradition: the codification of law is an example of such an 
attempt (AP: 55). 
(We are using the expression "ethical traditions" as a case in point. This could be any 
tradition. ) 
In the above quotation, Barden reminds us of a very important fact. That is, 
though we are a tradition, this tradition is not totally systematic, but nev~rtheless a 
tradition can be systematised. He has given us the .example of the codification oflaw. 
The point here is that though we are a tradition, we are, at the same time, the set of 
operations or the subject-in-act who is capable of codifying the law. The accumulated 
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wisdom is expressed in propositions or postulates or axioms. These may be in the 
form of principles, general guidelines or rules. Whatever form they may take, 
however, they can only serve as data There still remains the need for the 
systematising criterion and that is the subject-in-act. It is the systematising criterion -
the subject-in-act - that will codify the law and totally systematise the tradition. Right 
from the beginning Barden is thus putting the subject-in-act in a foundation position. 
So let us now proceed with the actualisation of the subject. 
5.2.2 Problem of Relativism and Traditions 
We begin this actualisation with an exploration of a problem We have just said that 
we are not only located in a tradition but we are also defined by a tradition. In Chapter 
Four we had said that traditions or systems are different. A very good example is that 
of Evans-Pritchard' s science or the European system and the non-science or the 
Azande system The discovery ofthis difference 
... assumes that there are logically incompatible systems and that actors are in 
principle confined within one of them (AP: 56-57). 
Barden compares this situation to geometry. He says that different geometries with 
mutually incompatible postulates are incompatible. This case is comparable to 
different traditions. As he puts it, different traditions with different and incompatible 
postulates will be incompatible. He also stipulates that if human responsibility is 
confined within a logical system, then in, as far as there are incompatible logical 
systems, there will be radical relativism of traditions. 
What would the implication of this state of affairs be? Barden gives us the 
likelihood of what is likely to happen by comparing traditions A and B. He proceeds 
as follows: suppose the two traditions are both logical systems, each with its own 
postulates, definitions and conclusions. If actors perform wholly within their 
respective traditions, there might arise a situation where A as a tradition may have a 
postulate that there can be no circumstances in which it would be good for an ethical 
actor to state what he or she knew to be untrue and suppose that B as a tradition also 
has a postulate that there may be circumstances in which an ethical actor can state 
what he or she knew to be untrue. Given this situation, it is clear that an actor from 
tradition A who tells the truth and an actor from tradition B who tells a lie under the 
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same circumstances will act correctly, as long as they operate within the confines of 
their respective traditions. However, the question still remains, is there a meeting 
point between actors from tradition A and actors from tradition B? So the implication 
here is that the two traditions are simply incommensurable. Actors are confined 
within the respective logical systems of their traditions. There can be no possibility 
for the two traditions to engage in a logical argument. Even if there were a possibility 
of an argument between the two traditions, the conclusions derived by the two 
traditions w~uld still be incompatible. Does this state of affairs signal an impasse? 
Barden says no. Proponents of modem radical relativism are generally agreed that 
... ethical actors are already fundamentally confined within an already given 
horizon, or worldview, or episteme, or paradigm, or a set of presuppositions or 
postulates ... (AP: 56). 
An impasse, according to Braden, would arise if the ethical actors were 
confined within their mutually incompatible traditions in principle. This problem is 
allayed by the fact that ethical actors are largely confined within an already given 
horizon, or world view or episteme, as stipulated above. In other words, they are 
confined in these spheres mainly in practice. That leaves an opening. This opening 
lies in recognising the difference between being confined in principle and being 
confined in practice. To illustrate this point, Barden uses Collingwood's example of 
the logic of question and answer. According to this logic, 
. .. Propositions were answers to questions; questions emerged from 
presuppositions; these presuppositions were either relative or absolute; r.elative 
presuppositions were themselves answers to .earlier questions and so were also 
propositions; absolute presuppositions were not answers to earlier questions 
but formed the intellectual context within which the questions arose. 
Intellectual contexts with different and mutually incompatible absolute 
presuppositions were incommensurable. Enquirers operated within these 
intellectual contexts (Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, in AP: 57). 
The question that we have to answer is whether Collingwood's views do aggregate to 
what may be called radical relativism Barden redirects this position by saying that if 
Colllingwood had stopped there then this view would have aggregated to what may be 
called radical relativism But Collingwood avoids this position by recognising the fact 
that it is possible for an enquirer or a group of enquirers to shift from one set of 
absolute propositions to another, in other words, to shift from one basic intellectual 
context to another. This implies that those enquirers and the community of inquirers, 
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in principle, are not confined to the intellectual context or tradition in which they are 
born or fmd themselves. 
Given this development, Barden is repudiating or avoiding altogether the 
notion of radical relativism, that is, he is avoiding the assertion that within a tradition 
there are postulates that everyone must accept. Accepting such a position would be 
tantamount to accepting the notion that there are incontrovertible truths that must be 
accepted by everyone in all traditions. Barden reminds us that the search for 
incontrovertible truths has occupied the minds of philosophers for centuries. He 
asserts that 
... that may have been tried for several centuries for both judgements of fact 
and judgements of value. Underlying the real and important differences 
between empiricists and rationalists, between modern natural lawyers and 
command theorists, is the shared concern to discover incontrovertible truths. 
The empiricists and rationalists looked for these truths in different places, but 
they were looking for the same thing and both conspicuously failed to find it 
(AP: 58). 
He proceeds to cite some of the prominent philosophers who have engaged in 
the search but failed. These include Pierce, Dewey, the early Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger, to mention a few. He proceeds to draw a conclusion: " am convinced that 
these fundamentally incontrovertible given truths simply do not exist" (AP: 58). He 
observes that the common concern occupying the minds of philosophers from 
different schools of thought is how to account for human knowing and valuing in the 
full realisation that there are no given incontrovertible truths, either of fact or of value. 
Some of the philosophers who recognise this fact include Collingwood, who 
recognises the fact that the enquirer or the community of enquirers is not radically 
confined within a traditional intellectual context. So what is Barden's advice on this 
matter? He suggests the repudiation of radical confinement. Barden proceeds to say 
that, although philosophers like Collingwood recognized this fact, what they failed to 
advance was either a theory or a method to account for this repudiation In search of a 
method, efforts should be concentrated on liberating us from logical, contextual or 
traditional confinement and instead re-orient us towards human responsibility. Barden 
reminds us that philosophers, including Davidson, Sartre and Lonergan, have 
demonstrated that 
There is concern to show how the efforts to come to judgements of fact and 
value is not confined, in principle, to the traditional intellectual context of the 
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enquirers although it is from within the context, tradition or horizon that the 
enquirer begins, and must begin, for that is where the enquirer is (AP: 59). 
It is perfectly legitimate for the enquirer to begin from his context, tradition or 
horizon. The fact remains that he is inquiring, so it is perfectly normal for him to 
begin from the propositions, conclusions and postulates or axioms with which he is 
familiar. 
5.2.3 ProjHJsitional Coherence and Radical Revisions 
The first question to be asked is how do we escape the confines of these contexts, 
traditions, horizons and the logical systems? Barden gives us the example of late 
nineteenth century physics. One of the strains that led Einstein to relative mechanics 
was the fact that the propositions of electromagnetics were not perfectly consistent 
with the propositions of mechanics. When Einstein undertook this endeavour one of 
his main 0 bjectives was to dispel the conflict between mechanics and the 
electromagnetic theory of Maxwell. He warned us that human knowing is not 
modelled as a logical system or ethics or a science. As he put it, it is true that the 
conclusions of any modem science may be expressed in postulates, but the problem is 
that these propositions may or may not be coherent with each other. 
The concern here is that if these propositions have turned out to be incoherent 
with one another, they may not lead to the understanding of the logical system or the 
tradition or the horizon in which they are functioning. If that turns out to be the case, 
how can they lead to reliable knowing? It therefore remains clear that propositions or 
postulates or axioms on their own cannot lead us to the Wlderstanding of human 
knowing. In other words, they cannot form a fOWldation that would lead to reliable 
knowing. Below Barden leads us in the exploration of this problem As we said 
above, the conclusions of any modem science may be expressed in propositions, 
which mayor may not be coherent with each other. 
Barden reminds us that the logical analysis of any science has, as one of its 
functions, the discovery of coherencies and incoherencies; and that it is the discovery 
of the latter which incites further discovery and invention In this enterprise we 
experience both coherence and incoherence, with incoherence leading to further 
action and therefore progression The point here is that there is no foundation that can 
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be based on the possibilities of the proposition being coherent and incoherent within 
systems. The main problem remains the fact that this is how systems and traditions 
operate. To consolidate this, Barden gives us a further example of Hegel's theory of 
"thesis and antithesis" (AP: 59). In this theory the synthesis is not a consequence of 
coherence but of conflict between thesis and antithesis. 
5.2.4 "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" 
Barden cites the problem of "radical revisions" discovered by Thomas Kuhn (AP: 59). 
This problem comes about as a consequence of the reality that, in any modem science, 
there exist elements that are merely supposed to exist and are therefore radically 
hypothetical. He brings it to our attention that it is the presence of these radically 
hypothetical elements that led Kuhn to the discovery of radical revisions. 
The first radical revision was the one between the pre-Newtonian before 
Newtonian mechanics. The question that faced the pre-Newtonian scientists before 
Newtonian mechanics is that it had been assumed that there was no need to explain 
matter at rest. What needed explanation was the transition from rest to motion Within 
Newtonian mechanics, however, what needs explanation is the divergence from 
uniform motion or acceleration. In other words, uniform motion requires no 
explanation Another case that required radical revision was that between Newtonian 
and relativity mechanics. The question again is what had transpired before relativity 
mechanics. In Newtonian mechanics it was assumed that what formed the framework 
against which movement was to be measured was absolute space and absolute time. 
Relativity mechanics, however, does not respect this position. In the schema of 
relativity mechanics the assumption of absolute space and time is dropped and instead 
what is advocated is a multiplicity of frameworks, with transformation equations 
between them 
What emerges from this drama? In the previous paragraphs we have looked at 
propositions within a system Propositions within a system sometimes do not seem to 
provide us with a perfect internal consistency. Because of the possibility of a lack of a 
perfect internal consistency within a system it may be difficult to establish a 
foundation within the system This is because the system is developing along a 
direction not predictable from the foundational propositions. 
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We are confronted with the systems themselves, leading us to radical 
revisions. We have seen that the two systems, namely the pre-Newtonian mechanics 
and the Newtonian mechanics, as systems, are incompatible. We have also seen that 
relativity mechanics as a system are also incompatible with Newtonian mechanics as a 
system It is therefore not only propositions within systems which are 
incommensurate, leading to incompatible and different conclusions, but systems are 
also incommensurable with systems leading to incompatible conclusions, as 
exemplified by the pre-Newtonian and the Newtonian mechanics as systems. Perhaps 
we could call this scenario an extreme case of radical relativism 
To emphasise our fears, Barden gives us an example of a passenger bouncing 
a ball in a moving train. How would a question such as ''what is the real trajectory of 
the ball?" be answered, according to the interpretation of these different systems? 
According to Newtonian mechanics, the real trajectory of the ball would be the 
movement of the ball relative to the framework of absolute space. Relativity 
mechanics, on the other hand, comes up with a more radical answer. According to this 
system, there is no single real trajectory of the ball. The ball is simply moving up and 
down relative to the carriage. That being the case, and assuming that the earth is 
stationary, what will the answer be to someone who is standing on the side of the 
track? To this person the ball is simply moving in a parabola The situation is such 
that relative to the rotation of the earth the ball will follow a different course and 
relative to the rotating earth circling the sun the trajectory will be different again. 
Using this notion we must draw a distinction between compatibility and 
incompatibility regarding the scientific system and the ordinary common sense 
experience. For example, is ordinary common sense experience and science 
incompatible? In this case, the man standing on the ground is in the realm of ordinary 
day-to-day experience. The way he perceives the trajectory of the ball is not the same 
as that of the scientist, because the perception of the scientist is based on a 
scientifically provable assumption or hypothesis. 
The scientist and the common sense man are faced with two different 
questions on which they base their hypotheses. The question of the common sense 
man is ''How do things relate to us',? In this case, how does the bouncing ball in a 
moving train relate to the man who is standing on the seemingly stationary earth? The 
scientist, however, is faced with a different question altogether. His question is ''how 
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does the sun relate to the moving planets", in this case the earth? The two are 
therefore not addressing the same question. Because of this, their hypotheses are 
equally different. The hypothesis of the common sense man is, ''The sun rises and 
sets". His judgement is based on the common sense evidence. The hypothesis of a 
scientist is, "The earth moves around the sun". His judgement is based on the 
scientifically provable assumption that ''The sun is still and it is the planets that move 
around it". This scenario looks like a case of incompatibility but, in fact, it is not. It 
only appears to be incompatible. This is because the scenario of the scientist can be 
scientifically proved, something that can be clearly demonstrated to the common 
sense man. He can be shown that, relative to the rotation of the earth, the trajectory 
will appear different; relative to the rotating earth circling the sun the trajectory will 
appear different again These different trajectories are not real, but only appear to be 
real. It can be equated to someone seeing a mirage in the distance. The scenario of the 
scientist and that of a common sense man are therefore not incompatible, but the 
problem is that the common sense man lacks adequate knowledge of the relationship 
between the sun and the planets. 
Let us extend this analysis to two people, one of whom thinks along the lines 
of pre-relativity mechanics and the other along the lines of a radical relativist. The 
pre-relativity mechanic asks the radical relativist, the one real or the one true 
trajectory of the ball The response of the radical relativist will be that the one real or 
the one true trajectory of the ball is not only unknown but there is no single real 
trajectory. That is, the question simply does not arise. It remains clear that a radical 
relativist cannot draw conclusions from the premises of a pre-relativity mechanic and 
vice versa. At this juncture, Barden takes us back to the original question of the 
source of ultimate hypothetical elements. If human knowing and (valuing) is 
understood ·as a logical system, then according to Barden we have reached an 
impasse. This is because, in the logical system itself: there is no source of these 
ultimates. Barden expands by informing us that, for example, the postulates and 
axioms in the Euclidean geometry cannot be derived within the Euclidean system 
From this exposition we can see that a logical system cannot be a solution to our 
problem of a foundation. This leaves us with no alternative but the subject-in-act. 
221 
5.2.5 Logical System Compared with a Set of Operations 
Barden has made it clear to us that, whether we like it or not, we belong to systems, 
horizons and traditions. He advises us to begin searching for a foundation from these 
systems. This is because, though we may be confmed to these systems or traditions 
practically, we are certainly not confined to them intellectually. Systems may yield 
incompatible and incommensurable propositions, definitions, postulates or axioms 
and, at the same time, the systems themselves or traditions may be incompatible or 
incommensurable. However, that is not the end of the matter. We ask ourselves, 
again, where do we find a foundation that will lead us to the understanding and 
knowing of all reality? The answer to this question provides the beginning of the 
solution to all the problems raised in Chapters Two to Four. So what is the answer? 
Barden suggests ... 
that more ultimate than logical systems, more ultimate than the ultimate 
concepts of any system, is the set of operations that generates all 
understanding, all knowledge, all systems (AP: 61). 
It is in this suggestion that we find our answer. What Barden refers to as a "set of 
operations" Lonergan, in Chapter Three, refers to as the "basic pattern of operations", 
or "transcendental method", and that is what we call the "subject-in-act." It is the 
subject-in-act who is foundational and therefore the answer to the problems related to 
the understanding and knowing reality in the final analysis. 
5.2.6 The Principle of Non-Contradiction as Foundational 
According to Barden, propositions are not naturally known. If propositions were to be 
naturally known, then there would probably be a possibility of seeking a foundation in 
them This is not possible, however, as an examination of the example below shows. 
''N othing can both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect." 
"We cannot assert that something both is and is not at the same time and in the 
same respect." 
,,~ (p & ~ p)" 
,,~ (p . ~ p)" 
''N Kp N p" 
''0 P N p" (AP: 62). 
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Here we have six sentences, but, in fact, only one proposition. It is this one 
proposition that is expressing the concept of the principle of non-contradiction. The 
proposition itself is not the principle of non- contradiction. It is only expressing the 
principle of non-contradiction. It is this proposition that, in turn, can be expressed in a 
variety and a multiplicity of sentences. 
Here the question is, what is Barden's objective in giving us the six sentences 
and what sense does he want us to make of them? We can interpret Barden' s six 
sentences as follows. First of all, we are able to recognise the first two sentences 
because we are English-speakers and because we learnt the characters which make up 
those sentences. The point is that, we do not understand them naturally, but we do 
understand them because we have learnt them For similar reasons, we are able to 
recognise the third and fourth sentences because we have learnt symbolic logic, and 
again, it is because of that that we are able to recognise and make sense out of those 
symbols and not because we know them naturally. 
In fact, some of the textbooks of formal logic give the version of the third 
sentence, while other textbooks give the version of the fourth sentence. It is possible 
that a logician who is trained in the first version will not make sense of the symbols in 
the second version and vice versa. It might be that we are unable to make sense out of 
sentences five and six, which are picked from the Lukasiewicz or Polish Logic, 
because we are neither speakers of that language nor have we learnt that notation. In 
fact, Barden challenges us with the case that, suppose a student of logic who has not 
been taught the principle of non-contradiction was asked whether he knew the 
principle of non-contradiction, it is very likely that he would not be able to answer the 
question. 
But suppose, to the same student, without mentioning the principle of non-
contradiction at all, one uttered a proposition such as, "Ireland is an island and Ireland 
is not an island" (AP: 64). The student or the listener would resist such an expression. 
Here we ask ourselves why this is the case. It will not be because the student knows 
the principle of non-contradiction in the ordinary sense of knowing and is applying 
this ordinary knowledge to the proposition, but because, as Barden puts it, the listener, 
understood in our tenm as the subject-in-act, "is the principle of non-contradiction. " 
He explains that the subject-in-act has the ability to detect and reject a contradiction. 
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This realisation agam takes us back to Wittgenstein's problem of a 
functionless metaphysical subject. We said it then and we are saying it now, that the 
subject is not a functionless metaphysical being. We join hands with Barden in saying 
that 
The principle of non-contradiction is not the object of a person's knowing; it is 
an element in the person's knowing; it is a fact that the person tends to 
coherence and consistence. A principle is a source from which something 
flows; from the principle of contradiction flows coherence. The activity that 
reveals the principle is the tendency toward coherence (AP: 65). 
Here we must say that, when seeking a foundation, we must proceed from coherence 
and not from propositions, atomic or elementary, as Wittgenstein suggested. What 
Barden is trying to say by "the principle of contradiction is not the object of a 
person's knowing" is that this principle is not intended by the subject. It is not 
something that is out there detached from the subject and which comes to the subject 
empirically, or it is not something that one learns flrst and, because of the knowledge 
and skills one has acquired, one gets to apply it to a practical situation. We must say 
that the principle is the source from which learning flows and not the consequence of 
knowing. As Barden says, "the activity that reveals the principle is the tendency 
towards coherence" (AP: 65). In other words, it is the operation and not the 
proposition that reveals the principle and it is this principle that leads to coherence. 
Barden explains that this realisation that the principle of contradiction is not 
revealed by a proposition but by an operation helps to portray a shortcoming that is 
put in place by those he terms "propositionalists." ''Propositionalists'', in discovering 
the principle of non-contradiction, flrst make the practice of knowing the object of 
their inquiry. The problem with this belief is that, once the principle of non-
contradiction has been discovered in this way, it will be expressed in a proposition To 
a "propositionalist" the proposition and the principle become one and the same thing. 
If this proposition is placed in a deductive system, for example, then it could become 
an axiom within that deductive system If it became an axiom in that system, then it 
cannot be deduced within the same system Within that system it becomes basic, that 
is neither derived nor derivable. 
In our discussion we have reached a stage where it is apparently clear that a 
proposition cannot become ultimately basic. If at this juncture we allow a proposition 
to be ultimately basic, then we go back to the problem of incompatibility and 
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incommensurability within the systems of logic and science. With this trend we end 
up right at the root of this thesis, where Wittgenstein attempts to make atomic or 
elementary propositions basic. 
Barden helps us to rescue the situation, by pointing out that the principle of 
non-contradiction is known in two distinct ways. It is known in the practice of 
knowing. In this respect it is not the object of knowledge, but it may also be known as 
an object of knowledge, or as what the enquirer is attending to. With this clarification, 
Barden presents to us with two scenarios. One is the mistaken scenario of the 
"propositionalist". This is where the principle of contradiction is regarded as the 
object of knowledge or what the inquirer is attending to. In this respect, the inquirer 
will arrive at the principle of non-contradiction through propositions, namely 
premises and conclusion From our knowledge of formal logic we know that 
conclusions are demonstrable. If this is the case, then the situation becomes 
problematic. We have just seen that an axiom that may be a proposition within a 
deductive system may not be deduced within that system. This is because, within that 
system, it happens to be basic, so the effort of the "propositionalist", of attempting to 
make the principle of contradiction basic is in vain. The other scenario, which is in 
consonance with our thesis, is where the principle of contradiction is known in the 
practice of knowing. In this respect it is neither derived nor derivable. It is known by 
itself, that is nothing else is used in coming to know it. It flows spontaneously from 
the subject and is not demonstrated through propositions as an object of knowledge. 
From our exploration we can see that there are two ways of coming to know the 
principle of non-contradiction. One of these is to make it the intended object of 
knowledge and the other is through the operation of the subject. Barden suggests that 
we may consider ourselves as coherently present to ourselves in the activity of 
knowing. In other words, we can consciously and spontaneously repudiate a 
contradiction when we are confronted with it. 
The proposition such as "Ireland is both an island and not an island", for 
example, is spontaneously rejected by the subject-in-act, as himself or herself 
intelligently and rationally at work. That makes the subject at work or the subject-in-
act, and not the proposition "Ireland is an island and not an island", the principle of 
non-contradiction. As Barden states, 
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· .. what is ultimate is a set of operations in their operation and not a set of 
propositions as known and as expressed in sentences. What is ultimate are 
operations, not propositions. The principle of contradiction is an operation 
through which we attain coherence; it is ourselves intellectually and rationally 
operating coherently. It is that operation that is ultimate. The sentence that 
expresses the proposition, that expresses the concept of the principle of non-
contradiction, as an object of knowledge, is not ultimate (AP: 66). 
5.1.7 Application of Our Ideas to the Inter-Cultural Context 
We now apply these ideas to the inter-cultural context. We need to clarify the grounds 
for arriving at truth in general, along the lines we have been suggesting. First we 
focus on the proposition. Later, in section 5.3, we mainly focus on the criteria for 
arriving at the truth. 
5.1.7.1 Truth of a Proposition and the Subject-in-Act 
We must clarify that when we talk of truth being determined by the subject-in-act we 
do not in any way imply absence of inter-subjective truth. We are not looking at truth 
in the Cartesian sense where truth exists in an individuals mind in disregard of what 
may be existing in other minds. Our contention is that if the precepts of the subject-in-
act are followed, by no matter who, it will lead to truth; hence the idea of inter-
subjective truth. 
With that clarification made we precede to ask the question, ' 'How do we get 
to the truth of a proposition?" Barden gives us three scenarios that are involved in this 
task In the first scenario, we have to establish the fact that propositions can be both 
true and false. In the second scenario, we have to establish the fact that a proposition 
can be true whether anyone knows it or not. In the third scenario, we have to 
establish the fact that a proposition can be known to be true. 
We now proceed to illustrate these scenarios, using Barden's examples. In the 
first scenario Barden gives us the example, "Pegasus is a flying horse" (AP: 76). This 
proposition could be true if Pegasus was a character in a myth. It could be false if 
Pegasus is a real horse that can fly. We illustrate the second scenario with the 
example, "Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas" (AP: 76). According to 
Barden, this proposition will be true if, and only if, Atahuallpa was the last emperor of 
the Incas. 
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This exposition takes us back to our original question, posed at the beginning 
of this sub-section, of how to get to the truth of a proposition There are three ways in 
which this can be done. The first one is through the naive correspondence theory, 
which claims that truth can be obtained from a proposition by comparing it with 
reality. Barden is of the view that this cannot be done and, where it could be possible, 
it would be redundant. 
The second approach is through Tarski's principle, which states that the 
proposition P is true if, and only if, the state of affairs P obtains. This principle helps 
to explain Barden' s second example, that is "Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the 
Incas". According to Barden, Tarski' s principle is applicable to any proposition. In 
other words, a proposition is true if, and only if, the state of affairs it asserts obtains. 
Anything contrary to this is unacceptable. He illustrates this point with the following 
examples (AP: 77): 
i. Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas, but the proposition 
"Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas" is false. 
ii. Atahuallpa was not the last emperor of the Incas, but the proposition 
"Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas" is true. 
iii. Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas, but the proposition 
"Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas" is neither true nor false. 
iv. Atahuallpa was not the last emperor of the Incas, but the proposition 
"Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas" is neither true nor false. 
v. Atahuallpa both was and was not the last emperor of the Incas. 
Propositions one to four clearly support Tarski' s principle and, if one accepts 
proposition five, then one is repudiating the principle of non-contradiction The 
relevance of Tarski ' s approach to truth lies in the fact that generally, in all traditions, 
a contradiction is unacceptable. Secondly, in almost every culture or tradition, a 
proposition is acceptable not only because it is true but also because it is known to be 
true. That is, when the state of affairs obtains. 
The third approach by which the truth can be obtained from a proposition is 
through Barden' s approach of the subject-in-act. As he puts it: 
A proposition is known to be true if the judging subject has sufficient evidence 
to come to the judgement, such and such is the case. Accordingly for me to 
know that Atahuallpa was the last emperor of the Incas requires that I (riot 
somebody else, but I) have sufficient evidence (AP: 78). 
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He emphasises that the evidence must be sufficient for him. It is him and not anybody 
else who must know, so the evidence must be sufficient for him. It is him who must 
be convinced, again not anybody else. This stage is reached when there are no further 
relevant questions to ask. 
Barden introduces a very interesting notion, which distinguishes his case from 
the position of the naive correspondence theory. He shows this in the following: 
When I grasp that the evidence is sufficient and judge that something is the 
case, then I claim that it is the case independent of my jUdging. That is I claim 
that the fact that I am convinced is not part of the evidence for the thing' s 
being the case (AP: 79). 
In this particular case, Barden is trying to differentiate two different things; one is the 
evidence itself: which must be sufficient and two, the operation of judging. What this 
means is that what leads to truth of the proposition is the operation of judging; as he 
confirms it: 
Most fundamentally, the criterion of the true judgement of fact is not reality 
that may be compared with the proposition; it is rather the enquiring and 
reasonable subject (AP: 79) 
5.2.7.2 Problem of Objective Knowledge in an Inter-Cultural Context 
At this juncture, let us recall Winch's argument in Chapter Four. Winch projects 
MacIntyre as suggesting that one cannot explain social behaviour independently of 
one's norms of rationality. This is reminiscent of Evans-Pritchard's idea that it is the 
scientific method which leads to objective truth and reality. Using examples from 
Wittgenstein' s theory of following a rule, Winch points out that it is difficult to draw 
conclusions in one context from premises drawn in another context. In other words, 
for MacIntyre to suggest that the Azande common sense practice of witchcraft cannot 
be explained by the European outside his norms of rationality, reflects that he is 
playing the European language-game. Also, Evans-Pritchard's claim, that using 
premises from the scientific method leads to objective truth, is also playing the 
scientific language-game. Both MacIntyre and Evans-Pritchard are playing their own 
language-game and following their own rule. The Azande, in consulting their oracle, 
are also playing their own language-game and following their own rule. 
Winch's idea is that before one makes a judgement about the correctness or 
incorrectness of a method within a system or a tradition, one must understand the 
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definitions, the propositions, the postulates and axioms which define, explain and 
project the true identity of that particular system or tradition. Winch is influenced here 
by Wittgenstein's idea of the language-game, where a player follows a rule as it is 
applied in common use in that particular context. By understanding the mechanisms 
and functions of how the game is played in that particular context one can learn 
something in that particular context or tradition. In a way, one will be expanding 
one' s context or horizon or tradition, without leaving it altogether. For us, or for the 
purposes of this thesis, Winch makes a very positive development, which helps to 
overcome Evans-Pritchard's tendencies of relativism, in the sense that Evans-
Pritchard regards the scientific method as the only method that can lead to objective 
truth and reality, while MacIntyre seems to be confined within the scientific tradition. 
Winch makes this point and stops at that. He does not tell us in precise terms 
how someone from the scientific tradition can learn how to play the common sense 
game like that of the Azande and how someone from the common sense tradition can 
learn how to play the scientific game, especially when the background of the two 
communities are diverse and far apart. 
In any case, we shall return to the Azande and the European traditions in a 
moment, but now let us see how Barden addresses this problem. First of all he agrees 
that contexts as systems may be incompatible or even incommensurable, with no 
means of deriving the second context from the first without introducing new 
postulates. But it might be the case that these new postulates may not fit into either 
context as a system If the definitions, propositions and postulates are different in 
either of the two contexts as systems then it is impossible to move from one context to 
another. Or if one attempts to do that then that contextual shift would be unintelligent 
and irrational. 
In this case how does a contextual shift get effected? Barden gives us the 
answer. We begin by rejecting any position that suggests the idea that a contextual 
shift must be logical. And what would be the justification for that? Barden has 
emphasised the fact that it is not the postulates of a system which are ultimate, but the 
activities of the inquirers. Concretely, Barden puts it as follows: 
The source, then, of shifting from one system to another is the enquiring 
subject who is the set of ultimate operations, that is, the enquiring subject who 
experiences, who asks about what is experienced, who understands what is 
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experienced, who asks whether the understanding is correct, who judges that it 
is or it is not, who asks what it is or what it is not, who asks what is to be 
done, who suggests possible courses of action, who wonders whether the 
possible courses of action are truly worthwhile and who decides to realise one 
of them (AP: 67). 
Here Barden solves the problem which Winch posed, which is how to shift from 
context to context. What does he say about this matter? 
... one is inclined to shift from one context to another because questions have 
occurred within one's present context that cannot be answered within it. The 
questions are present. The solutions not only are not present; they are known 
not to be available within the context ... (AP: 67). 
What we are about to discuss is a demonstration which will help us understand 
Winch' s idea offinding a common ground in different contexts, That is someone from 
one context learning something from another context. 
Before we see how Barden executes the approach of the contextual shift, we 
wish to remark that, in a way, the illustration that we are about to see helps to address 
the problem of following a rule in a particular language-game. Following a rule in one 
particular game may keep someone in a state of confinement. Something may be 
lacking in one game, which may be available in another game. 
In any case, let us see how Barden executes the approach of contextual shift. 
He explains this situation by using the analogy of the enlargement of sets of numbers 
in elementary mathematics. He proceeds as follows: A student may have knowledge 
of the basic operations of arithmetic. Namely, "+", "-", '<=:" . . . on top of that she may 
also know a set of numbers such as 1, 2, 3, 4,5, 6, 7, 8 ... (AP: 68). The student may 
have learnt that if any number in the set is added to another number the result will be 
another number in the same set. For instance, 3 + 5 = 8. The same process may be 
repeated for multiplication, subtraction and division. 
What Barden is telling us is that the set of numbers is comparable to a system 
or a horizon or a tradition, as in the case of Winch. The figures or numbers are 
comparable to propositions, postulates, or axioms. As long as these figures - or for 
that matter propositions - can be manipulated and they yield the results which are 
within the confmes of the set or a tradition, that tradition will continue to exist and 
function in its limited state. 
Comparatively, the same can be said about following a rule, as in the case of 
Wittgenstein. As long as one follows the rules of addition, subtraction, multiplication 
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and division to the letter, and as long as the numbers to be added, subtracted, 
multiplied, and divided are there, then the system will function normally. 
That said, however, there a situation might arise where a question may emerge 
whose answer cannot be found in that particular set, or for that matter, horizon or 
tradition or language-game. For instance, if a student is faced with solving a problem 
such as 5-5=? Or 4-5=? Here questions have emerged whose answers are not in the set 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 .... Here it is not only that the student cannot find the answers in 
this set, but also that the answers cannot be found in that set. 
This is precisely the situation which may emerge in a tradition or a language-
game. In a tradition, one may need to use different propositions or postulates, which 
may not be available in one' s own tradition. In a language-game, if one is to answer a 
question which cannot be answered by following the rules that are currently in use, 
then one may have to extend one's operations to another language-game that contains 
the rules, which may help to answer the new question. For instance, the student may 
shift to a less restricted set such as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 .. . . In this new set the student 
will discover that there is now an answer to his new question 5-5=? This becomes 5-
5=0. 
What is important here is that the student would not have solved the problem 
of 5-5=? if she had maintained a relativist attitude of incompatibility. Here we again 
note that the student has been able to solve her new problem by extending her interest 
to another set, without abandoning her old set of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 ... altogether. 
What Barden is suggesting, which is tantamount to what Winch suggested in Chapter 
Four, is that a student can grow intelligently in a tradition. We see her starting from a 
set whose members are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 ... She shifts to another set whose members 
are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 ... Here she has learnt something new from the new set, as 
we said, without abandoning her old set. As she grows intelligently in a tradition, 
however, she continues to be confronted with new problems, which cannot be solved 
within her own tradition if the tradition is thought of as being defined by, or restricted 
to, a finite set of axioms or basic propositions. 
There comes a time when yet new problems do emerge, even in the expanded 
new tradition, where she has learnt something whose answers cannot be found in that 
new tradition. Here the student will look to yet another tradition, which is still less 
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restricted. For instance, a student is confronted with a strange question or problem 
such as 4 - 5 = ? 
This is a new problem, or a new and strange question, which happens to be 
absent in the student's experience. The answer to this problem cannot be found in any 
one of the traditions she has encountered thus far. It is absent in the student's original 
set and it is absent in the less restricted set where the student happens to be at the 
moment. The student has to shift to yet another, less restricted, set compared to the 
previous one. This new set will be: -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1,2,3,4,5, 6, 7, 8 .. .. Again, what 
is important to note is that, though this new set solves the new problem which the 
student has encountered, it takes cognisance of the entire stock of the student's 
knowledge since she started her enquiry. This, in a way, undermines the position of 
radical relativism. 
Barden emphasises the fact that the present wealth of knowledge that is 
currently prevailing is a consequence of the immense intellectual efforts of others. In 
this case, radical relativism turns out to be more of a hindrance than a way forward. 
For instance, Barden explains, intellectual development is not fragmented; it is all-
embracing. We see a student shifting from context to context, but within the realm of 
the already-known sets of elementary mathematics. 
This endeavour of exploring within the already-known or within the present 
contexts, Barden continues to inform us, is equivalent to Kuhn's idea of "normal 
science". However, at times there emerges a need to invent new ideas altogether; this 
requires a contextual shift. This corresponds to Kuhn's idea of "revolutionary 
science." The message we are receiving from Barden is the same message we picked 
up from Winch; and that is the open door policy. Contextual or traditional 
confinement tends towards radical relativism. Radical relativism seems to have no 
place in the contemporary world, which is full of traditions which are rich in ideas and 
which can fertilize and enrich one another. However, that said, we mentioned that the 
place of Barden's ideas in this thesis is to help us solve the problems which were 
raised in the previous chapters. 
At the moment we are trying to address the problems raised by Winch in 
Chapter Four, namely of how members from one context or tradition can learn from 
members of another context, like the Europeans. It appears that what we have done so 
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far is to give further elaborations of what Winch said in Chapter Four. We seem not to 
concretely have given the actual method of how one tradition can learn from the 
other. 
Let us now explore, in concrete terms, what Barden' s reaction to this 
observation would be. He is using an ethical actor who represents anyone in any 
context or horizon or tradition He has the following to say: The ethical actor is 
brought up and lives within a tradition. At any moment the ethical actor is in their 
tradition. Because tradition is often thought of as simply something outside us 
... one' s tradition is oneself situated in the world. One may question one' s 
tradition; that is one may ask about the adequacy of one' s present context. One 
may agree or disagree. But what is ultimate in action is not the set or 
collection of more rather than less collection of ultimate propositions; what is 
ultimate is the spontaneous and unavoidable orientation toward responsible 
action (AP: 69). 
Barden told us right from the beginning that all of us originate and belong to one or 
the other tradition Indeed, at any particular moment, we are in our tradition He 
reminds us that, contrary to popular thought, tradition is not outside us, our concrete 
tradition is ourselves situated in the world. When we talk of us, we are not presenting 
ourselves as objects, which form part of the features that constitute a tradition, but 
we present ourselves as a set of operations. In fact, we are the subject-in-act, a basic 
pattern of operations or a transcendental method that handles the definitions, 
propositions, conclusions, postulates of our tradition, beginning from the self as 
aware, conscious and present to ourselves and then proceeding to other notions such 
as beliefs, practices, values and artefacts, to the attentiveness of the senses, to the 
questions of intelligence, to reasonableness of judgement and to the choice of 
responsibility. 
As we saw in Chapter Three, this is the method which works in all contexts 
and traditions, so when Winch talks of one tradition attempting to understand and 
learning from another tradition, this is the method to use. We can begin from 
ourselves as subjects and check ourselves and then proceed to our own traditions and 
check our definitions, assumptions, propositions, postulates and axioms and thereafter 
proceed to other traditions without necessarily abandoning our own, just as in the case 
of the third set of the mathematical example, which is: -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2,3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8 .... This is a set reflecting our development from the first set: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
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8 ... to the second set, which is: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 .. . and finally to the current set. 
The third set solves all the questions which have been asked, but could not be found 
in the previous two. 
When it comes to traditions we can do the same thing. The method for 
knowing all reality or all traditions is not rooted in atomic or elementary propositions, 
as Wittgenstein had suggested in Chapter Two, or any other proposition from any 
walk oflife or tradition, but it is rooted in the subject-based operations. 
So far we have seen that the subject-in-act, or transcendental method, can lead 
us to knowledge of ourselves as consciously aware selves and to ourselves as 
traditions and also to all paraphernalia of our traditions and also to all those different 
systems, contexts, horizons other than our own. The problem that we are faced with at 
this stage is that of criteria for the understanding and the knowing of reality in its 
ultimate nature. It is to these criteria that we now turn. 
5.3 Knowing and the Idea of a Horizon 
We can now expand our discussion by introducing the idea of a ' 'horizon.'' This 
notion will allow us to see how one culture can learn from another. Within a horizon 
there will always be questions that arise, but seem answered beyond that particular 
horizon (which we can not see to carry on the metaphor). This will indicate that one 
culture will normally be open to learning. It would be natural to expand one' s horizon, 
but first we need to clarify that objectivity cannot be reached by the subject positioned 
outside the object (''taking a look") - as per naive correspondence theory - nor can 
objectivity be reached by rule following. 
However we must add that common-sense people do not hold to "naive 
realism" because they do not have any distinction between ''taking a look", and other 
approaches to knowledge, in other words they just do what they do - which only a 
later, more developed culture can then turn around and say, oh you are a naive realist. 
5.3.1 Subject-in-Act: Criteria/or Knowing 
There is a tendency towards regarding what is looked at or perceived as real. That is 
what transpires in the functioning of the naive version of correspondence theory, or 
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naIve realism. NaIve realism that is commonplace among people operating largely at 
common sense level, like the Azande, seems to be the channel through which the 
understanding and knowing of all reality is attempted. This tendency to think of 
knowing as "taking a good look" is linked to empiricism and Wittgenstein' s 
positivism (the picture theory of knowledge). 
In the "picture theory of knowledge", held by the early Wittgenstein, the role 
of the subject-in-act is hidden The basic propositions are known to be true because 
they picture reality. Later, Wittgenstein repudiates this approach. There are many 
kinds of truth, he now says, each truth taking its value from what is meant in the 
context: is what is in front of me, for example, solid and smooth (the table) or is it a 
bumpy, moving collection of molecules with large empty spaces between them? 
Wittgenstein' s answer to this question is that it depends on your language-game, 
which may be a common sense game or physics game or the Azande game?" The 
question that emerges here is: are there criteria of truth that apply in both cases and 
contexts? 
In this thesis we feel that attempting to know or to reach truth through the 
naIve version of correspondence theory or naIve realism, without a criterion, cannot 
work. So the question that we are now to address is: "what is this criterion?" In this 
section we shall explore the notion of the subject-in-act or transcendental method, as 
criterion for explaining, understanding and knowing in the realms of the naive version 
of correspondence theory or naIve realism We shall use Barden's ideas in this 
exploration 
Barden tells us that 
.. .. In the naive version of correspondence theory there lurks a beguiling 
image. The image has several variants, but one of the most immediate 
appealing is the activity of comparing a pictorial representation, drawing, 
painting or photograph with its subject, in order to discover whether the 
representation looks like the original (AP: 73). 
He employs the example of the passport controller, who uses the photograph as the 
criterion against which to judge the identity of the real person being represented. 
The passport controller is faced with the question of whether the person 
standing in front of her is the same person whose photograph appears in the passport. 
The photograph is supposed to portray the truth about the person, to confrrm whether 
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that person is the real one or not. The controller is confronted with two relevant 
images; namely, the image of the real physical person, on one hand, and the image of 
the photograph representing that person, on the other. 
The image of the person is obtained by looking at her directly and the second 
by looking at the photograph. Here we are assuming that the controller is an expert in 
photograph interpretation. Gi ven this expertise, we assume that the controller does 
discern a similarity which is common to the two images. Does this discernment satisfy 
her curiosity? Does it give her the answer she is looking for? Would this serve as a 
basis for her to stamp the passport and clear the person, or does it present the ~ontrary 
to what she expected? 
At this stage the controller has not yet got the answer. Instead she is faced with 
another operative question of whether the perceived similarity constitutes enough 
evidence for the controller to make the judgement that the person now presenting the 
passport is the same person represented in the passport photograph, basing herself on 
the two pieces of evidence: namely, the image of the person and the image of the 
photograph in the passport. 
Barden reminds us of the crucial point here, which is in consonance with our 
thesis, and that is " ... neither image can be the criterion for the judgement, for images 
are simply images" (AP: 74). What the controller perceives is the similarity. This 
similarity is neither image. It is outside the two images. The similarity occurs within 
the controller. The controller uses this similarity to ascertain whether or not it 
constitutes enough evidence for her judgement. Now if we take the image of the 
person as data and the image of the photograph also as data, this perceived similarity 
becomes the third piece of data, but this third piece of data is distinct from the first 
two. The first two are external to the controller. The third is internal to the controller. 
Even though this third piece of data is distinct and internal to the perceiver, it still 
does not constitute the criterion for judgement. This is because, even with the third 
piece of evidence at his disposal, the controller will still ask whether it ~onstitutes 
enough evidence for the judgement that the person presented in the photograph is the 
same person as the one who is now presenting the passport. So where does all this 
leave us? 
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We say that the answer to the problem, as to the criterion for judgement, is, 
contrary to common belief, that it is not the person presenting the passport, it is not 
the photograph in the passport, and it is not the images of the person and the 
photograph, neither is it the similarity between the person and the photograph; the 
criterion is the subject-in-act who grasps the sufficiency of the evidence. 
The notion of grasping the sufficiency of the evidence goes a long way to 
weaken Wittgenstein' s notion of a functionless metaphysical subject. Barden shows 
us how this is the case. First he points out that the case of perceiving similarity 
between the photograph and the person it projects is more complex than merely taking 
a look Using the example of the passport controller, Barden informs us that, in his 
culture, the skill of photograph interpretation and other visual images is learnt. The 
skill that is acquired helps to make the perception of similarities rapid and habitual. In 
other words, photograph interpretation is a culturally learnt skill. The expertise of the 
controller becomes a further development and specialisation of this skill. Barden 
challenges anyone from her own culture who doubts this fact to compare two Chinese 
photographs. At times the perception between the original and photograph does not 
come out at once. This necessitates the perceiver to work her way bit by bit towards a 
hypothesis of similarity. 
Wittgenstein's idea of a functionless metaphysical subject is thus greatly 
undermined by Barden' s revelation that the ability to interpret photographs and other 
visual images is acquired through conscious learning. Barden' s idea of conscious 
learning is reminiscent of Lonergan's point - discussed in Chapter Three - of being 
attentive to the data of the senses. Being attentive to the data of the senses prepares 
one for the grasping of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is a deliberate function or an 
operation, therefore the subject is not functionless. This is because she is capable of 
working her way bit by bit towards a hypothesis of similarity in the case of comparing 
the photograph and the original. 
Again the practice of working one' s way bit by bit towards a hypothesis is an 
operation, which is tantamount to Lonergan' s idea of being intelligent. Here someone 
is subjecting the data of the senses to the intellect. The operations of being attentive to 
the data of the sense of sight, of subjecting this data to the intellect through working 
out a hypothesis bit by bit, of finally grasping the sufficiency of the evidence through 
reasonableness, exonerates the subject completely from being a functionless 
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metaphysical being in favour of being a set of dynamic operations. That means it is 
the subject who is the criterion for explaining, understanding and knowing and not 
the individual senses operating outside the metaphysical subject, as Wittgenstein's 
picture theory advocate. 
In the above example, which involves the grasping of the sufficiency of the 
evidence by the set of operations, we have tried to use the case of Barden's objections 
to the stipulations of naIve realism, or the naIve version of correspondence theory, to 
interpret Wittgenstein' s position of the functionless metaphysical subject. We are 
doing this in favour of the subject-in-act or a set of operations in operation. This 
example has shown us that it is the subject- in-act who is the criterion and not the 
intended object, as in the case of the original person and her photograph, and not the 
perceived similarity. The criterion is the grasper of the sufficiency of the evidence, 
who is the subject-in-act. 
In order to concretise the inevitability of the subject-in-act as basic to all 
contexts of knowing, Barden gives us another example, in the context of the 
correspondence theory, of how we cannot come to genuine truth or reality without 
involving the subject-in-act. In this example an institution compares the examination 
result to a set condition or a grade. In this case, entry to the university degree is 
determined by comparing the student's score to the set condition in the computer. The 
deciding subject-in-act is excluded. Instead, admission is done by the computer. The 
set condition is the score of a B grade in mathematics. A logical structure is designed 
and fed into the computer and the process proceeds as follows: "Entry iff B in 
mathematics in the examination ... Enter ifB; reject if -B" (AP: 75). Of course ''B'' is 
the minimum mark and does not preclude "A" and "A+". 
Here Barden seems to be taking us back to the place of propositions within a 
context or a system. We know that propositions within a system include postulates 
and axioms. We also know that these propositions within a context or a system can 
sometimes lead us into incompatible and incommensurate situations. Similarly, a 
proposition such as: "Enter iff B in mathematics in the examination" that is, admit the 
student if and only if he scored a B in the mathematics examination simply cannot be 
justified within the system This is because it is the grade which is being used as a 
criterion to judge the potential and ability of the student to rope with the demands of 
mathematics. The B grade is just data, which should not only be fed into the computer 
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to decide on its own the potential and ability of the student, but should also be 
subjected to the operation of intelligence. This is because the grade only satisfies the 
condition set by the institution but on its own it says little, if anything, about the 
student who is being admitted to the mathematics class. In fact, this situation raises a 
number of questions, which cannot be answered by the computer. These include the 
genuineness of the grade. For instance, "Does the student actually qualify?" or "Did 
she score the grade all by herself?" Is there no possibility that the student may have 
got the answers to the examination questions in advance? Is there no possibility that 
the student may have impersonated another student who actually scored the grade? 
There is a host of possibilities that this grade may not be accruing to the student who 
is claiming to have earned it. 
If that happens to be the case, the grade only remains a condition, and not the 
criterion, for admitting the student to the mathematics class. The computer which 
admits the student, because it is programmed to do so, cannot be the criterion either. 
This is because it cannot answer any of the simple questions asked above. In the 
previous example involving the controller, the traveller and the photograph in the 
passport, we established that the criterion for exposing the similarity between the 
photograph in the passport and the original owner of the photograph was the grasp of 
the sufficiency of the evidence. Prior to this, in the previous example, we had seen 
that the subject-in-act is actually the principle of non-contradiction. In this case, if the 
grade and the computer are not the criteria, then what is the criterion? In our case the 
criterion is the operation, which moves us from the grade to the questioning of that 
grade. 
Lonergan - as discussed in Chapter Three - would not admit the student to the 
mathematics class, a position we entirely agree with, simply because she has satisfied 
the condition set by the institution of scoring B grade in the examination. The mere 
grade would only be data that would serve as a starting point for the process that 
would eventually lead to a judgement that would finally bring the student to the 
mathematics class. This grade would be subjected to the intellect in order to answer 
the questions about the grade before the final decision to admit or not to admit, or to 
admit after a qualifying entry examination has confirmed that the grade matches the 
potential and ability of the student. 
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For our purposes, we say that we should not take conditions as criteria for the 
truth or the reality. For instance, the proposition "Entry if and only if B in the 
mathematics examination", as a minimum requirement, could lead to incompatibility 
if that condition was contradicted by the outcome of any or all of the questions about 
the genuineness of the grade, or if the outcome of the qualifying examination 
suggested otherwise. The computer cannot be the arbiter either, because it will admit 
the candidate on the basis of the formula that has been fed into it. Needless to say, a 
computer cannot account for that formula and its outcome in case of incompatibility 
that may surface at the levels of intelligence, reasonableness or judgement. It remains 
a fact that it is the subject-in-act who is the criterion for the admission of the student 
to the mathematics class. 
5.3.2 Subject-in-Act in the Provisional Horizons 
We have discussed how an individual or a system can expand from a more restricted 
to a less restricted context. We discussed this through examples picked from 
elementary mathematics. In this sub-section we introduce the idea of horizon and we 
shall look more closely at how the subject-in-act can lead to knowledge where 
horizons are provisional. We recall that Winch thought that we should try to 
understand and learn from one another. He raised the question of one tradition 
learning from another. Here Barden introduces the notion of a "provisional horizon", 
enabling us to explain this question better. 
Barden provides us with a method to solve this problem by suggesting a set of 
operations (the subject-in-act). In order to understand how positive development can 
be realised in the situation where horizons are provisional, let us recapture the 
experience where positive development, which is one tradition learning from a less 
restricted horizon, is achieved. Barden reminds us that in the Western ethical theory 
the criterion has been thought to be a set of principles conceived as propositions. He 
makes a correction here, that that is not the case. On the contrary, the criterion is not a 
proposition but a set of operations. It is the subject who asks what is to be done. It is 
the subject who moves from horizon to horizon. In the process he raises questions in a 
more restricted horizon in which answers are not found. In the end he may construct 
new horizons in which they are answered. This may go on and on making the newly 
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constructed horizons, as Barden says, only provisional. This is because, with time, 
new challenges do emerge, prompting new questions which, in turn, demand new 
horizons and the process goes on and on. This happens because the subject is 
programmed not to be confined to a particular provisional horizon If the subject were 
to be confmed to a particular provisional horizon, his movements would be greatly 
impeded, if not stopped. If her movements from one horizon to another, for one 
reason or another, were to be possible, in the absence of a criterion or a set of 
operations, her movements in the final analysis would be arbitrary and random. 
Barden calls a horizon provisional. Why? There rnight be situations where 
certain questions may not be answered in a particular horizon leading to searching for 
the answers in another horizon That may not be the end of the matter. Further 
questions may still be raised in the new horizon, and so on. This situation leads to yet 
another question and this is, is the shifting of horizons ad infinitum, or is there such a 
thing as a perfect horizon, which is beyond criticism? Here we may dare to say that 
the answer is both yes and no. However, we are not getting trapped in a contradiction 
but are preparing ourselves for a possibility of shifting from a less restricted horizon 
to a more restricted one. The horizon can reach perfection. This is not, as Barden says, 
when asking further questions is prohibited but when there are no further relevant 
questions to ask. 
We may also be tempted to state that the situation may arise where the subject 
may shift from a less restricted horizon to a more restricted horizon. Concerning this, 
Barden says. 
As there can be development of horizons, so also can there be a restriction 
from a less to a more encompassing horizon within which questions that arose 
in the former horizon no longer appear. This decline can come about through a 
refusal to act in accord with the demands within the larger horizon, followed 
by a subsequent rationalisation until the good as specified within the larger 
horizon no longer seems good. The decline can occur within the ethical 
biography of a single person, but decline, as much as development, can be 
social, so that the next generation of children are educated within the more 
restricted horizon that their parents have adopted, rather than within the larger 
horizon within which their parents were brought up but that they have 
abandoned (AP: 88). 
We can see, therefore, that questions do not only arise in a more restricted 
horizon demanding answers in a less restricted horizon, but the reverse is also true. In 
this case, knowing is not only a consequence of searching for answers in a less 
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restricted horizon but, a situation can arise where answers may be sought in a more 
restricted horizon We recall, in Chapter Four, MacIntyre's notion that we cannot 
explain social behaviour independently of our own norms of rationality. We also 
recall, in the same chapter, Evans-Pritchard ' s notion of the scientific method being the 
only method that leads to objective truth and reality. Winch objected to the two 
notions and instead advanced the idea of the possibility of one culture learning from 
another. As we have repeatedly said, however, Winch lacked the method of how his 
idea could be implemented. 
In sub-section 5.2.7.2, we put emphasis on how the subject can lead to 
searching for answers in a less restricted tradition. In this sub-section we have 
discovered that, with the possibility of horizons being provisional, the less restricted 
tradition can also seek answers in a more restricted tradition We can say that because 
the scientific method encompasses both the notions of common "Sense and theory, it is 
less restricted than the Azande' s, that is operating mainly at the level of common 
sense. By science, we mean an approach that is controlled by theory and formula Of 
course such and approach would be improbable in a situation which relies on 
witchcraft. 
We saw, however, that when it comes to the issue of a human being compared 
with the rest of the other creations or objects, the Azande ask a further question 
demanding an answer which goes beyond mere cause and effect. This is something 
worth noting by the scientific tradition. The scientific tradition, with the aid of 
transcendental method, could pick up the issue from here and try to explore whether 
or not there is any explanation beyond mere coincidence or unwelcome accident, as 
far as a human being is concerned. As we end this sub-section, we wish to reiterate 
our claim that the place of Chapter Five in this thesis is in providing solutions to 
issues raised in the previous chapters. The solution to all those issues is in the 
presence of the subject-in-act, whom we have regarded as foundational. It is to that 
aspect that we now tum. 
5.3.3 Criterion for Questioning: Foundational to all HU1lUln Beings 
In this sub-section Barden helps us to provide an answer to Winch's problem 
concerning the foundation that underlies all traditions. In Chapter Four, when 
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comparing the Azande and the European traditions, we discussed how Winch raised 
the point that every tradition is different from every other tradition. He makes it clear 
that it is not appropriate to impose one tradition on another. It was instead appropriate 
to extend one' s tradition by learning what is taking place in the other tradition. He 
uses Wittgenstein' s idea of the language-games to explain this point convincingly. 
What Winch did not give us, however - and without which the extension of 
one's standpoint from one horizon to another in order to learn what transpires there 
would be impossible - is the basic element which is common to all human beings, 
irrespective of tradition, that would facilitate these trans-cultural or trans-traditional 
movements. It is this basic element which Barden is helping us to establish in this 
sub-section. 
Barden begins by recapturing Winch's submissions on the Azande practice of 
witchcraft, which we discussed in Chapter Four. Winch uses Wittgenstein' s idea of 
the language-game, discussed in Chapter Two, to show clearly that the Azande 
practice of witchcraft means that they live in a context that is incompatible with the 
European context. Barden recaptures the Azande notion of witchcraft and compares it 
not with science but with the Europeanjudicial system. In doing so he is attempting to 
provide this common element that is missing in Winch' s submissions. This element 
would enable us to oscillate from context to context, horizon to horizon, system to 
system or tradition to tradition. Barden explains that Winch analysed Evans-
Pritchard's study of the Azande witchcraft oracle and magic in order to illustrate one 
interpretation and possible application ofWittgenstein' s theory of the language-game. 
Winch' s analysis revealed that the Azande and the Europeans were acting in two 
different worlds. The consequence of this was that what seemed rational to the 
Azande was completely irrational to the Europeans. This revealed that everyday 
reasonable behaviour was contextual. The study revealed, as Barden puts it, that 
people' s conclusions are based on certain premises, but because they act or function 
in different contexts, their conclusions or actions produce different responses. 
According to Barden, this fact is now so clear that it needs no further emphasis 
and could be recorded as an important contribution of Evans-Pritchard's study and 
Winch's analysis of this study. But for us the question still remains, if we are to 
extend our standpoint from one context to another, what is it that should enable us to 
do so? As we have said, this is what Winch fails to give us. Yet it is so vital and 
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fundamental that without it Winch's idea of one context extending its standpoint into 
another context cannot simply be implemented. 
In order to bring out this element succinctly, Barden once again uses the 
example of the Azande case of witchcraft. Returning to the example we discussed in 
Chapter Four, suppose a man was walking under his bam and it fell upon him causing 
him some bodily injury, he would immediately attribute that to witchcraft. What is 
interesting and needs our careful attention is the fact that he is not ignorant about the 
fact that the beams, which were supporting the barn, had been eaten by termites. He 
knows very well that this was the cause of the collapse of the barn. He is probably not 
bothered by this fact. The crucial question, however, which is of great concern to him, 
is the bam falls at the exact time he is walking under it. Whilst Europeans would 
attribute this happening to coincidence or unwelcome chance, the Azande would 
attribute it to witchcraft. To the Azande, what witchcraft explains is why the bam fell 
exactly at the time that the man was passing under it. This explanation is incompatible 
with the European belief and Europeans would immediately dismiss it as irrational. 
To the Azande, on the other hand, the interpretation accruing to that explanation is 
perfectly rational. Here we may say that this is one good example of contextual 
incompatibility. 
Although this is an apparent incompatibility, there is an element that is basic 
to the two contexts, that is the context of the Europeans and that of the Azande. 
Before we expose this basic element, however, let us make it clear that this unpleasant 
coincidence is a very important happening in the Azande context, irrational or 
mistaken as it may appear to Europeans. To the Azande, it is not irrational to think 
that the man had been bewitched, neither is it irrational for him to try and explain it 
using witchcraft. On the contrary, what is irrational to the Azande is to think that he 
had been bewitched and at the same time fail to explain that he had been bewitched. 
This is where Barden wonders whether this situation is any different from 
what happens in the European context. What happens, for example, when one fails to 
understand a particular event? Is it not attributed to an omnipotent and omniscient 
providence? How would this explanation be interpreted, as rational or irrational? 
Probably, according to Barden, what the Europeans have not taken seriously is the 
fact that the aspect of how to account for unpleasant coincidence is the question that 
occurs to Europeans, too. It is only the answers which are different. He points out 
244 
... there is not now, in any event, a single culturally accepted answer in 
Western culture; our answers range from providence, to astrological accounts 
of the influence of the stars, to unexplained and unexplainable chance .. . (AP: 
91-92). 
This exposition reflects the position of the Europeans in their context and the Azande 
in their context. Now what is it that is common and therefore basic to the two 
contexts? And what is it that is different and therefore keeps these contexts apart? 
And what is it that can enable one context to extend its horizon into the other context 
to learn and know what is happening there and benefit from it? 
It is the answer to the issue raised by these questions which will solve Winch' s 
problem of how one can extend one' s standpoint into another context and learn from 
them. According to Barden, what keeps these contexts separate, and apart from each 
other, is the answer to the question they ask. By now we know that answers to 
questions are contingent. They are also transitional. They are perpetually changing as 
new enquiries, researches and discoveries are made. So answers per se cannot be 
regarded as fundamental or foundational . According to Barden, it is the answers that 
make the Europeans and the Azande live in different worlds. 
That said about the answers, what about the question itself? Barden states: 
By their question they live in the sarne world. Since their question is a 
specification of questioning, by their question they reveal themselves to share 
the same operations that I have called basic (AP: 92). 
At this juncture could we say that we have finally found the answer to Winch' s 
problem? We have seen that an answer or answers are contingent. Could we say that a 
question or questions are fundamental or foundational? Before we establish what is 
really foundational in this respect, we need to make this aspect clear. If an answer or 
answers are contingent, what about a question or questions? 
We know that answers emerge out of questions. If answers are contingent is it 
not possible that questions are also contingent? We should clarify, here, that in our 
discussion we are not talking about answers or questions as being foundational. What 
is foundational and therefore a solution to Winch' s problem is the operation of asking 
questions or the operation of giving answers. This is what is common to all humanity. 
This is the only element which can make us oscillate from context to context horizon , 
to horizon or tradition to tradition. 
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What follows from this fact is the question on how this foundation enables us 
to make the oscillations. Let us now turn our attention to how this task is 
accomplished, but before that let us first go back to the issue of contexts. According 
to the Azande context it is witchcraft which accounts for unwelcome coincidences. 
We can say that this is a basic proposition to the Azande. Because it is basic it 
generates further questions. Again, we know that questions do emerge out of 
suppositions. Because of the contextual differences between the Europeans and the 
Azande, their suppositions are also different. This fact makes their further questions 
different, as well. The process of asking further questions is cumulative because it 
continues to yield further answers, which, in turn, yield further questions. This results 
in an edifice of an elaborate culture which is, according to Barden, increasingly alien 
to someone to whom the initial conditions are alien. 
This observation redirects us to our foundation. It is a fact that the Azande live 
in a different world from that of the Europeans. Because of this they playa different 
game from that of the Europeans. Although this is true, still a question does emerge, 
which is, does this fact make the Azande fundamentally different from the 
Europeans? Barden points out that this would be the case if the Azande were by 
nature confined to their answers. But it appears that there are no grounds for making 
such an assertion Another question that arises is whether or not the Azande are 
confined within their conceptual scheme? This also seems not to be the case. If it were 
to be the case, there would be no intelligibility among conceptual schemes. Moreover, 
Winch' s suggestion or idea of oscillating from one context to the other would simply 
be impossible. 
From this we conclude that there is no such a thing as being confined by 
nature and, in principle, to answers within a particular context and there is no such a 
thing as being confined within a conceptual scheme. This point is proved by the fact 
that the operation of questioning and challenging presuppositions, propositions, 
postulates, and axioms is common to all of us. It is the operation that would facilitate 
intercultural learning, understanding and knowing what transpires in different 
contexts. 
We have to reiterate the sense in which the operation of questioning is 
common to us all. On this Barden explains that 
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... questions have two sources: an empirical source and an intellectual source. 
The experiential source is our living in the world; the intellectual source is that 
we are beings who ask questions. Everyone in nature wonders and what is 
wondered about is experience. So Azande ask about unwelcome coincidence 
because unwelcome coincidence is an important feature in their lives and 
because they are human (AP: 93). 
We know that experiences are rooted in contexts. We have seen that all of us live in 
one context or other. We also know that contexts are different, but within these 
contexts there are differences, as each and every one of them is based on 
presuppositions, assumptions and axioms. 
Needless to say, questions arise in each and every context, prompted and 
motivated by changes and an ever-increasing realisation of inadequacies in these 
contexts. So all of us, no matter in which context we happen to be, ask questions. 
Living in these differentiated contexts is experiential, but the aspect of asking 
questions is intellectual. Being intellectual enables all human beings to ask questions, 
irrespective of the context in which we are based. We can therefore say that contexts 
are variables. It is the intellect - the criterion for asking questions - that is a constant. 
Because it is a constant to all human beings, therefore it is foundational to all of us. 
In this sub-section we have seen how the operation of questioning IS 
foundational to all traditions. In the following sub-section we make a comparative 
enquiry in the Azande practice of witchcraft vis-a.-vis the European judicial system. Is 
there anything common to the two systems and, if so, what is it? 
5.3.4 Inter-Cultural Enrichment: Azande Witchcraft vis-a-vis the European 
Judicial System 
This subsection deals with Winch's suggestion of inter-cultural enrichment. Winch 
made this suggestion without an accompanying method to actualise it. Is there 
anything which the Azande practice of witchcraft can offer to the European context 
and is there anything which the European system can offer to the Azande context? Let 
us explore these notions. 
The first question which the Azande asks after he has been hit by the bam is 
who has done this? Is it for certain that it could be coincidence? Barden gives the 
example of the farmer (AP: 93) who, after comparing her harvest with his neighbours, 
suspects foul play. There could be two possible reasons for the farmer's poor harvest. 
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One is that the farmer could have used inappropriate methods. If that is the case, then 
it accounts for her poor harvest and the farmer has no cause for complaint or simply 
has no case. There could be another possibility for the farmer' s poor harvest 
,however, and this could be witchcraft. If it turns out to be so, then the farmer has a 
case. Someone, somewhere must be responsible; the culprit must be found. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, the approach that will finally lead to the discovery 
of the culprit is consultation with the oracle. The system of the oracle is stratified into 
three categories: the rubbing board oracle, the chicken oracle and the prince' s chicken 
oracle. As in any culture, individuals have enemies. Some of these enemies are 
staunch enemies, while others are mild enemies. So the selection of the suspect or 
suspects is not random The farmer selects the prima facie suspect from her staunch 
enemies. At times it might be necessary to go through all the three stages before the 
culprit is found. 
The function of the consultation with the oracle leads only to the discovery of 
the culprit. It is when the question of the identity of the culprit has been sufficiently 
answered that the proper judicial question arises and that is what is owed to the 
afllicted. Generally what is owed, according to the Azande context, is not material. 
The culprit may be required to repent or effect some reconciliation with the injured 
party and perhaps make some redress. The issue of redress is less significant 
compared to the first two. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Evans-Pritchard is of the view that it is only the 
European approach which leads to objective truth and reality. It is likely that the 
Europeans will be at least disconcerted by the oracular approach of the Azande. It 
may be possible for them to accept the fact that a tort has been committed, but it is 
likely that they would not accept the method of trial by oracle. This is especially so 
after they have extended their horizon from their earlier methods, such as trial by 
ordeal, to trial by courts of law. However, we still reiterate the fact that, as Barden 
puts it, 
... the Europeans ... and the Azande are in different worlds, different horizons, 
paradigms, perspectives, conceptual schemes, language games ... (AP: 94). 
What Barden is saying is that Europeans and the Azande contextually are different. 
However, their operational framework is the same. It is the content which they handle 
that is different, as he confirms, 
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· .. structurally what the Azande try to do by their system is what we try to do 
by our system of courts. In both cases a tort gives rise to the question as to 
who is liable and, when this has been settled, to the question of what is due. In 
both cases there is a system of appeal from lower to higher adjunction and to 
an adjunction of final appeal (AP: 94). 
Barden is reiterating the fact that what the Azande do with their oracle is what the 
Europeans do with their courts of law. They may be living in different contexts -
which contexts are determined by influences. These could be their histories, exposure, 
levels of education or even psychological complexes - but the fact remains that they 
have something in common. As we have said, no matter in what context they may be, 
they are both human beings who both ask questions and both seek answers. We must 
point out that we are not turning a blind eye to the problem that they may be asking 
questions or seeking answers badly. But that is a matter to be determined by 
something else. In our case this something else is the subject-in-act. She determines 
this correctness or wrongness through the elaborate precepts of transcendental 
method, that is attending to data, subjecting it to intelligence and through 
reasonableness establishing the truth in it. In the next chapter we shall flesh out the 
frameworks of common sense, theory and interiority in the realm of culture. 
Winch talked of inter-cultural learning, which we are calling inter-cultural 
fertilisation For purposes of emphasis, we still ask the same question: is there 
anything which the European tradition could learn from the Azande? Here we can say 
that once the European court has passed judgement or established who is guilty, what 
follows immediately is the issue of compensation. The court determines what is due 
and the matter ends there. 
But given the understanding of human nature, does the matter really end 
there? This is where the Europeans may have to learn something from the Azande. 
For the Azande what is more crucial is reconciliation. To them, reconciliation is more 
important than the mere paying of damages. The real issue is the enmity between the 
culprit and the afflicted. As far as possible, this is what must be overcome. The two 
affected parties must participate in a reconciliation ritual, whatever form it might take. 
The culprit must repudiate his offence and repent and the afflicted must accept the 
culprit's repentance. 
In this particular respect, the Azande do show a greater understanding of 
human relations, compared with Europeans. Paying damages or compensation in itself 
249 
will not remove the injury, especially if the injury is a social or a psychological one. 
Compensation will not remove the guilt from the culprit if the aftlicted does not 
genuinely forgive her. The European context in emphasising damages overlooks a 
very important element in human relationships. For instance, if what is given as 
compensation is material, it will either be consumed and be finished or it will perish 
with time. With enmity, if it is not genuinely and sincerely removed it will last as long 
as the two parties last. Worse still, it might be passed on to the next generation. It is 
genuine and sincere forgiveness that will cement human relationships. 
What the Europeans could learn from the Azande is the notion of looking for 
meaning beyond accident or coincidence in respect to a human person. As we recall, 
the Europeans look at the falling barn causing bodily injury as mere accident or 
coincidence. The barn falls simply because the termites have eaten its beams. They 
stop at that. While the Azande do recognise all these facts, they try to go beyond them 
to the question of meaning. 
The Azande do believe that questions of meaning can be answered and the 
method to answer them does exist. After the Azande has been hit and injured by the 
barn she does not just shrug her shoulders and proclaim that it was merely accidental 
and that it was coincidental that it fell at the moment when the Azande was passing 
under it and then stop at that. After the ordeal, to the Azande, the question, "what does 
all this mean?", will arise. This question of meaning will not concern her alone as an 
individual but her family and her clan as well and it may even extend to humanity as a 
whole. That is not the end of the matter, the Azande have a method for answering 
questions of meaning. This method is the oracle. 
We may question the merits of this method, but that is something else, to be 
handled by the subject-in-act. The fact remains that there is a method. This method is 
parallel to the European judicial system. Here we have two methods, as manifested in 
the Europeanjudicial system and the Azande oracular system. The crucial question to 
be answered now is that of the meeting ground between the two cultures. How can the 
two cultures learn from each other? Can the two cultures engage in a dialogue? Can 
there be inter-cultural communication between and among cultures? These are the 
issues that we discuss in the next chapter. 
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We shall tackle these issues by examining the framework of "common sense", 
manifested in traditional wisdom, the framework of theory, manifested in science, and 
the framework for interiority, manifested in the subject-in-act. We show that the 
method that can effectively facilitate and finally bring about inter-cultural learning is 
to be found in the idea of the subject-in-act or interiority. We show that interiority is 
the method that is foundational to all the rest. 
5.4 Conclusion 
After seeing who the subject is and his nature in Chapter TIrree, we proceeded to 
examine how the subject-in-act operationalises or actualises the functional operations 
that lead to the understanding, the explaining and the knowing of all reality. We have 
seen how Lonergan presents his basic idea that in order to understand, explain and 
know the world in which we are living, we have first to grasp our own self-
understanding. It is our own self-understanding which provides us with a master key 
and which opens all the doors to the strong-rooms of knowledge in all aspects. The set 
of operations is the method for all methods. It is the transcendental method. This is 
only possible, however, or it can achieve this status, after undergoing the process of 
self-appropriation. 
One of the main objectives of Chapter Five has been to emphasise the 
inevitability of self-appropriation. As we saw in our discussion, a self-appropriated 
subject helped to solve Wittgenstein' s problem, that the subject is not a functionless 
metaphysical subject. Again, a self-appropriated subject helped to solve the problem 
raised by Winch of a method that would facilitate inter-cultural learning. We conclude 
this chapter by elucidating Lonergan's journey to self-appropriation. He helps us to 
conclude this chapter by giving us the wisdom in the "ideal detective story." The 
detective is given all the clues about the criminal, but he cannot spot the criminal. 
From that experience Lonergan concludes, 
... reaching the solution is not the mere apprehension of any clues not the mere 
memory of all, but a quite distinctive activity of organising intelligence that 
places the full set of clues in a unique explanatory perspective (Lonergan, 
1970: ix). 
What Lonergan is advancing, and which underlies the inevitability of the 
subject-in-act having all the clues and the facts which we need, will in itself neither 
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lead us to the understanding nor the knowledge of the case, which we might be 
pursuing. For instance, if we happen to belong to the empirical school, all we can do 
is to jumble out all these clues and facts, which we may happen to have at our 
disposal at the empirical level. This will not lead us to the knowledge which we want. 
On the other hand, if we happen to belong to the rational school then our clues and 
facts will be handled at rational level. The case holds for any school that we happen to 
belong to. In order to get to the authentic knowledge that we want, we have to follow 
the precepts of transcendental method. Lonergan's aim all along has been, as he puts 
it, to convey an insight into insight. He reminds us that, for example, mathematicians 
seek insight into sets of elements, while scientists seek insight into ranges of 
phenomena and a man of commonsense seeks insight into concrete situations and 
practical affairs. For Lonergan, the concern is focused on reaching the act of 
organising intelligence. That act brings within a single perspective knowing 
mathematics, science and any other field of knowledge. That act is the transcendental 
method. As we can see, the basic concern of the transcendental method is not learning 
mathematics as mathematicians do, or science as scientists do, or even the concrete 
and practical situations, as envisaged in commonsense. 
Here we ask ourselves a question: if that is not the concern of trans-cultural 
method, then what is its concern? As we may have gathered throughout the thesis, the 
concern of transcendental method is with the acts or operations of understanding or 
knowing mathematics, science and any other aspect of knowledge. In order to 
understand, explain and know all reality we have to begin with self-understanding, 
that is understanding of the subject-based operations or understanding ourselves as the 
basic set of operations. How do we achieve this? We achieve it through self-
appropriation. Once we understand and know the basic set of operations we will be 
led to all knowledge in the universe, together with all its contents. This includes 
knowledge of all phenomena and noumena 
Here we reiterate our stand at the beginning of this thesis, namely that formal 
logic, language-games, scientific method, or any other approach, or even a system or 
a tradition, cannot be ultimately basic or foundational for knowing reality in all 
circles. It is the subject-in-act who is the foundation and not anything else. By 
foundation we mean that while all these aspects are contingencies, it is only the 
subject-in-act who is a constant. That is to say, for example, that while the questions 
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and the answers to these questions are changing all the time, the operation of 
questioning remains a constant and therefore ultimately basic or foundational to all 
human beings. 
To crown it all, let us remind ourselves of how Barden's contribution, 
discussed in this chapter, provides us with solutions to the problems or issues raised in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four. Barden reminds us that we all belong to a tradition. A 
tradition is made up of presuppositions, assumptions, postulates or axioms. But all 
these are simply propositions. Propositions cannot be basic. What is basic is the 
principle which they express. Barden uses the example of the principle of non-
contradiction to emphasise this point. We learn from him that the subject-in-act is the 
principle and not the linguistically formulated propositions. This is why 
Wittgenstein's efforts to make propositions basic without the subject-in-act could not 
work. 
In this Chapter Five, Barden helps us to clarify the fact that although all of us 
begin within traditions they cannot be basic or foundational to the subject-in-act. 
Barden calls them provisional, that is they can be cross-fertilised and enriched by 
ideas from other traditions. It is because of this changing nature that they cannot be 
basic. The subject-in-act is foundational because he has the potential or capacity, 
which is unchanging, to study, revise and change any tradition, any system of logic or 
any language-game. 
In Chapter Three, Lonergan offers us the transcendental method as the method 
for all methods. He offers us the self-appropriated subject as the criterion to all 
understanding and all knowing. Once again it is the subject-in-act who helps us to 
actualise the subject in the traditions, or contexts or horizons. Winch, in Chapter Four, 
in his criticism of Evans-Pritchard and McIntyre, offers inter-cultural learning as an 
alternative to the glorifying of one method at the expense of other methods. In the 
process, he does not tell us how inter-cultural learning can be achieved, however. 
Barden offers us the subject-in-act as a method with which to achieve inter-cultural 






In the final chapter we attempt to draw together our argument about finding a suitable 
framework for inter-cultural learning. In other words, the general epistemological 
theory outlined in Chapter Three is applied to the inter-cultural context as discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five. We begin with a summary account of common sense 
knowledge as explained by Cronin. This is illustrated with the help of Cisternino's 
analysis of traditional African proverbs and finally with views from Masolo, Mbiti 
and other African philosophers. In order to understand the place of common sense 
knowledge in relation to science we need to look at the history in Europe of how 
philosophy of knowledge developed. But it is Lonergan's concept of self-
appropriation which can supply what is needed. Finally the chapter ends with an 
overview of the whole thesis. 
6.2 Framework of Common Sense and African Traditional Wisdom 
6.2.1 General Exposition: Cronin 
Cronin informs us that every person and every culture starts with the mentality of 
common sense. Sometimes this person or this culture remains at that level. In 
common sense there are inadequacies and it is these inadequacies that call forth 
theory. Theory attempts to solve problems of common sense. However, sooner or 
later, theory itself reveals its own inadequacies. This necessitates the intervention of 
interiority, in our terms the subject-in-act. In the usual context, "common sense" 
refers to a down-to-earth, practical, sensible attitude, or as Cronin defines it, an 
undifferentiated, practical, short-term mentality (Cronin, 1999: 25). 
Cronin gives us the characteristics of common sense in traditional cultures. 
These cultures are simple and undifferentiated or compact. Political, social, religious, 
moral, economic and practical affairs tend to intermingle and overlap. Specialised 
institutions are not yet needed. Education and socialisation are informally passed on 
in songs, ceremonies and prescribed rituals. Economic institutions comprise 
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cultivation and survival skills. Oral cultures develop languages that are rich in 
proverbs, nuance, personal relations and attention to practical details of food and 
work. However, the problem is that they lack in precision, definition, distinction and 
mathematical terms of reference or abstraction 
In these cultures the predominant reality is personal relations, that is, the 
primacy of the community, belonging to the group and identifying with the clan. 
Another characteristic is that the wider cosmos tends to be identified along the lines of 
the family, that is, the sun as the father, the moon as the mother and the stars as the 
children Symbols and myths appeal to feelings, as they are easy to remember and 
pass on. It is these symbols and myth that provide the answer to global questions 
about God, life, death, sickness, origins and destiny. 
This compactness in all areas of life does not allow clear differentiation. 
Dangerous confusions result, for example between the symbol and the symbolised, 
the image and the real, dreams and the waking consciousness, desire and fulfilment. 
In these cultures the rhythms of nature are mostly cyclical. The day, the 
month, the year, the seasons, birth and death are cyclical and one generation succeeds 
the previous generation. In these communities, life is lived harmoniously, with these 
recurrent cycles. A linear historical idea of progress is alien. The gods, the divine, the 
spirits of the ancestors, spirits of places, earth and river, all inhabit a spiritual universe 
which is very close to the physical one. Cronin informs us that religion, superstition 
and empirical thinking overlap and intermingle. He points out that a failure of a crop 
might be attributed to bad farming methods, anger of an ancestor, witchcraft of a 
jealous neighbour, punishment from God or any combination of these. 
Cronin also points out that the languages of these cultures are poor m 
expressions concerning conscience, consciousness, intention, feeling, psychic tension, 
soul, intellect and will, freedom and responsibility. The internal states are usually 
alluded to by using symbols of inference such as head, heart, breath and bowels. He 
explains that the internal tends to be projected into theophanies, conversations with 
gods, divine signs and commandments on stone. Freedom is usually understood as 
submission to fate. Their beliefs are expressed in myth and ritual and handed on from 
generation to generation. He states that these cultures were practical in a sense that the 
struggle for survival was the first priority. The environment in which they live is often 
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quite hostile. Their technologies are primitive and challenges are many (Cronin, 1999: 
26). 
However, Cronin cautions, common sense does not exclude the distinction 
between true and false, right and wrong, good and bad. These criteria are operating, 
but only implicitly, and cannot be made explicit. The criteria are operating, but not in 
all areas and not at all times. 
Cronin is of the opinion that this inadequate distinction between image and 
idea, dream and reality, the symbol and the real, results in permanent confusion For 
example, disasters were sometimes attributed to natural causes, and at other times to 
sorcery or divine punishment. It is these inadequacies that eventually call forth the 
realm of theory. 
At this juncture we must note that SCIence is multi-definitional. In our 
discussion we are talking about the scientific method which is characterised by clear 
definition of compact and undifferentiated cases, theory that is based on laboratory 
provable results and formulae that leads to the proving of tentative hypotheses. We 
are not in anyway saying that the scientific method is a monopoly of the West 
(Europe). The scientific approach manifests itself allover the globe as long as its 
criteria are fulfilled. We are not saying that the subject-in-act is a Western creation. 
The subject-in-act is an idea which manifests in its precepts. It is an approach that is 
inter-cultural as will be discussed in the subsequent sections. 
6.2.2 Bantu Proverbs: Cistern;no 
Among the Bantu, who use proverbs, and we believe even in other social groups all 
over the world, the main function of proverbs and other genres found in folklore is 
teaching and learning. Folklore, in general, and proverbs, in particular, preserve the 
wealth of wisdom of a particular social group in a particular region or adjacent or 
related regions. This wisdom is standardised and memorised through the literary 
forms of proverbs. In the majority of cases, proverbs teach about the behavioural 
values and standards of a people in a particular region. The potency of proverbs cuts 
across all ages and social classes. Proverbs are structured aesthetically in order to 
assist the memory, but their chief function is to provide wisdom. For pedagogical 
reasons, proverbs are structured in propositions. These propositions are, however, not 
257 
atomic as in Wittgenstein' s case, because one proverb may be employed for many 
objectives or purposes. 
We are introducing proverbs into our discussion because they constitute a rich 
pedagogical reservoir in the common sense framework of learning and knowing. We 
feel that their pedagogical richness is not exploited to the full, due to the lack of a 
comprehensive learning method. In that respect the wisdom in them remains largely 
unexploited. Due to the lack of a comprehensive method of extracting the rich 
wisdom in them, they remain undefined, undifferentiated and lacking in logic and 
mathematical control. So this not only limits the learning of indigenous people, but 
may also affect foreigners who may not be familiar with the social experiences of the 
community. Here we are talking about inter-cultural learning and knowing. Proverbs 
are one genre that can teach a cross-section of people from many unrelated social 
strata. Proverbs might be based on the experiences of a particular social group. 
While that may be true, however, today it is difficult to keep social groups in 
strict confinement. Every day we experience cross-border and cross-continent 
movements. These movements entail the notion of inter-cultural learning. It is the 
case that in order to fit into a particular social group, we must respect the social 
behaviour and values of that group. Proverbs are a rich reservoir of norms of 
behaviour and values. If that is the case, we feel that mere tossing of proverbs to 
people whose experiences are alien to one' s own experiences may not answer 
effectively the quest for learning and knowing. For pedagogical purposes there is a 
method which is much more involved and thorough. We propose interiority or the 
subject-in-act as that method. This is a method which is more involved and more 
comprehensive for this pwpose. Before we see how this method -can accomplish this 
mission, however, let us discuss the potency of the proverbs in their teaching mission. 
In this endeavour we are assisted by ideas from Cistemino. In his book, The 
Proverbs of Kigezi and Ankole (1980), (these are some of the Bantu regions in South 
Western Uganda), Cistemino groups the proverbs of this region into thematic 
categories. Following his index, these categories are ranked. The first category 
focuses exclusively on human behaviour. He does this probably because behaviour 
among the Bantu as in any other cultural group that is 'Still functioning largely on the 
common sense framework of knowing, is of paramount importance. 
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The second category of proverbs focuses mainly on human life and nature. 
The first category teaches about the self, work, foresight, courage, selfishness, 
laziness, incompetence, despair, prudence, patience, anti-social feelings and 
behaviour, humility, truth, friendship, co-operation, kinship, pride, faults of the 
tongue, rivalling, disobedience, justice, negligence, theft, debts, drunkenness and 
stubbornness. 
In the second category he includes proverbs that teach about the pleasant side 
of life such, as marriage, children, well-being, riches, heredity and so on. Along these, 
he also introduces proverbs that teach about the bad side of life such as fate, poverty, 
illness, illusions and death. He also introduces a category on the human being and 
nature. 
We are mentioning these categories in order to show the extent and diversity 
of knowledge available in the genre of proverbs. At the level of common sense 
framework of knowing, there is almost no area which they leave out. Proverbs are 
thus a huge reservoir for knowledge worth benefiting from, by those interested in 
inter-cultural learning. Proverbs contain substantial wisdom to benefit anyone, 
indigenous or alien 
Cisternino, interpreting the proverbs of Banyankole and Bakiga (related tribes 
m South Western Uganda), says a proverb may be understood as "a soothing 
sentence" or a "medicine phrase." In fact, among the Banyankole and Bakiga, and 
related Bantu tribes, the word "proverb" means "orufumu", which is derived from 
"omufumu" or "medicine man" So a proverb, apart from its teaching role, is in fact a 
healing proposition. He goes ahead to define the proverb as follows. 
Proverbs are standardised, short, witty, humorous statements meant to 
comment on a situation or to give light to summarise it; .. . a proverb aims at 
shedding light onto today's fact by relating it to a broader, deeper and 
traditionally accepted experience. This light is rather dim and uncertain and 
therefore embodies a halo of mystery around it. .. (Cisternino, 1980: 8). 
In this respect, the problem with proverbs that needs to be tackled is the dimness, the 
uncertainty and the halo of mystery that surround them. This problem is there because 
proverbs are lacking in definition, differentiation and logical and mathematical 
control. The effect of this shortcoming is largely the blocking of the impact of the rich 
wisdom that they contain. They lack in logical and mathematical control because they 
are not a codified set oflaws or rules or counsels. 
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These shortcomings are evident, even in many other aspects within the 
framework of common sense knowing. We can cite Mbiti ' s example of the concept of 
time in the traditional set-up, in his book, African Religions and Philosophy (1969). 
Before we come to that in the spirit of inter-cultural knowing, however, let us see 
whether there is anything which Europeans can learn from the genre of proverbs. 
It is very likely that proverbs are used more within rural set-ups, where people 
are operating mainly within the common sense framework of knowing, than with 
those operating mainly within the framework of the scientific theory of knowing, such 
as adopted by the Europeans. Because of this imbalance it is likely that there are more 
proverbs for each topic, with a greater variety of meaning and social and 
psychological analysis in them within the framework of common sense, compared to 
the framework of scientific theory. 
This does not mean, however, that it is only those within the framework of 
common sense who should continue to learn from the rich wisdom of the proverbs. 
Cisternino observes that proverbs in the rural set-up have a much more developed 
social dimension, as compared to those of the Europeans. For instance, proverbs in the 
European context may be due to a predominantly urban set-up, where everyone is on 
their own, and tend to target individuals. Take the case of proverbs on "greed." These 
will teach the individual that the vice might harm you personally. On the contrary, 
Bantu proverbs do not only target the individuals but the whole community or society 
through the individual. In this case, the teaching from the same proverbs on "greed," 
might teach the individual that, through her, "greed" might be harmful to the 
community. In other words, they focus on the general welfare of the whole 
community. Maybe this is because of the compactness of these communities. This 
scenario provides a very good lesson for Europeans, that is while teaching about 
behaviour or morality it is better to target the community rather than the individuals 
within the community. 
Another lesson that might be learnt is that Bantu proverbs never tell you 
directly what to do or what to avoid. They almost never use the imperative fonn. They 
simply tell you that ''this is what happens" and leave you to draw your own 
conclusion This is a very important trait that probably should be learnt by everybody. 
Bantu proverbs give the premises and leave you to apply your operation of reason. 
We can see that there is a lot to learn from the proverb genre, but the problem remains 
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and that is how to go about it. As we mentioned a moment ago, this problem remains, 
even in many other aspects within the common sense framework. We mentioned 
Mbiti ' s problem of the concept of time. We now turn to this aspect. 
6.2.3 African Concepts of Religion and Time in the Common Sense Framework: 
Mbiti 
On the problem of compactness, lack of defmition and differentiation, we look briefly 
at two examples presented by Mbiti (1969). The first example concerns the religious 
consciousness of common sense culture. On the relationship between the human 
person and religion, Mbiti says that the individual is always immersed in religious 
participation. It is an experience which starts from birth and continues until death. 
Therefore, for the human being to live is to be caught up in the religious drama The 
human person lives in a religious universe. As Mbiti explains: 
Both that world and practically all his activities in it are seen and experienced 
through religious understanding and meaning. Names of people have religious 
meanings in them. Rocks and boulders are not just empty objects but religious 
objects; the eclipse of the sun or moon is not simply a silent phenomenon of 
nature, but one which speaks to the community that observes it, often warning 
of an impending catastrophe. There are countless examples of this kind (Mbiti, 
1969: 15). 
This quotation is a good summary of the lack of definition and differentiation 
characteristic of the common sense framework of knowing. As we can see, the world 
of religion is one, all-embracing phenomenon, into which everything else is 
compacted. There is no clear definition of what this world is. A physical rock is not 
just a rock but also a religious one. The religious component in the rock is not 
properly defined and its nature is not given. An eclipse is a warning sign of danger. 
The proper identity of material things and abstract things is not given. A name does 
not only identify a person, but it carries a religious connotation As Mbiti says, 
examples are countless. This world is a world with no clear boundaries, if it is 
undefined and undifferentiated to people who live in it, and definitely there is no way 
inter-cultural learning and knowing can be possible. 
We consider briefly another example from Mbiti regarding time. Mbiti tell us 
that time is of little or no academic significance to African peoples in their traditional 
life. Time for them is simply, a composition of events which have occurred that is 
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events which have taken place in the past are occurring now or are to occur in the 
very near future. Events which have not taken place now, and those which are not 
likely to occur immediately, fall in the category of "no-time". The consequence of this 
as Mbiti explains, is that 
.. . according to traditional concepts, time is a two dimensional phenomena, 
with a long past, a present and virtually no future . The linear concept of time 
in Western thought, with an infinite past, present and future, is practically 
foreign to African thinking (1969: 16-17). 
As the saying goes, we are now living in a global village, where 'Control of 
events would be impossible without a clear concept of time. Inter-cultural 
communication about happenings, harmonising of activities and proper planning 
would be impossible without the mathematical divisions of the clock. No one (;an 
afford to live only in the past, the immediate present or the near future. There is need 
to have a clear concept of the distant future, for the purposes of long-term planning. 
For proper inter-cultural learning the concept of time has to be clearly defined, and 
activities and events differentiated according to standardised modes of time. These 
two brief examples from Mbiti serve to confirm Cronin's description of the typical 
scenario of the compact nature of the common sense framework of knowing. We 
extend these observations to Masolo' s expositions of the same framework. 
6.2.4 TraditionalAfrica in the Comnwn Sense Framework: Masolo 
Masolo, in his book, African Philosophy in Search of Identity (1994), gives two sides 
of Africa that is Africa before colonialism and Africa after colonialism. He projects 
the views of scholars such as Hountondji, Wiredu and Odera Oruka, among others, as 
they discuss this dichotomy. Masolo points out that, in the twentieth century, a 
revolution in many Africans' conception of the universe has been produced. This new 
view of the universe in some case has led to complete repudiation of traditional 
beliefs, systems and, in some other case, to a sharp modification of them. He points 
out that now some African thinkers claim, in his words: 
That traditional reasoning was often inexact; that its physics was moral rather 
than scientific, that is, that it was divided into good motions and bad motions, 
good causes and bad causes; that its classifications were static and were based 
on supposedly unchanging forms and essences; and finally, that its 
formulations were useless, for they gave to people no control over natural 
forces (Masolo, 1994: 194). 
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The thinking in this quotation projects the exact picture of events in the common 
sense framework of knowing. Masolo points out that the thinking in this extract can 
be traced in the ideas of Hountondji, Wiredu, and Odera Oruka He quotes Hountondji 
in his essay, "Le probleme actuel de la philosophie africaine," as saying that 
Africa is rich in its products of language (proverbs, stories, dynamic poems 
and the whole of oral literature); but this language .. . is not philosophical. 
"Scientific rigor" requires that no philosophical meaning be read into such 
linguistic forms beyond what they express or are meant to serve. Although 
they are important, many such proverbs, stories, epics, and dynamic poems do 
not necessarily have a philosophical agenda (Hountondji, in Masolo 1994: 
197). 
Hountondji introduces a very interesting idea and that is that traditional folklore only 
projects what is meant in the genre. He says that, in its theoretical implications, a 
philosophical practice supposes, above all, and by all evidence, a responsible thought, 
a theoretical effort of an individual subject and excludes by this fact any reduction to 
philosophy of a collective thought. This is a debatable position held by Hountondji. 
For our purposes, however, it still reflects the compactness of ideas within the 
common sense framework of knowing. 
Another philosopher who falls within the framework of our discussion is 
Wiredu. Masolo presents Wiredu as a more moderate thinker, compared to 
Hountondji. In Wiredu' s thinking, the European or Western scientific forms of 
knowledge, and the knowledge that is prevalent in the traditional societies, can be 
modified and reconciled. Masolo presents Wiredu, in his book, Philosophy and an 
African Culture, thinking as follows: 
For him, ethno-philosophy is essentially a system of pre-scientific or pre-
industrial folk philosophies that have no direct relevance for the modem 
African who has adopted modem patterns of living .... Living by integrating 
not only the use of modem machinery into one' s life, but also the methods and 
techniques of acquiring knowledge so characteristic of modem disciplines of 
study, including philosophy. Both are important ways of living in a modem 
world (Wiredu in Masolo, 1994: 204-205). 
What we read in Wiredu is that he does not completely reject the idea of ethno-
philosophy, but for him it is a philosophy of the past. Though that is the case, it can be 
modified in order for it to fit into the modem patterns of living. Here we can say that 
even in Wiredu we still see the problem of compactness in the common sense 
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framework of knowing. This time it is expressed through ethnophilosophy. Our 
problem with Wiredu is that he also does not tell us how the modification in 
ethnophilosophy can be effectively carried out in order for it to fit into the modem 
patterns of living. 
Odera Oruka is one of the philosophers whose views, for instance on the 
African philosophic sagacity, falls within the scope of the common sense framework 
of knowing. Masolo presents Odera Oruka, in his essay, "Sagacity in African 
Philosophy," as belonging to a group of those who think that 
... in Africa, contemporary or traditional, there were, and must still be, wise 
men and women who, despite their lack of modem and formal education, 
convey critical thinking that is essentially philosophical and distinct from the 
type of general narrative description of cultural traditions, customs and laws, 
as portrayed by the old sage ... ( Oruka in Masolo, 1994: 234). 
Odera Oruka presents something new on the debate concerning Africa philosophy. He 
sees something else which is above the wisdom in the propositions and the narrative 
in the folklore, that is the men or women who may be illiterate but are capable of 
conveying critical thinking that is essentially philosophical. He is of the view that 
philosophic sagacity should go beyond the ability to recite the lore. He suggests a 
method of how this could be achieved and that is being rationally critical. However, in 
our opinion, good as this method might be, it is not comprehensive enough, as we 
shall demonstrate in the next subsection 
Odera Oruka defines philosophic sagaCity as the reflection of a person who is 
a sage and a thinker. A sage is a person who is well versed in the wisdom and 
traditions of his people. A thinker is a person who is rationally critical and who opts 
for, or recommends, only those aspects of the beliefs and wisdom that satisfy her 
rational scrutiny. 
As we have said, we fmd Odera Oruka's approach not sufficiently 
comprehensive. For instance, he does not tell us how one goes about the task of being 
rationally critical as one navigates through the lores. He says that a philosophic sage 
recommends only those beliefs and wisdoms which satisfy her rational scrutiny. Do 
traditions comprise only beliefs and wisdom? What about practices? How does he go 
about scrutinising these beliefs and wisdoms? His approach falls short of the set of 
operations. 
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Our main aim in this subsection on the framework of knowing is not to 
critique the ideas of the authors who are helping us in our arguments, but to use their 
ideas in order to show the general trend running through the common sense 
framework of knowing. Cronin presents this framework as compact and lacking in 
definition, differentiation and control. Cisternino, in his presentation of the Bantu 
proverbs, summarises this scenario as follows: 
Why do people suffer so much at times, if they have such wealth of human 
wisdom codified in proverbs? But then I look at the Bible and at the people 
who have had it for thousands of years! .. . Both people of the Bible and Bantu 
of the proverbs share at least one thing in common: that of disregarding in 
practice the wisdom they possess in theory ... (Cisternino, 1987: 5). 
Cisternino is calling our attention to failure to apply the subject-based set of 
operations as effectively as we should. In this case all the wisdom that we have 
remains a sealed possession. 
From Mbiti' s ideas we again see the problem of lack of definition, 
differentiation and control. The world of religion, spirits or superstition in general are 
not properly defmed and differentiated from the physical world. Time is compacted 
into the past, the present and the immediate future. This situation calls for a 
comprehensive method that would help to unveil this compacted knowledge and 
wisdom so that they benefit not only those in the common sense framework, but 
through inter-cultural dialogue and other cultures as well. Before we look at how our 
method of the subject-in-act can lead to inter-cultural knowing, let us give a brief 
summary of those frameworks which seek to solve the problems of the inadequacies 
of the common sense approach, namely the framework of theory and the framework 
of interiority. 
6.3 The Framework of Theory: the European Development 
6.3.1 Needfor Theory in the Clarification of Meaning 
As we have just seen in the section above, the compactness and the 
undifferentiatedness that characterise common sense cultures tend to breed confusion 
and ambiguity. Theory comes in here in order to attend to the problems of common 
sense. These problems include lack of clarity, distinction and control. Cronin proceeds 
with showing us how different traditional cultures, individuals and groups 
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experienced a breakthrough to theory. We begin with how the Greeks experienced a 
breakthrough to logical and metaphysical thinking, then we shall explore what Cronin 
calls the threefold philosophical breakthrough to modem epistemological theory and 
thereafter we shall explore theory in the scientific revolution 
6.3.2 Greek Breakthrough to Metophys;caJ Theory 
Cronin (1999: 27) reminds us that the early Greeks had a rich mythology. At first 
critical questions were therefore directed to these myths, for instance to the gods and 
their intervention in human affairs. It did not seem reasonable and fitting for gods to 
get drunk, marry and have children. A crop of thinkers emerged who tried to find 
alternative explanations to why in the universe things happen the way they do, for 
instance, the movement of heavenly bodies, why things change to other things, how 
an element can change into another, what everything is made of These questions 
demanded different answers which were discussed and refined and resulted in 
philosophy becoming fully theoretical at the time of Aristotle. A new culture of 
defining words and meanings in grammar, rhetorics, the logic of propositions and 
arguments emerged. In these endeavours, principles, definitions and distinctions were 
clearly drawn and laid down, which later were expanded into a system of interrelated 
terms and relations. 
Cronin cites the development of geometry as a good example of shifting from 
common sense to systematic theory. This development theoretically enabled Euclid to 
apply definitions, axioms and principles to straight lines, triangles, circles and other 
plane figures and later to three-dimensional figures. Euclid proceeded by applying his 
principles, developing, expanding, exploring, deducing, testing, proving, until he 
arrived at the required conclusion. 
A question emerges here: how do all these solve the problem of common 
sense? Cronin points out that at this stage a new control of meaning emerges and 
becomes explicit, words acquire precise meanings, arguments get formulated, systems 
are set up, deductions are made, politics are differentiated from ethics, logic from 
grammar, and the practical from the theoretical. It is at this stage at which many of the 
confusions of the common sense stage are cleared up. It is now possible for one to say 
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what one means and mean what one says. It is now possible to clear up arguments by 
appealing to forms of correct argument rather than just repeating traditional beliefs. 
6.3.3 Threefold Breakthrough to Epistenwlogical Theory 
Cronin tells us that during the period of modem philosophy, philosophers began by 
rejecting the confused Scholasticism that emerged from the Middle Ages. It set up a 
system of philosophy that was independent of theology or the authority of the church. 
The three thinkers who spearheaded this move were Descartes, Hume and Kant. The 
systems of philosophy that they founded were self-sufficient, theoretical and critical 
and needed no religious beliefs but reason and sensation. The focus of their systems 
was the limits and power of human knowing. The whole of philosophy became 
confined in epistemology. 
The first thinker in the picture was Descartes, who is regarded as the father of 
modem philosophy. He believed in the power of human reason alone. He believed 
that, using reason, one could arrive at clear and certain conclusions about man, God 
and everything else. Through his methodic doubt, he eliminated all presuppositions 
and established his philosophy on indubitable foundations. He established the fact that 
the one thing which one cannot doubt is one' s existence, hence his dictum "I think 
therefore 1 am." From there he moved to the existence of God and the rest of the 
universe. Cronin tells us, 
Descartes aimed at a single integrated system incorporating philosophy, the 
empirical sciences, mathematics and medicine. He produced the theory of 
rationalism (1999: 30). 
The second in line was David Hume. He typified the theory of empiricism He 
comes in opposition to Descartes. His stand is that all knowledge is sense knowledge. 
He is of the view that there will be more certainty and less disagreement if we stick to 
the obvious observable evidence of the senses. This stand led him to the abandoning 
of metaphysics, theology and ethics. According to him, the human mind is limited in 
its capacity to acquire truth. He believed that whatever ideas we have are derived 
from sensation and are put together by laws of imagination rather than intelligence. 
The third in line was Immanuel Kant. He was of the view that both Descartes' 
and Hume's theories were extreme. He instead set to establish a synthesis of the two. 
He accepted Hume's view that our contact with the world is through sensation. It is 
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through sensation that we know phenomena But this was not the whole of knowing. 
He thought that the mind had a contribution to make. The mind constructs or imposes 
forms on reality. He showed how sensation and the mind combine in the knowing of 
sensibility, understanding and reason. He established the theory of "subjective 
idealism." This theory incorporates elements of rationalism and empiricism Cronin 
impresses upon us that each of these positions is a theory because it is systematic and 
there are principles from which it starts, it follows certain methods and observes 
certain rules of logic. 
For our purposes, the problem here, as Cronin puts it, is that each theory 
claims to be true, to be the one and only truth and is incompatible with the others. 
Though each theory manifests the advantages of the theoretical mode in having the 
coherent, systematic, precise principles and methods, according to Cronin, 
each shows the disadvantage of the theoretical in that it cannot account for itself, 
cannot deal with contrary theories, and is subject to constant revisions and changes 
(1999: 31). 
In our sense theory, because of its weaknesses, cannot provide a foundation 
for the knowing of all reality, much as common sense cannot provide a foundation 
because of its ambiguities and confusions. So far we have looked at the establishment 
of theory in terms of philosophy we shall now look at the establishment of theory in 
terms of science. 
6.3.4 Theory in the Scientific Revolution 
According to Cronin, it is during the period of the scientific revolution that theories 
rather than common sense ideas concerning the physical world emerged. Generally, 
these theories manifested five particular characteristics, namely induction, 
mathematics, measurement, technology and method Cronin (1999: 31). 
Induction. In order to produce significant data, the first scientists appealed to 
sensation and experimentation. They stopped appealing to authority figures such as 
the Church or Aristotle. These endeavours involved inductive methods of moving 
from particular observable cases to generalisations about all cases. A case in point is 
that of astronomy, where precise and long-term observations helped to establish the 
heliocentric, as opposed to geocentric, systems. 
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Mathematics. There was a remarkable development and application of 
mathematics. Geometry expanded to trigonometry, algebra and calculus. Pythagoras' 
dream of reading the world in tenns of mathematics seemed possible. Now 
mathematical correlation seemed to unlock the mysteries of how matter behaves, as 
opposed to Aristotle' s schema of four causes. 
Measurement. Although the Greeks had made tremendous breakthroughs in 
producing profound geometrical systems that were coherent, systematic, rigorous, 
deductive and brilliant, they had shown little interest in the actual measurements. It 
would not strike them to solve a problem by actually measuring or counting. So 
measuring became important for accurate observations and precise experiments and 
for useful application of inventions. A case in point is that of Galileo, in his attempt to 
measure the distance and the time traversed by falling bodies. 
Technology. It was at this time when many scientific discoveries had many 
practical applications in the making of instruments, in aiding navigation, in building 
pumps, weapons, houses and roads, to mention a few. A technology that changed the 
way people lived evolved together with the principle of verification and progress; in a 
sense that every time a new machine worked it proved the theory on which it was 
designed. At the same time it produced new situations and new data for further 
improvement. The history of the motorcar is a case in point. 
Method. According to Cronin, the early scientists attempted to solve problems 
by trial and error. They rejected philosophy and Aristotle and had no one to tell them 
what to do. Science evolved its own fonn of theories and methods, verified by 
observation and experiment. 
We have seen a movement from common sense to theory. We have also seen 
that common sense has its own problems that seem to be solved by theory. But theory 
also has its own problems, in the sense that it cannot account for itself, it cannot deal 
with contrary theories and it is subject to constant revision and change. This situation 
calls for the third framework and that is interiority. Before we look at interiority, let 
us revisit the notion of the relationship between the framework of common sense and 
that of theory, by asking: "Does theory really solve the problems of common sense?" 
Here we again draw on Cronin He summarises the answer as follows (Cronin 1999: 
32). The mentality of common sense continues with its emphasis on the practical, the 
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short-term and the lack of clear definitions and distinctions. The undifferentiated 
nature of common sense remains with its confusions where images may be more 
important than verified facts, where the way a politician presents herself on television 
may be more important than what she is in actuality, where no difference may be seen 
between a psychiatrist and a witchdoctor or the astrologer and the diviner, where 
belief in alien abductions is on a par with belief in witches changing to animals, where 
the traditional medicine man is compared to a conventional medical doctor. This 
exposition shows that theory has not adequately tackled problems of the common 
sense framework. Now we tum to our method of interiority and ask the same 
question, does interiority - subject-in-act - solve the problems of the common sense 
and theory frameworks? Our contention is that it does. But before we look at how it 
does it, let us present its summary account. We discussed interiority to some extent in 
Chapter Three, but because of its importance in this section let us briefly recapture it 
here. 
6.4 The Framework of Inteliority 
Cronin, following Lonergan, defines interiority as follows (Cronin 1999: 36). 
Interiority is not just another theory, but a theory about theories; it is not more of the 
same, but is rather a shift to a new perspective, a different approach, a total appraisal. 
It is a going beyond common sense and theory, not in the sense of negating their value 
and leaving them behind, but in the sense of appreciating their specific but limited 
contributions. 
Interiority has four characteristics. Firstly, it is characterised by awareness of 
the actual process of human intellectual knowing. It is also characterised by reflection 
on the multitude of mental activities that together constitute human knowing. 
Interiority calls for a self-knowledge, not just of our feelings and dreams, our 
motivations and character, but of the very process by which we see, hear, think, 
imagine, remember, criticise, evaluate, conclude, and judge. The main characteristic 
of interiority is to grasp the activity of human understanding; not as it happens in 
others but as it happens in oneself. Interiority is not another theory about human 
knowing; rather, it is judging of all theories about human knowing in the light of the 
data of consciousness. 
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The second characteristic of interiority is that if we grasp the activity of 
human intelligence then we understand the source of all languages, cultures, common 
sense conclusions, philosophical systems, empirical science, historical knowledge, 
mathematics and the multitude of products of human intelligence. If we can grasp the 
source of this infinite variety of products it means that we can see that they have 
something in common, they conform to a common structure, that even though they 
seem to be contradictory they can also contribute to a single goal of comprehensive 
understanding of all things in the unity of a single perspective. Nothing is beyond the 
intention of understanding; nothing can be excluded in principle. Though we cannot 
fully understand everything we can intend, desire, name, point at, move towards an 
understanding; we can grasp our desires to know and compare it with the limits of 
achievement. 
The third characteristic of interiority is awareness of how understanding 
unfolds. It reveals that there are norms that are immanent in intelligence. This is how 
the mind is designed and works. When we have reached the right conclusion we can 
know. We do not need somebody to tell us. Ultimately we do not need to depend on 
an authority, a teacher or a tradition. This is because we can attend to the data; think 
the matter through; assess the relationship between the conclusion and the evidence of 
the conclusion; ask all relevant questions; exclude all alternatives; and posit the 
conclusion as certain, highly probable or just probable. Conclusions are reasonable, 
defensible and demonstrable; they are not the result of an arbitrary choice, or of 
blindly following a tradition. We have the criteria for being authentic in our common 
sense, our theory and our interiority. 
The fourth characteristic of interiority is in the recognition that we do make 
mistakes, but we can reflect further and discover our own mistakes. Systematically we 
can investigate the typical source of misunderstandings and false judgements. We can 
notice that we did not attend to all the data. For instance, we did not read all the 
reports or we jumped to conclusions on insufficient evidence. We can recognise that 
we did not think the matter through, or realise the implications of a statement, clarify 
precisely what we meant, or delimit clearly the limits of our competence. We can also 
recognise when temperament interfered either rashly, in pushing us into premature 
conclusions, or timidly, in unreasonable hesitation in positing a conclusion. We can 
also recognise many biases, prejudices, ulterior motives, much twisted affectivity, 
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which interferes with the proper unfolding of the process of knowing. Going to the 
basic root of all misunderstanding in philosophy and science, we can recognise the 
dialectic operating in our knowing between elementary animal knowing, with its 
criteria of the real in sense, and proper human knowing, with its criteria of the real in 
correct understanding and affirmation. 
We now have the three frameworks of understanding and knowing. We have 
seen that the common sense framework has problems and so does the theory 
framework. Cronin reminds us that the advantage of theory over common sense is to 
be found in the clarity, the precision, the control that it confers through mathematics 
or logic over the field covered by its principles and method. However, the problem 
with theory is that it cannot account for itself It also cannot account for a succession 
of theories. Again, it cannot identify the criteria for choosing between conflicting 
theories. It cannot account for its own origins or compare itself with common sense. 
lbis scenario calls for something more and that is interiority. 
On the urgent need for interiority Cronin summarises as follows: 
In the mentality of common sense there is a process of discernment between 
what is true and false, what is moral and immoral, what works and what does 
not work. But the process is implicit. It is difficult to put it into words, to 
check on how it operates, to objectify the procedures to be followed; hence the 
application of this common sense discernment is haphazard and uneven. In the 
mentality of theory the procedures of discernment are stated explicitly either 
in logic or in mathematics. Enormous clarity and rigor can be attained within 
the scope of its principles, procedures and conclusions. But. .. theory is 
nevertheless incapable of giving an account of its own limitations, its relation 
to common sense, and the criteria by which we discriminate between 
conflicting theories. The crisis in classicism, contemporary philosophy and 
contemporary science seems to be rooted in the intrinsic limitations of the 
theoretical mentality. The crisis of contemporary times seems to cry out for a 
further perspective, a third stage of meaning, the realm of interiority (I 999: 
36). 
In this quotation Cronin has not minced his words in giving the summary of the 
solution to our problem of inter-cultural understanding. It is clear that we can learn 
and know within the framework of common sense. We can also learn and know 
within the framework of theory. We can learn and know within a 'Combination of the 
two frameworks, but the confusion in our knowing remains enormous. It is not until 
we have moved into the framework of interiority, in our case that of the subject-in-act, 
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that we have genuinely learnt or known. We now tum to how interiority can lead to 
inter-cultural knowing. 
6.4.1 Subject-in-Act Facilitates Inter-cultural Knowing 
We now have the three frameworks of knowing. The pre-modem period framework of 
knowing whose centre of meaning is in the common sense framework. We also have 
the modem period framework of knowing whose centre of meaning is in scientific 
theory and, finally, we have what we would like to call the present-day framework, 
whose centre of meaning is in interiority or the subject-in-act. Our task now is to 
show how a debate or a dialogue can be conducted effectively in these frameworks 
leading to inter-cultural knowing. We would like to propose the subject-in-act as a 
way forward in this development. The question that we are addressing is how do we 
get to the truth in any of these frameworks and how can someone who has been 
predominantly influenced by what takes place in one framework get to the truth in an 
alien framework? While searching for truth in a tradition or a context or a horizon, 
among other things, we mainly look at peoples' principles, beliefs, practices and 
wisdoms. The approach that we propose, which we think cuts across all frameworks 
and which we think is a way forward in this endeavour, is to be found in the idea of 
Lonergan's slogan of ''Be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable and be responsible." 
We feel that this method can work effectively in any framework one may care to 
investigate. It is comprehensive because it touches all aspects in any framework. This 
is because it invites us to be attentive or alert to data of the senses and of our 
imaginations. If we are not satisfied with the truth in them then we move to the level 
of intelligence. Here we raise and attend to the questions that have led to our 
dissatisfaction. We also look at the alternative and competing data. At this level we 
isolate all those elements which have led to our dissatisfaction and make corrections 
where we can, or call upon assistance from experts. Then we move to the level of 
reasonableness, where we establish the truth in our data, that is whether this data 
meets our expectations before we finally move to the level of responsibility, where we 
make a personal decision to take a stand. In case we make mistakes along the way 
questions will arise which will direct us to where the problem is and then we make 
further investigations. As we can see, this approach creates room for open-
mindedness and keeps prejudice and bias in the background. This is a trait that is 
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needed in inter-cultural debates or dialogues. This approach is thorough and 
comprehensive because it can be applied to all frameworks. This means, for instance, 
one can be attentive at a common sense framework, intelligent at a common sense 
framework, reasonable at a common sense framework and responsible at a common 
sense framework It is also the case that one can be alert or attentive at the theory 
framework, intelligent at the theory framework reasonable at the theory framework 
and responsible at the theory framework. Of course one can be attentive at the 
interiority framework, intelligent at the interiority framework, reasonable at the 
interiority framework and responsible at the interiority framework That said, we are 
now faced with the problem of how our method actually works. When we settle for 
the task of understanding and knowing in any tradition, context, system, or horizon, as . 
Cronin puts it, we need to understand something. That is, understanding presupposes 
something that is to be understood, no matter what it is. This could be a principle, a 
belief, a practice or wisdom. And this could be at any framework of knowing. The 
task of knowing presumes a level of presentations, of data, or of the given. It 
presupposes the level of experience, where data are given but are not yet understood. 
There must be a content to the act of understanding. We cannot talk of understanding 
unless there is something to understand. The matter to understand comes to us either 
through the medium of the senses or through our memory or through our imagination. 
Cronin calls this the first level and it is the level of direct understanding. For our 
purposes, this is the level of being alert or attentive to the data, no matter at which 
framework we may happen to be operating. This level is characterised by activities or 
a set of cognitional operations, as Cronin puts it, 
... the activities of defining, distinguishing, considering, forming hypotheses, 
classifying, identifying, explaining, relating, correlating, counting, measuring, 
calculating, supposing, conceiving .... (1999: 206). 
Needless to say, all of us possess these operations, no matter the framework at 
which we are operating. These operations can bring members from all traditions and 
cultures to a round table and get them engaged in a dialogue or a debate. 
Understandably, there may be differences emanating from our frameworks but we-can 
go around them through, for example, the operation of definition, differentiating, 
distinguishing, classifying, explaining, relating and so on. Surely any normal human 
being should be able to participate in such a dialogue. This is because all those 
operations are common to all of us. Of course, some people may not agree with 
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others, but this will be the case not because they have failed to see the truth but 
because they have chosen not to see it. 
Again, no matter at what framework we may be operating, all of us can move 
to the second level of cognitional process. The first level gives us a possible relevant 
hypothesis or a bright idea, or a set of concepts or definitions which mayor may not 
be correct. At the second level of cognitional processes we are at the level of being 
intelligent. We are weighing the evidence, checking the results, studying the link 
between the conclusion and the premises, examining reasoning and so on 
Of course here we are likely to face a challenge concerning how people from 
the common sense framework can sit at a round table with people from the theory 
framework and learn from one another. The solution here lies in the definition and 
differentiation and not necessarily in content. For example, theory understood in the 
scientific context connotes coherence, systematicity, precise principles and methods. 
This mode is not a monopoly for the Europeans. It can be learnt by anyone from any 
framework. Similarly, people from the common sense framework do formulate 
theories and hypotheses in the form of ideas. Although we can add that these theories 
are still in their rudimentary form and are not yet well developed as a system in these 
cultures, they still work for them. For instance, the Azande, in their practice of 
witchcraft, do reflect tendencies of theory and hypothesis. They accept that witches 
are capable of causing harm to others. That is their theory, which is in the form of a 
belief They also ask the question who is responsible? This leads to hypotheses. 
Finally, they ask the question is it true? They then proceed to establish the aspect of 
truth through consulting with the oracles. Whether the outcome of this process is 
acceptable or not is a matter which can lead the two opposed members to a debate. 
Since the two groups have the criterion of intelligence, this debate should lead to 
some form of understanding from both sides. 
It is this process of looking at all aspects, examining them, comparing them, 
differentiating them, associating them and harmonising them that ensures a reasonable 
conclusion This is the level that culminates in judgement, whether the aspect is true 
or not, and finally leads to a personal stand being taken. 
As we saw in the previous sub-sections, Cisternino gives the genre of proverbs 
as the source of wisdom and knowing, but he does not tell us howthis knowing can be 
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achieved. Here we say that we can extend our method of the subject-in-act into the 
genre of proverbs. We can proceed from the level of being attentive right through 
being intelligent, to being reasonable and responsible. Cronin talks of the 
compactness at the framework of common sense knowing. Again we say our method 
can open up this compactness through definition and differentiation, and through all 
the other operations which we have mentioned. Odera Oruka talks of the rational 
sage, but he does not tell us how this sage operates. We see lack of definition and 
differentiation in African religions, according to Mbiti, and in their concept of time. 
Our method through the set of operations can clarify this scenario. Cisternino' s 
approach of the proverbs can lead to knowing, but this approach is not comprehensive 
enough to cover all areas of knowing, as we have demonstrated in this sub-section. 
The same can be said about many other thinkers. All-in-all we believe and remain 
convinced that it is the idea of the subject-in-act or self-appropriation that can lead to 
inter-cultural dialogue and debate that can finally lead to inter-cultural learning and 
knowing. We will now discuss how the self-appropriated subject comes about. 
6.5 Self-Appropriated Subject 
6.5.1 Moving in There 
Contrary to the empiricist view of reality being out there and being perceived by the 
detached sense organs, Lonergan invites us to begin the journey towards self-
appropriation by «moving in there." Before we see what that means, let us explore the 
problem which motivates Lonergan to invite us to undertake this journey. In order to 
appreciate the envisaged problem fully, he begins by inviting us to appreciate the fact 
that when we pursue knowledge we pursue the unknown. This quest is not only 
conscious but it is a pursuit that is intelligent, rational, deliberate and methodical. 
From this statement, anyone would wonder how this pursuit, which is intelligent and 
methodical, would be possible when one is attempting to attain something which one 
does not know. This aspect alerts us to the fact that in the human being, there exists 
something which Lonergan calls a natural ideal of knowledge that moves her towards 
knowledge. This ideal is a tendency that is innate. That is it belongs to the human 
being by nature. It is not a facility that is acquired externally. We cannot easily 
understand its nature or what it is. Equally, we cannot understand its goals naturally or 
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naively. We have to exert conscious efforts in order to work out our conception of it 
and its goals. That makes it a formidable problem to face. Why is that so? Lonergan 
points out that several ideas of knowledge have been put in place, but found to be 
inept as ideas that would lead to knowing all reality. For instance, the ideal of pure 
reason has been criticised by Kant and contemporary scholastics. Lonergan wonders, 
if this ideal is wrong, then which one is right? By being wrong, it means that 
philosophy can no longer claim its status as a movement from self-evident, universal, 
necessary principles to equally certain conclusions. 
In our discussion throughout this thesis we encountered several ideals of 
knowledge for knowing all reality, which all turned out to be inept foundations. These 
ideals included empiricism, rationalism, subjective idealism and dialectics, to mention 
a few. It has been a fundamental problem which, throughout this thesis, we have been 
trying to solve. Our solution to this problem, as we have demonstrated, is the subject-
in-act. We have to repeat this here that we cannot fully be the subjects-in-act unless 
we have completed the process of self-appropriation A moment ago we said that if 
we want to claim our position in the universe as human beings who are different from 
other creations, self-appropriation is a process which all of us have no choice but to 
undergo. We have to join hands with Lonergan, respond to his call and undertake this 
journey, but before we do that we have to understand what this journey is all about or 
what it involves. It is to that explanation that we now turn. 
Self-appropriation involves the perfection of the ideal of knowledge. Once this 
ideal is perfected, it will lead us to the correct search of the unknown. The ideal, for 
which we are searching, is conceptually implicit. Lonergan points out 
.. . . There does not exist naturally, spontaneously, throughout the whole of 
history, a set of operations, conceptions, and definitions that define the ideal of 
knowledge (Lonergan, 1990: 14). 
However, we may say that, where they exist, they are historically or environmentally 
conditioned. If this is the case, then they are not adequate enough to give the identity 
of the ideal of knowledge. Lonergan gives us the true identity of the ideal of 
knowledge. "The ideal of knowledge is myself as intelligent, as asking questions, as 
requiring intelligible answers." (I 990: 14). 
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The question of our concern now is, how do we begin the journey to self-
appropriation? We begin this journey by "moving in there" - not in the Cartesian 
sense though - that is, 
... to move into the subject as intelligent - asking questions; as having insights 
- being able to fonn concepts; as weighing the evidence - being able to 
judge ... in there the ideal is functionally operative prior to its being made 
explicit in judgements, concepts and words. Moving in there is self-
appropriation ... reaching what is prepredictive, preconceptual, prejudicial ... it 
is moving from ontology, which is the logos, the world about being, to the 
on tic, which is what one is (1990: 14-15). 
Here we can say that moving in there is tantamount to looking in there, though not in 
the ocular sense, which Wittgenstein and the empirical school try to propose. Below 
Lonergan uses the term "presence" to illustrate what is understood by looking in 
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understood. For instance, it is possible to say that the chairs are present in the room, 
but it would not be possible to say that the chairs are present to the room, or the room 
is present to the chairs. Being present to, which is the second sense of presence, 
cannot be used in order to relate to the objects that are not conscious of one another. 
Presence in the second sense can be used to relate to animals, for instance a dog 
seeing another dog across the road and crossing over. In this example the term 
"present" can be used in the second sense. The dog is present to the other dog, or the 
dogs are present to each other. This second sense of present is different from the first, 
because the second sense of present presupposes consciousness. However, there is a 
third sense of presence, which is our direct concern. This is the sense which concerns 
the subject, which explains what is meant by self-appropriation, begins by looking in 
there. My being present to someone and someone being present to me is not the same 
thing as the chairs being present in the room The third sense of present is ~ 
someone cannot be present to me without me being present to myself This third sense 
of presence is again different from the second sense of presence. For instance, if I 
were unconscious someone would not be present to me and if someone was 
unconscious I would not be present to her, so the third sense of presence is the 
presence to oneself. In a nutshell, the presence of the chairs in the room is a physical, 
material presence. This sense of presence is different from the presence of two objects 
being present to each other, for example a dog being present to another dog. In the 
third sense, the person has to be present to herself first, in order for others to be 
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present to her. This is the presence which is of importance in the process of self-
appropriation. Someone is there but she is also present to herself Self-appropriation 
involves this third presence. 
Our task now is to see how it is achieved. As Lonergan expresses it, is not 
achieved by craning one' s neck to see what is inside oneself, neither is it achieved by 
turning oneself inside out in order to look at oneself Even if this was possible, it 
would still be being present to oneself in the second sense. In other words, in order to 
have yourself to yourself, you will have to be out there first, looking at yourself This 
type of looking is the empirical type. It is only a step in the process of self-
appropriation. As Lonergan states, 
What is important, in other words, is the looker, not the looked at, even when 
the self is what is looked at. So it is not a matter of introspection in any special 
sense, in any sense of "looking back into," because what counts · is not the 
presence of what is looked at but the presence of the subject that looks, even 
when he is looking at himself (1990: 16). 
To explain the main idea in the above quotation, Lonergan uses the example of 
a teacher in class. In a lecture room students are empirically conscious. However, 
depending on what is going on in the class, the teacher can tell by the mere looks on 
the students' faces whether what she is teaching them is penetrating, or whether they 
are finding it dull. If what the teacher is saying is getting through, then the 
consciousness goes beyond the mere physical to the intellectual or intelligent 
consciousness. What is happening is that the students are probably catching on or 
understanding; or they are trying to, but are still puzzled. That is what is regarded as 
intellectual consciousness or presence. Then there is the third level, which is the level 
of reflection. This is when the student is judging whether what she is trying to 
understand or what she has understood is true or false. Once the student is satisfied 
that she has got the idea properly and it is a true idea, then she moves to the fourth 
level, which is rational self-consciousness. That is the final level along the journey of 
self-appropriation. At this level the student's rational reflection is about herself It is 
the stage when she asks herself whether what she is doing is right or wrong. This is 
where rational reflection is concerned with her own action. Lonergan summarises this 
journey of moving in on oneself, as follows : 
It is not a matter of looking back into yourself, because it is not what you look 
at but the looking that counts. But it is not just the looking; it is not being 
entirely absorbed in the other object; rather, it is adverting to the fact that, 
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when you are absorbed in the object, you are also present to yourself. If you 
were not, it would not count. If there were no one there to see, that to whom 
other things are present, that which must be present to itself for other beings to 
be present to it, is not necessarily there. He or she is intelligent, rational, and 
rationally self-conscious (1990: 16-17). 
Self-appropriation is thus a series of operations ranging from empirical experiences, 
or being empirically conscious, through to intellectual experiences or being 
intellectually conscious, that is trying to understand what one is confronted with, to 
being rationally conscious or the level at which one is trying to establish whether what 
one has understood is true or false and finally to the level where one takes personal 
responsibility for the rightness or wrongness of one's actions and that is the level of 
rational self-consciousness. What we are learning from this exposition is that 
understanding all reality begins with self-understanding. Understanding all reality 
involves engaging the operations of the subject-in-act. The subject-in-act, through the 
precepts of transcendental method, can dialogue in all cultures, hence learning from 
them. We now proceed with an overview of the entire thesis. 
6.6 Foundation for a Multi-cultural Context: Overview 
In this thesis we have presented an argument that it is the subject-in-act who is 
ultimately basic or foundational for knowing in its final analysis and not formal logic 
or any other system or tradition. The thesis has been presented in six chapters. In the 
introductory chapter we have the major problem that served as a motivation that led 
us into conducting this research. We have given the major assumption that underlies 
the entire thesis. It this assumption which has revealed the solution to our major 
problem. We have also given the scope of our investigations, as reflected in the cited 
references. The purpose for including references for each chapter in the introduction 
is to provide an on-the-spot check This is because the bibliography simply provides 
references, irrespective of the chapters concerned. 
Our major problem was that formal logic, or any other system or tradition, was 
not ultimately basic or foundational for learning in all respects. What is foundational 
is the subject-in-act. We have demonstrated that this anomaly originated from the 
early Wittgenstein, who purported that formal logic formed an ideal language that 
could reflect all reality, as he understood it. Formal logic could not be foundational to 
knowing in all respects because of its failure to show clearly its link with 
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epistemology. We have argued that the link between fonnallogic and epistemology is 
the subject- in-act. This is an agent who functions both in logic and epistemology. The 
agent uses fonnal logic as a step in that direction We have demonstrated that the 
subject-in-act is the architect of formal logic. So logic cannot be ultimately basic or 
foundational to her. 
Our assumption has been that fonnallogic has to be placed in its context. This 
context is the subject-in-act. It is this subject-in-act who is ultimately basic or 
foundational for the understanding, explaining and knowing reality in any system or 
tradition. The subject-in-act wonders, asks questions and is critical of her suggested 
interpretations. Concretely it is the subject-in-act, engaged in the practical act of 
reasoning, who underlies all logic, all systems and all traditions. It is the subject-in-act 
who leads to inter-cultural learning. 
In our argument to this effect we have looked at the views presented in the 
early and later Wittgenstein. In his early thought he attempted to find an ideal 
language. He identified this language in atomic or elementary propositions. He 
structured these propositions into logical fonn and it is this fonn that reflected all 
reality, as he understood it. He developed this fonn into the picture theory. A picture 
was supposed to agree or disagree with reality. This agreement or disagreement 
determined truth or falsity, correctness or incorrectness, in short, all reality. In his 
presentation we saw Wittgenstein moving from objects to things, to states of affairs or 
facts, to pictorial fonn, to thought, and he ends in deductive reasoning. Our biggest 
quarrel with Wittgenstein is his failure to give the agent of fonnallogic, in our case 
the subject-in-act, a functional role (2.1.3). 
We have been helped by Hudson to clarify what Wittgenstein's views in his 
early thought were all about. Wittgenstein was of the view that the meaning of 
language was its referent, or that language was truth functional. An object could be 
identified either verbally or by pointing. Language involved meaning. Language had 
to refer to an object and the object had to be determinate. Because names carried 
meaning, objects had to be named and an atomic proposition contained a nexus of 
names. These names were simple signs. It is these simple signs that fonned the atomic 
proposition Because they were meaningful the atomic proposition had to be 
meaningful and it is in that sense that it became ultimately basic to knowing. Formal 
logic is such that it presents structures that comprise variables and constants. Names 
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or simple objects are variables, while connectives are constants simply because 
connectives do not name objects, but simply link together the simple signs or the 
atomic propositions (2.2.3). After seeing Hudson's clarification, we proceeded to 
examine what went wrong in Wittgenstein's early thought. His position was that all 
misunderstandings in philosophy could be wiped out if facts could be expressed in 
atomic propositions. This is because atomic propositions would eliminate the 
problems of ambiguity. While this may be true, we have argued that there is need for 
criteria to determine the presence or absence of ambiguity. We have also agued that 
the meaning of a proposition may be determined by circumstances and conditions. 
The shift in these could lead to change of meaning in the proposition (2.2.5). 
Wittgenstein was of the view that objective truth could be reached through logical 
calculus, which could describe the world fully. Our view on this has been that 
attempting to describe the world fully through logical calculus would be separating 
logic from semantics. This was not a correct endeavour, because logical calculus 
would project the formal objective reality. It would have no room for the informal 
reality or the reality of particulars. Between objective reality projected by forma1logic 
and the reality of the particulars, there is the subject-in-act, who participates in both 
realities (2.2.5.2). We have noted the problem created by Wittgenstein when he 
attempted to separate the set of cognitional operations from their context. In talking 
about clarity of thought, he was actually talking about the thinking subject. It was not 
correct for him to say, at the same time, that there is no such thing as a thinking 
subject. We have noted that the subject is not only a metaphysical being but also 
functional in the activity of knowing (2.2.5.3). In this respect we have shown how 
Wittgenstein' s idea of the subject-less formal logic, or the picture theory, does not 
work. We have also shown that logical symbolism and prose language do not 
necessarily agree. This disagreement does not, in the real sense of the word, reflect 
reality in its final analysis. We have seen that logic is not capable of looking after 
itself without the subject-in-act. We have also shown that it was a serious mistake for 
Wittgenstein to regard the subject-in-act as a metaphysical being without a functional 
role in the knowable world (2.2.6). 
In his later thought we have seen Wittgenstein abandoning his former stand of 
having an ideal language - formal logic - that would picture and reflect reality in all 
departments of knowing. We have seen him placing language in a social context. We 
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have discussed his idea of knowing through following a rule in the language-game. 
Even in his later thoughts, it is Hudson who has helped us to clarify Wittgenstein' s 
thoughts. We have seen Wittgenstein exposing the defects in his early thought. 
Referring a word to its referent becomes confounding the meaning of a name and the 
bearer of a name. This position is now rejected. He also rejects his idea of a one-one 
representation between the simples of a language and reality. His new stand now is 
that analysing a language into atomic propositions does not make the meaning clearer. 
He rejects the idea of the picture theory that, in order for a proposition to have sense, 
it must have an absolute determinate sense. He has now posited his stand in the fact 
that a proposition fmds meaning in the use in which it is put (2.3.1). Hudson has 
helped us to clarify terms in Wittgenstein' s new stand. Now knowing involves 
learning what meaning is, the object being named, and the action that is required in 
the process of naming. It is this that makes language part of an activity or a form of 
life. In order to accomplish this fact, training is required (2.3.2). We have seen how 
language relates to reality. It is a fact that reality is made up of things, facts and events 
each aspect having its own language-game; that game can only be played by 
following its rules. These rules must be followed without explanation because 
explanations do tum out to be endless. Following a rule is a social practice. Rules 
should be understood as they are applied in their social context. We have argued that, 
while Wittgenstein' s stand may be acceptable for us, there should be a difference 
between accepting the beliefs and practices laid down by society and understanding. 
Understanding involves the cognitional set of operations. This is the inevitable fact 
which Wittgenstein does not bring out clearly. There is no aspect of understanding, in 
whatever language-game, that can escape these operations (2.3.3-2.3.5). We have 
discussed the relevance of the subject-in-act in the language-games. We have 
recaptured Wittgenstein' s term that language is a labyrinth of paths. In order for us to 
be able to sort out these paths and fmd direction we have to apply the cognitional set 
of operations. Following a rule, in itself, is not enough. Rules must be formulated and 
reformulated, their relevance constantly assessed. It is the subject-in-act who can 
accomplish this task (2.3.6). 
We have posited our foundation in the subject in Chapter Three. Cronin has 
assisted us in setting the problem of the lack of a trans-cultural philosophy. This had 
been the case because of the scenario of fragmenting philosophy. It became difficult 
283 
to establish a foundation in these fragments. We have seen that, in the past, it was 
possible for a particular society to establish a foundation. This was because societies 
then were simple and unsophisticated, but given the complexity and sophistication 
prevalent in societies today, society can no longer provide a foundation. We have also 
pointed out that science has solved many empirical problems, but when it comes to 
the aspect of human values, science has done very little. We also saw that science is 
incapable of accounting for its own success. Society and science could thus not 
provide us with a foundation that is ultimate. Our argument has been that the locus of 
a foundation that is ultimate is the subject. We have been invited to join in the task of 
self-discovery. Self-discovery will lead us to self-understanding and therefore self-
knowing. From self-knowing we proceed to knowing everything else (3.1.1). We have 
seen that Lonergan, in Insight, characterises the problem of lack of a foundation as a 
crisis of knowledge. The solution is located in having insight into insight or insight 
into oversight, that is understanding what there is to understand and why people run 
away from understanding. In InSight, he invites us to join in, in the task of self-
appropriation. We saw that Insight is not presented as an argument. It is a programme 
that presupposes readers. It invites us to focus on our inner intelligence and 
reasonableness. In this respect, we do not only focus on the activity of knowing but 
also on the fact of what it is to know. We are not to focus only on disciplines such as 
mathematics, science and humanities, but also to penetrate our inner dynamism of 
intelligent enquiry and critical reflection. We also saw that we could not find a 
foundation in the aspects of knowledge such as mathematics, science and the like, but 
in our own cognitional operations. The aspect of knowledge only provides a scheme 
for our cognitional operations. In order to understand this scheme we must first of all 
apply the cognitional set of operations. In our quest we have looked for a method that 
will integrate the content of knowledge and the knower. This foundation knows both 
the aspects of knowledge and the knowing subject. It, in effect, solves the crisis of 
knowledge (3.1.2). 
In our argument we have shown that the main reason for not having a 
foundation so far is that the subject has hitherto been neglected. It had not dawned 
upon us that it is self-knowing that precedes all kinds of knowing. Philosophers have 
been engaged in the search for truth, as evidenced in empiricism and rationalism. 
What had not been recognised is the fact that, in order to reach truth, the cognitional 
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set of operations is an absolute necessity. We also noted that the focusing on the 
dualism of the body and soul has also engaged the attention of philosophers. This 
trend therefore deprived the subject of the opportunity to focus on herself and 
appropriate herself. The overall consequence of this has been self-ignorance and, in 
some cases, has led to the conclusion that there is no such a thing as the subject. We 
have argued that, through self-appropriation, efforts should be made to establish the 
nature of the cognitional operations of the subject. This is the knowledge that leads to 
all other types of knowing (3.2.1). We have presented the foundational nature of the 
subject in the knowing activity. Human knowing is a complexity of different 
operations. The subject is neither immanent nor partly hidden. We have also shown 
that the activity of knowing involves self-transcendence. This involves the act of 
knowing and at the same time being aware that one is actually knowing. In other 
words, being the subject involves being an integrated whole. The subject should not 
be regarded as merely immanent, or merely the soul or merely the body. The subject 
is a conscious being, present to herself both in the data of the senses and the data of 
consciousness. We have shown that the subject of our thesis is different from the 
neglected and truncated subject. She is characterised by a movement from the data of 
the senses to the data of intelligence to the judgement and to responsibility. Ours is a 
complete process that ensures knowing in objective terms (3.2.2). 
We have shown the composition and description of the basic pattern of 
operations. We possess the operations of the senses and the operations of the mind. 
This is the edifice of the subject-based method. We have also shown the relationship 
between the subject and the object. This involves the perceiving subject and the object 
being perceived. We saw that the subject is the operator who voluntarily operates 
consciously. Because of the fact that the perceiving subject intends the perceived 
object, that makes the perceiving subject basic to the perceived object. We also saw 
that their relationship is psychological rather than mechanical. This is because a 
mechanical operation functions on mechanical rules, while the subject functions on 
conscious operations, that is she functions consciously and intentionally. We have 
discussed fully the four levels of cognitional operations: these being the empirical, the 
intellectual, the rational and the responsible. Their relationship is that they work in 
close collaboration with a conscious dynamism running across them: all of them being 
conscious and intentional. The movement is such that questions emerging from 
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enquiry help to organise data into intelligible wholes. We noted that the level of 
inquiry is more challenging than the empirical one. Conflicting alternatives are sorted 
out at this level, leading to appropriate judgement. This is done in order to ensure that 
before we commit ourselves at the level of judgement we have to ensure that the 
selected alternative is truly true. We have shown that the cognitional set of operations 
move progressively in an interlocking manner from the empirical level to the 
intellectual level, where alternative and competing data are sorted out, up to the more 
challenging level of depositing a judgement that finally leads to a responsible choice 
(3.3.1). We have shown that the subject-based set of operations is not only a method 
but also a transcendental one. It is a method because of its nonnative pattern of 
recurrent and related operations that yield cumulative and progressive results. It is 
transcendental because its results are not limited categorially to some particular field 
or subject. We saw that it is transcendental because its precepts are present in all of us 
and no one can function without them (3.3.2). We have reiterated that transcendental 
method is a rock to build on. This is because of its characteristics. These include 
presupposition of intellectual curiosity, together with a striving to understand and to 
know. It also presupposes critical reflection, responsibility, truth or falsity in the 
propositions and conclusions being drawn. We have shown that, in this method, 
operations are not arrived at in isolation There is unity of consciousness at any level 
of cognitional operation. The cognitional operations are clearly distinguishable as we 
move from sense through to judgement and responsibility. In this processes anomalies 
are isolated. Transcendental method is neither hypothetical nor susceptible to change. 
We saw that it is only data that changes and not the operations. So any attempt to 
reject transcendental method is tantamount to self-rejection (3.3.3). We have shown 
that transcendental method is functionally useful to all other methods. It sets a 
standard for all of them. It operates in such a way that anomalies experienced at sense 
level can be resolved at the intellect level and the process proceeds through 
reasonable and responsible levels. This method is systematic in a sense that it 
constructs the elementary acts of knowing into compound knowing and the 
elementary objects of knowing into compound objects of knowing, thus ensuring 
continuity, something that is desirable for all methods. We saw that it also executes a 
heuristic function This is a method that leads the prospective knower into the 
unknown until she reaches the knowledge world. This is done through the precepts of 
transcendental method. We saw that ,since no method escapes the precepts of 
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transcendental method of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible, 
transcendental method brings all the other methods to harmony, thus transcending all 
of them (3.3.4). 
We have used ideas from commentators to help us argue our case. Cronin has 
reminded us that the reason why we do not have a foundation to all knowing is 
attributed to the attempt to locate this foundation in the wrong places. He helped us to 
locate this foundation in interiority or self-appropriation. Shutte concurred with 
Lonergan and described his method as capable of touching all areas of knowing. He 
helped us to show that this method is self-assembling and self-constituting. Shutte 
described the knower as conscious, intelligent and rational. Because of his description 
of the subject-in-act as conscious and self-assembling he helped us to bring the crux 
of the matter of our argument to the fore. He also reminded us that the subject-in-act 
is self-corrective. We have been trying to identify a method that is not only 
comprehensive but also self-corrective. TIlls is the sort of method that Shutte is 
advocating. In addition to Shutte' s views, Giddy has helped us to project Lonergan' s 
ideas as integrative, or as heightening the presence to self. Lonergan' s ideas do not 
presuppose the dualism of the subject and object. TIlls fact helped us to clarify the 
empiricist position that knowing was through scientific objectivity achieved by 
eliminating subjective elements. His argument, that the empiricist and rationalist stand 
are lopsided, helped us to exalt transcendental method as all-inclusive and 
comprehensive. Using the precepts of transcendental method, Giddy stretched into the 
realm of behaviour. His argument was that there is no excuse for misbehaviour under 
the guise of being determined. TIlls is because the actor has the potential to correct 
herself through the precepts of transcendental method. He also stressed the idea of 
self-understanding as leading to the understanding of everything else, or knowing in 
the ultimate sense (3.4). 
We have extended our thinking to belief. Over the years, knowledge has been 
accumulated by experts and distinguished scholars. High-tech instruments have been 
designed and put in place. Libraries and museums are filled with information from all 
walks of life. We have been implored to believe in the knowledge that is prevalent in 
these sources. It would not be necessary to verify each and every piece of knowledge 
ourselves before accepting it as true. However, belief in this sense should not conflict 
with judgement in the Lonergan sense. Belief is based on trust of expertise and 
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scholarship, while judgement is based on the precepts of transcendental method. 
However, we are advised to resort to the precepts of transcendental method in the case 
of conflict (3 .5.1). In order to emphasise our position on the transcendence of 
transcendental method, we made an attempt to compare it with the scientific method. 
We saw that the scientific method is based on hypothesis, theory and experimentation 
It functions on set rules, logic and precision Logic ensures accuracy, excellence and 
continuity. It also applies non-logical procedure that ensures advancement. lbis is in 
order, but our argument has been that science does not lead us to all departments of 
knowledge, as stipulated by the precepts of transcendental method. It starts us off on 
the journey to all knowing but it does not take it to its logical conclusion. lbis is 
because it does not recognise the subject. Failure to do so leaves science at the 
empiricist position and, as we have discussed, this is not comprehensive enough to 
lead to knowing in all spheres (3.5.2-3 .5.3). 
In Chapter Four we addressed the problem of incompatibility among cultures. 
We looked at what we called the European culture, following the scientific approach, 
and the Azande culture, following the oracular approach. We tried to address the 
question concerning whether there was any method that would lead to mutual 
comprehension between the two cultures. We also tried to see if it was possible for 
each of the two cultures to learn something from each other. To discuss these issues 
we were assisted by Winch (4.1). 
We looked specifically at the idea of rationality being relative to culture. 
Winch helped us in this respect. We saw that the Azande do not only believe in 
oracular revelation but also believe that some of their members are capable of 
exercising a malignant occult influence on the lives of their fellow members. This was 
a point of incomprehensibility between the Europeans and the Azande. According to 
Winch, a social anthropologist such as Evans-Pritchard attempting to interpret the 
way of life of the Azande faced the problem of understanding them and of convincing 
fellow Europeans, who followed the scientific norms of rationality. Such a European 
was likely to suffer from an attitudinal problem because of the cultural ties of her 
tradition. Winch described both the European approach and that of the Azande as 
logical and remained opposed to Evans-Pritchard's stand that it was the European 
approach that led to objective truth and reality. On the issue of independent reality, 
Winch remained convinced that the check for independent reality was not peculiar to 
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science. To him reality was contextual. He gave the example of the reality of God as 
being comprehended in the religious context or tradition. Winch presented the reality 
of witchcraft as forming the very foundation of the social life of the Azande. They are 
entangled in their beliefs and practices. So it is difficult for the European to 
comprehend this structure using her own norms. We looked specifically at the fact 
concerning whether or not the oracular approach made sense to the Azande, especially 
given the contradictions that are evident in it. The contradictions in the Azande 
system are seen from the point of view of scientific theory. This is the level at which 
the Europeans are operating. The Azande, however, are operating at common sense 
level and these are two levels which are incompatible. We saw that what made sense 
to the Europeans did not necessarily make sense to the Azande. Because of this 
contextual difference, the oracular approach did make sense to the Azande. Because 
of these cultural differences, we saw Winch in full support of following the idea of the 
language-games. The European should play their own language-game and the Azande 
theirs. Should the Europeans want to play the Azande language-game, they should 
learn its rules and social use first. According to Winch, the European norms of 
rationality are not a finite set. Learning should come through training and not 
adhering to one' s norms. It is not correct to take the scientific approach or norms of 
rationality as a paradigm by which to compare other systems or traditions. The 
Azande way of life should not be looked at in terms of the European way of life. We 
made it clear that what we are faced with is a clear case of cultural relativism. Winch, 
Evans-Pritchard, MacIntyre and Horton are only engaged in an academic exercise of 
attack and counter-attack, defence and counter-defence, with none of them helping us 
out of the situation. It was Barden, through his idea of the set of operations, that 
helped us extricate ourselves from these squabbles (4.2). 
In addition to Winch, we were assisted by ideas from commentators. Barden, 
discussing Winch, raised the issue of whether there are meanings behind accidents, as 
Azande purport, or whether accidents are mere coincidence, as Europeans purport. He 
also broUght out the issue of cultural relativism and therefore incompatibility between 
cultures due to contextual differences. Unlike Winch, who suggested inter-cultural 
learning without a method for doing so, Barden provided a method - the basic set of 
operations - that helped us to circumvent the problem of cultural relativism. We 
looked at the impasse between MacIntyre and Winch. Winch maintained the position 
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that in order for the Europeans to interpret the Azande way of life, they had to follow 
the Azande nonns of rationality, while MacIntyre maintained the position that it 
would be impossible for the European to interpret the Azande way of life outside the 
European's nonns of rationality. We reached the situation where the Europeans could 
not play the Azande game because the oracular approach appeared irrational to them. 
And because the Azande game appeared incompatible with the Europeans, the 
Azande could not play the European game. Again, using Barden's approach of the set 
of operations, we circumvented this problem. Along the same lines, we saw Horton 
defending Evans-Pritchard and MacIntyre against Winch, as regarding Winch's idea 
of translational understanding and mystical thinking. Winch's position was that in 
order to understand utterances made in an alien culture, one should first try to 
understand the point that these utterances have for them. These utterances must first 
of all be placed in the social context from which they arise. It is only after that that 
one will be in position to say which utterances associated with one' s conceptual 
systems are appropriate translational instruments. Horton had a problem with this 
position Horton, at the same time, seemed to have problems with Winch' s insistence 
of not imposing one' s nonns of rationality on an alien culture. On the issue of 
mystical thinking, Horton interprets it as spiritualistic and therefore presents Evans-
Pritchard' s scientific approach as a model to emulate. We saw that all these are 
problems that can be overcome by the subject-in-act (4.3). 
After a discussion on how we can learn from other cultures, we crowned the 
chapter by identifying the relevance of Winch' s ideas to the whole project (4.4). 
In Chapter Five we looked at how Barden came to our rescue. He gave us the 
idea that intercultural learning begins in a tradition, more specifically one's own 
tradition. We discussed the idea of the coherence of traditions, cultures and systems 
and the idea of how we arrive at truth in inter-cultural debate. We also noted that 
knowing is always knowing against a tradition. We do not choose where to be born 
but where we end is our choice. We are born with the potential to shape our destiny. 
This potential is the criterion that helps us to judge whether what we are learning is 
true or false. In this chapter, we moved from purely cognitive to the realm of 
behaviour. We did this by recapturing the Azande and their oracular system and the 
European judicial system We showed that, though the two systems may be 
addressing different content, they nevertheless run side-by-side with each other. We 
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saw that they both have a method of approach. They may differ on the outcome of 
their judicial practice, but that is the purpose of our cognitional set of operations. The 
operators in the two systems both have this set of cognitional operations that can 
enable them to harmonise their differences (5.1- 5.1.1.3). 
We discussed the fact that the subject-in-act is not only born in a tradition but, 
more profoundly, that is what she is. We also noted that traditions are not necessarily 
systematic. Traditional wisdom is translated into propositions, postulates and axioms 
that later turn into general guidelines for that tradition. For our purposes we saw that 
this scenario is nothing more than data for the subject-in-act to operate upon. We saw 
that traditions and systems are different. This meant that propositions, postulates and 
axioms in these traditions are also different. Needless to say, these differences led to 
incompatibility in these traditions and systems. What is cardinal is that this 
incompatibility is only apparent in practice and not in principle. This makes it 
vulnerable to the subject-in-act. We looked at the way out from the confines of 
traditions, contexts, logical systems and horizons. This attempt came as a result of 
radical revisions. To help us out of this we discussed Einstein's shift to relative 
mechanics because of the inconsistencies among the propositions of electro mechanics 
and mechanics. We saw that there exists the possibility of incoherence among the 
propositions of science that could lead to the possibility of lack of understanding of 
the logical systems or the traditions or the horizons in which they might be 
functioning, with the consequence of unreliability in knowledge. In this respect we 
argued that propositions, or postulates or axioms on their own, could not lead us to 
reliable knowing. There is a need for the subject-in-act to direct them. We also 
discussed the aspect of what appears to be real at common sense level and noted that 
the situation could be explained by the subject-in-act. We also looked at the principle 
of non-contradiction. We saw that the principle of non-contradiction is not a 
proposition. It is not learnt first before it is applied. This principle is a criterion that is 
innate. We are programmed by nature to recognise a contradiction when it occurs. It 
need not first be expressed in a proposition. This principle is an operation and not a 
proposition. Because it is an operation, therefore it leads to coherence. We saw that 
coherence is vital in the activity of knowing. It is at this point at which we made an 
attempt to flesh out the idea of interculturalleaming in the inter-cultural contexts. We 
first focused on how we arrive at truth of a proposition and then focused on the 
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criterion for truth. We first recaptured our major contributors, who included 
Wittgenstein, Lonergan, Winch, Evans-Pritchard, MacIntyre and Barden, and looked 
more specifically at their respective contributions in their traditions and systems. 
Wittgenstein' s ideas were the formation of an ideal language, formal logic that would 
picture all reality. This language was meant to be foundational to all knowing; and 
following a rule in the language-games in a given social context. Either way, a 
functional subject-in-act was not given a clear role to play. Lonergan provided a 
foundation to all knowing in the idea of self-appropriation. We agreed entirely with 
this position Evans-Pritchard took the position that it was only the scientific approach 
that could lead to objective truth and reality. Winch did not agree with that position, 
and in addition, he contributed the idea of inter-cultural learning. His view was that in 
order to comprehend and interpret social behaviour of an alien tradition one had to 
learn their way of life first. MacIntyre encountered problems with that view and his 
stance become that it was difficult to interpret an alien way of life outside one' s 
norms of rationality. That scenario plunged us deep into cultural relativism. We were 
exalted by Barden, following Lonergan, with his idea of the set of operations or the 
subject-in-act. Barden helped us to demonstrate that the subject-in-act did not only 
understand her culture and the systems therein but transcended it. This is not all. She 
extends her own horizon into other cultures and systems and can learn from the new 
horizons, traditions and systems. It is through this procedure that the idea of inter-
cultural learning can be actualised (5 .2.7.2). 
We specifically looked at the criteria for arriving at truth. To help us in this, 
we referred to the naIve version of correspondence theory. This is a theory that 
functions mainly at common sense level. According to this theory, truth is simply 
reached by "taking a good look" This is evident in empiricism and Wittgenstein's 
positivism in the picture theory of knowledge. We saw that in the picture theory the 
role of the subject is hidden Truth is seen in the atomic proposition. Later it becomes 
contextual, due to many language-games, rules and uses. We saw truth being 
established in the subject-in-act, who happened to be the ·grasper of the sufficiency of 
the evidence. We discovered that horizons could be provisional. This was because 
new questions keep on emerging, demanding answers that cannot be found in our 
current horizon. This calls for a shift in horizons in search of new answers. We also 
noted that horizons are a two-way traffic. We do not only seek answers in a less 
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restricted horizon, but the time comes when we seek answers in a more restricted 
horizon. We noted that a horizon could reach perfection, when there is no more 
relevant questions to ask. By recapturing both the Azande and the European 
traditions, we noted that members in both traditions do possess a capacity to ask 
questions. This capacity is neither an exclusive possession of the Azande nor of the 
Europeans. It is an endowment that is common to all of us. We also saw that the 
questions and answers of both the Azande and the Europeans are contingent. We 
established that it is only the capacity, or the endowment, that is actualised into an 
operation for asking questions that is a constant for all human beings. Because of its 
being a constant it becomes the only facilitator for inter-cultural learning. We posited 
it as the solution to Winch's problem of inter-cultural learning or knowing. Since we 
are all born with this endowment - the set of cognitional operations - all of us can 
engage in dialogue that would lead to mutually acceptable answers and if some people 
do not recognise the mutually derived answers it will be because they have chosen not 
to recognise them and not because of inherent differences. (5.3.1- 5.3 .4). 
Chapter Six concluded our discussion, with a further application of the method 
for inter-cultural learning. We did this by applying it to the frameworks of inter-
cultural learning. These included the common sense framework We say that this 
framework is characterised by compactness where activities intermingle and overlap. 
We looked at specific cases which included proverbs with their pedagogical potential, 
religious experiences and the concept of time in the common sense framework and 
how philosophy has been interpreted before and after the colonial experiences. We 
established the fact that answers to questions raised in the common sense framework 
could be found in the theory framework This is because the theory framework is 
characterised by rules, precision, systematicity, coherence, logic and control. It 
became evident, however, that theory also had its own weaknesses, such as failure to 
account for itself, failure to deal with contrary theories and the problem of being 
constantly subjected to revisions and changes. We came to the stage where it was 
evident that, though the framework of theory could explain some of the issues in the 
common sense framework, because of its weaknesses it could not be established as a 
foundation for inter-cultural learning. That necessitated a call for another framework, 
which is interiority or the cognitional set of operations or subject-in-act. We saw that, 
through its precepts of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible, it 
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qualified as being comprehensive enough to facilitate the pedagogical call for inter-
cultural learning. We addressed more specifically the issue of whether, traditions, 
such as those of the Azande and other traditions, could actually reach the level of 
interiority. To answer this question, we looked at how the Greeks went about 
questioning their rich mythology. This was the beginning of a journey towards clarity 
and differentiation We saw how philosophers during the modem period came up 
more succinctly with the theories of rationalism and empiricism. This demonstration 
shows that even traditions like those of the Azande, and all those which fall into the 
same category, could reach the framework of interiority (6.1.1-6.1.3). 
However, that would not be possible until the Azande and all those who are 
still operating largely at the common sense framework, all those who are still 
operating largely at the theory framework and all of us have heeded Lonergan's call in 
Insight to undergo the process of self-appropriation or interiority. We must, first of 
all, be present to ourselves before anybody else can be present to us. We must know 
ourselves in the Lonergan sense, before we can know anything else in any tradition or 
system. We established that it is a prerequisite that we must first undertake the 
journey to self-knowledge as conscious, intelligent, reasonable and responsible 
knowers. This is the move that would make us ultimately basic or foundational for all 
knowing. It is after accomplishing this move that we could proceed to inter-cultural 
knowing. We established that through the cognitional set of operations, or the subject-
in-act, we could move towards knowing reality in its final analysis in all traditions 
and systems. European and African social anthropologists, and philosophers such as 
Wittgenstein, Lonergan, Winch, MacIntyre, Evans-Pritchard, Horton, Shutte, Giddy, 
Mbiti, Wiredu, Masolo and Odera Oruka, would come to a round table to solve the 
problem of inter-cultural knowing, once and for all. If that could be achieved, then we 
say that we have completed the mission that this thesis set out to accomplish (6.1.4). 
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